FOREWORD

A handbook for NLRB trial examiners or administrative law judges has existed in various forms since the earliest days of the National Labor Relations Act. The Bench Book was first published in 2001, and has been updated periodically since. Judge Jeffrey Wedekind has served as its editor since 2010.

The Bench Book is designed to provide NLRB judges with a reference guide during unfair labor practice (ULP) hearings when other resources may not be readily available. However, it is also a useful tool for all trial practitioners before the Board. It sets forth Board precedent and other rulings and authorities on certain recurring procedural and evidentiary issues that may arise during the hearing. It is not a digest of substantive law. Nor should it be cited as precedent, or be considered a substitute for issue-specific research. A good source for such research is the NLRB’s Classification Outline and Index (also known as CITENET, the Board’s website search database of Board cases) particularly in Chapter 596 “Procedure in ULP Proceedings,” in Chapter 737 “Evidence,” and in Chapter 700 “General Legal Principles.”

The basic sources that govern Board ULP hearings are the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Board’s Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure, and Board decisions. The Board also applies, so far as practicable, the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), and frequently seeks guidance from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). All citations in the Bench Book to the Board’s Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure, the FRE, and the FRCP have been updated to reflect the most recent amendments. Thus, this updated edition of the Bench Book incorporates the relevant changes made by the new procedural rules published by the Board in February and September 2017. See 82 FR 11748-01 (Feb. 24, 2017); 82 FR 43695 (Sept. 19, 2017); and 82 FR 43697 (Sept. 19, 2017). It also incorporates the amendments to FRE 902 regarding the self-authentication of electronic records or data, which became effective Dec. 1, 2017.

The Bench Book includes references to unpublished Board orders, unappealed administrative law judges’ decisions, and other Board documents that are not binding precedent. It also includes citations to some of the two-Member Board decisions that issued from January 1, 2008–March 29, 2010, and the recess-Board decisions that issued from January 4, 2012–August 4, 2013. These decisions, which are marked with an asterisk (*), lack precedential weight and should be cited, if at all, with caution, unless they have been reaffirmed. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010) (holding that the two-Member Board lacked authority to issue its decision in that case); and NLRB v. Noel Canning, --- U.S. ---, 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014) (holding that the appointments of Members Sharon Block, Richard Griffin, and Terence Flynn during a 3-day intrasession recess were invalid). However, they may provide useful guidance in evaluating similar issues and factual situations.

A search of the Bench Book can be performed by pressing the “Ctrl” and “F” keys together and typing the search word(s) in the box.

Robert A. Giannasi
Chief Administrative Law Judge
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CHAPTER 1. MODEL STATEMENTS, ORDERS, AND OATHS

§ 1–100 Opening Statement by Judge

The following is a suggested opening statement:

The hearing will be in order. This is a formal trial before the National Labor Relations Board in ___________________, Case __________. [If consolidated with an objections-to-election case, add: "consolidated with Case__________ for hearing on objections to election."]

The administrative law judge presiding is _________________. I am assigned to the _____________ office of the Division of Judges. Any communications should be addressed to that office, and any requests for extensions of time should be addressed to the [Chief Judge or Deputy or Associate Chief Judge] in that office.

Will counsel and other representatives of the parties please state their appearances for the record. For the General Counsel . . . [the Charging Party] . . . [the Respondent].

If settlement discussions are desired at any time during the trial, I will be glad to grant a reasonable recess for that purpose. Trial developments sometimes change attitudes and make settlement possible. Accordingly, I am advising you now, before I have heard any of the testimony, that I intend to offer opportunity for settlement discussions at two specific stages of the trial: first, at the conclusion of the General Counsel's case and, second, at the conclusion of the trial. If by inadvertence I overlook the matter, please call it to my attention.

I invite you to bear in mind, as the trial proceeds, that opportunities for discussion of settlement will be available at all times on request.

Mr./Ms. _______________ [the General Counsel's attorney] please introduce the pleadings and other formal papers. I will dispose of any preliminary motions after those are in evidence.

The judge may also want to ask if the appearance sheet is completed.

§ 1–200 Closing Statement by Judge

The following is a suggested closing statement:

I will prepare and file with the Board my decision in this proceeding. A copy will be served on each of the parties.

You are reminded to refer to the Board’s Rules and Regulations for information regarding the filing of briefs and proposed findings for my consideration, and regarding procedures before the Board after the issuance of a judge's decision.
Now that all the evidence is in, you have a better opportunity to assess your chances regarding the outcome of the issues than you had at the outset of the trial. All parties should carefully weigh the risks entailed and decide whether an amicable settlement of the issues might not offer a more satisfactory solution. Settlement may be arranged now or at any time before I issue my decision.

I will allow until [date no more than 35 days from the close of the trial] for the filing of briefs and any proposed findings and conclusions. Briefs should be filed directly with the Judges Division office in ______________, regardless of whether they are mailed or e-filed. See Sections 102.2–102.5 of the Board’s Rules for filing and service requirements.

Any request for an extension of time for the filing of briefs must be made in writing to the [Chief Judge or Deputy or Associate Chief Judge] in that office and served on the other parties. The positions of the other parties regarding the extension should be obtained and set forth in the request. It is the policy of the Division of Judges to grant discretionary extensions only when they are clearly justified. Requests for extensions must contain specific reasons and show that the requesting party cannot reasonably meet the current deadline.

There being nothing further, the hearing is now closed. Off the record.

§ 1–300  **Sequestration Order**

A full discussion of Board precedent with respect to separating, excluding, or sequestering witnesses is set forth in **CHAPTER 11, Sequestration of Witnesses,** below. The following is a model sequestration order set forth in *Greyhound Lines*, 319 NLRB 554 (1995):

Counsel has invoked a rule requiring that the witnesses be sequestered. This means that all persons who are going to testify in this proceeding, with specific exceptions that I will tell you about, may only be present in the hearing room when they are giving testimony.

The exceptions are alleged discriminatees, natural persons who are parties, representatives of non-natural parties, and a person who is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party’s cause. They may remain in the hearing room even if they are going to testify, or have testified. However, alleged discriminatees, including charging parties, may not remain in the hearing room when other witnesses on behalf of the General Counsel or the charging party are giving testimony [regarding] events as to which the alleged discriminatees will be expected to testify.

The rule also means that from this point on until the hearing is finally closed, no witness may discuss with other potential witnesses either the testimony that they have given or that they intend to give. The best way to avoid any problems is simply not to discuss the case with any other potential witness until after the hearing is completed.

Under the rule as applied by the Board, with one exception, counsel for a party may not in any manner, including the showing of transcripts, inform a
witness about the content of the testimony given by a preceding witness, without express permission of the administrative law judge. The exception is that counsel for a party may inform the counsel’s own witness of the content of testimony, including the showing of transcripts, given by a witness for the opposing side to prepare for rebuttal of such testimony.

I expect counsel to police the rule and to bring any violation of it to my attention immediately. It is the obligation of counsel to inform potential witnesses who are not now present in the hearing room of their obligations under the rule.

It is also recommended that witnesses be reminded as they leave the witness stand that they are not to discuss their testimony with any other witness or potential witness until the hearing is completed.

The following is a shortened version of the *Greyhound* order:

A sequestration order is being issued in this proceeding. This means that all persons who expect to be called as witnesses in this proceeding, other than a person designated as essential to the presentation of a party’s case, will be required to remain outside the courtroom whenever testimony or other proceedings are taking place.

A limited exception applies to witnesses who are alleged discriminatees in this matter. They may be present in the courtroom at all times, other than when witnesses for the General Counsel or a charging party are giving testimony regarding the same events that the alleged discriminatees are expected to testify about.

The sequestration order also prohibits all witnesses from discussing with any other witness or possible witness the testimony they have already given or will give.

Likewise, counsel for a party may not disclose to any witness the testimony of any other witness. Counsel may, however, inform his/her own witness of the content of testimony given by any opposing party’s witness to prepare to rebut that testimony.

It is counsel’s responsibility to make sure that they and their witnesses comply with this sequestration rule.

The judge should also ask each party to identify on the record the person designated as essential to the presentation of that party’s case.

§ 1–400  Witness Oath

Examination is under oath. NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.30. The oath should be administered to each witness in a manner calculated to impress the witness with the duty to testify truthfully.

A solemn affirmation instead of an oath is acceptable. See FRE 603 and FRCP Rule 43(b). If a witness is unwilling to either swear or affirm on the basis of religious conviction, any
formula of words that can reasonably be construed as a promise or undertaking to testify truthfully will suffice. See *Union Starch & Refining Co.*, 82 NLRB 495, 496 (1949); and *Ferguson v. C.I.R.*, 921 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1991). But see *Gordon v. State of Idaho*, 778 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1985) (witnesses need not “swear” or “affirm” or raise their right hand, but their alternative statement must indicate that they understand they can be prosecuted for perjury for failing to tell the truth, i.e. that they are testifying under penalty of perjury).

A party that will be calling a witness it knows is unwilling to swear or affirm should bring this to the judge’s attention before the oath is administered.

The traditional oath is:

> Do you swear that your testimony in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

A typical affirmation substitutes “affirm” for “swear” and omits “so help you God” or any similar religious reference:

> Do you affirm that your testimony at this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Some judges add or substitute a reference that a witness may be prosecuted for perjury for failing to tell the truth. For example:

> Do you swear or affirm, under penalty of perjury, that your testimony in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth [so help you God]?

Following the oath or affirmation, the witness should be asked to give his/her name to the court reporter, and to spell it if necessary.

§ 1–500  **Interpreter’s Oath**

The following is a suggested interpreter’s oath:

> Do you solemnly swear that you are fluent in both English and [foreign language] and that you will truthfully and accurately interpret and translate, to the best of your skill and understanding, the questions asked of the witnesses and their answers in this proceeding?
CHAPTER 2. THE TRIAL JUDGE

§ 2–100 Designation

Section 102.15 of the Board’s Rules states that the complaint shall contain “a notice of hearing before an administrative law judge.” Similarly, Section 101.10(a) of the Board’s Statements of Procedure states that a “designated administrative law judge presides over the hearing.”

The administrative law judge is designated by the Chief Judge or Deputy or Associate Chief Judge in the appropriate office, “as the case may be.” NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.34. The designation “is a matter for administrative determination by the Board with which the parties have no concern.” East Texas Steel Castings Co., 116 NLRB 1336, 1337 (1956), enfd. 255 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1958).

§ 2–200 Ex Parte Communications

§ 2–210 Basic Prohibition

Once designated, the judge is prohibited from ex parte communication with any of the parties to the proceeding. NLRB Rules and Regulations, Secs. 102.126 and 102.128(e). Nor shall any person “knowingly and willfully solicit the making of an unauthorized ex parte communication by any other person.” Sec. 102.131.

An ex parte communication is any “oral or written communication not on the public record with respect to which reasonable prior notice to all parties is not given.” Sec. 102.127(b). See also Sec. 102.129. The prohibition continues “until the issues are finally resolved by the Board.” Sec. 102.128.

Even communications with the judge regarding inadvertent errors in a judge’s decision may be considered improper if the errors are substantive. See Wilco Business Forms, 280 NLRB 1336 n. 2 (1986) (representative of the General Counsel notified an Associate Chief Judge of the omission of two employees’ names from the decision’s list of laid off employees, prompting the deciding judge to issue an errata adding the names). See also Today’s Man, 263 NLRB 332, 333 n. 3 (1982) (Board’s Executive Secretary treated as a prohibited ex parte communication a letter from the respondent’s counsel to the judge requesting deletion of certain language from the judge’s decision).

§ 2–220 Exceptions to Basic Prohibition

Not every off-the-record communication between the judge and the parties is prohibited. Section 102.130 of the Board’s Rules lists a number of ex parte communications that are permitted. These include:

Communications regarding matters that a judge is authorized to handle ex parte (Sec. 102.130(a)). This includes applications for subpoenas. NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.31(a); and Blake Construction Co., 245 NLRB 630 n. 1 (1979), enfd. in part 663 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Thus, a party may submit a subpoena application to a judge outside the presence of other parties and without serving them with a copy of the application.
Communications regarding the status of a proceeding (Sec. 102.130(b)). See, e.g., Care Manor of Farmington, 314 NLRB 248 n. 2 (1994) (judge did not make an improper ex parte communication by calling counsel for the General Counsel to advise that he would be presiding and to request that counsel notify the respondent’s counsel of that fact, as there was no evidence that a prohibited topic was discussed).

Communications which all parties agree, or which the judge formally rules, may be made ex parte (Sec. 102.130(c)). See, e.g., Kendick Engineering, 244 NLRB 989 n. 2 (1979) (rejecting respondent’s claim that the judge improperly had an ex parte off-the-record conversation with the General Counsel during the trial, as the conversation occurred with respondent’s assent).

Communications proposing settlement or agreement for disposition of any or all issues (Sec. 102.130(d)). See, e.g., Sanford Home for Adults, 253 NLRB 1132 n. 1 (1981) (judge did not engage in improper ex parte communication by meeting privately with counsel for the General Counsel and the Regional Director to discuss settlement possibilities, as there was no evidence that the conversation, which occurred with respondent’s knowledge on the heels of a settlement discussion with all parties, in any way involved the merits of the complaint allegations), enfd. 669 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1981); and Sumo Airlines, 317 NLRB 383 n. 1 (1995) (judge’s alleged statement to the discriminatees about a pending settlement offer did not constitute an improper ex parte communication, as there was no evidence that the communication in any way involved the merits of the complaint allegations).

Communications between the trial judge and fellow judges. Although not specifically listed in rule 102.130, it is also permissible for the trial judge to consult with fellow judges concerning a legal or procedural issue in a case. See Pioneer Hotel, Inc. v. NLRB, 182 F.3d 939, 944 and n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In that case, the court rejected the respondent’s contention that the ALJ engaged in an improper ex parte communication by consulting with a colleague on the correct procedure for handling a motion to amend the complaint to add a new allegation. The court noted that 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(A) and Section 102.126 of the Board’s Rules only prohibit communications with “interested person[s] outside the Agency,” and that 5 U.S.C. § 554((d)(1) only prohibits communications with “a person or party on a fact in issue.”

See also Rule 2.9(A)(3) of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2011 Edition), which states: “A judge may consult with court staff and court officials whose functions are to aid the judge in carrying out the judge’s adjudicative responsibilities, or with other judges, provided the judge makes reasonable efforts to avoid receiving factual information that is not part of the record, and does not abrogate the responsibility personally to decide the matter.”

§ 2–230 Procedure When Prohibited Communication Received

Oral communications. If the communication is oral, the judge should refuse to listen, inform the communicator of the prohibition, and advise the communicator to put what he or she has to say in writing, with copies to all parties. If the communication was completed, the judge should prepare a memorandum stating its substance, place it “on the public record of the proceeding,” and serve copies “on all other parties to the proceeding and on the attorneys of record for the parties.” NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.132(a) and (b).
Written communications. If the communication is written, the judge should place it “on the public record of the proceeding,” and serve copies “on all other parties to the proceeding and on the attorneys of record for the parties.” Ibid.

In both situations, parties have 14 days after the judge has served the copies to file with the judge and serve on all other parties, “a statement setting forth facts or contentions to rebut those contained in the prohibited communication.” Any such responses “will be placed in the public record of the proceeding, and provision may be made for any further action, including reopening of the record which may be required under the circumstances.” Sec. 102.132(b).

It is not clear what further steps should be taken by the judge. Section 102.133(a) of the Board’s Rules provides:

Where the nature and circumstances of a prohibited communication . . . are such that the interests of justice and statutory policy may require remedial action, the Board, the Administrative Law Judge, or the Regional Director, as the case may be, may issue to the party making the communication a Notice to Show Cause, returnable before the Board within a stated period not less than 7 days from the date of issuance, why the Board may not determine that the interests of justice and statutory policy require that the claim or interest in the proceeding of a party who knowingly makes a prohibited communication, or knowingly causes a prohibited communication to be made may be dismissed, denied, disregarded, or otherwise adversely affected on account of such violation.

Succeeding subsections of Section 102.133 set forth actions to be taken by the Board, but make no provision for further action by a judge who issues the notice to show cause.

§ 2–300 Duties and Powers of Trial Judge

The administrative law judge’s basic duty is “to inquire fully into the facts . . . whether the Respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice affecting commerce as set forth in the complaint or amended complaint.” NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.35(a). Specific powers of administrative law judges are enumerated in Section 102.35(a)(1)–(a)(13) of the Board’s Rules, several of which are discussed below.

To regulate the course of the hearing (Sec. 102.35(a)(6)). The judge should direct the hearing so that it “take[s] place in a dignified atmosphere, free of threats and intimidation,” Altemose Construction Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 8, 12–13 (3d Cir. 1975), and is “confined to material issues and conducted with all expeditiousness consonant with due process,” Indianapolis Glove Co., 88 NLRB 986, 987 (1950). See also FRE 611(a) (“The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth, (2) avoid wasting time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment”).

In doing so, “the question of whether certain lines of inquiry or responses of witnesses should be curtailed rests within [the judge’s] sound discretion.” American Life Insurance and Accident Co., 123 NLRB 529, 530 (1959). However, the judge “must guard against expediting a hearing by limiting either party in the full development of its case.” Indianapolis Glove, above. See also Better Monkey Grip Co., 113 NLRB 938, 940 (1955) (trial examiner improperly “cut off lines of inquiry and limited the response of witnesses to such an extent that the development of the case may have been hampered”); and Boetticher & Kellogg Co., 137 NLRB 1392 n. 1,
1398–1399 (1962) (trial examiner improperly barred respondent from cross-examining a General Counsel witness because respondent refused his direction to conduct cross examination before the charging party union had questioned the witness).

In appropriate circumstances, however, the judge may place time limits on a party’s presentation of its case. Dickens, Inc., 355 NLRB 255, 256 (2010); University Medical Center, 335 NLRB 1318 n. 1, 1343 (2001), enf’d. in part 335 F.3d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2003); and Teamsters Local 122 (August A. Busch & Co. of Massachusetts), 334 NLRB 1190, 1193, and 1255 (2001).

See also §§ 16–102.1 and 16–403, below.

If appropriate or necessary, to exclude persons or counsel from the hearing for contemptuous conduct (Sec. 102.35(a)(6)). Although Section 102.38 provides that “any person shall have the right to appear at the hearing in person, by counsel, or by other representative,” the right of parties and counsel to appear at trials is not unlimited. Indeed, the same section states that “the participation of any party shall be limited to the extent permitted by the administrative law judge.” See also Section 102.177(a) of the Board’s Rules (“misconduct at any hearing before an administrative law judge . . . shall be ground for summary exclusion from the hearing”), discussed in § 6–610, Exclusion of Counsel, below.

To strike all related testimony of a witness who refuses to answer a proper question (Sec. 102.35(a)(6)). See, e.g., Nassau Insurance Co., 280 NLRB 878, 897 (1986) (judge properly acted within her discretion by striking the entire testimony of a General Counsel witness who failed to appear for further examination); and Today’s Man, 263 NLRB 332 (1982) (judge properly ruled that the respondent’s president could not assert the attorney-client privilege in response to certain questions on cross examination, directed him to respond to the questions, and issued an order striking his entire testimony when he failed to do so).

To hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of issues (Sec. 102.35(a)(7)). See § 7–100, Conference Calls, and § 9–220, Promoting Settlement at Pretrial Conference, below.

To rule on procedural requests and motions (Sec. 102.35(a)(8)). This authority is addressed more fully below in Chapter 10, Motions and Special Appeals (discussing, inter alia, motions in limine, motions to dismiss and for summary or default judgment, and motions to reopen the record). See also § 3–230 (motions for a bill of particulars or more definite statement), § 3–400, et seq. (motions for consolidation and severance), § 3–740 (motions for deferral to grievance arbitration), § 5–300, et seq. (motions to change the date or location of the hearing), § 8–415 (motions for a protective order), and § 12–400 (applications to take testimony by videoconference).

To approve stipulations of fact (Sec. 102.35(a)(9)). See § 10–200, Motions for Decision Based on Stipulated Record, below.

To make and file decisions (Sec. 102.35(a)(10)). “After hearing for the purpose of taking evidence upon a complaint, the administrative law judge shall prepare a decision.” NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.45(a). See also NLRB Statements of Procedure, Sec. 101.11(a). Thus, in Machinists Lodge 1129 (Sunbeam Appliance Co.), 216 NLRB 630 (1975), the Board held that the judge erred in granting the respondent’s posthearing motion to transfer the case directly to the Board for issuance of a decision over the objections of the General Counsel and the charging party. See also § 15–700, Contents of Judge’s Decision, below.
To call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses and to introduce documentary and other evidence (Sec. 102.35(a)(11)). This section corresponds to FRE 614 and has generally been applied consistently therewith. Thus, it is not improper for a judge to question witnesses, or to even call witnesses. *Hall Industries*, 293 NLRB 785 n. 1 (1989), enfd. mem. 914 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1990). See also *Teamsters Local 722 (Kasper Trucking)*, 314 NLRB 1016, 1017 (1994) (judges may “examine witnesses or interrupt questioning in order to clarify testimony or develop the record”), enfd. mem. 57 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1995); *Indianapolis Glove*, above (“it is appropriate for [the judge] to question witnesses in order to ascertain their credibility or to clarify their testimony”); and *NLRB v. Honaker Mills*, 789 F.2d 262, 265 (4th Cir. 1986) (judge properly “attempted to obtain more specific statements from the witnesses to determine the weight that he should assign to their testimony”).

However, care should be taken to avoid examining witnesses to the extent that the judge “takes out of the hands of either party the development of its case,” *Indianapolis Glove Co.*, above, or “appears to assume the role of an advocate in attempting to impeach [the witnesses’] prior testimony,” *Better Monkey Grip Co.*, above.

The judge’s failure to ask questions of a party witness is generally not grounds for reversal. See *Advocate South Suburban Hospital v. NLRB*, 468 F.3d 1038, 1048 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[I]n an adversary legal system it is generally the attorney’s duty to provide specific testimony. [The respondent] cannot palm off on the ALJ its apparent failure to properly question [the witness]”).

§ 2–400 Disqualification of Judge

Section 102.36 of the Board’s Rules states that an administrative law judge “may withdraw from a proceeding because of a personal bias or for other disqualifying reasons.”

§ 2–410 Grounds Asserted for Disqualification

“The functions of all administrative law judges . . . are conducted in an impartial manner,” NLRB Statements of Procedure, Sec. 101.10(b). “It is essential not only to avoid actual partiality and prejudgment . . . in the conduct of Board proceedings, but also to avoid even the appearance of a partisan tribunal.” *Indianapolis Glove Co.*, 88 NLRB 986, 987 (1950).

Former representation of a party. Former service on the staff of the General Counsel’s office is not grounds for disqualification. *Heads & Threads Co.*, 261 NLRB 800 n. 1 (1982), enfd. in part 724 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1983). Nor is past representation of another party, at least if that representation was relatively remote in time. See *Centeno Super Markets*, 220 NLRB 1151 n. 1 (1975) (8 or 9 years had passed by time of trial), enfd. 555 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1064 (1978). See also 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(a) and (b)(1)(iv) (prohibiting any Agency employee from participating in a matter involving a party or representative of a party for whom the employee had served as an officer, director, trustee, general partner, agent, attorney, consultant, contractor, or employee within the past year).

However, judges should recuse themselves if they previously served as a lawyer in the matter, participated personally and substantially as a government lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or publicly expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the matter while serving in government employment. See Rule 2.11 of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2011 Edition) (also discussing other grounds for disqualification).
Prior disposition statistics. In *Eldeco, Inc. v. NLRB*, 132 F.3d 1007, 1010 (4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth Circuit rejected the employer’s contention that the judge was biased because approximately 89% of his decisions in the last 20 years were in favor of labor unions. The court stated that such statistics are “irrelevant,” citing its earlier decision in *Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc. v. NLRB*, 97 F.3d 65, 69 (4th Cir. 1996) (“To evaluate an ALJ’s impartiality in this way amounts to judging his record by mere result or reputation, and in reality, such statistics tell us little or nothing”).

Prior rulings against party. “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion . . . and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required . . . when no extrajudicial source is involved.” *Liteky v. U.S.*, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Thus, bias may not be inferred simply because the judge made evidentiary rulings unfavorable to the party. *United Nurses Associations of California v. NLRB*, 871 F.3d 767, 778 (9th Cir. 2017). Likewise, a judge who previously decided a case against a respondent is not disqualified from presiding over the remand of the case. *NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co.*, 330 U.S. 219, 236–237 (1947). See also *Waterbury Hotel Management v. NLRB*, 314 F.3d 645, 650–651 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (judge did not err in refusing to recuse himself simply because he had ruled against respondent’s predecessor in an unrelated case). But see *St. Mary’s Nursing Home*, 342 NLRB 979, 980 n. 6 (2004) (judge’s adherence to an erroneous ruling, after an initial remand, and allegations that the judge showed “irritation” and “impatience,” warranted a second remand to another judge to remove any suggestion of bias or prejudice), second remand decision afld. 240 Fed. Appx. 8, 10, 12–13 (6th Cir. 2007).

Criticism of counsel, parties, or witnesses. “[J]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge”; however, the criticisms “may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” *Liteky*, 510 U.S. at 555.

It is generally not evidence of bias that the judge rebuked counsel for improper conduct. See *U.S. v. Logan*, 998 F.2d 1025, 1029 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1000 (1993) (judge “upbraided” counsel for flouting the judge’s orders); and *U.S. v. Mendoza*, 468 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 2006) (judge referred counsel to a bar disciplinary board). See also *Merillat Industries*, 307 NLRB 1301, 1301–1302 (1992), where the Board rejected the charging party union’s contention that the judge’s actions in an unrelated case—questioning counsel for the General Counsel’s professional integrity and thereafter withdrawing from that case and reporting the matter to the Regional Director—created the appearance of impartiality, notwithstanding that the judge’s accusations were gratuitous and unwarranted.

But compare *New York Times Co.*, 265 NLRB 353 (1982) (reversing and remanding case to another judge for a hearing de novo because the trial judge made unsupported statements “impugn[ing] the good faith of the Union and question[ing] whether the General Counsel and the Charging Party were abusing the Board’s processes”); and *Reading Anthracite Co.*, 273 NLRB 1502 (1985) (same, where the trial judge made “serious accusations” in a “hostile tone” to respondent’s counsel, including telling the attorney that he would be “suborning perjury” if he attempted to ask certain questions of his witness, and accused the attorney, without any basis or justification, of engaging in “contemptuous and unethical conduct” by filing a motion for the judge’s disqualification). See also *Victor’s Café 52, Inc.*, 338 NLRB 753, 756–757 (2002), where the Board cautioned judges against using intemperate language about a witness or counsel that
“undermines the confidence of parties, representatives, and the public in the overall fairness and equity of the Board’s treatment of parties. . .and ability to. . .render a fair judgment.”

Suggestions to counsel regarding litigation strategy or tactics. Such suggestions are generally improper. See Reading Anthracite Co., above (judge suggested that the General Counsel “maintain a reasonably militant posture [regarding] the relevancy of . . . material”); and Thermoid Co., 90 NLRB 614 n. 2 (1950) (trial examiner allegedly suggested trial tactics to the General Counsel during a recess). But see Teamsters Local 722, above, 314 NLRB at 1017 (no bias found where the judge suggested to counsel a line of questioning that the judge might have accomplished through his own questioning).

Questioning witnesses. It is well established that bias may not be inferred simply because the judge questioned the party’s witnesses. United Nurses Associations of California, above, 871 F.3d at 778. See also § 2–300, Duties of Trial Judge, above, regarding the authority of administrative law judges to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, and the limits to that authority.

Gratuitous remarks. The Board has cautioned against making gratuitous remarks regarding witnesses or testimony, Better Monkey Grip Co., 113 NLRB 938, 940 (1955), or matters “extraneous to the legal and factual issues,” Teamsters Local 777 (Crown Metal), 145 NLRB 197, 198 n. 4 (1963), enfd. 340 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1964).

Comments about the merits and evidence presented. A judge’s opinions, formed “on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Thus, the Board has rejected allegations of bias where judges expressed an opinion about a particular defense after all the evidence had been received, Teamsters Local 722 (Kasper Trucking), 314 NLRB 1016, 1018 (1994), enfd. mem. 57 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1995), or about the ultimate merits of the case in the context of suggesting the possibility of settlement, Roto Rooter, 288 NLRB 1025 n. 2 (1988). See also NLRB v. Honaker Mills, 789 F.2d 262, 265 (4th Cir. 1986) (“A judge’s remarks that constitute mere expressions of a point of law are not sufficient to show personal bias or prejudice”).

However, the Board has cautioned judges that it is “both advisable and prudent” to “refrain both on and off the record from making unnecessary remarks or comments to parties concerning the merits of their cases,” Aeroasonic Instrument Corp., 116 NLRB 1502, 1503 (1956). See also Center for United Labor Action, 209 NLRB 814, 814–815 (1974) (finding bias where the judge expressed his view that some “allegations . . . did not constitute unfair labor practices” and that he therefore intended to preclude introduction of “any evidence to support [the] allegations”); and Reading Anthracite, above (finding bias where the judge made “statements throughout the hearing” creating “the impression that he had prejudged the ultimate issue in the case”).

Encouraging settlement. “[S]imply encouraging the parties to consider settlement . . . [does] not display bias or create the impression of prejudice.” J. Westrum Electric, 365 NLRB No. 151, slip op. at 1 n.1 (2017) (rejecting the respondent’s contention that the judge displayed bias by encouraging the parties to discuss settlement after the General Counsel finished presenting his case and again at the close of the hearing).

Copying from briefs. The Board discourages judges from extensively adopting and relying on partisan briefs. Fairfield Tower Condominium Assn., 343 NLRB 923 n.1 (2004). See also
**Waterbury Hotel Management**, above, 314 F.3d at 650–651. Indeed, in **Dish Network Service Corp.**, 345 NLRB 1071 (2005), the Board set aside the judge’s decision and remanded the case to a new judge for an independent review of the record and preparation of a new decision because the judge had copied verbatim extensive portions of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the charging party, even though the Board had previously warned him in another case where he did so that it did not condone the practice. See also **J.J. Cassone Bakery**, 345 NLRB 1305 (2005); and § 15–300, Post-Trial Briefs, below.

§ 2–420  **Disqualification Procedure**

The provisions regarding disqualification of administrative law judges are set forth in Section. 102.36 of the Board’s Rules. A party may request the judge to withdraw “on grounds of personal bias or disqualification” at any time following the judge’s designation and before filing of the judge’s decision. The requesting party must file with the judge “promptly upon the discovery of the alleged facts a timely affidavit setting forth in detail the matters alleged to constitute grounds for disqualification.” If, in the judge’s opinion, the affidavit is filed “with due diligence and is sufficient on its face,” the judge “will promptly disqualify himself/herself and withdraw from the proceeding.” If the judge does not disqualify himself/herself, the judge “must rule upon the record, stating the grounds for that ruling.” See also NLRB Statements of Procedure, Sec. 101.10(b).

The foregoing provisions require a party seeking to disqualify a judge based on the judge’s hearing conduct to file the motion with the judge before the judge issues a decision. See **Al Bryant, Inc.**, 260 NLRB 128 n. 1 (1982) (judge erred in admonishing respondent’s counsel for filing the recusal motion with him rather than with the Board), enf’d. 711 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 1039 (1984). If a party fails to file the motion with the judge before issuance of the judge’s decision, although aware of the asserted disqualifying facts, a subsequent motion for disqualification will be regarded by the Board as untimely. See **Roto Rooter**, 288 NLRB 1025 n. 2 (1988); **Central Mack Sales**, 273 NLRB 1268 n. 2 (1984); and **Sanford Home for Adults**, 253 NLRB 1132 n. 1 (1981), aff’d in relevant part 669 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1981).

For what constitutes “due diligence,” see **Manor West, Inc.**, 311 NLRB 655 n. 1 (1993) (finding that the respondent’s motion to disqualify, which was filed with the trial judge 7 weeks after the hearing closed but well before the judge’s decision issued, was filed with due diligence and was not untimely).
CHAPTER 3. PLEADINGS

§ 3–100 The Charge

See Secs. 102.9–102.14 of the Board’s Rules.

§ 3–110 General Principles

A charge may be filed by anyone: a labor organization, an employee, an employer, or any other individual or entity. See NLRB Rules and Regulations, Secs. 102.9 (a charge may be filed by “any person”) and 102.1(a) (the term “person” has the same meaning set forth in Section 2 of the Act); and Sec. 2(1) of the Act (“The term “person” includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, . . . or receivers”). See also Operating Engineers Local 39 (Kaiser Foundation), 268 NLRB 115, 116 (1983) (“The simple fact is that anyone for any reason may file charges with the Board.”), enfd. 746 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1984).

A charge must be filed with the appropriate Regional Director or with the General Counsel. NLRB Rules and Regulations, Secs. 102.10 and 102.33. However, the venue where the charge was filed does not affect the Board’s jurisdiction. Harris Corp., 269 NLRB 733, 734 n. 1 (1984), citing Allied Products Corp., 220 NLRB 732, 733 (1975).

§ 3–120 Filing and Service Under Section 10(b)

Under Section 10(b) of the Act, a charge must be both filed and served within 6 months of the alleged unfair labor practice. Dun & Bradstreet Software Services, 317 NLRB 84, 84–85 (1995) (charge served on respondent 1 day late was untimely, even if the charging party received erroneous advice from the Board’s regional office), affd. 79 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir. 1996). For a discussion of what constitutes service of the charge, see Chapter 4, Service of Documents, below.

The charge must also be signed. NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.11. But an unsigned copy served on the charged party is adequate if the original filed with the Regional Office is signed. Freightway Corp., 299 NLRB 531 (1990). The Board has also held that the failure of a charging party to comply with the sworn acknowledgment or declaration requirements of Section 102.11 does not affect the timeliness of the filing of the charge. Alldata Corp., 324 NLRB 544, 544–545 (1997), enf. denied on other grounds, 245 F.3d 803, 807 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

See also §3–600, Section 10(b) Affirmative Defense, below.

§ 3–130 Sufficiency of the Charge

A charge is required before the Board can act. NLRB v. Kohler Co., 220 F.2d 3, 7 (7th Cir. 1955). But a charge is not a pleading and does not require the specificity of a pleading. It merely serves to initiate a Board investigation to determine whether a complaint should be issued. NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 307 (1959). A charge "is sufficient if it informs the alleged violator of the general nature of the violation charged against him and enables him to preserve the evidence relating to the matter." NLRB v. Louisiana Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 696, 704–705 (8th Cir. 1967), quoting from NLRB v. Raymond Pearson, Inc., 243 F.2d 456, 458 (5th Cir. 1957).
§ 3–140  Withdrawal or Dismissal

Before the hearing opens, a charge may be withdrawn only with the consent of the Regional Director. After the hearing opens and evidence is introduced, but before the judge’s decision issues, the charge may be withdrawn only with the consent of the judge. This usually occurs as part of the withdrawal of the complaint allegations approved by the judge pursuant to approval of a settlement agreement. Alternatively, the judge may order the matter remanded to the Regional Director, who may rule on the withdrawal of the charge. After the judge’s decision issues, the charge may be withdrawn only with the consent of the Board. NLRB Statements of Procedure, Sec. 101.9.

The General Counsel retains unreviewable discretion to withdraw the complaint even after the hearing opens if no evidence has yet been introduced. Sheet Metal Workers Local 28 (American Elgen), 306 NLRB 981, 981–982 (1992). After evidence has been introduced, however, the General Counsel must file a motion to withdraw a complaint allegation with the judge, who has discretion to grant or deny the motion. Sheet Metal Workers Local 162 (Lang’s Enterprises), 314 NLRB 923 n. 2 (1994). See also CHAPTER 9, Settlements, below.

The dismissal of a charge by the Regional Director may be appealed to the General Counsel’s Office of Appeals in Washington, D.C. Until the charge is finally dismissed by the Office of Appeals, it continues to exist during the appeals period. It is not time barred if it is reinstated during that period by the Regional Director, even though the reinstatement comes more than 6 months after the occurrence of the unfair labor practice. Children’s National Medical Center, 322 NLRB 205 (1996); and Sioux City Foundry Co., 323 NLRB 1071, 1074 (1997), enf’d. 154 F.3d 832, 837–838 (8th Cir. 1998). Compare Smithfield Packing Co., 344 NLRB 1, 10 (2004), enf’d. 447 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (where the General Counsel has denied the charging party’s appeal of the Regional Director’s dismissal of the charge, the charge cannot thereafter be reinstated pursuant to a motion for reconsideration after the 10(b) period).

See also §3–650, Revival of Withdrawn or Dismissed Charge, below, in the context of Section 10(b) of the Act.

§ 3–200  Complaint

The authority to issue complaints rests solely with the General Counsel. The disposition of charges, and the decision whether a complaint should issue or be litigated, is within the exclusive province of the General Counsel and is not subject to review. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967). See also Cincinnati Enquirer, 298 NLRB 275 (1990), (judge erred by stating that the Regional Director was “without authority” to issue the complaint), review denied 938 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

§ 3–210  Complaint Closely Related to Timely Charge

A complaint is not restricted to the precise allegations of the charge. The complaint may also allege matters related to and growing out of the charged conduct. NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 309 (1959). The test is stated in Redd-I, Inc., 290 NLRB 1115, 1116 (1988):

If a charge was filed and served within six months after the violations alleged in the charge, the complaint (or amended complaint), although filed after the six months, may allege violations not alleged in the charge if (a) they are closely related to the
violations named in the charge, and (b) occurred within six months before the filing of the charge.

See also *Old Dominion Freight Line*, 331 NLRB 111 (2000).

In evaluating whether allegations are “closely related” under *Redd-I*, the Board considers:

1) Whether the untimely allegation involves the same legal theory as the timely charge.

2) Whether the untimely allegation arises from the same factual circumstances or sequence of events as the timely charge.

3) Whether the respondent would raise the same or similar defenses to both allegations.

*Nickles Bakery of Indiana*, 296 NLRB 927, 927–928 (1989). The first factor does not require that the untimely allegation involve the same section of the Act as the other alleged violations. And the relevant inquiry under the third factor is whether the timely and untimely allegations allege the same unlawful object, not whether the respondent merely claims different lawful reasons for taking the different allegedly unlawful actions. Id. at nn. 5 and 6.

Sufficient nexus has been found when the disputed charge and existing charge allegations "all occurred within the same general time period and concern conduct which constitutes an overall plan to resist the Union." *Well-Bred Loaf*, 303 NLRB 1016 n. 1 (1991). See also *Kentucky Tennessee Clay Co.*, 343 NLRB 931, 932 (2004) (8(a)(3) allegation that respondent discriminatorily reduced employee’s hours was closely related to 8(a)(3) charge alleging that respondent discriminatorily disciplined and discharged the employee), enf’d. 179 Fed. Appx. 153 (4th Cir. 2006). But see *Carney Hospital*, 350 NLRB 627, 630 (2007) (“Mere chronological coincidence during a union campaign does not warrant the implication that all challenged employer actions are related to one another as part of a planned response to that campaign.”); and *SKC Electric, Inc.*, 350 NLRB 857, 858 (2007) (applying *Carney Hospital*).

See also § 3–330, Amendments and Section 10(b), and § 3–650, Revival of Withdrawn or Dismissed Charge, below.

§ 3–220 Adequacy of Complaint

Like all pleadings before the Board, the requirements of a complaint are governed by the Board’s Rules rather than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See *Nissan North America, Inc.*, Case 10-CA-198732, unpub. Board order issued Nov. 16, 2017 (2017 WL 5516533), at n. 2; and *Component Bar Products, Inc.*, 364 NLRB No. 140, slip op. at 10 (2016). Section 102.15 of the Board’s Rules states that a complaint “will” contain:

(a) A clear and concise statement of the facts upon which the Board asserts jurisdiction, and

(b) A clear and concise description of the acts which are claimed to constitute unfair labor practices, including, where known, the approximate dates and places of such acts and the names of Respondent’s agents or other representatives who committed the acts.

“Applying this rule, the Board and the courts have consistently found that an unfair labor practice complaint is not judged by the strict standards applicable to certain pleadings in other,
different contexts.” *Artesia Ready Mix Concrete*, 339 NLRB 1224, 1226 (2003), citing, e.g., *NLRB v. Piqua Munising Wood Products Co.*, 109 F.2d 552, 557 (6th Cir. 1940) (“The Act does not require the particularity of pleading of an indictment or information, nor the elements of a cause like a declaration at law or a bill in equity. All that is requisite in a valid complaint before the Board is that there be a plain statement of the things claimed to constitute an unfair labor practice that respondent may be put upon his defense.”).

§ 3–230 Bill of Particulars or More Definite Statement

If a respondent believes the complaint provides inadequate notice of the allegations, it may file a motion for a bill of particulars or more definite statement with the Division of Judges. See *Nissan North America*, above. Although FRCP 12(e) requires such a motion to be filed before a responsive pleading, the Board’s Rules do not impose any deadline or timeframe. Ibid. However, the motion is normally filed before the hearing opens so that the respondent can use the additional details to prepare its defense. In that event, the motion will be handled by the Chief Judge or Deputy or Associate Chief Judge in the appropriate office, unless the trial judge has been designated. If the motion is not filed until after the hearing opens, the trial judge will rule on the motion. The General Counsel’s opening statement, however, may provide the details or clarification the respondent seeks, thereby rendering the motion moot. See *Stor-Rite Metal Products*, 283 NLRB 856, 861 n. 6 (1987), enf. denied on other grounds 856 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1988).

As a general matter, “a bill of particulars is justified only when the complaint is so vague that the party charged is unable to meet the General Counsel’s case.” *Affinity Medical Center*, 364 NLRB No. 67, slip op. at 2 (2016), quoting *North American Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB*, 389 F.2d 866, 871 (10th Cir. 1968). Thus, in *Affinity*, the Board held that the judge erred in requiring the General Counsel to provide additional information regarding a proposed amendment to the complaint, as the proposed amendment already stated the nature of the alleged conduct (specific unilateral rule changes), the names of the supervisors allegedly involved in each change, the dates of the changes, and the location. See also *Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. NLRB*, 222 F.2d 938, 940 (1st Cir. 1955) (employer was not prejudiced by the General Counsel’s failure to furnish particulars regarding the alleged 8(a)(1) interrogations and threats where the complaint identified the month of the alleged violations and the officials responsible); and *Dal-Tex Optical Co.*, 130 NLRB 1313 n. 1 (1961) (employer’s motion for particulars was properly denied where the complaint described the nature of the activity, the dates, and the names of the agents that committed the alleged acts).

Compare *Guitar Center Stores, Inc.*, 13–CA–130446, unpub. Board order issued Nov. 3, 2015 (2015 WL 6735635). In that case, the 8(a)(5) complaint alleged that the respondent had bargained in bad faith “at various times” during the previous 2 years by, inter alia, making regressive bargaining proposals and unilateral changes to mandatory subjects of bargaining, failing to make proposals for an extended period of time, and implementing benefits in nonunion facilities. The Board held that the judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the respondent’s motion for a bill of particulars and ordering the General Counsel to identify the regressive bargaining proposals and unilateral changes at issue, the period of time during which respondent unlawfully failed to make proposals, and the benefits implemented at nonunion stores.

A rough rule of thumb is that a complaint should allege the 4 Ws: who committed the act, what was done, when was it done, and where. See also Sec. 102.15 of the Board’s Rules, set forth in § 3–220, above. Thus, the following additional information need not be pleaded:
Names of employees who were allegedly threatened or interrogated. The names of employees to whom an alleged threat or other 8(a)(1) violation was directed need not be pleaded, and a respondent is not entitled to disclosure of the names before the hearing. See *Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co.*, 129 NLRB 294, 295 (1960); and *Storkline Corp.*, 141 NLRB 899, 902–903 (1963), enfd. in part 330 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1964). See also *Pacific 9 Transportation, Inc.*, 21–CA–116403, unpub. Board order issued June 11, 2015 (2015 WL 3643583). In that case, the judge ordered the General Counsel to disclose the identity of the driver or drivers allegedly interrogated given that the respondent had asserted, as an affirmative defense, that its drivers were independent contractors, the respondent had the burden of proving that defense with respect to the particular driver(s) involved, and the respondent would be expected to proceed with its defense as early as the first day of hearing. The Board reversed, noting that the respondent could request a continuance to prepare its defense, if needed. See also § 7–100, below, discussing the Board’s policy against pretrial discovery.

Dates alleged discriminatees engaged in union or concerted activity. The date(s) that an alleged discriminatee engaged in protected union or concerted activity likewise need not be pleaded. *Cannoli Factory*, 29–CA–187620, unpub. Board order issued April 18, 2017 (2017 WL 1462121).

Theory of the case. The General Counsel is also not required to plead evidence or the theory of the case in the complaint. *McDonald’s USA, LLC*, 362 NLRB No. 168 (2015); *Artesia Ready Mix Concrete, Inc.*, 339 NLRB 1224, 1226 n. 3 (2003); *Boilermakers Local 363 (Fluor Corp.),* 123 NLRB 1877, 1913 (1959); and *North American Rockwell*, above, 389 F.2d at 871.

With respect to General Counsel motions for a bill of particulars regarding affirmative defenses asserted in a respondent’s answer, see § 3–550, below.

§ 3–300 Amendments to Complaints

§ 3–310 Who May Seek and Who May Grant Amendments

After the hearing opens, the complaint may only be amended on motion by the General Counsel. The judge may not amend the complaint over the General Counsel’s objection or in a manner inconsistent or contrary to the General Counsel’s motion. *GPS Terminal Services*, 333 NLRB 968, 968–969 (2001). Nor may the judge find a violation on a theory that the General Counsel has expressly disclaimed. *Mid-Atlantic Regional Council of Carpenters (Goodell, Devries, Leech & Dann, LLP)*, 356 NLRB 61 n. 2 (2010).

The Board has also held that the judge may not find a violation based on an allegation or theory that has been asserted only by the charging party. See *Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 365 NLRB No. 195, slip op. at 1 n. 2 (2016) (“It is well settled that a charging party cannot enlarge upon or change the General Counsel’s theory of a case.”), citing *Kimtruss Corp.*, 305 NLRB 710, 711 (1991) (judge erred in finding an 8(a)(1) violation based on the charging party’s theory as well as the General Counsel’s theory). See also *GTE Automatic Electric*, 196 NLRB 902, 903 (1972) (judge erred by granting the charging party’s motion to amend the complaint to allege an 8(a)(3) discharge); *Winn-Dixie Stores*, 224 NLRB 1418, 1420 (1976), (judge erred in finding that the respondent engaged in surface bargaining as claimed by the charging party, as the General Counsel had not acquiesced in expanding the complaint’s 8(a)(5) allegations to include that allegation), enfd. in part 567 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1978); and *Zurn/N.E.P.C.O.*, 329 NLRB 484.
(1999) (judge properly refused to consider charging party’s theory that respondent’s hiring policy was unlawful on its face, as the General Counsel argued only that it was unlawfully applied).

The courts generally agree. See Weigand v. NLRB, 783 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2015); and Operating Engineers Local 150 v. NLRB, 325 F.3d 818, 830 (7th Cir. 2003) (General Counsel, not the charging party, controls the issues raised in the complaint). But see Service Employees Local 32BJ v. NLRB, 647 F.3d 435, 446 (2d Cir. 2011), remanding AM Property Holding Corp., 355 NLRB 721 (2010), reafng. 352 NLRB 279 (2008) (Board erred in refusing to consider alternative theory of violation urged by the charging party simply because that theory had not been alleged by the General Counsel; Board has authority to consider such a theory if it is closely related to the subject matter of the complaint and was fully litigated).

However, as discussed in § 6–400, below, charging parties may submit, and the judge may consider, evidence regarding an appropriate remedy different from the remedy sought by the General Counsel.

§ 3–320 When Amendments Are Allowed

Section 102.17 of the Board’s Rules authorizes the judge to grant complaint amendments “upon such terms as may be deemed just” during or after the hearing until the case has been transferred to the Board. See also Folsom Ready Mix, Inc., 338 NLRB 1172 n. 1 (2003). Although this provision affords the judge “wide discretion” to grant or deny a motion to amend, in exercising that discretion the judge should consider: “(1) whether there was surprise or lack of notice, (2) whether there was a valid excuse for the delay in moving to amend, and (3) whether the matter was fully litigated.” Rogan Bros. Sanitation, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 61, slip op. at 3 n. 8 (2015), enfd. 651 Fed. Appx. 34 (2d Cir. 2016).

See also § 3–330, Amendments and Section 10(b), discussing allegations occurring more than 6 months before the motion to amend but within 6 months of the charge; and § 3–340, De Facto Amendment—Unpleaded But Fully Litigated, discussing when the judge may find a different violation even without a motion to amend the complaint.

During trial. In Rogan Bros., above, the Board held that the first and third factors supported allowing the General Counsel to amend the complaint during the trial to allege that the respondent employers were a single employer as well as alter egos. Although the General Counsel had stated at the outset of the hearing that no single employer allegation was being made, the General Counsel subsequently filed the motion to amend during a 2-month adjournment, before the General Counsel rested, and the allegation was thereafter fully litigated. Accordingly, the Board found that the judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the General Counsel’s motion. The Second Circuit agreed (albeit in an unpublished opinion). The court found no prejudice as the single employer theory was substantially similar to the alter ego theory alleged in the complaint, it was added before the General Counsel completed the case in chief, and the respondent could have recalled any of the General Counsel’s witnesses that had already testified.

See also Remington Lodging & Hospitality, LLC, 363 NLRB No. 112, slip op. at 1 n.1 (2016) (judge did not deny the respondent due process by granting the General Counsel’s motion to add an 8(a)(1) allegation involving an employer leaflet 12 days after the hearing opened, as the respondent did not produce the leaflet in response to the General Counsel’s subpoena until 7 days after the hearing opened, and the respondent had an opportunity to introduce evidence
regarding the allegation before the hearing closed); Amglo Kemlite Laboratories, 360 NLRB 319, 323 (2014) (judge erred in denying the General Counsel’s motion, on the last day of the 3-day hearing, to amend the complaint to allege an 8(a)(1) threat of mass discharge, as the respondent did not object to the testimony at the time it was adduced and had the opportunity to examine both the witness and the official who made the remark, and the motion amended an existing complaint allegation, which alleged a similar threat on the same day, to conform to that evidence), enfd. 833 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2016); and Pincus Elevator & Electric Co., 308 NLRB 684, 684–685 (1992) (judge abused her discretion by denying the General Counsel’s motion during the hearing to add a Johnnie’s Poultry allegation that respondent’s counsel had improperly questioned employees about the case without giving assurances against reprisal, as the respondent’s counsel had first introduced the subject employee statement; the allegation was fully litigated; and the respondent had therefore suffered no prejudice), enfd. mem. 998 F.2d 1004 (3d Cir. 1993).

But see King Soopers, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.3d 23, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2017), denying enf. in relevant part of 364 NLRB No. 93, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2016). In that case, the court reversed the Board and found that the General Counsel’s mid-trial motion to amend the complaint came too late because the General Counsel had access to all of the relevant information necessary to investigate the charge for a full year before the hearing, provided no valid excuse for failing to include the charge in the initial complaint, and did not make the motion to amend until after the company had finished cross-examining the General Counsel’s key witness).

Compare also Latino Express, Inc., 358 NLRB 823 n. 3, and JD. at 827 n. 2 (2012), reafdf. 361 NLRB No. 137 (2014) (judge did not abuse his discretion in denying, as “inexcusably late and prejudicial,” the General Counsel’s motion, at the end of the second day of the 3-day hearing, to amend the complaint to allege that respondent unlawfully served subpoenas on employees 2 weeks before the hearing that sought union-related pamphlets, letters, emails, and other documents in their possession).

At close of trial. In Stagehands Referral Service, 347 NLRB 1167 (2006), the Board affirmed the judge’s denial of a motion to amend the complaint at the end of the hearing. The complaint alleged that the union had discriminatorily failed to refer a single discriminatee, and the General Counsel sought to add an allegation that the entire hiring hall operation was unlawful because no objective criteria were applied. The Board found that the amendment would not have been “just” because: (1) the respondent had not been given notice that the hiring hall operation would be placed in issue; (2) the General Counsel did not move to amend as soon as the evidence came to light, but only after the respondent had rested; and (3) it could not be assumed that the respondent’s handling of the case would have been unchanged, as the lack of objective criteria had little or no bearing on the union’s decision not to refer the discriminatee. Id. at 1171.

Compare Bruce Packing Co., 357 NLRB 1084, 1085–1086 (2011), revd. in relevant part 795 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In that case, the General Counsel moved to amend the 8(a)(3) complaint to add an 8(a)(1) promise-of-benefits allegation. As in Stagehands Referral Service, the General Counsel made the motion at the end of the hearing, after the respondent had rested, even though the relevant testimony had been elicited from one of the General Counsel’s employee witnesses the day before. The ALJ denied the motion, citing the lateness of the motion and the General Counsel’s delay in making it. The Board, however, held that the judge should have granted the motion because the issue had been fully litigated. The Board noted that respondent had called the supervisor, who denied making the promise, and respondent failed to identify any other evidence or defense that it would have presented if the motion to amend had been made earlier.
The D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that the late amendment was prejudicial and denied respondent due process. The court noted that, had respondent been given earlier notice of the allegation, it "could have attacked [the employee's] credibility on this specific aspect of the conversation, cross-examined her to expose any inconsistencies in her testimony, or explored the issue more fully with [the supervisor] and other witnesses." The court rejected the Board's argument that respondent had a burden in these circumstances to identify with specificity the testimony or defenses it could have presented to defeat the allegation.

After trial. In *Desert Aggregates*, 340 NLRB 289, 292–293 (2003), the Board denied the General Counsel's posthearing motion to amend the complaint to allege an additional 8(a)(1) statement by a manager. (The motion had been made in the General Counsel's posthearing brief and the judge failed to rule on it.) The Board found that the respondent did not have fair notice that the manager's statement would be alleged as a violation because the manager's testimony about the statement emerged incidentally during the General Counsel's cross-examination, and, consequently, was not fully litigated. See also *Sheet Metal Workers Local 91 (Schebler Co.)*, 294 NLRB 766, 774–775 (1989) (affirming judge's denial of the General Counsel's posthearing request to amend the complaint to allege an additional 8(b)(3) violation), enfd. in part and remanded in part 905 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

Compare *Roundy's Inc.*, 356 NLRB 126 (2010), enfd. 674 F.3d 638, 646–647 (7th Cir. 2012). In that case, the complaint alleged that the respondent had unlawfully prohibited union representatives from handbilling at several of its stores. Although the General Counsel asserted only a disparate treatment theory at trial, the General Counsel's posthearing brief also argued that the respondent had failed to show that it had a sufficient property interest to exclude the handbillers. The judge found that the General Counsel had asserted this new theory too late. The Board, however, remanded for the judge to take evidence on the property-interest issue, noting that it was the respondent's burden to establish a sufficient property interest and that it would be unnecessary to reach the disparate treatment theory if the respondent lacked a sufficient property interest to exclude the handbillers. The judge thereafter reopened the hearing, found a violation at most of the respondent's stores under the property-interest theory, and the Board affirmed on that basis.

Obviously, the relevant factors identified by the Board can only be considered and applied if the General Counsel specifies exactly what is being added to or amended in the complaint. Thus, nonspecific, open-ended motions to conform the pleadings to the proof should be rejected.

§ 3–330 Amendments and Section 10(b)

A complaint may be amended to allege conduct outside the 10(b) period if the conduct occurred within 6 months of a timely filed charge and is "closely related" to the allegations of the charge. *Fry's Food Stores*, 361 NLRB No. 140, slip op. at 2 (2014), citing *Redd-I, Inc.*, 290 NLRB 1115 (1988). For a discussion of the Redd-I "closely related" test, see § 3–210, Complaint Closely Related to Timely Charge, above.

§ 3–340 De Facto Amendment—Unpleaded But Fully Litigated

Judges occasionally must decide whether it is appropriate to find a violation in the absence of a specific allegation in the complaint. This typically arises in three situations: (1) where the conduct was alleged as a violation, but of a different section of the Act; (2) where the
conduct was alleged as a violation, but on a different theory; and (3) where the conduct was not alleged as a violation at all.

In *Pergament United Sales*, 296 NLRB 333, 334 (1989), enfd. 920 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1990), a case involving the first situation, the Board stated that the test is whether the issue "is closely connected to the subject matter of the complaint and has been fully litigated." With respect to whether an issue has been "fully litigated," the Board stated that this "rests in part on whether the absence of a specific allegation precluded a respondent from presenting exculpatory evidence or whether the respondent would have altered the conduct of its case at the hearing, had a specific allegation been made."

This same test has since been applied in the other two situations as well. See cases cited below. See also *Service Employees Local 32BJ v. NLRB*, 647 F.3d 435, 447 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting, in remanding for the Board to properly apply the *Pergament* rule, that "the Board has applied this rule to a variety of circumstances"). Nevertheless, the judge should be careful to identify which of the three situations is presented. See *Massey Energy/Mammoth Coal*, 358 NLRB 1643, 1652 n. 36 (2012), where the Board majority, in finding liability based on an unalleged theory, rejected as "inapposite" cases cited by the respondent and the dissent that involved unalleged violations.

**Violations of a different section of the Act.**

For cases involving this situation, see *Pergament*, above (judge properly found that the respondent’s refusal to hire employees violated 8(a)(4) rather than 8(a)(3) as alleged, as both involved the lawfulness of the respondent’s motivation for failing to hire the employees, no party objected to the General Counsel’s introduction of the evidence relevant to the 8(a)(4) issue, and the respondent’s personnel director corroborated that evidence and admitted that the employees were not hired because of the pending NLRB charges); *KenMor Electric Co.*, 355 NLRB 1024 (2010) (finding that employer’s job application referral system violated 8(a)(1) rather than 8(a)(3) as alleged), enf. denied in relevant part sub nom. *Independent Electrical Contractors of Houston, Inc., v. NLRB*, 720 F.3d 543 (5th Cir. 2013); and *Airborne Freight Corp.*, 343 NLRB 580, 581 (2004) (finding that supervisor’s alleged 8(a)(1) and (3) statements and refusal to transfer an employee both also violated 8(a)(4)).

**Violations based on a different theory**

For cases involving this situation, see *Space Needle, LLC*, 362 NLRB No. 11, slip op. at 4 (2015) (finding that a supervisor’s statements to an employee violated 8(a)(1) on the ground that they were coercive, regardless of whether they constituted an unlawful interrogation as alleged in the complaint, as the coercive-statement theory involved the same facts and inquiry as to whether the statement would reasonably tend to coerce employees, and was fully litigated), enfd. 692 Fed. Appx. 462 (9th Cir. 2017); *AKAL Security, Inc.*, 354 NLRB 122, 125 (2009), reaffd. 355 NLRB 584 (2010) (holding that the judge’s application of *Burnup & Sims* instead of *Wright Line* to find an 8(a)(1) discharge violation did not deny respondent due process as respondent clearly anticipated that *Burnup & Sims* could apply and litigated accordingly); *Graymont PA, Inc.*, 364 NLRB No. 37, slip op. at 4–7 (2016) (finding that the respondent employer’s failure to timely notify the union that the information it requested did not exist violated 8(a)(5) even though the complaint only alleged the failure to provide the information, as the issues were closely related and the respondent asserted that the information did not exist as an affirmative defense to the refusal-to-provide-information allegation); and *Teamsters Local 89 (Jack Cooper Transport Co.)*, 365 NLRB No. 115 (2017) (finding that the respondent union’s delay in furnishing certain information
to the company violated 8(b)(3) even though the complaint only alleged that the union failed to furnish information to the company, as the issues were closely connected and the respondent union itself elicited testimony to explain why it delayed furnishing the information).

See also Intertape Polymer Corp., 360 NLRB 957, 958 n. 8 (2014) (finding that the employer’s confiscation of union literature from the employee breakroom violated 8(a)(1) because the employer’s past policy or practice was to permit literature in that area, even though the complaint alleged a violation on a disparate-enforcement theory), enfd. on point 801 F.3d 224, 232–233 (4th Cir. 2015); Parexel Int’l, LLC, 356 NLRB 516 (2011) (finding an 8(a)(1) discharge violation based on a “preemptive strike” theory rather than the alleged “retaliation” theory); Facet Enterprises v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 963, 969–975 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding the Board’s finding of an 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain violation based on a direct-dealing theory even though the alleged refusal to bargain was based on a theory of attempted unit splitting); and IBEW Local 58 (Paramount Industries, Inc.), 365 NLRB No. 30, slip op. at 4 n. 17 (2017) (holding that it was proper to find an 8(b)(1)(A) violation on an additional theory that the General Counsel had not clearly pursued, as “the conduct was alleged in the complaint,” “all of the underlying facts [were] undisputed,” “the law [was] well established,” and “no due process concerns [were] implicated”).

But compare Springfield Day Nursery, 362 NLRB No. 30, slip op. at 2–3 (2015) (holding that the judge improperly found an 8(a)(5) violation based on a unilateral-change theory where only an 8(d) contract-modification theory was alleged in the complaint, litigated at the hearing, and addressed in the General Counsel’s posthearing brief); Baptist Hospital of East Tennessee, 351 NLRB 71 n. 5 (2007) (declining to address whether the employer violated 8(a)(5) under an 8(d) contract-modification theory, as the General Counsel only pursued a unilateral-change theory); and Lamar Advertising of Hartford, 343 NLRB 261, 265 (2004) (rejecting the General Counsel’s attempt, on exceptions to the judge’s decision, to “expand” the theory underlying the alleged 8(a)(4) violation, as the “necessary predicates” for finding a violation on the different theory were not litigated). See also Buonadonna ShopRite, 356 NLRB 857, 858 (2011), and Laborers Local 190 (VP Builders, Inc.), 355 NLRB 532, 534 (2010), where the General Counsel’s representations would reasonably have led the respondent to believe that it would not have to defend itself on the basis of the unalleged theory.

Violations based on unalleged conduct.

For cases involving this situation, see UnitedHealth Group, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 134, slip op. at 2 (2016) (finding that the respondents’ district court motion to compel individual arbitration of the employee’s claims violated 8(a)(1), even though the unfair labor practice complaint only alleged that the maintenance of the mandatory arbitration policy violated 8(a)(1), as the motion was filed with the court after the complaint issued, the enforcement violation “flows from, and depends entirely on” the alleged maintenance violation, and the enforcement issue was fully litigated as the respondents stipulated that they filed the motion pursuant to the arbitration policy); Irving Ready-Mix, Inc., 357 NLRB 1272, 1285 n. 13 (2011) (finding that certain unalleged but admitted statements by a manager violated 8(a)(1) where the complaint alleged that other statements by the same manager during the same phone conversation violated 8(a)(1)); Hi-Tech Cable Corp., 318 NLRB 280 (1995) (finding that unalleged statements by two managers violated 8(a)(1) where the complaint alleged other 8(a)(1) violations, including an interrogation by one of the same managers in the same conversation, and the respondent did not object to the testimony about the statements, cross-examined the witnesses and presented its own witnesses to testify about them, and addressed their legality in its posthearing brief), enfd. in part 128 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1997); and Meisner Electric, Inc., 316 NLRB 597 (1995) (finding that an unalleged statement by the respondent’s foreman violated 8(a)(1) where the complaint alleged other
unnlawful statements by the same foreman in the same speech and the foreman raised the issue and admitted making the statement while testifying on direct examination by the respondent’s counsel), affd. mem. 83 F.3d 436 (11th Cir. 1996).

But compare Dalton School, 364 NLRB No. 18 (2016) (8(a)(1) interrogation was not fully litigated, notwithstanding that the interrogation was related to the alleged 8(a)(1) termination and respondent relied on it as a defense to that allegation, as respondent was not put on notice that the pertinent facts would be used to prove an interrogation violation); Piggly Wiggly Midwest, 357 NLRB 2344, 2345 (2012) (8(a)(5) refusal to provide certain information was not fully litigated, even though respondent presented evidence on the issue, as the respondent had no reason, in the absence of a complaint allegation or amendment, to attempt to substantiate its previous response to the union that it was impossible to provide the information as requested); Dilling Mechanical Contractors, 348 NLRB 98, 105 (2006) (8(a)(3) refusal to hire was not fully litigated, even though the parties presented evidence regarding the underlying conduct, as that evidence was also relevant to the 8(a)(1) complaint allegation that the respondent had breached an earlier settlement agreement, the violations involved different burdens of proof, and none of the parties argued that the conduct violated 8(a)(3) in their posthearing briefs); Desert Aggregates, 340 NLRB 289, 292–293 (2003) (manager’s unalleged statement during a captive-audience meeting was not fully litigated where the manager’s testimony regarding his statement “emerged incidentally,” during General Counsel’s cross-examination, and the General Counsel’s failure to move to amend the complaint during trial may have hindered the respondent in presenting exculpatory evidence); and Champion International Corp., 339 NLRB 672 (2003) (finding that litigation of the alleged 8(a)(5) unilateral-change violation did not establish that the parties also fully litigated the unalleged 8(a)(5) direct-dealing violation). See also Teamsters “General” Local 200, 357 NLRB 1844, 1845 (2011) (judge improperly found an 8(b)(1)(A) violation as his statements in response to the General Counsel’s motion on the first day of hearing to add the allegation led respondent to reasonably believe that it would not have to defend against that allegation).

Unnamed Discriminatees

Situations sometimes also arise where the judge must decide whether it is appropriate to find a violation and/or grant a remedy with respect to an unnamed discriminatee. “Where the General Counsel has alleged and proven discrimination against a defined and easily identified class of employees, the Board, with court approval, has found it appropriate to extend remedial relief to all members of that class, including individuals not named in the complaint,” leaving “the question of precisely which individuals comprise the class [to be] considered at the compliance stage of the case.” Iron Workers Local 433 (Reynolds Electrical), 298 NLRB 35, 35–36 (1990) (citations omitted), enf'd. mem. 931 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Denholme & Mohr, Inc., 292 NLRB 61 n. 1 (1988) (judge properly found that a previously unnamed discriminatee’s discharge violated the Act—even though the complaint specifically named the other three discriminatees and the General Counsel indicated that the unnamed, fourth discriminatee had chosen not to participate—as the sole issue at hearing was whether the group of employees as a whole, rather than individually, were discriminatorily discharged).

Compare *Merchants Bldg. Maintenance, 358 NLRB 578, 579–580 (2012) (rejecting the General Counsel’s request, in a refusal to hire case, to grant a remedy to a previously unnamed discriminatee where: (1) the complaint specifically named 22 other individual discriminatees and did not include “with others unknown” or similar catch-all language; (2) the General Counsel reasonably should have known about the additional discriminatee; and (3) the General Counsel
did not request a remedy for the additional discriminatee until the case reached the Board), and cases cited there.

§ 3–400  Consolidation and Severance

§ 3–410  General Principles

Before issuance of a complaint, the General Counsel or the Regional Director has exclusive authority to consolidate or sever cases. The Regional Director also retains the authority to consolidate or sever on his or her own motion after the complaint issues, but only until the hearing has opened. NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.33(a)–(d).

After issuance of the complaint and before the hearing opens, the Chief Judge or Deputy or Associate Chief Judge in the appropriate office may consolidate or sever cases on motion of any party. After the hearing has opened, a motion for consolidation or severance is made to and ruled on by the trial judge. Secs. 102.33(d), 102.24, 102.25, and 102.35(a)(8).

Whether to grant or deny the motion is within the judge’s discretion, “considering such factors as the risk that matters litigated in [an earlier trial] will have to be relitigated in [a second trial] and the likelihood of delay if consolidation, or severance, is granted.” Service Employees Local 87 (Cresleigh Management), 324 NLRB 774, 775–776 (1997). See also Affinity Medical Center, 364 NLRB No. 66 (2016) (judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the General Counsel’s motion to consolidate three new complaints with the existing “highly complex 118-page amended consolidated complaint” given that the old and new allegations were not sufficiently intertwined to require consolidation and could be effectively litigated separately, and consolidation would cause significant delay in the ongoing proceeding); and McDonald’s USA, LLC, 363 NLRB No. 91 (2016) (judge did not abuse her discretion in denying motion to sever consolidated complaints against McDonald’s and numerous franchisees and to require separate complaints and hearings for each where the General Counsel alleged that they were joint employers).

With respect to compliance proceedings, see Sec. 102.54(b) and (c) of the Board’s Rules regarding consolidation of a complaint and related compliance specification. See also Airport Bus Service, 273 NLRB 561 n. 4 (1984) (judge properly granted the General Counsel’s motion to consolidate the unfair labor practice cases with a backpay specification in prior cases).

§ 3–420  Consolidation

The Board generally disfavors piecemeal litigation. Thus, the General Counsel is expected to consolidate all pending charges into one complaint and litigate all known issues in one case. See Peyton Packing Co., 129 NLRB 1358, 1360 (1961) (where the General Counsel had alleged and litigated certain conduct as an 8(a)(1) violation in an earlier proceeding, that same conduct could not be alleged and litigated as an 8(a)(5) violation in a separate proceeding); and Jefferson Chemical Co., Inc., 200 NLRB 992 n. 3 (1972) (where, notwithstanding a broad 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain charge, the General Counsel had alleged only a narrow unilateral change violation in an earlier proceeding and disavowed any allegation of general bad-faith bargaining, the General Counsel could not subsequently allege and litigate in a separate proceeding a surface bargaining violation based on events occurring before the hearing had opened in the earlier proceeding).
However, this is not a “blanket rule” that requires consolidation into one proceeding of all charges filed against the same respondent that arise during the pendency of that proceeding. As the Board stated in **Affinity Medical Center**, 364 NLRB No. 68 (2016), “**Jefferson Chemical** and **Peyton Packing** have been narrowly limited to their factual situations,” and “only apply to cases involving the relitigation of the same conduct.” Slip op. at 2 (citations omitted). Thus, the Board in **Affinity** found no bar to litigating the allegations in three new consolidated complaints separately as they were “factually independent” of those in the ongoing consolidated proceeding. The Board also noted that the judge had denied the General Counsel’s motion to consolidate the new complaints with the consolidated complaint in the ongoing proceeding.

See also **Maremont Corp. World Parts Division**, 249 NLRB 216, 216–217 (1980) (finding no bar to litigating an allegation in a separate proceeding where the General Counsel learned of the alleged violation just 6 days before the hearing in the earlier proceeding and the judge in that proceeding denied the General Counsel’s motion on the first day of hearing to add the allegation to the complaint); **Harrison Steel Castings Co.**, 255 NLRB 1426, 1426–1427 (1981) (finding no bar to litigating an allegation where the underlying charge was not filed until after the hearing in the earlier proceeding closed, the allegation was “not intertwined with” those in the earlier proceeding, and there was no evidence that the General Counsel knew about or should have discovered the alleged violation during the earlier proceeding); and **Frontier Hotel and Casino**, 324 NLRB 1225 (1997) (finding no bar to litigating an allegation where it involved a “discreet act” that did not occur until well after the lengthy hearing in the earlier proceeding opened).

Indeed, in **Cresleigh Management**, above, the Board found no bar even where the complaint was issued before the hearing on the complaint in the earlier proceeding. The Board stated that, “even when the General Counsel fails to consolidate cases that normally should be consolidated,” dismissal is improper “in the absence of a showing of prejudice to a party.” 324 NLRB at 776. Accord: **U-Haul of Nevada, Inc.**, 345 NLRB 1301, 1302 (2005), enf’d. 490 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

**§ 3–430 Severance or Bifurcation**

As indicated above, a judge has the authority, after a trial opens, to sever cases previously consolidated by the Regional Director. See, e.g., **Adair Standish Corp.**, 283 NLRB 668, 669–671 (1987) (affirming judge’s order granting the charging party’s motion, over the respondent’s objection, to sever the technical 8(a)(5) test-of-certification case from the 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) case), enf’d mem. 875 F.2d 866 (6th Cir. 1989), cited with approval in **Storer Cable TV of Texas**, 292 NLRB 140 (1988). But see **Quaker Tool & Die, Inc.**, 169 NLRB 1148 (1968) (trial examiner erred in sua sponte issuing an order after the close of the hearing severing two 8(a)(5) allegations that related to the same alleged unilateral action and had been fully litigated at the hearing).

Occasionally, a respondent may seek to sever and/or bifurcate litigation of particular issues raised by the complaint. For example, if the respondent is challenging the Board’s jurisdiction or asserting a Section 10(b) limitations defense, it may seek to have such issues addressed before the unfair labor practice allegations are litigated. This likewise appears to be a matter within the ALJ’s discretion. See **Asociacion Hospital del Maestro**, 317 NLRB 485, 490 (1995) (denying the respondent’s appeal of the judge’s denial of its motion to bifurcate the trial and litigate respondent’s Sec. 10(b) statute of limitations defense before the merits); and **Gulfport Stevedoring Assn.**, 15-CA-096939, unpub. Board order issued Sept. 9, 2013 (2013 WL 4782797) (denying respondent’s motion to dismiss without prejudice to renewing its
jurisdictional arguments, and any request to bifurcate the hearing, before the ALJ). See also
\textit{NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc.}, 316 F.3d 995, 1002 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that
the ALJ denied the respondent’s motion to sever); and \textit{Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of
Shipbuilding Corp.}, 303 U.S. 41, 51 (1938) (merely holding the unfair labor practice hearing is
not irreparable harm).

But see \textit{U.S. Gypsum}, 284 NLRB 4, 8 (1987). In that case, the General Counsel set
aside a settlement agreement because of the respondent’s alleged postsettlement unfair labor
practices, and issued a complaint containing both the postsettlement allegations and the
presettlement allegations. The judge ruled that the postsettlement allegations would be litigated
and decided before litigating the presettlement allegations because there would no basis to set
aside the settlement and litigate the presettlement allegations if the postsettlement allegations
were without merit. (See § 9–800, Setting Aside Settlement Agreements, below.) The Board,
however, granted the General Counsel’s special appeal, and directed the judge to permit the
introduction of all evidence relating to all the consolidated cases for hearing.

Compare \textit{McDonald’s USA, LLC}, 363 NLRB No. 92 (2016) (denying respondents’
special appeal and finding that the judge did not abuse her discretion by issuing a case
management order in the consolidated proceeding providing that the General Counsel and
charging parties would present evidence on the alleged joint employer status of the respondents
before presenting evidence on the merits of the alleged unfair labor practices).

Relevant factors to consider may include the anticipated length of the trial on the
jurisdictional, 10(b), or other threshold issue and the remaining issues; whether the same
witnesses will be testifying on all issues; and the possible adverse impact on the memory and
availability of witnesses if litigation of the remaining issues is delayed. Compare FRCP 42(b)
(authorizing federal courts to order a separate trial of one or more separate issues or claims “for
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize”), discussed in \textit{Gensler, 1
2017); and \textit{Hoyt v. Career Systems Development Corp.}, 2010 WL 2653368 (S.D. Cal. June 30,
2010) (denying the defendant company’s motion, in an employment discrimination case, to
bifurcate and litigate the threshold issue of the plaintiff’s status as an independent contractor or
an employee, given that the motion was not filed until 6 business days before trial and 17 of
plaintiff’s 20 witnesses would be testifying about both that issue and the substantive
discrimination claims).

§ 3–500 Answer to Complaint

Section 102.20 of the Board’s Rules sets forth the requirements for an answer. It provides
that, if no answer is timely filed within 14 days after service, all allegations of the complaint are
deemed to be admitted as true. It further provides that the answer must “specifically admit, deny,
or explain each of the facts alleged in the complaint, unless the respondent is without knowledge,
in which case the respondent shall so state, such statement operating as a denial.” See, e.g.,

Although not identical, Section 102.20 is similar to FRCP 8. Thus, court decisions
construing FRCP 8 may provide useful guidance in applying Section 102.20 where the Board has
not specifically addressed the matter. See \textit{Gensler, 1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules
and Commentary Rule 8} (database updated Feb. 2017); and \textit{State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.}

Sham responses. A response that the respondent is without knowledge may be stricken as a sham where the allegation involves the respondent’s own conduct or is otherwise within its knowledge. See Information Processing SVC, Inc., 330 NLRB No. 95 (2000) (striking pro se respondent’s responses to the service, jurisdictional, and supervisory allegations of the complaint), citing DPM of Kansas, 261 NLRB 220 n. 2 (1982). See also § 6–620 below, regarding the judge’s authority to admonish or reprimand counsel for denying allegations without good cause and purely for delay.

Late Answer. Section 102.2(d) of the Board’s Rules states that an answer to a complaint “may be filed within a reasonable time after the time prescribed by these Rules only upon good cause shown based on excusable neglect and when no undue prejudice would result.” The rule further requires that the late answer be accompanied by “a motion that states the grounds relied on for requesting permission to file untimely,” and that “the specific facts relied on to support the motion . . . be set forth in affidavit form and sworn to by individuals with personal knowledge of the facts.” See also Elevator Constructors Local 2 (Unitec Elevator Services Co.), 337 NLRB 426, 428 (2002) (Board strictly adheres to affidavit requirement).

Amended Answer. Under Section 102.23 of the Board’s Rules, a respondent may amend its answer at any time before the hearing. After the hearing opens, the judge has the discretion to permit an amended answer. Motions to amend an answer, particularly when they come early in the hearing and there is no prejudice to the General Counsel, should probably be viewed favorably. See FRCP 15(a)(2); and Hylton v. John Deere Co., 802 F.2d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 1986) (district court judge did not abuse his discretion by granting the defendants in a products liability case leave to amend their answer to respond to two allegations in the amended complaint that they had inadvertently failed to respond to). And see Baron Honda-Pontiac, 316 NLRB 611 (1995) (undenied allegation in amended complaint was not deemed admitted because it was substantially unchanged from the denied allegation in the initial complaint).

However, in St. George Warehouse, Inc., 349 NLRB 870 (2007), the Board held that the judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the respondent’s motion, on the second day of trial, to amend its answer to deny a supervisory-status allegation that it had previously admitted, assertedly by mistake. Motions to amend an answer have also been held untimely when made at the end of the respondent’s case in chief. Oak Harbor Freight Lines, Inc., 358 NLRB 328, 332 n. 2 (2012), reaf fd. 361 NLRB No. 82 (2014) (denying motion to allege an additional affirmative defense). See also the additional cases cited in the sections below regarding affirmative defenses.

See also § 16–801.3, Admission or Statement by Opposing Party, for discussion of the conclusive or evidentiary effect of admissions in pleadings.

Withdrawn Answer. Sometimes, pursuant to a settlement or for other reasons, a respondent may withdraw an answer. “The withdrawal of an answer has the same effect as a failure to file an answer, i.e., the allegations in the consolidated complaint must be considered to be true.” Rock Technologies, 346 NLRB No. 68, slip op. 1 (2006).

Motions for default or summary judgment. The failure to file a sufficient answer or to deny the complaint allegations may warrant issuance of a default or summary judgment. See, e.g., Intersystems Design, 267 NLRB 1310, 1311 (1983) (finding that the respondent’s plea of “nolo
contendere" to certain allegations constituted an admission and warranted granting summary judgment as to those allegations).

In most cases in which no answer or an insufficient answer is filed, the General Counsel files a motion for default judgment directly with the Board pursuant to Section 102.24(b) of the Board’s Rules. F.A. Ford Electrical Contracting, Inc., 296 NLRB No. 84 n. 1 (1989). Motions for default judgment must be filed no later than 28 days before the scheduled hearing and are filed with the Executive Secretary of the Board and not the Division of Judges. However, if for any reason the General Counsel fails to file a motion for default judgment within the time prescribed by Section 102.24(b), the motion may be filed with the judge. See § 10–400, Motions for Summary and Default Judgment, below.

§ 3–550 Affirmative Defenses

Affirmative defenses must be pled in an answer or timely raised at the hearing. Affirmative defenses raised for the first time after the hearing are untimely and may be considered waived. See, e.g., EF International Language Schools, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 20, slip op. at 1 n. 2 (2015) (defense that allegation is barred by Sec. 10(b) limitations period), enf’d. 673 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017); and Springfield Manor, 295 NLRB 17 n. 2 (1989) (defense that alleged discriminatee is a supervisor), and additional cases discussed in §§ 3–600 through 3–770, below.

Defenses may be stricken if they are not recognized affirmative defenses in law or are irrelevant to the issues set for hearing. See, e.g., Harding Glass Co., 347 NLRB 1112, 1115 (2006) (granting the General Counsel’s motion to strike several of the respondent’s affirmative defenses to the backpay specification as they were without merit as a matter of law), enf’d. 500 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 935 (2008); TNT Logistics, North America, 346 NLRB 1301 n. 1 (2006) (upholding judge’s pretrial order granting the General Counsel’s motion in limine to strike seven of the respondent’s eight affirmative defenses as that they raised irrelevant matters), enf’d. 246 Fed. Appx. 220 (4th Cir. 2007); Tri-county Paving, Inc., 342 NLRB 1213, 1216 (2004) (striking defenses in a refusal-to-hire case that challenged the alleged discriminatees’ status as bona fide applicants); Electrical Workers Local 1316 (Superior Contractors), 271 NLRB 338, 340 (1984) (striking, as irrelevant and immaterial, respondent’s affirmative defense regarding the charging party’s motivation in filing the charge); and additional cases discussed in § 3–700, Other Affirmative Defenses, below. See also FRCP 12(f) (authorizing courts to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter,” either on its own or on motion by a party).

A defense should also be stricken if it is interposed to engage in a “fishing expedition” to discover evidence needed to support the defense. See Flum Appetizing Corp., 357 NLRB 2006, 2010–2011 (2011) (striking the employer’s affirmative defenses in the backpay proceeding asserting that the discriminatees were undocumented aliens, as the employer failed, in response to motion for particulars, to articulate any factual support, or reason to believe it could obtain such factual support, for the defenses), and cases cited therein.

The General Counsel is not required to anticipate and negate an affirmative defense in the complaint. See Flying Food Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 471 F.3d 178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and cases cited there.
§ 3–600  Section 10(b) Affirmative Defense

Section 10(b) of the Act is a statute of limitations. It generally “extinguishes liability for unfair labor practices committed more than 6 months prior to the filing of the charge.” NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 309 n.9 (1959). For a complete analysis, see Machinists Lodge 1424 (Bryan Mfg. Co.) v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 414–429 (1960).

Section 10(b) is not jurisdictional. It is an affirmative defense and, if not timely raised in the answer or at the hearing, it is waived. EF International Language Schools, above; Approved Electric Corp., 356 NLRB 238 n. 1 (2010); and Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 339 NLRB 650, 653 n.8 (2003), enfd. in part 402 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005).

§ 3–610  Computation of Section 10(b) Period

The Section 10(b) period commences only when a party has “clear and unequivocal notice of a violation.” Leach Corp., 312 NLRB 990, 991–992 (1993), enfd. 54 F.3d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The burden of showing notice is on the party raising the 10(b) affirmative defense. Ibid.

The requisite notice may be actual or constructive, i.e., sufficient notice may be found if the party should have become aware of a violation in the exercise of reasonable diligence. See, e.g., Castle Hill Health Care Center, 355 NLRB 1156, 1191 (2010); and Moeller Bros. Body Shop, 306 NLRB 191, 192 (1992). However, constructive notice will not be found where a delay in filing is a consequence of conflicting signals or otherwise ambiguous conduct. A & L Underground, 302 NLRB 467, 469 (1991). See also Taylor Ridge Paving and Construction Co., 365 NLRB No. 168, slip op. at 3–4 (2017); and Cab Associates, 340 NLRB 1391, 1392 (2003).

In Postal Service Marina Center, 271 NLRB 397, 397–400 (1984), the Board held that the Section 10(b) period is computed from the date of the alleged unlawful act, rather than the date its consequences become effective. Thus, an employee who received notice that he would be terminated, but waited to file a charge until the termination became effective—more than 6 months from the date of the notice—was barred by Section 10(b) from filing the charge. This rule, however, is restricted to discriminatory discharge cases. It does not apply in refusal to bargain cases. See Howard Electrical, 293 NLRB 472, 475 (1989), enfd. mem. 931 F2d 63 (10th Cir. 1991); and Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 746 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1989). See also Leach Corp., above, 312 NLRB at 991 n. 7 (the Sec. 10(b) period for an 8(a)(5) charge, involving a plant transfer and withdrawal of recognition, did not begin until a “substantial percentage” of employees had been transferred).

In computing the time, the day on which the unfair labor practice occurred is excluded. MacDonald’s Industrial Products, 281 NLRB 577 (1986).

§ 3–620  Not a Rule of Evidence

Evidence may be admitted concerning events outside the 10(b) period if the evidence is used only as background and not to prove a time-barred unfair labor practice. Machinists Lodge 1424 (Bryan Mfg. Co.) v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 414–429 (1960) (“earlier events may be utilized to shed light on the true character of matters occurring within the limitations period”). See also Monongahela Power Co., 324 NLRB 214, 214–215 (1997) (admissible to shed light on the respondent’s motivation).
However, when the conduct within the 10(b) period can be found to be an unfair labor practice only through reliance upon an earlier unfair labor practice, evidence of the earlier conduct cannot be used because "it does not simply lay bare a putative current unfair labor practice," but "serves to cloak with illegality that which was otherwise lawful." *Bryan Mfg.*, above, 362 U.S. at 417–418 (allegation that the employer and the union unlawfully maintained and enforced a facially lawful union security agreement outside the 10(b) period was barred because the allegation required the General Counsel to prove that the union lacked majority status, and that the agreement was therefore unlawful, at the time it was executed). See also *Teamsters Local 27 (Combined Containair Industries)*, 209 NLRB 883, 883–884 (1974).

§ 3–630 Continuing Violations

Violations that are continuing in nature are not barred by Section 10(b). Thus, an allegation that an employer maintained an unlawful rule within the 10(b) period is timely, even if the respondent promulgated the rule outside the period. *Control Services*, 305 NLRB 435 n. 2, 442 (1991), citing *Alamo Cement Co.*, 277 NLRB 1031, 1036–1037 (1985). There is likewise no 10(b) bar to finding that a contractual provision was unlawfully maintained and enforced more than 6 months after the contract was executed. *Central Pennsylvania Regional Council of Carpenters*, 337 NLRB 1030 (2002), enf’d. 352 F.3d 831 (3d Cir. 2003) (anti-dual shop clause); and *Teamsters Local 293 (R. L. Lipton Distributing)*, 311 NLRB 538, 539 (1993) (shop steward superseniority clause). But see *Bryan Mfg.*, above.

Similarly, if the employer simply fails to abide by certain contract provisions, without repudiating the contract, each successive contract breach constitutes a separate unfair labor practice. However, if the charging party had received clear and unequivocal notice of the total contract repudiation before the 10(b) cutoff date, it is time barred from subsequently alleging contract violations within the 10(b) period. See *Springfield Day Nursery*, 362 NLRB No. 30, slip op. at 3–4 (2015); *Vallow Floor Coverings, Inc.*, 335 NLRB 20 (2001); and *A & L Underground*, 302 NLRB 467, 468–469 (1991), and cases cited there. See also *Chambersburg County Market*, 293 NLRB 654, 655 (1989) (“a charge alleging an unlawful refusal to execute a bargaining contract is cognizable only when filed within 6 months”).

§ 3–635 Backpay for Continuing Violations

Where a continuing violation is found, and the charging party did not know or have reason to know of the original violation, the usual make whole remedy from the date of the original violation is normally appropriate, i.e., backpay may be ordered beyond the 10(b) period, even in the absence of any fraudulent concealment. See *Vallow Floor Coverings*, above, 335 NLRB at 20–21 (ordering employer to pay backpay since 1991, even though the charge was not filed until 6 years later, in 1997).

§ 3–640 Fraud or Deception

Fraudulent concealment of facts of an unfair labor practice from a charging party tolls Section 10(b) as to both the violation and the remedy, unless the charging party failed to exercise due diligence. See *Burgess Construction*, 227 NLRB 765, 766 (1977) (fraudulent concealment found where the respondent fraudulently and deceitfully assured the union it would no longer employ carpenters), enf’d. 596 F.2d 378 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 940 (1979), and cases cited there.
For fraudulent concealment of facts from the General Counsel, see the next section.

§ 3–650 Revival of Withdrawn or Dismissed Charge

As a general rule, the General Counsel may not revive a withdrawn or finally dismissed charge after the Section 10(b) period has run. Ducane Heating Corp., 273 NLRB 1389, 1390–1391 (1985), enfd. mem. 785 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986). There are, however, three exceptions to the general rule:

1) Fraudulent Concealment. If material facts have been concealed from the General Counsel, a dismissed or withdrawn charge may be revived. Kanakis Co., 293 NLRB 435, 435–437 (1989) (affidavit submitted to and relied on by the General Counsel in dismissing the charge was later discovered to have been perjured). Compare Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 321 NLRB 924, 924–925 (1996), rev. denied 130 F.3d 1083, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied 524 U.S. 926 (1998) (finding no fraudulent concealment of material facts regarding alleged bad-faith bargaining because the General Counsel did not ask for or demand information about certain issues); and Benfield Electric Co., 331 NLRB 590, 591–592 (2000) (finding no fraudulent concealment where the attorney’s position statement was not forthcoming about his client’s true motive but did not attempt to conceal material facts).

Three elements are required to establish fraudulent concealment: (1) deliberate concealment, (2) of material facts, and (3) the injured party was ignorant of those facts without any fault or want of due diligence on its part. Brown & Sharpe, above, 321 NLRB at 924. In Morgan’s Holiday Markets, 333 NLRB 837, 840–841 (2001), the Board clarified that “material facts” means concealed evidence that would, “as an objective matter, make the critical difference in determining whether or not there was a reasonable cause to believe the Act was violated.”

2) Noncompliance with Informal Settlement Agreement. If charges are withdrawn or dismissed as a consequence of an informal settlement agreement approved by the Agency, and the respondent does not comply with the terms of the settlement, Section 10(b) does not bar revival of the charges. Settlements are subject to an implicit condition that they will be carried out and that unfair labor practices will not be resumed. See Sterling Nursing Home, 316 NLRB 413, 416 (1995).

3) Closely Related to Current Complaint. If a viable and timely charge exists and the General Counsel seeks to add allegations that were contained in a previously withdrawn or dismissed charge, the closely related test applies. Redd-I, Inc., 290 NLRB 1115, 1115–1116 (1988); Sonicraft, Inc. v. NLRB, 905 F.2d 146, 148–149 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024 (1991); and Pioneer Hotel, Inc. v. NLRB, 182 F.3d 939, 944–945 (D.C. Cir. 1999), enfg. in part 324 NLRB 918 n. 1 (1997). See also § 3–210, Complaint Closely Related to Timely Charge, and § 3–330, Amendments and Section 10(b), above.

Finally, the general rule set forth in Ducane prohibiting revival of dismissed charges does not apply to a charge that has not been finally dismissed and is pending before the General Counsel on appeal. See § 3–140, Withdrawal or Dismissal, above.

§ 3–660 Potential Violations Uncovered During Investigation of Charges

The Regional Office is not required to limit the investigation of a charge to the specific unfair labor practices alleged therein. See NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 307–309 (1959) (“Once its jurisdiction is invoked the Board must be left free to make full inquiry under its
broad investigatory power in order properly to discharge the duty of protecting public rights which Congress has imposed upon it. There can be no justification for confining such an inquiry to the precise particularizations of a charge.

Section 10062.5 of the NLRB Casehandling Manual provides that, where the Regional Office’s investigation uncovers evidence of other unfair labor practices not specified in the charge, the Region should make a determination whether the charge is sufficient to support the additional allegations, and, if it is not, the charging party should be apprised of the deficiency and given an opportunity to file an amended charge.

Although the Casehandling Manual is not binding on the Board (see § 3–730, below), the Board has implicitly approved the foregoing procedure. See Leukemia and Lymphoma Society, 363 NLRB No. 123 (2016). In that case, the respondent moved to dismiss certain allegations involving its handbook rules because the allegations were unrelated to the charge; the Region evaluated the handbook on its own initiative; and the charging party amended the charge to include the handbook allegations at the Region’s suggestion or direction. The Board found “no merit” in the respondent’s contention that the allegations were barred by Section 10(b) in these circumstances, noting that the investigative procedure respondent described “conforms to Section 10062.5 of the NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part One) Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings.”

§ 3–700 Other Affirmative Defenses

§ 3–710 Misconduct of Charging Party

Alleged misconduct of a charging party is ordinarily not a defense to an unfair labor practice. See Carpenters Local 621 (Consolidated Constructors), 169 NLRB 1002, 1003 (1968), enf. 406 F.2d 1081 (1st Cir. 1969); and Plumbers Local 457 (Bomat Plumbing and Heating), 131 NLRB 1243, 1245–1247 (1961), enf. 299 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1962).

But, as a legal matter, if proof of misconduct could affect the unfair labor practice findings, an affirmatively pleaded defense to that effect must be heard. This applies even though the misconduct was the subject of a charge that was dismissed by the General Counsel. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 274 (Warwick Caterers), 269 NLRB 482, 482–483 (1984). See also Chicago Tribune Co., 304 NLRB 259, 259–261 (1991) (bad-faith bargaining by the union may be raised as a defense to bad-faith bargaining by the respondent, even though the General Counsel dismissed the charge of union bad-faith bargaining). Compare Greyhound Lines, 319 NLRB 554, 555–557 (1995) (affirmative defense based on alleged union misconduct was stricken because no nexus was shown between the alleged misconduct and the respondent’s refusal to bargain, which was the subject of the complaint).

Alleged charging party misconduct may also be relevant to the remedy. See Laura Modes Co., 144 NLRB 1592, 1596 (1963); and Allou Distributors, 201 NLRB 47, 47–48 (1973) (finding that union violence warranted withholding the normal bargaining order and instead directing an election). Compare Cascade Corp., 192 NLRB 533 n. 2 (1971) (distinguishing Laura Modes), enf. denied on other grounds 466 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1972); and Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 235 NLRB 363, 365–366 (1978) (provocation must be weighed), enf. as modified 628 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
§ 3–720 Laches

Apart from the restrictions of Section 10(b) of the Act, the Board generally does not apply the doctrine of laches to itself or the General Counsel. See **Entergy Mississippi, Inc.**, 361 NLRB No. 89 (2014) (considerable delay by the Board in issuing the backpay specification does not warrant a reduction in the backpay award even assuming the delay contravenes the APA), affd. in relevant part 810 F.3d 287, 298–299 (5th Cir. 2015). See also **Midwest Terminals of Toledo**, 365 NLRB No. 157, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2017), reaaff. 362 NLRB No. 57, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2015) (rejecting defense even though the supervisor allegedly made the 8(a)(1) statement over 4 years before the hearing commenced and he no longer worked for the company and was unavailable as a witness); **United Electrical Contractors Assn.**, 347 NLRB 1, 2–3 (2006) (denying motion to dismiss complaint against members of the employer association, notwithstanding the General Counsel’s “inordinate and inexcusable” 5 ½ year delay in naming them as respondents, given the absence of any showing of prejudice); and **Human Development Assn.**, 348 NLRB 677 (2006) (rejecting defense despite the 13-year delay between enforcement of the Board’s remedial order and issuance of the compliance specification), enfd. 275 Fed. Appx. 64 (2d Cir. 2008).

But see **Garvey Marine, Inc.**, 328 NLRB 991, 995–997 (1999); and **Wallace International of Puerto Rico**, 328 NLRB 29 (1999) (Board considers passage of time as a factor in evaluating whether to issue a Gissel bargaining order).

§ 3–730 Inadequate Investigation/Compliance with Casehandling Manual

Due process claims are tested not by analysis of the investigation, but by analysis of the complaint allegations. Thus, the adequacy of the General Counsel’s investigation may not be litigated in the unfair labor practice hearing. **Redway Carriers**, 274 NLRB 1359, 1371 (1985). See also **Laborers Local 135 (Bechtel Power Corp.)**, 301 NLRB 1066, 1068 n. 19 (1991) (citing the same rule in a compliance proceeding).

Respondents may also argue that the General Counsel failed to follow the NLRB Casehandling Manual. However, the Casehandling Manual provides guidance only and is not binding on the General Counsel or the Board. See **Hempstead Lincoln Mercury Motors Corp.**, 349 NLRB 552 n. 4 (2007); and **Offshore Mariners United**, 338 NLRB 745, 746 (2002), and cases cited therein.

But see § 6–203, “Skip Counsel” Violations, below.

§ 3–740 Deferral to Grievance Arbitration

It is well settled that deferral to the grievance and arbitration machinery of the collective-bargaining agreement is an affirmative defense that must be timely raised in the answer to the complaint or at the trial. **Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co.**, 361 NLRB No. 132, slip op. at 10 (2014). Therefore, the respondent’s assertion of this defense after the trial closes is untimely. **SEIU United Healthcare Workers–West**, 350 NLRB 284 n. 1 (2007), enf’d. 574 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2009); **Milford Manor Nursing & Rehabilitation Center**, 346 NLRB 50, 51 (2005); and **Master Mechanical Insulation**, 320 NLRB 1134 n. 2 (1996). See also **Wisconsin Bell Telephone**, 346 NLRB 62, 64, n. 8 (2005) (although the respondent raised deferral as an affirmative defense in its answer, it waived the argument by failing to raise the issue subsequently at the hearing or in its brief to the judge).
Burden of proof. The burden is on the moving party to prove that prearbitral deferral is warranted. See, e.g., *King Soopers*, 364 NLRB No. 93, slip op. at 22–23 (2016), enfd. in relevant part 859 F.3d 23, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2017); *Regency Heritage Nursing & Rehabilitation Center*, 360 NLRB 794, 806 (2014), enfd. 657 Fed. Appx. 129 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied 137 S.Ct. 1229 (2017); and *Rickel Home Centers*, 262 NLRB 731 (1982). The Board has found prearbitral deferral appropriate when the dispute arises within the confines of a long and productive bargaining relationship; there is no claim of animosity to the exercise of employee statutory rights; the parties’ agreement provides for arbitration of a very broad range of disputes; the arbitration clause clearly encompasses the dispute; the employer has asserted its willingness to arbitrate the dispute; and the dispute is eminently well suited to resolution through arbitration. See *Wonder Bread*, 343 NLRB 55 (2004), citing *Collyer Insulated Wire*, 192 NLRB 837, 839 (1971), and *United Technologies Corp.*, 268 NLRB 557 (1984). In its 2014 decision in *Babcock & Wilcox*, above, the Board added that, with respect to future cases involving 8(a)(3) and (1) allegations, the parties must have explicitly authorized the arbitrator to decide the unfair labor practice issue, either in the collective-bargaining agreement or by agreement in that particular case.

With respect to postarbitral deferral, the Board has gone back and forth regarding who has the burden. In *Olin Corp.*, 268 NLRB 573, 574 (1984), the Board overruled precedent and held that the party opposing deferral has the burden of demonstrating that the standards for deferral have not been met, i.e. the party opposing deferral must show that the contractual issue is not factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue; that the arbitrator was not presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving that issue; and/or that the award is “clearly repugnant” to the Act. However, in *Babcock & Wilcox*, above, the Board again reversed course and held that, as with prearbitral deferral, the burden of proving that postarbitral deferral is appropriate in future 8(a)(3) and (1) cases is properly placed on the party urging deferral. The Board held that postarbitral deferral in such cases is appropriate only if the arbitration procedures appear to have been fair and regular, the parties agreed to be bound, and the proponent of deferral demonstrates that the parties presented the statutory unfair labor practice issue to the arbitrator, the arbitrator considered the statutory issue or was prevented from doing so by the party opposing deferral, and Board law reasonably permits the award, i.e. the arbitrator’s decision constitutes a reasonable application of the statutory principles that would govern a Board decision.

As indicated, *Babcock & Wilcox* applies only prospectively, i.e. it does not apply to 8(a)(3) and (1) cases pending at the time of the Board’s December 15, 2014 decision. Indeed, the Board stated that where current contracts do not authorize arbitrators to decide unfair labor practice issues, the new deferral standards will not apply until those contracts expire or the parties agree to present particular statutory issues to the arbitrator. However, if a contract already provides for arbitration of unfair labor practice issues or the parties have explicitly authorized the arbitrator to consider such issues in a particular case, the Board will apply the new criteria in those cases. Slip op. at 14.

Procedure. The judge should evaluate whether deferral is warranted before evaluating the merits of the complaint allegations. See *Olin Corp.*, 268 NLRB 573, 574 (1984), overruled on other grounds by *Babcock & Wilcox*, above. The judge appears to retain the discretion, however, whether to bifurcate litigation of the deferral and unfair labor practice issues. See *Sheet Metal Workers Local 18 (Everbrite, LLC)*, 359 NLRB No. 121, slip op. at 3 (2013) (“The Board has long held that . . . a deferral defense and the merits may be addressed in the same hearing . . .”); *Cargill, Inc.*, 17-CA-088608, unpub. Board order issued Jan. 3, 2014 (2014 WL 31718) (judge did not abuse her discretion in ruling that the scheduled unfair labor practice
hearing, which was anticipated to last only about 1–2 days, would proceed, and that evidence should be presented with respect to both the deferral issue raised by the respondent and the merits of the complaint); and *Bunge Milling, Inc.*, 33-CA-15997, unpub. Board order issued Dec. 30, 2011 (2011 WL 6886279) (judge did not abuse his discretion by requiring the parties to submit prehearing briefs on whether the Board should defer to an arbitrator’s decision and award).

If the facts relevant to the deferral issue are undisputed, it may be appropriate to address the issue without a hearing, either on a stipulation of facts or a motion to defer. See, e.g., *IAP World Services*, 358 NLRB 33 (2012) (Board affirmed judge’s decision dismissing/deferring the case pursuant to the parties’ stipulation of facts); *Certainteed Corp.*, 8-CA-73922, unpub. Board order issued Feb. 28, 2013 (2013 WL 772784) (Board granted respondent’s prehearing motion to dismiss/defer); *Southern California Edison Co.*, 310 NLRB 1229 (1993) (same), rev. denied 39 F.3d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1994); and *Specialized Distribution Management, Inc.*, 318 NLRB 158 (1995) (Board found that the judge properly deferred/ dismissed the complaint pursuant to the respondent’s pretrial motion). See also § 10–300, Motions to Dismiss, below. But see *BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles*, 361 NLRB No. 75 (2014) (judge should have held evidentiary hearing to determine whether grievance settlement was repugnant to the Act).

As indicated in the cases cited above, if the motion for pre or postarbitral deferral is granted, the complaint should be dismissed. However, if the motion is for prearbitral deferral, the decision should note that the Board retains jurisdiction for the limited purpose of entertaining an appropriate and timely motion for further consideration on a proper showing that either (a) the dispute has not, with reasonable promptness after the issuance of the Board’s decision, been either resolved by amicable settlement in the grievance procedure or submitted promptly to arbitration, or (b) deferral to the arbitration award is unwarranted.

**§ 3–750** Prior Settlement

A settlement agreement generally disposes of all issues unless the prior violations were unknown to the General Counsel, not readily discoverable by investigation, or specifically reserved from the settlement by the mutual understanding of the parties. *Hollywood Roosevelt Hotel*, 235 NLRB 1397 (1978). This so-called “settlement bar” rule is likewise an affirmative defense and is waived if not timely raised in the pleadings or at the hearing. See *Richard Mellow Electrical Contractors Corp.*, 327 NLRB 1112, 1112–1113 (1999). See also §§ 9–620, Reservation Clauses: Settlement Bar Rule, and § 13–400, Reliance on Settlements, below.

**§ 3–760** Section 8(g) Notice

A respondent’s assertion that the union failed to give notice under Section 8(g) of the Act is an affirmative defense. Therefore, raising the issue for the first time in a posthearing brief to the judge is untimely. *Vencare Ancillary Services*, 334 NLRB 965, 968–969 (2001), enf. denied on other grounds, 352 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2003).
CHAPTER 4. FILING AND SERVICE OF DOCUMENTS

§ 4–100  Filing of Documents

Under the Board’s Rules, as amended in 2017, all post-charge unfair labor practice case documents filed with the Agency, including the Division of Judges, must be e-filed utilizing the Agency’s website (www.nlrb.gov). If a party files such documents in paper format, it must explain why it could not e-file them or why doing so would be unduly burdensome. Documents may not be filed with the Agency via email without the prior approval of the receiving office. See Sec. 102.5(c).

The time requirements for filing are set forth in Section 102.2. In computing the time prescribed, the day the time period begins to run is not included; however, the last day is included unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. When the time period is less than 7 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays are excluded. See Sec. 102.2(a).

E-filed documents must be received by 11:59 p.m. of the time zone of the receiving office. Non e-filed documents must be received before the official closing time of the receiving office. However, with certain exceptions (charges, EAJA applications, petitions to revoke subpoenas, and requests for extension of time to file a document), the Board will accept as timely filed documents which are deposited with a delivery service at least one day before the due date, as shown by the postmark or other record provided by the delivery service. Sec. 102.2(b).

§ 4–200  Service of Documents

Service of documents on parties in Board proceedings is governed by the NLRA and the Board’s Rules rather than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Control Services, 303 NLRB 481, 481–482 (1991), enf'd. 961 F.2d 1568 (3d Cir. 1992). See Section 11(4) of the Act and the following sections of the Board’s Rules: 102.3 (date of service), 102.4 (service by the Agency), 102.5 (service by parties), and 102.14 (service of charges).

Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, depending on the type of document, service may be made by:

Personal service (charges, complaints, compliance specifications, ALJ decisions, Board orders, subpoenas, other Agency-issued documents, and documents served by a party on other parties).

Registered or certified mail (charges, complaints, compliance specifications, ALJ decisions, Board orders, subpoenas, other Agency-issued documents, and documents served by a party on other parties).

Private delivery service (charges, subpoenas, and documents served by a party on other parties).

Leaving a copy at the principal office or place of business of the person required to be served (complaints, compliance specifications, ALJ decisions, Board orders, subpoenas, other Agency-issued documents, and documents served by a party on other parties).
Email (charges with the permission of the person receiving the charge, complaints, compliance specifications, ALJ decisions, Board orders, subpoenas, other Agency-issued documents, and documents served by a party on other parties unless otherwise provided in the Rules).

Regular mail (charges, and documents served by a party on other parties).

Fax (charges, and documents served by a party on other parties).

Any other means with the consent of the party being served (charges and documents served by a party on other parties).

Any other method authorized by law (complaints, compliance specifications, ALJ decisions, Board orders, subpoenas, and other Agency-issued documents).

Section 102.4(e) requires that pleadings or other papers must also be served on any attorney or other representative of a party. When service is by the Board or its agents, the attorney or representative may be served by any means permitted by the Rules, including regular mail.

Note, however, that Section 102.5(f) states that, “unless otherwise specified elsewhere in these Rules, service on all parties must be made in the same manner as that used in filing the document with the Board, or in a more expeditious manner.”

§ 4–300 Determining Date of Service

The date of service is specified in Section 102.3 of the Board’s Rules as follows:

Personal service or fax: “the date on which the document is received.” See also Hardesty Co., 336 NLRB 258, 259 (2001) (presumption of employer’s receipt of union’s faxed information request was supported by fax confirmation report, which was not rebutted by testimonial denial of employer’s lawyer at trial), enfd. 308 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2002).

Private delivery service: “the day when the document . . . is deposited with a private delivery service that will provide a record showing the date the document was tendered to the delivery service.”

Mail: “the day when the document served is deposited in the United States mail.” See also Electrical Workers IUE (Spartus Corp.), 271 NLRB 607 (1984).

Email: “the day when the document . . . is sent by email.”

§ 4–400 Proof of Service

Section 11(4) of the Act and Sections 102.4(d) and 102.5(g) of the Board’s Rules specify certain methods of proof of service:

Personal service or delivery to a principal office or place of business: “the verified return by the serving individual, setting forth the manner of such service.”
Registered or certified mail: “the return post office receipt.”

Private delivery service: “the receipt from [the] service showing delivery.”

However, the same sections of the Board’s Rules state that the foregoing methods of service “are not exclusive; any sufficient proof may be relied upon to establish service.” See also CCY New Worktech, Inc., 329 NLRB 194 (1999) (service of a complaint by certified mail can be established by either an affidavit or the return post-office receipt).

Where service of documents is permitted by regular mail, the failure of the postal service to return the documents is sufficient to establish actual receipt. See, e.g., Omega Construction Services, LLC, 365 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2017); and Apex Electrical Services, 356 NLRB No. 172, slip op. at 1 n. 3 (2011), citing Lite Flight, Inc., 285 NLRB 649, 650 (1987), enf'd. 843 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1988).

Whether service is made by the Agency or by a private party, the person making service “shall submit a written statement of service . . . stating the names of the parties served and the date and manner of service”; however, “failure to make proof of service does not affect the validity of service.” NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.114(e). Thus, the absence of such a statement will not invalidate service, nor preclude other methods of proof of service. The Board has long held that procedural requirements regarding proof of service should be liberally construed. See Control Services, 303 NLRB 481, 481–482 (1991), enf'd. 961 F.2d 1568 (3d Cir. 1992). For example, in G. W. Truck, 240 NLRB 333, 334–335 (1979), proof of a charge’s service was based upon testimony by a Board agent, supported by her written description “almost contemporaneous with service,” of what had occurred when she served the charge.

§ 4–500 Failure of Service

A party’s failure to make timely service on other parties is a basis for either “rejecting the document,” or “[w]ithholding or reconsidering any ruling on the subject matter raised by the document until after service has been made and the served party has had reasonable opportunity to respond.” NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.5(i).

Ordinarily, the Board has been reluctant to reject a document due to lack of timely service. See Cameron Iron Works, 235 NLRB 287, 287–288 (1978), enf. denied on other grounds 591 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1979); Our Way, Inc., 244 NLRB 236 n. 1 (1979) (General Counsel’s failure to serve timely filed exceptions); and Terpening Trucking Co., 271 NLRB 96 n. 1 (1984) (respondent’s failure to serve exceptions on the charging party).

The Board has been particularly reluctant to do so if a party is unrepresented and if filing of that document otherwise complies with the Rules. See Tri-Way Security, 310 NLRB 1222, 1223 n. 5 (1993); and Acme Building Maintenance, 307 NLRB 358, 359 n. 6 (1992) (answer to complaint). However, in Active Metal Mfg., 316 NLRB 974, 974–975 (1995), a self-represented respondent’s timely-filed answer was rejected for failure to serve the charging party because there had been “repeated efforts” by the Region to apprise the respondent of its obligations but service was never made.
§ 4–600  Efforts to Frustrate Service

“[T]he Board has long held that a respondent’s failure or refusal to claim certified mail or to provide for receiving appropriate service will not be permitted to defeat the purposes of the Act”. *SMC Engineering & Contracting*, 324 NLRB 341 (1997) (complaint). Accord: *Apex Electrical Services*, 356 NLRB No. 172, slip op. at 1 n. 3 (2011) (compliance specification).

§ 4–700  Special Aspects of Service of Particular Documents

§ 4–710  Charges and Amended Charges

As discussed in § 3–120, above, under the proviso to Section 10(b) of the Act, a charge must be both filed with the Agency and served on the charged party within the 6-month limitations period. Where service is made by regular mail, service is timely if the charge was deposited in the mail during the 10(b) period. See § 4–300 above, and *Laborers Local 264 (D & G Construction Co.)*, 216 NLRB 40 n. 1, 43 (1975), affd. in relevant part 529 F.2d 778, 781–785 (8th Cir. 1976).

The charging party, not the Regional Office, is responsible for assuring timely service of a charge on the charged party. *Dun & Bradstreet Software Services*, 317 NLRB 84, 85 (1995), affd. 79 F.3d 1238, 1250 (1st Cir. 1996). Although the Regional Office will normally serve a copy of the charge on the charged party, this is merely a courtesy and does not relieve the charging party of its service obligation. NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.14(a) and (b), and Statements of Procedure, Sec. 101.4.

Technical defects in the manner of service will not necessarily invalidate the service. See *Control Services*, above, 303 NLRB at 481–482 (“when charges have in fact been received, technical defects in the form of service do not affect the validity of the service”). For example, service of an unsigned copy of a charge was held adequate in *Freightway Corp.*, 299 NLRB 531 (1990).

Further, the “failure to make timely service of a charge on a respondent will be cured by timely service within the 10(b) period of a complaint on the respondent, absent a showing that the respondent is prejudiced by [the] circumstances.” *Buckeye Plastic Molding*, 299 NLRB 1053 (1990).

Where there are multiple charged parties, service on only one of them is sufficient if they are:


Only charged parties must be served. Thus, a copy of a charge need not be served upon the labor organization that is asserted to be a party to an allegedly unlawful collective-bargaining contract, or which is asserted to be unlawfully dominated, assisted, or supported, as long as no remedial order is sought against the labor organization. *Meyers Bros. of Missouri, Inc.,* 151 NLRB 889, 893 n. 1 (1965) (“the limitations clause of Section 10(b) relates only to the Board’s power to issue complaints and thus limits the Board in proceeding against ‘Respondents’ as distinguished from ‘parties’”). See also *General Molds & Plastics Corp.,* 122 NLRB 182, 186 (1958).

§ 4–720 Complaint and Notice of Hearing

Complaints must be “served on all other parties.” NLRB Rules and Regulations, Secs. 102.4(a) and 102.15. Thus, a copy of the complaint and notice of hearing must be served on the party to a collective-bargaining contract that would be invalidated by the remedial order. *Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. NLRB,* 305 U.S. 197, 218–219 (1938).

§ 4–730 Compliance Specifications

“[T]he Regional Director may issue and serve on all parties a compliance specification in the name of the Board.” NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.54(a).

Service of a compliance specification upon the respondent’s attorney of record is sufficient service on the respondent. *Star Grocery Co.,* 245 NLRB 196, 197 (1979); and *Cera International Corp.,* 272 NLRB 1360 n. 2 (1984). This is so, even if the attorney no longer represents the respondent, unless notice has been given to the Regional Director that the representation has been discontinued. *Hopkins Hardware,* 280 NLRB 1296, 1297 (1986).

§ 4–740 Answers to Complaints and to Compliance Specifications

Answers to complaints. Section 102.21 of the Board’s Rules provides that, “immediately upon the filing” of its answer, the respondent shall serve a copy on the other parties. As set forth in §4–500, “Failure of Service,” above, although the Board is reluctant to reject an answer for failure to make service on other parties, particularly if filed by an unrepresented respondent, it will do so if the respondent has ignored repeated efforts to encourage it to make proper service.

Answers to compliance specifications. Section 102.56(a) of the Board’s Rules provides that “each respondent alleged in the specification to have compliance obligations must” file an answer and “immediately serve a copy” on the other parties.

§ 4–750 Subpoenas

It is not necessary to establish actual receipt of the subpoena by the recipient; “proof that it was mailed is sufficient to prove service.” *Best Western City View Motor Inn,* 327 NLRB 468, 468–469 (1999). Moreover, “an attorney’s affirmation of service” will suffice as proof of service,
even “without submission of the postal [service] return receipt card.” Ibid. See also § 8–120, Service of Subpoena, below.
CHAPTER 5. TIME AND PLACE OF HEARING

§ 5–100 Before Hearing Opens

Section 102.15 of the Board’s Rules requires that a complaint contain “a Notice of Hearing” at a fixed date and “a time not less than 14 days after the service of the complaint.” “Except in extraordinary situations the hearing is . . . usually conducted in the Region where the charge originated.” NLRB Statements of Procedure, Sec. 101.10(a).

Generally, before hearing, the Regional Director issuing a complaint may extend the date of the hearing or change the hearing location. But when there are less than 21 days before the scheduled hearing date and a party objects to a postponement, motions to reschedule should be filed with the Division of Judges, which rules only on whether to grant the motion to extend the hearing date. NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.16(a). See also Carriage Inn of Steubenville, 309 NLRB 383 (1992). The “Regional Director issuing the complaint shall retain the authority to order a new date for hearing and retains the responsibility to make the necessary arrangements for conducting such hearing, including its location and the transcription of the proceedings.” NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.16(b).

§ 5–200 After Hearing Opens

The notice of hearing that accompanies complaints typically provides that the hearing will commence on the date set by the Regional Director and continue “on consecutive days thereafter.” However, as discussed in § 2–300 (Duties of Trial Judge), above, after a hearing opens the designated administrative law judge possesses authority to “regulate the course of the hearing.” NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.35(a)(6). This includes the “discretion” to continue the trial “from day to day, or adjourn [it] to a later date or to a different place, by announcement . . . at the hearing . . . or by other appropriate notice.” Sec. 102.43. See also Abrahamson Chrysler-Plymouth, 225 NLRB 923 n. 1 (1976) (ALJ did not abuse her discretion in denying respondent’s several motions for continuances at the beginning of the first and second days of hearing and at the close of the General Counsel’s case), enfd. mem. 559 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1977), and cases cited below.

§ 5–300 Requests for Continuance to Obtain Counsel

Typically, two situations are presented: (1) an unrepresented party seeks a continuance to obtain counsel or other representative; and (2) the party’s counsel or representative is unavailable on the trial date.

To Obtain Counsel. When a party seeks a continuance to obtain counsel, a balance must be struck between the right of parties to be represented, NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.38, and the principle that “proceedings must proceed with the utmost dispatch,” NLRB v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 98 F.2d 488, 492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 306 U.S. 643 (1939). In striking that balance in particular situations, several relevant considerations have been identified:

1) The length of time since the complaint issued, during which the party had an opportunity to obtain counsel. See K & L Fire Protection Systems, 306 NLRB 988 n. 1 (1992) (judge reasonably denied request at the hearing for a 2-week continuance to obtain approval from
the bankruptcy court to retain counsel, as the complaint had been outstanding for more than 6 months).

2) Whether a continuance has already been granted to allow the party to obtain counsel. See *Peter Vitalie Co.*, 310 NLRB 865 n. 1 (1993) (judge reasonably denied motion where the respondent had already requested and been granted a prior 6-week postponement); and *Crusader-Lancer Corp.*, 144 NLRB 1309 n. 1 (1963) (trial examiner did not commit prejudicial error by denying motion where a request for a 1-week continuance for the same purpose had previously been granted).

3) Efforts shown by the moving party to obtain counsel. See *K & L Fire Protection Systems*, above (noting that the respondent’s application to bankruptcy court for authorization to appoint an attorney was not made until 3 days before the hearing); and *Peter Vitalie Co.*, above, (noting that, after receiving the prior continuance, the respondent “elected to do nothing except seek ‘another eleventh hour postponement’”).

Unavailability of chosen counsel on trial date. In striking a balance in this area, the following relevant considerations have been identified:

1) Reason for unavailability. See *Mississippi Valley Structural Steel Co. v. NLRB*, 145 F.2d 664, 665–667 (8th Cir. 1944) (trial examiner should have granted respondent’s request for a postponement at the start of the hearing due to illness of counsel who was the only attorney conversant with case). But see *Quicken Loans, Inc.*, 28-CA-146517, unpub. Board order issued August 14, 2015 (2015 WL 4910611) (judge did not abuse his discretion by denying counsel’s second postponement request due to medical problems where judge had informed counsel when granting the first postponement that, if he could not proceed on the new hearing date, he should prepare alternative counsel).

2) When the conflicting commitment was made. See *Hijos de Ricardo Vela, Inc.*, 194 NLRB 377 n. 1 (1971) (trial examiner justifiably denied request where the conflicting commitment—to bargain on behalf of another client—was made “long after the notice of hearing” and “indeed only shortly before the scheduled hearing date”), enfd. 475 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1973).

3) Length of continuance contemplated. See *Wittek Industries*, 313 NLRB 579 (1993) (judge properly denied request where no alternative trial date was proposed and corporate counsel, who had some familiarity with the circumstances leading to the discharge of the alleged discriminatees, was available to try case).

4) Complexity of facts and issues. See *Franks Flower Express*, 219 NLRB 149, 149–150 (1975) (judge did not abuse his discretion by denying second postponement request where the case was “neither a complicated nor lengthy proceeding” and respondent was represented at the hearing by a member of the same firm who presumably had knowledge of the issues as framed by the pleadings), enfd. mem. 529 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1976).

5) Whether it is the first request for a continuance. See *Quicken Loans*, above; and *Franks Flower Express*, above.

6) Availability of substitute counsel. Compare *Mississippi Valley Structural Steel Co. v. NLRB*, above; with *NLRB v. Glacier Packing Co.*, 507 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1974) (judge did not abuse his discretion by denying request for postponement due to counsel’s conflicting
legal engagements where other attorneys in the firm were qualified to handle the case), *Wittek Industries*, above, and *Franks Flower Express*, above.

§ 5–310  Length of Continuance to Obtain Counsel or Substitute Counsel

In the following cases, the Board found that the time granted to obtain counsel or substitute counsel was reasonable in length: *Peter Vitalie Co.*, above (40 days to secure counsel); *Franks Flower Express*, above (5 days to secure substitute counsel); *Wittek Industries*, above (1 day for counsel to be available); and *NLRB v. Glacier Packing Co.*, above (4 hours to secure substitute counsel from same firm after pretrial denials of requests for further continuances).

§ 5–320  When Counsel or Party Leaves After Request Is Denied

When a continuance has been properly denied, it is not improper to go forward with the hearing without the presence of counsel. *NLRB v. Glacier Packing Co.*, above; and *NLRB v. Hijos de Ricardo Vela, Inc.*, 475 F.2d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 1973). See also *Ethan Enterprises, Inc.*, 342 NLRB 129 n. 2 (2004) (approving judge’s decision to proceed with hearing after departure of respondent’s attorney, following adverse ruling, where the attorney agreed to notify respondent that the hearing would proceed in his absence), enfd. 154 Fed. Appx. 23 (9th Cir. 2005). And see § 6–350, Absence of Respondent’s Attorney, below.

§ 5–400  Motions for Continuance to Prepare a Defense

The judge has discretion to grant or deny respondent a continuance to prepare its defense. *Spiegel Trucking Co.*, 225 NLRB 178, 179 n. 9 (1976), (judge did not abuse his discretion in denying respondent’s request for a postponement to investigate the allegations described in the General Counsel’s opening statement and to procure witnesses, as the complaint had adequately apprised respondent of the alleged violations), enfd. mem. 559 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also *East Bronx Health Center*, 271 NLRB 898 n. 1 (1984) (judge properly denied respondent’s motion for a 10-day adjournment at the close of the General Counsel’s case, as the hearing had previously been postponed at respondent’s request, which afforded respondent an additional 2 months to prepare its case, and respondent failed to adequately explain why another postponement was necessary).

§ 5–500  Motions for Continuance Because of Unavailable Witness

Obviously, there will be circumstances where a continuance may be appropriate due to the temporary unavailability of an important witness. However, the following are circumstances where a judge’s denial of a continuance has been upheld:

1) Existence of prior notice that witness would be necessary. *Quebecor Group, Inc.*, 258 NLRB 961 n. 1 (1981) (witness was named as supervisor in complaint); and *Don’t Stop*, 298 NLRB 961, 962 (1990) (complaint named witness as sole actor who committed unfair labor practices).

3) Failure to show that the whereabouts of witness is unknown or that witness is otherwise unavailable. *Quebecor Group, Inc.*, above.


5) Witness simply chose to do something other than attend the hearing. *Greenpark Care Center*, 236 NLRB 683 n. 3 (1978) (witness chose to leave the country on vacation despite issuance of the notice of hearing almost 2 months before the hearing date); and *Don't Stop*, above (witness “chose not to be present at the hearing because it was his considered business judgment that his presence at the hearing was less important than a meeting with a major customer”).

6) Failure to assert that witness was actually needed to present the respondent’s defense. *Stevens Ford*, 272 NLRB 907 (1984), enf’d. in part 773 F.2d 468, 476–477 (2d Cir. 1985).

7) Failure to indicate when witness would become available. *Sarkes Tarzian, Inc.*, 157 NLRB 1193, 1194 n. 3 (1966).

8) Failure to take advantage of reasonable alternative arrangements to avoid continuance. *Somerville Cream Co.*, 95 NLRB 1144, 1146 (1951) (General Counsel offered to move trial temporarily to the home of the assertedly incapacitated respondent witness), enf’d. 199 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1952).

§ 5–600        Motions to Change Location of Hearing

In *Flame of Miami, Inc.*, 159 NLRB 1103, 1105 (1966), the Board held that it was “clearly reasonable” for the trial examiner to deny a motion to transfer the hearing from Miami to New York, where some of the respondents were located, as the unlawful conduct took place in Miami and the respondents failed to show that holding the trial in Miami was unreasonable or burdensome. Compare *Altemose Construction Co. v. NLRB*, 514 F.2d 8, 12 (3d Cir. 1975) (ALJ committed reversible error by denying the respondent employer’s motion to move to another location because of the “mob atmosphere” outside the federal building where the hearing was being held).

Guidance may also be found in court decisions applying 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought . . .”). The decisions indicate that the trial judge has “broad discretion” in ruling on such motions. *SEC v. Savoy Industries, Inc.*, 587 F.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied 99 S.Ct. 1227 (1979). Relevant factors include the plaintiff’s choice of location, the availability and convenience of witnesses, parties, and counsel, the location of the documentary evidence, the place or situs where the material events occurred, and the possibility of delay and prejudice if transfer is granted. “The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the balance of factors weighs heavily in favor of transfer and that transfer would not merely shift inconvenience from one party to another.” *Graham v. United Parcel Service*, 519 F.Supp.2d 801, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (denying employer’s motion to transfer employee’s ADA and ERISA action from the Eastern to the Western Division of the Northern District of Illinois), citing, e.g., *In re National Presto Industries, Inc.*, 347 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding trial judge’s denial of employer’s motion to transfer SEC
enforcement action from the Northern District of Illinois to the Western District of Wisconsin, even though the only factor favoring the former venue was the convenience of the SEC and its staff). See also *Carlile v. Continental Airlines, Inc.*, 953 F.Supp. 169 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (denying employer’s motion to transfer employee’s discrimination action from Galveston to Houston, Texas).
CHAPTER 6. APPEARANCES AT HEARING

§ 6–100 Representation at Hearing

“Any party has the right to appear at the hearing in person, by counsel, or by other representative, to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses and to introduce into the record documentary or other evidence.” NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.38. See also NLRB Statements of Procedure, Sec. 101.10(a). There is no requirement that the representative be a lawyer.

§ 6–110 Respondent Not Represented by Counsel

There is no constitutional or statutory right for the respondent to have an attorney appointed to represent it at government expense. Betra Mfg. Co., 233 NLRB 1126 n. 2 (1977), enf'd mem. 624 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 996 (1981); and Golden Hours Convalescent Hospitals, 200 NLRB 279, 280 n. 5 (1972). It is sufficient that the self-represented respondent is accorded a full and fair opportunity to present its case and cross-examine witnesses. American Cleaning Co., 291 NLRB 399 n. 1 (1988). See also Father & Sons Lumber v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 1093, 1096–1097 (6th Cir. 1991) (there is no constitutional or statutory basis to overturn a Board decision on the ground that the respondent was denied the effective assistance of counsel), enfg. 297 NLRB 437 (1989).

An unrepresented respondent also has no right to receive personal instruction from the judge. Indeed, the Board has stated that the judge should not “act as advocate of those who appear” without representation, because to do so “would seriously erode [the judge's] neutral position at the hearing”. Air Transport Equipment, 190 NLRB 377 n. 2 (1971), enf'd mem. 486 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1972). See also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183–184 (1984) (pro se defendant has no “constitutional right to receive personal instruction from the trial judge on courtroom procedure” and judge is not required to “take over the chores . . . that would normally be attended to by trained counsel”), citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n. 46 (1975).

However, as long as the judge remains impartial, he or she may answer procedural questions or explain basic rights. See Air Transport, above; Dickens, Inc., 355 NLRB 255, 257 (2010) (judge instructed unrepresented respondent regarding which areas of testimony would be relevant); and Quality Asbestos Removal, 310 NLRB 1214, 1215 (1993) (judge informed the respondent’s nonlawyer representative, its owner, that she could ask to see any statements of the Government’s witnesses when they had completed their direct examination).

§ 6–200 Ethical Issues Involving Representation

§ 6–201 Attorney as Witness

The Board will not police the canons of ethics of the various bar associations. When, for example, a party’s trial lawyer takes the stand as a witness, any objection that the attorney’s testimony should be stricken as a violation of the canons of ethics should be overruled. Operating Engineers Local 9 (Fountain Sand Co.), 210 NLRB 129 n. 1 (1974). Accord: Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp., 290 NLRB 872, 873 n. 3 (1988). See also Page Litho, Inc., 311 NLRB 881 n. 1 (1993) (citing Wells Fargo and disavowing judge’s statement that counsel was precluded ethically from appearing as a witness), enf. denied in part on other grounds mem. 65 F.3d 169 (6th Cir. 1995). But see §§ 6-202 and 6-203, below.
§ 6–202 Conflicts of Interest

Courts clearly have the authority, derived from their “inherent power to preserve the integrity of the adversary process,” to disqualify counsel due to a conflict of interest under the canons of ethics. See Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Village of Valley Stream, 409 F.3d 127, 132–133 (2d Cir. 2005). See also Paul E. Iacono Structural Engineer, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1983). The Board has the similar authority to protect its own processes. See Supreme Airport Shuttle LLC, 365 NLRB No. 27, slip op. at 1 (2017) (“The Board’s decisions make clear that, in an unfair labor practice proceeding, an [ALJ], subject to the Board’s review, has the authority to disqualify a party’s counsel based on an impermissible conflict of interest.”), citing Mack Trucks, 277 NLRB 711 n. 1 and 715–723 (1985). See also *Stericycle, Inc.*, Case 32-CA-24230, unpub. Board order issued Jan. 28, 2010 (Board permitted the respondent employer to present evidence at the unfair labor practice hearing regarding whether counsel for the union should be disqualified due to a conflict of interest). But cf. § 6–201, Attorney as Witness, above.

For situations where a party’s attorney is a former Board lawyer, and is therefore subject to the post-employment restrictions currently set forth in Section 102.120 of the Board Rules, see Hillview Convalescent Center, 266 NLRB 758 (1983) (Board stated that it would order former Board attorney to terminate his participation if he was still doing so, as it would violate the Board’s post-employment rules, but reversed judge’s conclusion that the entire law firm should also be disqualified under the circumstances presented).

With respect to alleged conflicts involving counsel for the General Counsel, see AM Property Holding Corp., 350 NLRB 998, 1008 (2007) (counsel for the General Counsel, whose prior law firm had represented the charging party, had no conflict under applicable Federal statutes and regulations because she had not served as an attorney for the law firm in the last year); and Terrace Gardens Plaza, Inc., 315 NLRB 749 n. 1 (1994) (rejecting respondent’s contention, in a test-of-certification refusal-to-bargain proceeding, that counsel for the General Counsel should be disqualified because she served as the hearing officer in the underlying representation case and investigated contemporaneous charges brought by the employer against the union that had previously represented the employees), enfd. 91 F.3d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

In consolidated “C” and “R” cases (where a complaint in an unfair labor practice case is consolidated with election objections or challenged ballots in a representation case), established Board law permits counsel for the General Counsel to also serve as the Regional Director’s neutral representative for the objections/ballots portion of the case. Freuhauf Corp., 274 NLRB 403, 405–406 (1985). The procedure generally has been upheld by the courts. See, for example, Beaird-Poulan Division v. NLRB, 649 F.2d 589, 597–598 (8th Cir. 1981); and Barrus Construction Co. v. NLRB, 483 F.2d 191, 194–195 (4th Cir. 1973).

§ 6–203 “Skip Counsel” Violations

Where it is alleged that the General Counsel improperly interviewed a supervisor or agent of the respondent employer or union without the presence of respondent’s counsel, the judge should evaluate the circumstances to determine if a “skip counsel” violation occurred and the appropriate evidentiary sanction or remedy, if any. See Success Village Apartments, Inc., 347 NLRB 1065 (2006) (Board rejected the respondent employer’s contention that a former manager’s affidavit was improperly admitted into evidence, as the respondent failed to establish that the former manager’s affidavit was improperly obtained); and Operating Engineers, Local
17 (Hertz Equipment Rental Corp.), 335 NLRB 578 (2001) (Board found that, under the circumstances, the Region’s investigator properly took an affidavit of the respondent union’s organizer and agent without the presence of respondent’s counsel, and therefore rejected the respondent’s contention that the complaint should be dismissed and the case reassigned to another Region for a new investigation).

For an overview of this issue, see Lori Ketcham, Skip Counsel Issues in NLRB ULP Investigations, 16 No. 1 Prof. Law. 18, 20 (2005).

§ 6–300 Failure of Party to Appear at Hearing

§ 6–350 Absence of Respondent’s Attorney

When the respondent has filed an answer, but its lawyer or representative fails to appear at the hearing, the judge should hear the General Counsel's evidence and issue a decision. Beta Steel Corp., 326 NLRB 1267 n. 3, 1268 (1998); Quality Hotel, 326 NLRB 83 n. 4 (1998); and Bristol Manor Health Care Center, 295 NLRB 1106 n. 1 (1989), enf’d mem. 915 F.2d 1561 (3d Cir. 1990).

Of course, if the answer previously filed by the respondent is found insufficient, a default or summary judgment may be appropriate. See §§ 3–500, and 10–400.

§ 6–400 Rights of Charging Parties and Discriminatees

Charging Parties. NLRB Rules and Regulations, Section 102.38, provides that “Any party has the right” to appear at the hearing, “to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses,” and to introduce evidence, “except that the participation of any party shall be limited to the extent permitted by the administrative law judge.”

Charging parties have a right to participate in the hearing regardless of whether they are represented by counsel. The “better practice” is for the judge to specifically offer the unrepresented charging party the opportunity to question each witness, although the failure of the judge to do so does not represent a denial of due process. Cowin & Co., 322 NLRB 1091 n. 1 (1997).

The charging party also has the right to see the affidavits of respondent witnesses in the General Counsel’s file for cross-examination. Senftner Volkswagen Corp., 257 NLRB 178 n. 1, 186–187 (1981), enf’d. 681 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1982). See § 16–613.1, Jencks Statements, below.

As discussed in §§ 3–200 and 3–310, above, the General Counsel has exclusive authority over the issuance and prosecution of unfair labor practice complaints under Section 3(d) of the Act. The charging party therefore has no right to introduce evidence in support of an allegation or theory not asserted by the General Counsel.

However, the responsibility for fashioning an appropriate remedy rests with the Board under Section 10(c) of the Act. Thus, the charging party may introduce, and the judge may consider, evidence supporting a remedy not sought by the General Counsel. See Kaumagraph Corp., 313 NLRB 624, 624–625 (1994) (judge erred by refusing to allow the charging party to introduce evidence to support a restoration and reinstatement remedy for the respondent’s alleged unlawful transfer of operations). However, the requested remedies must be consistent with the General Counsel’s complaint and theory of the case. ATS Acquisition Corp., 321 NLRB
712 n. 3 (1996) (judge erred in awarding backpay at the request of the charging party as the complaint did not allege unlawful unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment).

With respect to compliance matters, the General Counsel does not act on his own initiative, but as agent of the Board in effectuating the remedy and order. Therefore, the charging party is entitled to file a request for review with the Board if it disagrees with the General Counsel’s decision regarding a compliance issue. See Sec. 102.53(c) of the Board’s Rules; and Ace Beverage Co., 250 NLRB 646, 647 (1980) (cutoff date for reinstatement). See also Page Litho, Inc., 325 NLRB 338, 338–339 (1998).

Discriminatees. The failure of a discriminatee to appear or testify at the hearing does not preclude the judge or the Board from finding a violation regarding that employee. Riley Stoker Corp., 223 NLRB 1146, 1146–1147 (1976) (Board reversed judge who dismissed an 8(a)(3) violation because the employee abstained from appearing at the hearing), enfd. in part mem. 559 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1977).

See also § 11–400, below, regarding exclusion of charging parties and discriminatees from portions of the hearing pursuant to a sequestration order.

§ 6–500  Intervention at Hearing

Section 102.29 of the Board’s Rules permits “any person” to file a motion with the judge to intervene in the hearing. The motion should be in writing, unless it is made orally at the hearing, and should “state the grounds upon which [the] person claims an interest.” The judge shall rule on the motion and “may permit intervention . . . to [the] extent and upon such terms as . . . deem[ed] proper.” For useful guidance in evaluating the timeliness of such motions, see 7C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1916 (3d ed. Database updated April 2017) (discussing timeliness of motions to intervene in federal court actions under FRCP 24).

Section 10(b) of the Act states that any person may be allowed to intervene and present testimony “in the discretion” of the judge or Board. Based on this language, the courts have held that the ruling of the judge or Board will not be disturbed absent abuse or prejudice. Auto Workers v. NLRB, 392 F.2d 801, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied 392 U.S. 906 (1968); and Semi-Steel Casting v. NLRB, 160 F.2d 388, 393 (8th Cir. 1947).

The Board has held that intervention should be permitted in certain situations. For example, benefit fund trustees should be permitted to intervene where the complaint alleges that the employer violated 8(a)(5) by failing to make benefit fund payments. See Camay Drilling Co., 239 NLRB 997, 998 (1978). In that case, the judge concluded that the trustees would have no interest in the hearing until a backpay proceeding was held. The Board disagreed, finding that because of the fiduciary obligations imposed on the trustees by ERISA, they are “interested parties” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and are entitled to intervene to safeguard assets of the trust fund. See also Operating Engineers Local 12 (Griffith Co.), 212 NLRB 343, 345 (1974), revd. on other grounds 545 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 (1977), where the judge permitted fund trustees to appear in an 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and 8(e) case alleging that the respondent union unlawfully maintained a clause prohibiting subcontracting to employers who were delinquent in making payments to the funds.

The Board has likewise held that an employer association is properly permitted to intervene under Section 10(b) where it is party to the collective-bargaining agreement with the
union and the complaint allegations against the employer-member of the association turn in part on the contract. See *Sterling Furniture Co.*, 94 NLRB 32 n. 1 (1951).

Compare *Postal Service*, 5–CA–140963, unpub. Board order issued Nov. 4, 2015 (2015 WL 6750314). In that case, the complaint alleged that the Postal Service had violated 8(a)(5) by unilaterally contracting out bargaining unit work to Staples, and requested that the Postal Service be required to restore the unit work as a remedy. The Board held that the judge erred in granting Staples’ motion to intervene in the proceeding as a party, inasmuch as the complaint did not allege that Staples engaged in any unlawful conduct or that the contract between the Postal Service and Staples was invalid, or seek relief against Staples; rather, Staples’ only interest appeared to be the potential impact of the remedy on its contract with the Postal Service. The Board therefore vacated the judge’s order and directed the judge to “consider how best to afford Staples an opportunity, short of full-party status, to address its interest in remedial matters.”

With respect to intervention by employees, see *Chino Valley Medical Center*, 363 NLRB No. 108, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2016) (judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the decertification petitioner’s motion to participate as an intervenor in the 8(a)(5) case alleging that the employer unlawfully withdrew recognition from the union); *Latino Express, Inc.*, 360 NLRB 911 n. 2 (2014), reunfg. unpub. Board order issued Nov. 27, 2012 (2012 WL 5942293) (same); *Hotel Del Coronado*, 345 NLRB 306 n. 1, JD. at 308 n. 1 (2005) (judge denied an employee’s motion to intervene in an 8(a)(5) case to urge that a neutrality agreement entered into between respondent’s predecessor and the union was improper; but both the judge and the Board, on later exceptions, permitted the employee to file an amicus brief); and *McKinney v. Southern Bakeries, LLC*, 2014 WL 2812257 (W. D. Ark. June 23, 2014) (court denied antiunion employee’s motion to intervene in the 10(j) injunction proceeding to oppose the Board’s request for an interim bargaining order against the employer, as the employer would adequately represent his interests in the proceeding and his proffered defenses to the complaint were not legally relevant).

See also *Affinity Medical Center*, 8-CA-90083, unpub. Board order issued April 30, 2013 (2013 WL 1809351), final decision and order issued 362 NLRB No. 78 (2015). There, the Board held that the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a motion filed by two employees to intervene in a post-certification refusal-to-bargain proceeding. The Board had previously denied the same employees’ motion to intervene in the post-election objections proceeding on the ground that individual employees do not have standing to file objections. See *unpub. Board order issued Jan. 11, 2013 (2013 WL 143371). The judge cited the Board’s previous order, as well as the lack of factual or legal support for the employees’ objections to the election, in denying the motion to intervene. On appeal, the Board additionally noted that, under Section 102.9 of the Board’s Rules, the employees were free at any time during the applicable limitations period to file an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the conduct at issue violated the Act.

But see *Washington Gas Light Co.*, 302 NLRB 425 n. 1 (1991) (Board affirmed judge’s ruling permitting an employee to intervene to represent his own interests in an 8(a)(5) dues-checkoff case, but not the interests of other employees absent evidence that they requested or authorized him to do so); *Taylor Bros., Inc.*, 230 NLRB 861 n. 1 (1977) (judge granted motion, over General Counsel’s objection, to permit 10 employees to intervene in an 8(a)(5) case for the limited purpose of any remedy that might issue regarding the bargaining status of the union); *J. P. Stevens & Co.*, 179 NLRB 254, 255 (1969) (judge granted motion, over General Counsel’s objection, and permitted 114 employees to intervene in an 8(a)(5) case to challenge the validity of their authorization cards), enf’d. 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 404 U.S. 830 (1971); and *Spruce Pine Mfg.*, 153 NLRB 309 n. 1 (1965) (judge granted motion by 64 antiunion employees,
who were represented by counsel, to intervene in the 8(a)(5) case, and many testified regarding the manner in which the union procured authorization cards, enf'd. in part 365 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Novelis Corp., 3–CA–12193, unpub. Board order issued Sept. 12, 2014 (2014 WL 4545621) (judge did not abuse his discretion in granting limited intervention to four antiunion employees with respect to the 8(a)(5) Gissel bargaining order remedy requested in the complaint; the judge’s order permitted the employees to cross-examine witnesses called by the other parties and to file a posthearing brief, but not to call witnesses absent a showing that the respondent company had not adequately addressed a relevant issue).

Whether and to what extent employees should be permitted to intervene to contest the allegations and remedial order in other circumstances (such as an 8(a)(3) discrimination case) is unclear. The full Board addressed this issue, albeit by unpublished order, in Boeing Co., 19-CA-32431, unpub. order dated June 20, 2011 (2011 WL 2451725). In that case, the General Counsel alleged that Boeing had discriminatorily transferred work from its facilities in the Pacific Northwest to a new facility in South Carolina, and requested as a remedy that the work be returned. Three employees at the South Carolina plant filed a motion with the judge to intervene. The employees sought either unlimited intervention, or, alternatively, the right to file a posthearing brief. The judge denied the motion in its entirety. However, on special appeal, the full Board reversed the judge in part. Noting that the judge had subsequently granted 16 state attorneys general the right to file a posthearing amicus brief, the Board held that the employees had articulated a sufficient interest to grant them limited intervention to likewise file a posthearing brief in the matter.

For court cases addressing this issue in arguably analogous circumstances under FRCP 24, compare Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405 (9th Cir. 1998) (cited by the judge in Boeing), which held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion by male employees to intervene in the female employees’ class action discrimination suit, as “the proposed intervenors have no protectable interest in positions that they may have obtained due to specific discriminatory employment decisions,” with Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte, 602 F.3d 469 (2d Cir. 2010), and Brennan v. New York City Bd. of Education, 260 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2001), which reversed district court orders and granted intervention to white employees to challenge any proposed order or settlement remedying alleged race discrimination.

§ 6–510 Necessary Parties

For a discussion of the application of FRCP 19 (required joinder of parties) to Board proceedings, see Expert Electric, Inc., 347 NLRB 18, 19 (2006) (holding that, even assuming FRCP 19 applies to Board proceedings, which is questionable, individual members of a multi-employer association were not necessary and indispensable parties to the 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain case against the association itself because the Board could accord full relief to the parties without the joinder of each individual member). Compare UPMC, 362 NLRB No. 191, slip op. at 1 n. 2, JD. at 27 (2015) (holding UPMC, the parent entity of the respondent companies, liable for certain of the Board-ordered remedies, even though the complaint did not allege that UPMC, as a separate entity, committed unfair labor practices, as UPMC had stipulated and consented to be bound by those portions of the Board’s remedial order).

§ 6–520 Parties in Interest

A “party in interest” named in the complaint normally has the same rights as other named parties under Section 102.38 of the Board’s Rules to notice and an opportunity to be heard,
including presenting evidence and examining witnesses. See, e.g., *Midwestern Personnel Services, Inc.*, 331 NLRB 348, 350 (2000); and *U.S. Steel Corp.*, 280 NLRB 837 (1986). Thus, its position must also be considered in approving a settlement agreement, but only to the extent of its interest. See *Haven Manor Health Related Facility*, 243 NLRB 39 (1979) (where union was party in interest only to the 8(a)(2) allegations, its joining or becoming a party to the settlement of the 8(a)(1) and (3) allegations was unnecessary).

Note, however, that a decertification petitioner may be named a “party in interest” to a related unfair labor practice proceeding solely for the purpose of receiving a copy of the order or other document that finally disposes of the proceeding. See NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part One), Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings, Sec. 1173.2(b); and *BOC Group, Inc.*, 323 NLRB 1100 (1997). See also § 6–500, above, regarding intervention by decertification petitioners.

§ 6–600 Misconduct by Attorney or Representative

The judge has no authority to hold attorneys in contempt for engaging in misconduct during the trial such as interrupting other counsel, witnesses, or the judge, making derogatory comments to or about them, refusing to obey the judge’s rulings, or engaging in other conduct that the judge believes is intended to unreasonably delay the trial.

However, the Board’s Rules and precedents provide the judge various other methods to deal with such misconduct. Obviously, the judge should first point out to the offending party that the conduct is improper and will not be tolerated. A brief recess may also help in certain circumstances. See *Estate of Diaz v. City of Anaheim*, 840 F.3d 592, 604 (9th Cir. 2016) (“After all, lawyers and witnesses, like misbehaving children or rattled basketball players, sometimes need a timeout.”), cert. denied 137 S.Ct. 2098 (2017).

If the conduct nevertheless persists, Section 102.177 of the Board’s Rules (“Misconduct by Attorneys or Party Representatives”) provides that the judge may: (1) exclude counsel from the hearing, (2) issue, after due notice, an admonishment or reprimand, and/or (3) refer the matter to the General Counsel for investigation and appropriate action.

§ 6–610 Exclusion of Counsel

Section 102.177(b) of the Board’s Rules provides that “misconduct by any person . . . may be grounds for summary exclusion from the hearing.”

Although this option is within the judge’s discretion, it should be used cautiously because it involves an interference with the respondent’s right to counsel. See *Great Lakes Screw Corp. v. NLRB*, 409 F.2d 375, 380–381 (7th Cir. 1969). There, the court reversed the Board’s affirmation of the judge’s decision to exclude counsel, both because the judge and the Board did not provide detailed and specific references to the attorney’s conduct that allegedly warranted exclusion, and because, in the court’s view, counsel’s conduct “fell short of being contemptuous.”

Thus, the judge should clearly specify the conduct that the judge considers inappropriate and warn the individual on the record that he or she will be excluded if the conduct continues. See, for example, the judge’s warnings to counsel in *Earthgrains Company*, 351 NLRB 733, 736 n. 14 (2007); and *Baddour, Inc.*, 281 NLRB 546 n. 2 (1986), enfd. mem. 848 F.2d 193 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 488 U.S. 944 (1988).
If the person being excluded represents the respondent, it is appropriate, if not necessarily required, to adjourn the trial to permit the respondent to obtain new counsel or to appeal the judge’s exclusionary ruling. See *Great Lakes Screw Corp.*, 164 NLRB 149 n. 2 (1967), revd. and remanded 409 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1969).

For a good example of how to proceed both before and after excluding a respondent’s representative from participating in the trial, see the judge’s decision in *USA Remediation Services, Inc.*, 5–CA–31524, JD–20–06 (March 15, 2006) (2006 WL 691192), slip op. at 15–20, adopted in the absence of exceptions May 16, 2006. See also the subsequent, related disciplinary proceeding, *In re David M. Kelsey*, 349 NLRB 327 (2007) (issuing a default judgment imposing a 6-month suspension for the same conduct).

For cases where the judge has excluded the charging party’s representative, see *Advance Waste Systems*, 306 NLRB 1020, 1032–1033 (1992) (representative excluded over the objection of the General Counsel and with assistance of Federal Protective Service); and *State Bank of India*, 283 NLRB 266, 277–278 (1987). It is not clear whether an adjournment was requested or granted in either of these cases to permit the charging party to obtain a new representative. However, if an attorney for the charging party is excluded and the charging party requests an adjournment of the trial to obtain new counsel to appeal the exclusion ruling, the request should probably be granted. See *Great Lakes Screw*, above.

A possible middle ground, which could avoid the postponement problem, is available when the offending party has co-counsel. In *Baddour, Inc.*, above, the Board affirmed the judge’s ruling that an attorney, who constantly interrupted witnesses, objected to questions the judge had previously ruled proper, and argued after his evidentiary rulings, should be precluded from speaking or examining witnesses, but could remain in the room to assist co-counsel. The Board concluded that judge’s ruling limiting the participation of the attorney was not improper.

§ 6–620 Authority to Admonish or Reprimand Counsel

Section 102.177(b) of the Board’s Rules also authorizes judges and the Board to “admonish or reprimand, after due notice, any person who engages in misconduct at a hearing.” See also *675 West End Owners Corp.*, 345 NLRB 324, 325 (2005), enf’d. 304 Fed. Appx. 911 (2d Cir. 2008). A “formal admonition or reprimand declares conduct improper and cautions the offender that repetition of offense will result in more severe discipline.” *Sargent Karch*, 314 NLRB 482, 486 n. 14 (1994). See also *Mail Contractors of America*, 347 NLRB 1158 (2006) (holding that judge’s issuance in his decision of a “notice of potential admonishment, reprimand, or summary exclusion” stating that counsel’s hearing conduct was unprofessional and, if repeated, could result in an admonishment, reprimand, or exclusion, was itself an admonishment or reprimand under Sec. 102.177), enf. denied on other grounds, 514 F.3d 27 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

The exclusion and formal-admonition remedies are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, in most cases, exclusion will also be accompanied by a formal admonition. See *Advance Waste Systems*, above, and *State Bank of India*, above.

Due notice required. The rule specifically requires “due notice” before an admonishment or reprimand is issued. Thus, the judge should be careful to give both advance notice and an opportunity to respond before issuing such discipline. See *Mail Contractors of America*, above. One option would be to provide the representative notice during the hearing and an opportunity to respond in a posthearing brief before issuing the admonishment or reprimand.
As indicated above, Section 102.177(b) also authorizes the Board to issue an admonishment or reprimand after due notice. In light of this, some judges have simply recommended in the decision that the lawyer or representative be admonished or reprimanded by the Board. This procedure allowed the representative to address the issue on exceptions before such discipline was actually administered. However, the Board has not been receptive to this procedure. See 675 West End Owners, above (holding that the judge should have either exercised her authority under 102.177(b) to issue the warning and reprimand herself, or referred the matter to the General Counsel for investigation under Section 102.177(e) [discussed below]).

Conduct warranting reprimand. Some examples of conduct found to warrant a formal reprimand, admonishment, or warning include: interrupting counsel, witnesses, and the judge and failing to follow the judge’s instructions, Advance Waste Systems, above; inappropriate or unprofessional comments about the judge, Maietta Contracting, 265 NLRB 1279, 1279–1280 (1982), enf. mem. 729 F.2d 1448 (3d Cir. 1984); profanity directed towards counsel and the judge, refusal to obey the judge’s instructions, and accusing the judge of “taking money,” State Bank of India, above; violating the judge’s witness sequestration order, Seattle Seahawks, 292 NLRB 899, 908 (1989), enf. mem. 888 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1989); and willfully taking frivolous positions at the trial to delay and abuse the Board’s processes, Nursing Center at Vineland, 318 NLRB 337, 344 (1995). Other examples include talking loudly, interrupting while witnesses are testifying, interposing baseless objections, and evading or disregarding the judge’s rulings. 675 West End Owners, above. See also Government Employees (IBPO), 327 NLRB 676 (1999); and Alan Short Center, 267 NLRB 886 n.1 (1983).

Frivolous answers. Note that a separate Board rule, Section 102.21, specifically provides for disciplinary action against an attorney or representative for willfully filing an answer that is not supported by good grounds and is interposed for delay. This section has frequently been cited by the Board in cautioning and warning attorneys against engaging in misconduct. See, e.g., Nursing Center at Vineland, above, 318 NLRB at 338 n.7; Graham-Windham Services, 312 NLRB 1199 n. 2 (1993); Worldwide Detective Bureau, 296 NLRB 148 n. 2 (1989); and M. J. Santulli Mail Services, 281 NLRB 1288 n. 1 (1986). See also *Uzi Einy, 352 NLRB 1178 (2008) (imposing 6-month suspension on the respondent’s nonattorney representative for his misconduct in 675 West End Owners Corp, above, including filing frivolous answers that denied allegations he knew to be true and had been established in previous Board proceedings).

It is a useful tool for judges to cite these cases when encountering obviously frivolous answers to complaint allegations. This should be done in conference calls, especially because very often these answers engender subpoenas and needless litigation. It is not uncommon for attorneys to suddenly amend their answers when confronted with the possibility of disciplinary action for needlessly litigating issues that are not really in dispute.

§ 6–630 Suspension of Counsel

The final and most severe remedy for misconduct is set forth in Section 102.177(d) of the Board’s Rules, which states that misconduct “at any stage of any Agency proceeding, including but not limited to misconduct at the hearing,” which is “of an aggravated character may be grounds for suspension and/or disbarment from practice before the Agency and/or other sanctions.”

Procedure for referral of allegations. Under Section 102.177(e), any person, including the Board and its ALJs, can file an allegation of misconduct with the Investigating Officer—the Associate General Counsel, Division of Operations Management—who has final, unreviewable
authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against an attorney or other representative. See, e.g., Imperial Sales, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 95, slip op. at 3 (2017) (Board referred allegations of hearing misconduct by the respondent employer’s attorney to the Investigating Officer for investigation and appropriate disciplinary action).

The explanatory material that accompanied Section 102.177 when it was published in the Federal Register in 1996 indicated that the judge could recommend disciplinary action in his or her decision, which might then be referred by the Board to the Investigating Officer. 61 Fed. Reg. 65323, 65329, n. 12 (Dec. 12, 1996). However, the Board has expressed a preference in subsequent cases that the judge separately submit a recommendation for discipline directly to the Investigating Officer. See Earthgrains Co., 351 NLRB 733, 738 n. 3 (2007); 675 West End Owners Corp., 345 NLRB 324, 325–326 (2005), enf'd. 304 Fed. Appx. 911 (2d Cir. 2008); and McAllister Towing & Transportation, 341 NLRB 394, 398 n.7 (2004), enf'd. 156 Fed. Appx. 386 (2d Cir. 2005). See also Smithfield Packing Company, Inc., 344 NLRB 1, 19 n. 59 (2004) (agreeing with judge’s recommendation to refer perjury and subornation of perjury allegations to the General Counsel, but noting that the judge had the authority to do so as well), enf'd. 447 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Thus, disciplinary allegations and recommendations should normally be sent to the Investigating Officer by separate letter, not to the Board. See, e.g., David M. Kelsey, 349 NLRB 327 (2007) (judge excluded respondent’s representative from the hearing due to his misconduct, and thereafter, on the same day as his decision in the underlying case, sent a separate letter referring misconduct allegations to the General Counsel pursuant to Sec. 102.177, which ultimately resulted in the representative’s 6-month suspension).

Definition of “aggravated” misconduct. The Board’s Rules do not define the term “aggravated” misconduct. But Section 102.177(a) states that attorneys and representatives “must conform to the standards of ethical and professional conduct required of practitioners before the courts, and the Agency will be guided by those standards in interpreting and applying the provisions of this section.” See also the supplementary information accompanying the final rule published in the Federal Register, 61 Fed. Reg. 65323, 65327 (Dec. 12, 1996) (stating that such standards “may include the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (and/or any other standards adopted by the ABA in the future), applicable state bar rules, and court decisions applying such rules”).

The Board emphasized when it adopted Section 102.177 in 1996 that it was not changing the standard for “aggravated misconduct.” Thus, it is instructive to examine case precedent before as well as after that date to determine the meaning of the term.

One of the most important factors appears to be the presence of prior disciplinary offenses. See Sargent Karch, 314 NLRB 482, 486 n. 10 (1994), where the Board suspended an attorney from practice for 6 months for violating the judge’s sequestration order. The Board noted that the attorney had been “formally admonished” for identical misconduct in a prior case, and cited Section 6.23 of the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, which states that prior disciplinary offenses constitute an “aggravating” factor justifying increased discipline.

However, the Board made clear in Sargent Karch that it did not mean to imply that suspension would never be appropriate in the absence of a prior formal admonition or reprimand. The Board cited Matter of an Attorney, 307 NLRB 913 (1992), where it approved a settlement that imposed a 6-month suspension on an attorney for using profanity and verbally addressing
opposing counsel in a rude, vulgar, and profane manner, even in the absence of prior disciplinary proceedings against him. See also *David M. Kelsey*, 349 NLRB 327 (2007) (despite lack of prior discipline, Board issued a default judgment and imposed a 6-month suspension on the respondent employer’s nonattorney representative for his misconduct during the trial in *USA Remediation Services, Inc.*, 5–CA–31524, JD–20–06 (March 15, 2006) (2006 WL 691192), adopted in the absence of exceptions May 16, 2006); and *Uzi Einy*, 352 NLRB 1178 (2008) (imposing a 6-month suspension on the respondent’s nonattorney representative for his misconduct in *675 West End Owners Corp.*, above).

**Length of suspension.** Although 6 months appears to be a common sanction, longer suspensions have been ordered. See *Stuart Bochner*, 322 NLRB 1096 (1997) (Board issued a 2-1/2 year suspension to an attorney who had lied to the judge in one proceeding, purposely delayed other proceedings by engaging in frivolous delaying tactics, including failing to produce subpoenaed documents without filing a motion to revoke in three separate proceedings, and filing answers that he knew or should have known were false in three proceedings, and had been previously admonished by the Board in *Advance Waste Systems*, 306 NLRB 1020, 1032–1033 (1992) for interrupting counsel, witnesses, and the judge and for failing to follow the judge’s instructions). See also *Joel I. Keiler*, 316 NLRB 763, 766–770 (1995) (Board issued a 1-year suspension to an attorney who engaged in ad hominem comments and scurrilous characterizations of the General Counsel, as well as other conduct designed to obstruct and delay the Board’s exercise of subpoena authority, despite the Board’s previous expressions of disapproval with respect to his similar conduct in two prior cases), vacated by unpub. district court order dated February 3, 1998.

Although rare, the Board has also disbarred an attorney. See *Kings Harbor Health Care*, 239 NLRB 679 (1978) (attorney had pleaded guilty in a criminal proceeding to subornation of perjury in a prior Board proceeding). See also *Application and Motion of Horowitz*, 266 NLRB 755 (1983) (denying the same attorney’s subsequent request for reinstatement of his right to appear before the Board).

§ 6–640  **Awarding Litigation Costs**

The Board has also upheld the award of litigation costs against a party whose counsel has engaged in conduct deliberately designed to cause delay and draw out the litigation. See *Teamsters Local 122 (August A. Busch & Co. of Massachusetts)*, 334 NLRB 1190, 1193, 1255 (2001). See also *Pacific Beach Hotel*, 361 NLRB No. 65, slip op. at 3 (2014); *Camelot Terrace*, 357 NLRB 1934, 1937–1940 (2011); and *675 West End Owners Corp.*, 345 NLRB 324, 326, and 340 (2005), and cases cited there.

But see *HTH Corp. v. NLRB*, 823 F.3d 668, 678–679 (D.C. Cir. 2016), denying enforcement in relevant part of *Pacific Beach Hotel*, above, where the court held that the Board has neither inherent authority nor implicit authority under Sec. 10(c) of the Act to order a respondent to pay the litigation expenses of the General Counsel and the union.
CHAPTER 7. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE

§ 7–100  Conference Calls

Pretrial conference calls typically address a variety of non-substantive procedural matters, including the parties' and the judge's expectations regarding the conduct of the trial (e.g. the number and scheduling of witnesses, the submission of exhibits, and the length of the trial), as well as the potential for reaching a settlement or stipulation of facts (see § 9–220, below). Accordingly, as the judge typically does not issue any final rulings on disputed issues during the calls, the calls are usually not transcribed by a court reporter. See Lewis Foods of 42nd Street, LLC, 2–CA–093893 et al., unpub. Board order dated April 21, 2015 (2015 WL 1815276) (judge did not abuse her discretion in denying respondent's request to create an official record of a pretrial conference call where the judge did not intend to make any rulings on pending motions during the call). If issues arise during the calls, the judge may defer making any final rulings until after the hearing opens.

Occasionally, a conference call may be held after the hearing has officially opened, such as during a lengthy continuance or where the hearing had previously been opened only briefly by telephone or mail to address a particular pretrial issue (see § 12-200, below). If the conference call is held to hear an oral motion or to rule on a motion, the call should be transcribed by a court reporter. However, as with pretrial conference calls, the judge retains the discretion not to have the call transcribed in other circumstances. See Lewis Foods of 42nd Street, LLC, 362 NLRB No. 132 (June 26, 2015) (although the hearing had previously been formally opened, the judge did not abuse her discretion in denying respondent’s request to transcribe scheduled conference calls regarding the manner and timeframe for producing subpoenaed documents, where the judge’s letter to the parties scheduling the calls could not reasonably be read as contemplating the submission of oral motions during the calls).

§ 7–200  Pretrial Discovery

It is well established that pretrial discovery does not apply in Board proceedings. The Board, with court approval, has historically followed this rule to protect employees and other potential witnesses from reprisal or harassment and to avoid the delay and collateral disputes that often accompany discovery. See Offshore Mariners United, 338 NLRB 745, 746 (2002); and David R. Webb Co., 311 NLRB 1135 (1993), and authorities cited therein.

Thus, the judge may not order the General Counsel to provide the respondent with a witness list. See Beta Steel Corp., 326 NLRB 1267, 1267–1268 (1998), enf. mem. 210 F.3d 374 (2000). See also § 3–230, Bill of Particulars or More Definite Statement, above. Nevertheless, the General Counsel in some instances may voluntarily provide the respondent with advance notice of the current employees or managers who may be subpoenaed to testify, in order to reduce the impact on the respondent's business and/or for other appropriate reasons. See *Bashas’, Inc.*, 352 NLRB 661 (2008) (noting that the General Counsel had done so and that, "Where appropriate, voluntary agreements of this character can aid the efficient administration of the Act."). In addition, the judge may rule on requests that the testimony of such witnesses be scheduled to minimize the burden on the respondent or the witnesses pursuant to the judge’s general authority to regulate the course of the hearing under Section 102.35(a)(6) of the Board’s Rules. See § 2–300, Duties of Trial Judge, above.
§ 7–300    Depositions

Under Section 102.30 of the Board’s Rules, the judge has “discretion” to grant an application to take testimony by deposition, including by videoconference, but only upon a showing of “good cause” See December 12, Inc., 282 NLRB 475 n. 1 (1986) (“The Board does not allow the taking of depositions to provide discovery in ordinary circumstances.”); and David R. Webb Co., 311 NLRB 1135, 1136 (1993) (same rule generally applies in compliance proceedings). See also Kenrich Petrochemicals v. NLRB, 893 F.2d 1468, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 981 (1990) (same rule generally applies in compliance proceedings).  See also § 12–400, Testimony by Videoconference, below.

A respondent’s failure to request permission to take a deposition was cited in Goya Foods of Florida, 347 NLRB 1118, 1119–1120 (2006), enfd. 525 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir. 2008). In that case, the judge had refused to admit into evidence a witness’s deposition that had been taken pursuant to a separate state court action. The judge noted that the respondent failed to seek enforcement of its subpoena to have the witness testify in the Board proceeding. In affirming the judge’s ruling, the Board noted, among other things, that the General Counsel had no opportunity to examine the witness in the state court proceeding, and that the respondent did not apply to the judge to permit deposing the witness with all parties in the Board proceeding present, as provided in Section 102.30 of the Board’s Rules.

See also § 12–400, Testimony by Videoconference, below.
CHAPTER 8. SUBPOENAS

§ 8–100  In General

§ 8–110  Application for Subpoena

Section 102.31 of the Board’s Rules requires a written application for issuance of a subpoena. Before the hearing, the application should be filed with the Regional Director. During the hearing, it should be filed with the judge. As discussed in § 2–220, above, the application may be made ex parte.

A judge must issue a subpoena and await a petition to revoke, even if the subpoena on its face seeks the production of unobtainable information. See Canova v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1498, 1503 (9th Cir. 1983), citing Lewis v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 10, 14 (1958). After the hearing opens, if the judge is unavailable, as over a weekend, the Regional Director may issue a requested subpoena because issuance is “virtually a ministerial act and involves no exercise of discretion.” Free-Flow Packaging Corp., 219 NLRB 925, 926 (1975), enfd. in part 566 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1978).

§ 8–120  Service of Subpoena

As discussed in Chapter 4, above, service of subpoenas may be made personally, by registered or certified mail, by leaving a copy at the principal office or place of business of the person required to be served, by private delivery service, or by any other method of service authorized by law. See Sec. 102.4(b) of the Board’s Rules.

Thus, service may be made by Federal Express or similar carrier. Offshore Mariners United, 338 NLRB 745 (2002). Further, it is not required that the subpoena be left with a person specifically authorized to accept service of subpoenas. See Control Services, 303 NLRB 481, 483 n. 13 (1991) (leaving a copy of the subpoena with the receptionist at the respondent’s principal place of business was effective service on the respondent’s officer under Sec. 102.113(c), even if the respondent had not authorized the receptionist to accept such service), enfd. mem. 961 F.2d 1568 (3d Cir. 1992).

A verified return by the serving individual, a return post office receipt, or any other sufficient proof may be relied upon to establish that service was made. NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.4(d). See also Best Western City View Motor Inn, 327 NLRB 468, 468–469 (1999) (the attorney’s affirmation of service is sufficient; it is not essential to provide a postal return-receipt card signed by the person subpoenaed).

The date of service is the day when the subpoena is deposited in the U.S. mail, is deposited with a private delivery service that will provide a record showing the date it was tendered to the delivery service, or, if delivered in person, the date the document is received. NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.3. See also Best Western, above.

Pursuant to Section 102.4(e) of the Board’s Rules, a copy of the subpoena must also be served on any attorney or representative who has entered an appearance for a party. If served by the Board or its agents, service on the attorney or representative may be made by any means of service permitted by the Rules, including regular mail.
However, absent a showing of prejudice, the failure to serve counsel does not constitute grounds for revoking a subpoena or invalidate it ab initio. Further, a lawyer with actual notice of a subpoena must file a petition to revoke to raise a credible claim of prejudice, even if over 5 days have passed since service on the client. *NLRB v. Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market*, 805 F.3d 1155, 1159–1162 (9th Cir. 2015).

§ 8–125 Timing of Service of Subpoena

In *McAllister Towing*, 341 NLRB 394, 397 (2004), enfd. 156 Fed. Appx. 386 (2d Cir. 2005), the Board rejected the respondent’s contention that it was excused from producing subpoenaed documents at the outset of the hearing because the General Counsel did not serve the subpoenas, which contained a total of 60 paragraphs, until 2 weeks before the trial. The Board held that the respondent, “at the very least had an obligation to begin a good faith effort to gather responsive documents upon service of the subpoenas.” See also *Voith Industrial Services, Inc.*, 9-CA-75496, unpub. Board order issued August 27, 2012 (2012 WL 3679872) (granting General Counsel’s special appeal and reversing judge’s order quashing in part a subpoena served 2 weeks before the hearing, as the respondent had “not submitted any evidence supporting its assertion that the time required to locate and review the documents would exceed 2 weeks”). See also § 8–620 (Failure to Produce Documents), below.

§ 8–130 Geographic Reach of Subpoena

Section 11(1) of the Act provides that the Board may require the attendance of witnesses from any place in the U.S., its territories, or possessions.

§ 8–140 Fees and Mileage Required to be Paid

Witnesses subpoenaed for trial shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the federal courts by the party who issued the subpoena. NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.32; *Zurn/NEPCO*, 329 NLRB 484, 486–487 (1999). See also 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1821, and FRCP 45(b).

The failure of a respondent or charging party to provide fees and mileage with subpoenas at the time of service renders them “defective on their face,” and it is the recipient’s privilege not to comply with them. *Rolligon Corp.*, 254 NLRB 22, 23 (1981). See also *Champ Corp.*, 291 NLRB 803, 817 (1988), enfd. 933 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 957 (1991); and *O.K. Machine & Tool Corp.*, 279 NLRB 474, 479 (1986).

In contrast, the General Counsel need not advance the standard fees upon service of a subpoena. *Zurn/NEPCO*, above. See also *Valentine Painting and Wallcovering, Inc.*, 331 NLRB 883, 884 (2000) (rejecting respondent’s objection that witness and mileage fees were not tendered with the General Counsel’s subpoena, noting that the subpoena stated on its face that such fees would be paid upon the presentation of a voucher), enfd. 3 Fed. Appx. 116 (2d Cir. 2001). See also 18 U.S.C. 1825(c); FRCP 45(b), and NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part One), Secs. 11778 (service of subpoenas) and 11780 (witness fees).

However, the distance to be traveled may justify requiring that travel expenses be included with service of the subpoena, even by the Government. See *Zurn/NEPCO*, above (judge concluded that it was an “undue burden” to require a disinterested witness to advance his own costs for the 550-mile round trip).
Note that a respondent’s failure to pay the witness fee and mileage to employees who appear at the hearing as required by the subpoena may also constitute a violation of the Act. See *Howard Mfg. Co.*, 231 NLRB 731, 732 (1977) (respondent’s failure to tender fees to seven subpoenaed striker-discriminatees who had not been subpoenaed or called to testify by the General Counsel violated Section 8(a)(4) and (1) of the Act).

§ 8–150  **Expert Witnesses, Required Fees and Mileage**

The standard fee for witnesses does not constitute sufficient payment of the fee charged by an expert, and a subpoena may be quashed when the appropriate expert witness fee has not been included with service of the subpoena. *Zurn/NEPCO*, above, 329 NLRB at 486–487.

§ 8–200  **Revocation of Subpoenas**

§ 8–205  **Standing to File Petition to Revoke**

A party lacks standing to petition to revoke subpoenas that are addressed to third parties unless it asserts that the requested information is protected by a privilege or right to privacy. *Red Apple 180 Myrtle Avenue Development*, 29–CA–184816, unpub. Board order issued April 20, 2017 (2017 WL 1434208) (denying the employer’s petition to revoke subpoenas ad testificandum addressed to employees as the employer failed to establish that it possessed any personal privacy rights to the information sought from them); and *Jones & Carter, Inc.*, 16-CA-27969, unpub. Board order denying petition to revoke issued October 20, 2011 (2011 WL 4994786), and unpub. Board order denying motion for reconsideration issued December 30, 2011 (2011 WL 6936398) (holding that the employer’s assertion of contractual property interest in the services of its employees was not a legally sufficient basis to establish standing to petition to revoke subpoenas ad testificandum addressed to them).

See also *Elite Ambulance, Inc.*, 31–CA–122353, unpub. Board order issued July 25, 2017 (2017 WL 3229278). In that case, Respondent Elite Ambulance petitioned to revoke investigative subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Region to Bank of America, N.A. The subpoenas sought bank records of the Respondent’s owner and her husband to investigate whether they or other related business entities should be held personally or otherwise derivatively liable as alter egos to remedy the Respondent’s backpay obligations. The Board held that the Respondent lacked standing to file the petition to revoke, as it had “failed to substantiate its assertion that it has any personal right or privilege with respect to the bank records sought, which are the personal bank records of individuals who are not parties to this proceeding and not the corporate records of Elite Ambulance, Inc.”

As standing is jurisdictional in nature, it should be raised sua sponte by the judge even if no party has raised the issue. *Ibid.* See also *Teamsters Local 377*, 8-CA-39174, unpub. Board order issued Feb. 22, 2011 (2011 WL 815005).

§ 8–210  **Petition to Revoke “In Writing”**

Section 102.31(b) of the Board’s Rules provides that petitions to revoke “must” be filed “in writing.” However, oral motions may be permitted to avoid delay. See *G.W. Truck*, 240 NLRB 333 n. 1 (1979) (ALJ did not commit prejudicial error by granting the respondent’s petition to revoke the General Counsel’s subpoena duces tecum, notwithstanding that it was made orally rather than in writing); and *Harvey Aluminum, Inc.*, 147 NLRB 1287 n. 1 (1964) (trial examiner
did not commit prejudicial error by granting the General Counsel’s oral motion to revoke the respondent’s subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum. See also *Earthgrains Co.*, 336 NLRB 1199, 1122 (2001), enf’d. per curiam 61 Fed. Appx. 1 (4th Cir. 2003).

§ 8–220 “Within 5 Business Days” Requirement

A petition to revoke must be filed “within 5 business days after the date of service of the subpoena.” NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.31(b). The date of service and intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays are not counted. Sec. 102.2(a).

The petition to revoke must actually be received on or before the last day for filing, i.e., the postmark rule does not apply. Sec. 102.2(b). If the petition to revoke is filed prior to the hearing, it must be filed with the Regional Director, who will refer it to the administrative law judge or the Board for ruling. If the petition is filed during the hearing, it must be filed with the judge. Sec. 102.31(b).

Note that the 5-day rule may not be strictly applied if the subpoenaed material is subject to a privilege. See *M. J. Mechanical Services*, 324 NLRB 812, 832 (1997) (“reporter’s privilege”) and cases cited by the judge there. See also the following court cases holding that a party did not waive its right to challenge subpoena enforcement by failing to exhaust administrative remedies by timely filing a petition to revoke: *NLRB v. Midland Daily News*, 151 F.3d 472, 474–475 (6th Cir. 1998) (a Board subpoena that “constituted a constitutional infringement of [the respondent newspaper’s] right to exercise commercial free speech”); and *EEOC v. Lutheran Social Services*, 186 F.3d 959, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (an EEOC document protected by the attorney-client privilege), discussed at length in *NLRB v. Coughlin*, 2005 WL 850964 (S.D. Ill. March 4, 2005) (following *Lutheran Social Services* with respect to documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine).

But see *Detroit Newspapers Agency*, 326 NLRB 700, 751 n. 25 (1998), enf. denied on other grounds 216 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2000), where the Board, in an unpublished order, granted a special appeal during the trial and reversed a judge who refused to apply the 5-day rule because, inter alia, the subpoenaed material was covered by the attorney-client privilege. The Board held that the judge “abused his discretion . . . because the Respondent did not file a proper motion or petition to revoke within 5 days.” See also *FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline*, 202 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. 2001) (distinguishing *Lutheran Social Services*, above, on the ground that the FTC subpoena specifically stated that a petition to revoke or privilege log must be filed within 5 days).

§ 8–230 Grounds for Revoking Subpoena

Section 102.31(b) of the Board’s Rules states that a subpoena “will” be revoked if the evidence requested “does not relate to any matter under investigation or in question in the proceedings,” the subpoena “does not describe with sufficient particularity the evidence whose production is required,” or “if for any other reason sufficient in law the subpoena is otherwise invalid.” This rule applies to subpoenas ad testificandum as well as subpoenas duces tecum. See, e.g., *Elevator Constructors No. 1 (Otis Elevator)*, 29–CB–084077, unpub. Board order issued August 29, 2014 (2014 WL 4302555), and cases cited there.

Although not binding on the Agency, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also provide “useful guidance” and “should be consulted.” *Brink’s, Inc.*, 281 NLRB 468 (1986) (citing FRCP 26 and 45 in quashing the employer’s subpoenas in a representation case). See also *Clinton*
**Food 4 Less**, 288 NLRB 597 n. 1, 618–619 (1988) (applying *Brink*’s analysis in quashing the respondent employer’s subpoena in an unfair labor practice case); and *CNN America*, 352 NLRB 675, 676 (2008), supplemental proceedings 353 NLRB 891 (2009), final decision and order issued 361 NLRB No. 47 (2014), discussed fully below (applying FRCP in evaluating a General Counsel subpoena for electronically stored records).

The asserted nonexistence of requested records is not grounds for revoking a subpoena. See *Ironworkers Local 433*, 21–CB–129959, unpub. Board order issued Feb. 4, 2015 (2015 WL 471558) (“If no evidence responsive to any portion of the subpoena exists, the custodian of records must provide sworn testimony to that effect, including a description of the [Respondent’s] efforts to identify and locate such evidence.”). See also § 8–350, Possession or Control.

A respondent’s denial of jurisdiction is also not grounds for revoking a hearing subpoena, at least where Board jurisdiction is not plainly lacking. See *NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc.*, 316 F.3d 995, 1002 (9th Cir. 2003). See also, with respect to investigative subpoenas, *EEOC v. Kloster Cruise, Ltd.*, 939 F.2d 920, 924 (11th Cir. 1991); *NLRB v. Fortune Bay Resort Casino*, 688 F.Supp.2d 858 (D. Minn. 2010); and *Eulen America*, 12–CA–26948, unpub. Board order issued July 16, 2011 (2011 WL 3098547).

Ordinarily, the judge should not revoke a subpoena on grounds not asserted in the petition to revoke. *Postal Workers Local 64*, 340 NLRB 912 (2003).

§ 8–235 Ruling on Petition to Revoke

Section 102.31(b) of the Board’s Rules states that “[t]he Administrative Law Judge or the Board, as the case may be, will make a simple statement of procedural or other grounds for the ruling on the petition to revoke.”

The judge’s prompt ruling on the petition to revoke may assist the parties in preparing for trial and avoid subsequent delays. However, a judge’s failure to rule prior to the scheduled hearing does not excuse a party from making a good faith effort to begin gathering the subpoenaed documents upon service of the subpoena and bring them to the hearing. See *San Luis Trucking*, 352 NLRB 311, 312 (2008), reaffd. 356 NLRB 168 (2010), entd. 479 Fed. Appx. 743 (9th Cir. 2012); and *McAllister Towing & Transportation*, 341 NLRB 394 (2004). See also § 8–620, Failure to Produce Documents.

In ruling on a petition to revoke, the judge may evaluate the subpoena in light of any modifications or limitations that the subpoenaing party offers or agrees to in its opposition to the petition. See, e.g., *FCA US LLC*, 8–CA–185825, unpub. Board order issued Oct. 31, 2007 (2017 WL 5000838), at 1 n. 3; and *Starbucks Coffee Co.*, 1–CA–177856, unpub. Board order issued May 19, 2017 (2017 WL 2241023), at 1 n. 1.

§ 8–240 Preserving Related Material

For a discussion of the duty to preserve evidence, see *McDonald’s USA, LLC*, 364 NLRB No. 144, JD. slip op. at 6–7 (2016). The judge there found that McDonald’s litigation holds were not imposed in a timely fashion and were inadequate in scope, and that, for this and other reasons, its document preservation and retrieval efforts were inadequate. However, on special appeal, the Board found it unnecessary to reach this issue. The Board noted that McDonald’s “has not yet searched all sources available to it within the scope of the court-enforced subpoena,”
and that, “[u]ntil such efforts are completed, it will not be possible to assess the overall adequacy
of the documents produced; therefore it is currently premature to decide whether McDonald’s
preservation efforts have been sufficient and, if not, what further actions would be appropriate.”
Slip op. at 2 n. 5.

Regarding the duty to preserve evidence for a subsequent compliance/backpay
proceeding, see Dauman Pallet, Inc., 314 NLRB 185, 213 (1994). In that case, the judge
exercised his discretion to defer issues of “piercing the corporate veil” and personal liability to the
compliance proceeding, but did not revoke the General Counsel’s subpoena for this reason to the
extent it sought such information. Rather, he ordered the respondent to “preserve” and “maintain”
documents related to these issues for later use at the compliance stage of the proceedings.

§ 8–300 Scope of Subpoenas

§ 8–310 Material Must Be “Reasonably Relevant”

Generally, subpoenaed information should be produced if it relates to any matter in
question, or if it can provide background information or lead to other evidence potentially relevant
to an allegation in the complaint. See NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.31(b);
McDonald’s USA, LLC, 363 NLRB No. 144, slip op. at 15 (2016); and Perdue Farms v. NLRB,
144 F.3d 830, 833–834 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (information must be “reasonably relevant”).

If the subpoenaed information is not reasonably relevant, the subpoena should be
revoked. See McDonald’s USA, LLC, above (trial judge did not abuse her discretion in revoking
McDonald’s subpoenas to the extent they sought information regarding the charging party unions’
motives for their campaign, as such information was not relevant to its defenses to the complaint
allegations); *Hispanics United of Buffalo, 359 NLRB No. 37 (2012) (respondent’s subpoena
seeking various information from the alleged discriminatees, including communications among
themselves, applications for and receipt of unemployment benefits, and any complaints to State
or Federal agencies, was properly revoked by the judge as an unwarranted “fishing expedition” as
the respondent failed to show that such information was relevant to any issue in dispute); and
NLRB v. Jackson Hospital Corp., 557 F.3d 301, 305–306 (6th Cir. 2009) (ALJ did not violate
respondent’s due process rights in compliance proceeding by quashing its subpoena to the extent
it sought the discriminatees’ personal banking and other records relating to their private financial
obligations, as the employer failed to establish a reasonable suspicion to believe that the
discriminatees were hiding income), enfg. 352 NLRB 194 (2008).

With respect to employer subpoenas seeking information regarding the immigration status
of an alleged discriminatee or a witness, see §§ 16.402.6 and 16.608.1, below.

§ 8–320 Request Must Not Be Vague or Overbroad

For a case addressing whether a subpoena duces tecum was too vague, see NLRB v.
Carolina Food Processors, Inc., 81 F.3d 507, 513 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting employer’s
contention that the Region’s investigative subpoena in a post-election unfair labor practice case
was too vague because it requested payroll documents, W-4s, and I-9s for “all bargaining unit
employees” without defining the bargaining unit, as the unit was sufficiently identified in the
union’s previous election petition and the parties’ stipulated election agreement). See also SEIU
(General Counsel subpoena duces tecum was not impermissibly vague where it asked for
information about union pressure regarding employees’ refusal to work overtime in language borrowed from Board cases dealing with concerted refusals to volunteer for overtime in the healthcare industry).


A subpoena may also be quashed to the extent the subpoena, on its face, is overbroad and/or seeks privileged or otherwise protected information. See Brink’s, Inc., 281 NLRB 468, 469 (1986) (granting petitions to revoke the challenged portions of the employer’s subpoenas in their entirety where most of the challenged portions “generally were drafted without regard for the usual standards applicable to subpoenas or discovery” set forth in the Board’s Rules and FRCP 26 and 45); and In re Horn, 976 F.2d 1314, 1318–1319 (9th Cir. 1992) (quashing a grand jury subpoena that, “on its face . . . clearly encompass[ed]” privileged information and placed an “unreasonable and undue burden upon the subpoenaed witness” to justify withholding documents “which the government [knew] in advance [were] beyond its reach”). See also Cherokee Marine Terminal, 287 NLRB 1080, 1097 (1988); Harvey Aluminum, 156 NLRB 1353, 1365 (1966); and J. H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 223 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 94 S.Ct. 120 (1973) (quashing respondent subpoenas seeking the General Counsel’s entire investigative file).

The judge, however, should consider the circumstances of each case in deciding whether the subpoena should be revoked in its entirety or only in part. See NLRB v. Interstate Builders, Inc., 351 F.3d 1020, 1031 (10th Cir. 2003) (ALJ abused his discretion in summarily revoking the bulk of a subpoena respondent served on the union, as the subpoena was not “so overbroad so as to constitute a wholesale ‘fishing expedition’ meriting revocation in almost every particular”). See also *CNN America, Inc., 353 NLRB 891 (2009), final decision and order issued 361 NLRB No. 47 (2014) (rejecting employer’s argument that the General Counsel’s subpoena “must stand or fall as a whole”).

Note that a judge may often resolve objections that a subpoena is vague or overbroad by asking that the request be narrowed or made more specific. With a little time and attention, such objections may be resolved by compromise. If pressed, however, the judge must rule on such objections.

§ 8–330 Burdensomeness of Production

The burdensomeness of production may be grounds for revoking or limiting a subpoena. FRCP 26(b)(1) sets forth a balancing test, stating:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
In addition, FRCP 45(d)(3)(A)(iv) provides that, on timely motion, a court “must” quash or modify a subpoena that “subjects a person to undue burden.” The party asserting burdensomeness under this provision must meet a high standard or burden of proof. A subpoena is not “unduly burdensome” simply because it requires the production of a large number of documents; rather, the party must show that production of the subpoenaed information “would seriously disrupt its normal business operations.” *NLRB v. Carolina Food Processors*, above, 81 F.3d at 513–514, cited with approval in *McAllister Towing & Transportation Co.*, 341 NLRB 394, 397 (2004), enf'd. 156 Fed. Appx. 386 (2d Cir. 2005).

Bare or general assertions that production would be seriously disruptive are insufficient. See *NLRB v. AJD, Inc., a McDonald’s Franchisee*, 2015 WL 7018351 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2015) (whether a subpoena poses an undue burden “is typically a fact-intensive inquiry [requiring] a respondent to show that the actual costs of discovery are unreasonable in light of the particular size of the respondent’s operations”; thus, the respondent franchisees’ general allegations that the burden of production would be “astronomical,” that they have “virtually no” human resources to assist in production, and that production would require “countless hours” were insufficient). *Compare NLRB v. Fuyao Glass America, Inc.*, 2017 WL 1276728, *2* (S.D. Ohio April 6, 2017) (finding that the “knowledgeable and convincing” testimony of the employer’s HR vice president regarding the burden of complying with the Board’s subpoena warranted narrowing the subpoena “at least at the present time.”).

See also § 8–340, below, regarding electronically stored information.

Marginally relevant information. Where subpoenaed information is only marginally relevant, other factors may weigh in favor of quashing the subpoena. See, e.g., *Aladdin Gaming, LLC*, 345 NLRB 588 (2005) (judge did not abuse his discretion in quashing the charging party union’s subpoena given that the “marginal relevance” of the subpoenaed employer customer-contact information did not outweigh “the substantial privacy and business interests involved”), rev. denied 515 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008). See also *NLRB v. Detroit Newspapers*, 185 F.3d 602, 605 (6th Cir. 1999) (“this court’s task is to weigh the likely relevance of the requested material to the investigation against the burden . . . of producing the material”) (citation omitted).

Documents previously provided. To the extent a respondent previously provided to the General Counsel documents requested by a General Counsel subpoena, the respondent is not required to produce those documents to the General Counsel again; however, the respondent must accurately describe the documents that were previously provided and state whether those documents constitute all of the documents now being subpoenaed. See, e.g., *FCA US LLC*, 8–CA–185825, unpub. Board order issued Oct. 31, 2007 (2017 WL 5000838), at 1 n. 4; and *Island Architectural Woodwork, Inc.*, 29–CA–124027, unpub. Board order issued August 6, 2014 (2014 WL 3867966), at 1 n. 2.

Cumulative or duplicative requests. FRCP 26(b)(2)(C)(i) states that a court “must” limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” In *McDonald’s USA, LLC*, 363 NLRB No. 144, slip op. at 2 n. 2, 15–16 (2016), the Board found that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in applying this provision, along with FRCP 45(d)(3)(A)(iv), to quash subpoenas duces tecum McDonald’s had served on several nonparties seeking information that was materially identical to information sought in its subpoenas served on parties. Similarly, in *Nissan North America*, 15–CA–171184, unpub. Board order issued Nov. 2, 2016 (2016 WL 6562347), the Board granted a nonparty’s petition to revoke the Regional
Director’s investigative subpoena duces tecum, as the same information had been subpoenaed from the charged parties, which did not face the potential burden described by the nonparty. The Board did so, however, without prejudice to issuance of another subpoena to the nonparty in the event the Regional Director determined that the information is not available from the parties. See also *Duncan & Son Lines*, 28–CA–079700, unpub. Board order issued Sept. 5, 2012 (2012 WL 3862635), at 1 n. 2 (employer was not required to produce “all” documents where the additional documents would be cumulative or duplicative).

The mere possibility that the requested information may be available from other sources, however, is not a basis to quash a subpoena. *Bakery Workers*, 21–CA–171340, unpub. Board order issued Aug. 3, 2016 (2016 WL 4141121). In that case, the Region’s investigative subpoena requested commerce information, and the employer argued that the Region could and should get the information from other sources. The Board rejected the argument, stating, “[T]he possibility that the requested information may be available from other sources is not a basis to quash a subpoena, as the requested documents may be necessary to corroborate or supplement the investigative file.”


Information regarding methodology of document search. A subpoenaed party may be required to provide information regarding the manner or methodology of its search for requested documents. See *Starbucks Coffee Co.*, 1–CA–177856, unpub. Board order issued May 19, 2017 (2017 WL 2241023), at 1 n. 1 (denying the employer’s petition to revoke the Region’s request, in its cover letter to the subpoena, that the employer “should be prepared” to provide information regarding the methodology of its electronic search for subpoenaed emails, including whose email was searched, what mailboxes, folders, archives, and document management systems were searched, and what search software and/or terms were used). See also *Advanced Laboratories International, LLC v. Valentus, Inc.*, 2017 WL 6209297 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2017) (ordering a subpoenaed third party to provide a sworn declaration “describ[ing] in detail the steps he took to locate documents responsive to [the] subpoena, including the date(s) of each search performed, the locations searched (e.g., home office), the devices searched (e.g., phone, home computer, office computer), the types of files searched (e.g., email, Word, Skype logs, text messages, Facebook messages), and the methods used to perform the searches (e.g. the search terms used).”).

§ 8–340 Electronically Stored Information (Computer Records)

FRCP 26(b)(2)(B) states:

A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the
requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).

FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) states that, on a party's motion or on its own, a court "must" limit the frequency or extent of discovery if: (i) the discovery sought is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive," . . . or (iii) "the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1)" [which, as discussed above, sets forth a balancing test].

In *CNN America*, 352 NLRB 675, 676 (2008), the Board indicated that, if the subpoenaed party makes a "plausible argument" that production of certain types of information in electronic form would be disruptive of its business operations, then the judge should "strike a balance between the competing interests of the parties in the relevancy and necessity of the information and the potential cost and burdensomeness of its production in the form requested." The Board indicated that, in performing the analysis, the judge should apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the factors set forth in The Sedona Principles: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, Second Edition (June 2007), available at https://thesedonaconference.org/publications.

Following issuance of the Board's order in CNN, the judge (appointed as special master) evaluated the General Counsel's subpoena requests applying Sedona principle 2, which states, "When balancing the cost, burden, and need for electronically stored information, courts and parties should apply the proportionality standard embodied in FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) and its state equivalents, which require consideration of the technological feasibility and realistic costs of preserving, retrieving, reviewing, and producing electronically stored information, as well as the nature of the litigation and the amount in controversy."

The judge concluded that the foregoing factors favored the General Counsel's position—specifically, that the requested information related directly to the core complaint allegations and was highly important to the litigation; that the requested documents had a greater probative value than contradictory testimony; that there was a large amount of money in controversy; that CNN had failed to establish the cost of complying with the GC requests, which had been substantially narrowed following the Board's order; and that CNN had also failed to object to the technological feasibility of producing the documents. The Board agreed with the judge's analysis and conclusions. *353 NLRB 891 (2009), final decision and order issued 361 NLRB No. 47 (2014).

With respect to requests for production of emails, see, *Healthbridge Management, LLC*, 34–CA–12715, unpub. Board order issued Oct. 18, 2011 (2011 WL 4955613). In that case, the respondent contended that the judge improperly denied its petition to revoke in part a General Counsel subpoena seeking various communications, including emails. The respondent contended that compliance with the subpoena would require thousands of dollars and several months to retrieve and search email backup tapes for previously deleted emails. Granting the appeal in part, the Board directed the respondents "to provide all responsive documents and communications available without resort to analysis of the email backup tapes, subject to the... General Counsel having the opportunity to persuade the judge that an additional search is necessary and the Respondent having the opportunity to demonstrate that it would be unduly burdensome." The Board has issued similar orders in several other cases. See, e.g., *Somerset Valley*, 22–CA–29599, unpub. Board order issued June 23, 2011 (2011 WL 2515543).
§ 8–350 Possession or Control

Section 102.31(a) of the Board’s Rules provides that the Board shall, on written application of any party, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence “in their possession or under their control.” See also FRCP 45(a)(1)(A) (providing for issuance of subpoenas requiring production of documents in a person’s “possession, custody, or control”).

As indicated in the Practice Commentary to Rule 45, courts generally find control where the person has a legal right to obtain the document on demand. Some courts also find control where the person has a practical ability to obtain the documents. The party subpoenaing the documents has the burden of establishing control. See, e.g., U.S. v. Petroleum and Industrial Workers, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989); and Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing cases).

The subpoenaed party is required to conduct “a reasonable and diligent search for all requested evidence” within its possession or control, and to “affirmatively” advise the subpoenaing party if no responsive evidence exists. KMAC, Inc., 18–CA–185912, unpub. Board order issued Dec. 22, 2017 (2017 WL 6555202), at 1 n. 2; and Coca-Cola Refreshments, Inc., 9–CA–186932, unpub. Board order issued May 8, 2017 (2017 WL 1863090), at 1 n. 1.

A subpoenaed employer may also be required to seek information that is not in its possession or control from its subcontractors or vendors. If the subcontractors or vendors do not comply with the employer’s request, the subpoenaing party may seek the information from them directly. See KMAC, above, and Bruner Corp., 9–CA–148668, unpub. Board order issued Nov. 12, 2015 (2015 WL 7074669) (subcontractors); and Taylor Farms Pacific, 32–CA–116854, unpub. Board order issued Feb. 6, 2015 (2015 WL 514108) (vendors).

§ 8–400 Privileged Material

As indicated in § 8–320, above, a subpoena may be quashed to the extent the subpoena, on its face, seeks privileged material. The following sections apply where the subpoena has not been revoked, but the subpoenaed party asserts that one or more of the documents responsive to the subpoena contain privileged material.

§ 8–405 Burden of Proof—Privilege Log

FRCP 45(e)(2)(A) requires a person withholding documents or communications under a claim of privilege to “(i) expressly make the claim; and (ii) describe the nature of the withheld documents, communications, or tangible things in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable the parties to assess the claim.”

Detailed description required. Consistent with the foregoing, the Board requires the party asserting a privilege to prove that it is applicable. Lansing Automakers Federal Credit Union, 355 NLRB 1345, 1353 (2010); and *CNN America, Inc., 352 NLRB 448, 448–449 (2008), supplemental proceedings 352 NLRB 675 (2008) and 353 NLRB 891 (2009), final decision and order issued 361 NLRB No. 47 (2014). As part of this burden, the party must submit a privilege log to the ALJ identifying the documents it believes are covered by the privilege. Meadowlands Hospital Medical Center, 22–CA–086823, unpub. Board order dated Oct. 20, 2015 (2015 WL 6164938). See also NLRB v. NPC International, Inc., 2017 WL 634713, *6–7 (W.D. Tenn. Feb.
16, 2017) (rejecting the company’s argument that it had no obligation to produce a privilege log at the agency level); and NLRB v. Sanders-Clark & Co., 2016 WL 2968014 (C.D. Cal. April 25, 2016) (finding that the respondent waived the privilege by failing to timely submit a privilege log to the ALJ).

The log must “provide sufficient detail to permit an assessment by the judge of the [party’s] claims.” Meadowlands Hospital, above. At a minimum, the index must include “(1) a description of the document, including its subject matter and the purpose for which it was created; (2) the date the document was created; (3) the name and job title of the author of the document; and (4) if applicable, the name and job title of the recipient(s) of the document.” *CNN America, Inc., above, 353 NLRB at 899 (quoting from the Board’s unpublished order in Tri-Tech Services, 15–CA–16707, dated July 17, 2003). See also NLRB v. NPC International, above, 2017 WL 634713, *9 (finding that the company’s “conclusory” descriptions of the allegedly privileged emails were “wholly inadequate to enable the Court to determine whether the items were properly withheld”); and EEOC v. BDO USA, LLC, 856 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2017) (reversing magistrate judge and finding that the employer’s privilege log was insufficient to establish a prima facie showing that various HR communications that included in-house counsel were protected by the attorney-client privilege as the entries were vague and/or incomplete, failed to distinguish between legal and business advice, and failed to establish that the communications were made in confidence and that confidentiality was not breached).

The particular privilege or doctrine relied on for withholding the document must also be identified. See, e.g., GenOn Mid-Atlantic, LLC v. Stone & Webster, Inc., 2011 WL 221771, (S.D. N.Y. Nov. 10, 2011); and MSTG, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 2011 WL 221771 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2011), reconsideration granted in part, 2011 WL 841437 (N.D. Ill. March 8, 2011) (refusing to consider whether documents were protected by the work product doctrine as the privilege log did not rely on that doctrine as the basis for withholding the documents).

Each document and attachment must be described. Unless otherwise agreed or ordered, the foregoing information must be provided for each communication or document, including attachments. U.S. v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 1991). An attachment is not privileged simply because it is attached to a privileged communication, and must therefore be separately identified and described in sufficient detail to evaluate the claim. See, e.g., Lee v. Chicago Youth Centers, 304 F.R.D. 242, 249 (N.D. Ill. 2014); and S.E.C. v. Beacon Hill Asset Mgt. LLC, 231 F.R.D. 134, 145 (S.D. N.Y. 2004). See also Roberts Technology Group, Inc., 2015 WL 4503547 at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2015) (“[T]he privilege must be asserted on a document by document basis. The communication must be confidential and with the goal of furthering counsel’s provision of legal advice. Where the attached communication is not confidential but merely contains readily available or pre-existing information not prepared by counsel, it is not privileged.”)(citations omitted).

Requiring additional information. Under the FRCP, a judge in his/her discretion may also require the party asserting the privilege to provide additional information in the form of affidavits or testimony in order to evaluate the privilege. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 576 (1st Cir. 2001); Holifield v. U.S., 901 F.2d 201, 204 (7th Cir. 1990); Friends of Hope Valley v. Frederick Co., 268 F.R.D. 643, 651-652 (E.D. Cal. 2010); and In re Rivastigmine Patent Litigation, 237 F.R.D. 69, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Any significant gaps or ambiguities in the factual bases for the privilege claim are construed against the proponent. Ibid. See also EEOC v. BDO USA, LLP, above, 856 F.3d at 362.
Post-charge documents. Courts are split on whether post-complaint documents in civil litigation are conclusively or presumptively protected and therefore exempt from the FRCP 26(b) privilege-log requirement. Compare, for example, First Horizon National Corporation v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, 2013 WL 11090763, *2–5 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 27, 2013) (rejecting party’s blanket claim that all post-complaint documents were protected attorney-client communications or work product); with Prism Technologies, LLC v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 2011 WL 5523389, *2 (D. Neb. 2011) (holding that the defendant need not log communications that occurred after the date the litigation began). See also the additional court decisions cited in Attorney-Client Privilege in the U.S. § 11:8 (updated Dec. 2017) (arguing against such an exemption for post-complaint documents); and Douglas C. Rennie, Why the Beginning Should be the End: The Argument for Exempting Post-Complaint Materials from Rule 26(b)(5)(A)’s Privilege Log Requirement, 85 Tul. L. Rev. 109 (2010) (arguing for such an exemption).

However, neither the Board nor any court has applied the exemption to post-charge documents in NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings. In NLRB v. Jackson Hospital, 257 F.R.D. 302, 308 (D.D.C. 2009), the court stated that “sophisticated counsel [might] agree that a certain category of information is so clearly likely to be work product that it need not even be logged on a privilege log.” However, the court did not itself exempt all post-charge or complaint documents from the privilege log requirement.

Failure to submit a privilege log. If the party asserting the privilege failed to timely identify the document as privileged or demonstrate that an identified document is at least prima facie privileged in response to a subpoena, the judge may find that the privilege has been waived. See, e.g., EEOC v. BDO USA, LLC, above, 856 F.3d at 363; and In re Grand Jury Subpoena, above. Courts consider various factors, including the scope of the subpoena, the amount of time the party had to respond to the subpoena, whether the party had been afforded one or more prior opportunities to properly identify and adequately describe the documents it now claims are privileged, and whether the failure to comply was flagrant, deliberate, or in bad faith. See, e.g., NLRB v. NPC International, Inc., above, 2017 WL 634713, *9; In re Chevron Corp., 749 F.Supp.2d 141, 180–186 (S.D. N.Y.), affd. 409 Fed. Appx. 393 (2d Cir. 2010); and In re In-Store Advertising Securities Litigation, 163 F.R.D. 452, 457 (S.D. N.Y. 1995), and cases cited there. See also NLRB v. Jackson Hospital Corp., 257 F.R.D. 302, 307–308 (D.D.C. 2009) (where a party fails to submit an adequate privilege log, the court may: (1) permit the party another chance to submit a more detailed log; (2) deem the inadequate log a waiver of the privilege; (3) conduct an in camera inspection of the withheld documents; or (4) conduct an in camera inspection of a select sample of the withheld documents).

Note that it is unsettled whether ALJs have the authority to make such a waiver finding. In NLRB v. Sanders-Clark & Co., above, the district court held that the ALJ exceeded her authority in issuing an order finding that the respondent waived the attorney-client privilege by failing to submit a privilege log, as such a finding “was, at base, a discovery sanction,” and only the federal district courts may issue “binding discovery sanctions.” The court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in NLRB v. International Medication Systems, 640 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that only the federal district courts have authority to issue sanctions for subpoena noncompliance), as well as two subsequent decisions by the Sixth and Fourth Circuits citing it with approval, NLRB v. Detroit Newspapers Agency, 185 F.3d 602, 605 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a district court may not delegate to the ALJ responsibility for reviewing documents in camera to determine whether they are privileged); and NLRB v. Interbake Foods, 637 F.3d 492, 499 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that, while an ALJ has authority to order production of documents for in camera review to aid in evaluating the privilege, if the responding party refuses to obey, only an Article III court may resolve the impasse and enforce the subpoena).
However, the Board, with the approval of other circuit courts, holds that the General Counsel may seek, and ALJs may grant, evidentiary sanctions against a respondent for noncompliance with a subpoena ruling or order as an alternative to court enforcement. See, e.g., *McAllister Towing & Transportation Co.*, 341 NLRB 394, 396–397 (2004), enf'd. 156 Fed. Appx. 386, 388 (2d Cir. 2005), and cases cited there. Thus, Board precedent supports the authority of ALJs to make a waiver finding, whether or not the finding constitutes or is accompanied by any evidentiary sanctions for noncompliance.

For additional cases and discussion of in camera inspections and evidentiary sanctions for subpoena noncompliance, see §§ 8–410 and 8–620, below. For a discussion of waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine generally, such as by intentional or unintentional disclosure, see §§ 8–440 and 8–460, below.

### § 8–410 In Camera Inspections

**ALJ authority.** There may be circumstances where in camera review of the actual documents is warranted prior to ruling. The authority of administrative law judges to conduct in camera inspections has been specifically upheld by the Board. *CNN America*, above, 352 NLRB at 449; *Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.*, 339 NLRB 829 (2003); and *Brink’s, Inc.*, 281 NLRB 468, 470 (1986). See also *Everport Terminal Services, Inc.*, 32–CA–172286, unpub. Board order issued August 15, 2017 (2017 WL 3531095) (judge did not abuse her discretion in ordering the respondent union and one of its non-party locals to submit documents listed in their privilege logs for in camera inspection and to produce some of those documents to the General Counsel based on her assessment that they were not privileged).

**Factual basis required.** Generally, if a party seeks in camera inspection of material that is claimed to be privileged, the judge should require that party to articulate specific grounds for the inspection. If the moving party shows an adequate factual basis to support a good-faith belief that in camera inspection may reveal evidence that is not protected by the privilege, the judge in his/her discretion may order that the evidence be presented for such inspection, considering the amount of material to be reviewed, the material’s relevance, and the likelihood that an inspection will reveal whether the documents are privileged. See *U.S. v. Zolin*, 491 U.S. 554, 571 (1989); and *In re Grand Jury Investigation*, 974 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1992). See also *NLRB v. Interbake Foods*, above, 637 F.3d at 502, and on remand, 2011 WL 6736435 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2011) (finding that the General Counsel failed to present sufficient grounds to conduct an in camera inspection of email strings that respondent claimed were privileged attorney-client communications).

**Procedures.** If the ALJ determines that certain documents are not privileged and should be produced, the ALJ should not turn over the documents directly to the party subpoenaing them, but should identify the documents to be produced and afford the parties an opportunity to seek review. If such review is sought, the ALJ should place the documents under seal so that they can be reviewed by the Board and/or court. See *Quality Roofing Supply Company*, 4-CA-36952, ALJ special master’s report issued August 17, 2011 (2011 WL 3625915).

In camera inspections may also be used in other contexts. For example, if a subpoena sought the minutes of union meetings, disclosure of those minutes might reveal the names of the employees who attended, which would normally be confidential. See § 8–420, Identity of Union Supporters, below. Thus, if the meeting minutes are found relevant, the judge should view the minutes in camera and require redaction of any portions identifying individuals other than the

Noncompliance with in camera inspection. As indicated in the previous section, the Board, with the approval of some circuit courts, has upheld the authority of ALJs to issue evidentiary sanctions for noncompliance with subpoena rulings and orders. However, decisions by the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits are to the contrary. See also § 8–620, Failure to Produce Documents.

§ 8–415 Protective Orders

ALJ authority. “It is clear that judges do have [the] authority” to issue a protective order. *Teamsters Local 917 (Peerless Importers)*, 345 NLRB 1010, 1011 n. 7 (2005), citing *AT&T Corp.*, 337 NLRB 689, 693 n. 1 (2002) (ALJ issued a protective order prohibiting the disclosure of any of the hearing exhibits to “outside sources”); *United Parcel Service*, 304 NLRB 693 (1991) (ALJ issued a protective order with respect to certain documents subpoenaed by the General Counsel stating that “their use shall be limited to this hearing and shall neither be disclosed nor disseminated to other than counsel of record at this hearing”); and *National Football League*, 309 NLRB 78, 88 (1992) (Board ordered that “the protective order entered into during the hearing prohibiting the parties from disclosing the contents of certain testimony [will] be continued in full force and effect and that all exhibits introduced into evidence under seal will continue to be maintained under seal and that portions of the transcript of the hearing held during in camera sessions will not be open to the public”). See also *Exxon Corp. v. FTC*, 665 F.2d 1274, 1278–1279 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting the companies’ argument that the Federal Trade Commission’s administrative law judges lack the authority to issue protective orders).


A particularly strong showing of harm may be required where a party seeks to prevent disclosure to a discriminatee. See *Waterbed World*, above (denying respondent’s motion for a protective order, which would have barred disclosure to the discriminatees of documents attached to its motion to reopen the record, in part because of the Board’s policy of affording discriminatees the right to hear testimony except under certain circumstances). Likewise, a stronger showing may be required where the documents have been introduced and made part of the formal record, given the public’s interest in and historical access to judicial records. See, e.g., *NLRB v. CEMEX, Inc.*, above, 2009 WL 5184695, *2, citing Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu*, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006) (requiring “compelling reasons” to seal documents).
Routine employment information. The Board has indicated that certain types of routine employment information normally do not warrant a protective order. Thus, in Richmond Times Dispatch, 5–CA–29157 et al, unpub. Board order issued August 1, 2002, the Board held that the judge improperly issued a protective order governing the production and exchange of subpoenaed documents to the extent it covered timesheets that showed hours worked or wages paid to employees. In agreement with the General Counsel, the Board held that the material consisted of “routine employment-related information,” and that the respondent had “failed to demonstrate good cause warranting a protective order under FRCP 26 (c).” The Board majority did not pass at that time on whether the judge properly protected certain other information, including disciplinary records and electronic mail documents. However, the Board majority later denied the General Counsel’s special appeal with respect to that information, noting that there had been no showing of prejudice from entry of the protective order. 346 NLRB 74 n. 1 (2005), enfd. 225 Fed. Appx. 144 (4th Cir. 2007).

Provisions of order. If it is determined that a protective order is appropriate, the judge may ask the moving party to submit a proposed order. The judge can thereafter tailor the order to meet the legitimate needs of the moving party and the possible objections of other parties. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. FTC, above, 665 F.2d at 1274.

Protective orders typically address who may have access to the information, what the information may be used for, and how long the information may be retained. See the Board and court cases cited above. See also H & M International Transportation, Inc., 22-CA-089596, unpub. Board order issued May 23, 2014 (2014 WL 2194514) (Board ordered that production of the discriminatee’s cell phone memory card “should be subject to a protective order agreed upon by the parties, or formulated by the judge in the absence of such agreement, requiring that the memory card be given to a designated qualified expert in forensic analysis of electronic records, not in the direct employ of any party, for retrieval and review of the audio file at issue, and any associated metadata, in order to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the data.”); and Pepsi-Cola, 307 NLRB 1378, 1379 n. 1 (1992) (judge granted the employer’s unopposed motion to issue a protective order directing that excerpts from its security manual be sealed and returned to it at the close of the proceedings), which the Board subsequently cited as an example in Securitas Critical Infrastructure Services, Inc., 18–RC–120181, unpub. Board order issued April 4, 2014 (2014 WL 1330670), at 1 n. 1.

Alternatively, the order may require redaction of personal identifiers, such as names, addresses, and social security numbers, prior to any disclosure. See, e.g., Rangel v. City of Chicago, 2010 WL 3699991 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2010); and Kelly v. City of New York, 2003 WL 548400 (S.D. N.Y. Feb. 24, 2003). See also §12–800, below, regarding the required redaction of personal information from documents submitted into the record.

Applicability of the Freedom of Information Act. Where a party seeks a protective order from the ALJ that would prohibit or restrict Agency personnel from disclosing information to the public, the judge should consider and address the applicability of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552. FOIA generally requires federal agencies to promptly disclose their records on request unless one or more exemptions apply. The burden is on the agency to demonstrate that an exemption applies. U.S. Dept. of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991). If an agency declines to disclose a record, it must explain the basis for nondisclosure under FOIA; it
cannot simply rely on its own administrative protective order designating the record confidential at the time it was received. *General Electric Co. v. NRC*, 750 F.2d 1394, 1400 (7th Cir. 1984).

Various FOIA exemptions may apply to records submitted to the NLRB by private parties, including exemption 4, which exempts from disclosure “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,” and exemption 6, which exempts “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(4) and (6).

The Board’s FOIA regulations specifically address “business information”, i.e., “commercial or financial information obtained by the Agency from a submitter that may be protected from disclosure under Exemption 4.” Among other things, the regulations state that, subject to certain exceptions, the Agency will provide a submitter with “prompt written notice” of a FOIA request or administrative appeal seeking business information that the submitter has designated in good faith as protected, or the Agency has reason to believe may be protected, and “a reasonable time” to respond and object to disclosure. See Sec. 102.117(c)(2)(iv) of the Board’s Rules.

These regulatory provisions may provide sufficient protection with respect to such business information to render a protective order unnecessary, at least where the information has not yet been offered into evidence. See *NLRB v. CEMEX, Inc.*, above, 2009 WL 5184695, *3 (denying the employer’s request to prohibit public disclosure of customer lists and profit/loss statements subpoenaed by the General Counsel in part because the NLRB’s FOIA regulations requiring notice and an opportunity to object to disclosure “offer sufficient protection”), citing *EEOC v. AON Consulting, Inc.*, 149 F.Supp.2d 601, 609 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (finding that similar EEOC regulations provided sufficient protection with respect to confidential employer documents subpoenaed by the EEOC). See also *Illinois School Bus Co.*, 231 NLRB 1 n. 2 (1977) (denying the employer’s motion for a protective order covering the commerce information it had submitted to the Agency).

The provisions may also provide guidance in formulating a protective order sealing confidential documents that have been admitted into the record. See also *Exxon Corp. v. FTC*, above, 665 F.2d at 1279 (protective order issued by FTC ALJ was sufficient because it guaranteed that the companies would be given 10 days notice prior to release of confidential documents so that they could challenge the disclosure).

Sealing Documents. If the protective order forbids or restricts disclosure of an entire document that has been admitted into the record, it is essential that the judge place the document under seal. The failure to do so may undermine subsequent attempts to enforce the order. See *United Parcel Service*, above, 304 NLRB at 694. It is also advisable to include the protective order in any recommended order issued by the judge. See *National Football League*, above, 309 NLRB at 88; and *Carthage Heating & Sheet Metal*, 273 NLRB 120, 123 (1984).

Violations of order. Violating a protective order may constitute misconduct under Section 102.177 of the Board’s Rules. See *United Parcel Service*, above, and § 6–600, Misconduct by Attorney or Representative, et. seq., above.
§ 8–420   Identity of Union Supporters (Authorization Cards)

A respondent may not obtain copies of union authorization cards by subpoena. The identity of card signers is deemed confidential and disclosure would have a “potential chilling effect” on union activity. *National Telephone Directory Corp.*, 319 NLRB 420, 421–422 (1995) (judge erred in ordering production of the names of employees who signed authorization cards and attended union meetings, as the confidentiality interests of such employees outweighed respondent’s need to obtain their identity for cross-examination and credibility impeachment purposes and could only be waived by the employees themselves). See also *Chino Valley Medical Center*, 362 NLRB No. 32, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2015) (employer violated 8(a)(1) by issuing subpoenas duces tecum to employees encompassing communications between employees and the union, union authorization and membership cards, and all documents relating to the distribution and/or solicitation of union authorization cards), enf’d. sub nom. *United Nurses Associations of California v. NLRB*, 871 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2017); *Guess?, Inc.*, 339 NLRB 432 (2003) (employer violated 8(a)(1) by asking an employee during a deposition in a workers’ compensation case to reveal the identities of other employees who attended union meetings); and *Wright Electric, Inc.*, 327 NLRB 1194 (1999) (employer violated 8(a)(1) by subpoenaing employee authorization cards in a state court lawsuit), enf’d. 200 F.3d. 1162, 1167 (8th Cir. 2000).

The Board has applied the same rule to other types of materials that might reveal protected employee conduct. See *Sheraton Anchorage*, 19-CA-32148 et al., unpub. Board order issued January 21, 2011 (granting the union’s special appeal and quashing a respondent subpoena that sought all forms indicating that employees wanted continued representation by the union, notwithstanding that the General Counsel had introduced a few of them for impeachment purposes); and *Trump Ruffin Commercial, LLC*, 28–RC–153650, unpub. Board order issued July 28, 2016 (2016 WL 4036983) (Board affirmed hearing officer’s ruling revoking the employer’s subpoena request for “any and all photographs or records,” as production of such materials “could expose employee conduct protected by Section 7 of the Act that the Employer could not lawfully have photographed itself,” and the material was “not probative of [the Employer’s] specific objections” to the election).

See also *Veritas Health Services, Inc. v. NLRB*, 671 F.3d 1267, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing *National Telephone Directory* in holding that the ALJ did not abuse her discretion in redacting some documents and limiting certain testimony to protect the names of registered nurses who had contacted the union). But cf. *Ozark Automotive Distributors, Inc. v. NLRB*, 779 F.3d 576 (D.C. Cir. 2015), denying enf. and remanding 357 NLRB 1041 (2011). In that case, the court held that the hearing officer erred in quashing the employer’s subpoenas to the union and a prounion employee (Castillo) who the employer contended was a union agent and had made objectionable threatening phone calls to other employees before the election. The subpoenas sought records of the telephone calls between Castillo and the union, and between Castillo and other employees. The court held that the subpoena requests for the date and time of each call were relevant to the employer’s allegations and to Castillo’s credibility as a union witness, and did not infringe on any employee confidentiality interests under *National Telephone*. The court further held that, to the extent the subpoenas sought additional information that might infringe on employee confidentiality interests, the hearing officer should have conducted an in camera review of the documents to determine if those interests outweighed the employer’s interests or to narrow the scope of the subpoenas rather than revoking them in their entirety.
§ 8–425  Collective-Bargaining Information

The General Counsel (and indirectly the charging party union) may not, by using a subpoena, obtain the same information that the respondent employer allegedly withheld from the union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. This would amount to using the subpoena process “as a substitute for the Board order sought by the complaint.” Electrical Energy Services, 288 NLRB 925, 931 (1988).

Respondent subpoenas that broadly request union records, including communications between the union and its members, have been revoked in order to protect the bargaining process. See Berbiglia, Inc., 233 NLRB 1476, 1495 (1977) (“If collective bargaining is to work, the parties must be able to formulate their positions and devise their strategies without fear of exposure”); and Champ Corp., 291 NLRB 803, 817 (1988) (citing Berbiglia, as well as the subpoena’s overbreadth and facial deficiency, as grounds for revoking a respondent subpoena seeking all union notes or other records describing or recording collective-bargaining sessions), enf’d. 933 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 957 (1991). See also Cook Paint and Varnish Co., 258 NLRB 1230 (1981) (employer violated 8(a)(1) by demanding, prior to an arbitration hearing over an employee’s discharge, that the union steward disclose the substance of his conversations with the discharged employee and to produce his notes about the matter, as the union steward had the conversations with the employee and took the notes in his representational capacity, and compelling disclosure would “manifestly restrain[] employees in their willingness to candidly discuss matters with their chosen, statutory representatives”).

In Jung Sun Laundry Group, 29–CA–29946, unpub. order issued September 3, 2010, the Board applied this reasoning in revoking an employer’s subpoena that sought “all documents regarding the union’s collective-bargaining agreements and most favored nations clauses,” and minutes of meetings between the union and other employers regarding collective-bargaining negotiations. Citing both Berbiglia and Detroit Edison v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314-315 (1979), the Board found that the union had a “considerable” interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such documents, and that the employer had failed to establish that its interest outweighed the union’s interest. Accordingly, the Board granted the union’s special appeal and reversed the judge’s order, which had required the union to produce the documents subject to recording them on a privilege log, redaction, and in camera inspection.

This rationale would seem also to apply to subpoenas seeking employer notes relating to bargaining strategy. See Patrick Cudahy, Inc., 288 NLRB 968, 969–971 (1988) (quoting Berbiglia, above, and applying the attorney-client privilege broadly where the General Counsel’s subpoenas sought collective-bargaining information from the respondent employer), discussed in § 8–435, below. But see NLRB v. SEIU Local 521, 2008 WL 152176 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2008) (court enforced General Counsel subpoena notwithstanding that the subpoenaed documents might incidentally contain information about the respondents’ bargaining strategies, distinguishing Berbiglia and Champ on the ground that they involved employer subpoenas, the respondents had failed to explain or demonstrate how negotiations would be compromised if such information were disclosed to the Board, and any confidentiality concerns could be addressed by a protective order); and NLRB v. Jackson Hospital Corp., 257 F.R.D. 302 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing SEIU Local 521, the special master in a contempt proceeding rejected the respondent employer’s assertion that it was privileged to withhold documents revealing bargaining strategy from the General Counsel, and ordered the respondent to produce the subpoenaed documents to the General Counsel subject to a protective order prohibiting disclosure of the bargaining-strategy information to the union).
§ 8–430 Attorney-Client Privilege

“The Board recognizes the fundamental principle that communications made in confidence between an attorney and his or her client for the purpose of seeking and obtaining legal advice are privileged.” Smithfield Packing Co., 344 NLRB 1, 13 (2004), enf'd. 447 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The Board also recognizes that the privilege protects both communications from the attorney to the client and communications from the client to the attorney. Patrick Cudahy, 288 NLRB 968, 971 (1988), quoting Upjohn Corp. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981) (“the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice”).

A concise summary of the privilege is set forth in U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–359 (D. Mass. 1950), which the Board cited with approval in Patrick Cudahy:

The privilege applies only if (1) the holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his or her subordinate, and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his or her client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.

The burden is on the party asserting the privilege to establish that it applies. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Construction Products Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 519 U.S. 927 (1996); and Lansing Automakers Federal Credit Union, 355 NLRB 1345, 1353 (2010).

Regarding communications from the attorney to the client, courts are divided on whether such communications are protected (1) only if they would reveal a confidential communication from the client; (2) only if they are based in significant part on a confidential communication from the client; or (3) irrespective of their relationship to any communications from the client. See Graham, 24 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5491 (1st ed., database updated April 2017) (collecting cases). It appears that the Board has not directly addressed this issue.

Substance of communication. The privilege applies only to testimony or evidence that reveals the substance of communications to or from an attorney or his/her subordinate. For example, the privilege would normally apply to communications that reveal the motive of the client in seeking representation, litigation strategy, or the specific nature of the services provided, such as researching particular areas of law. However, it normally would not apply to the mere existence of an attorney-client relationship, including the identity of the client, the amount of the fee, and the general purpose of the work performed. See Clarke v. American Commerce National Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992), cited with approval in Benedictine Health Center, 18–CA–196456, unpub. Board order issued Dec. 27, 2017 (2017 WL 6728886), at 1 n. 1.

The privilege also would not normally apply to the mere fact that an attorney-client meeting or communication occurred about a particular topic. See, e.g., MacFarlane v. Fivespice LLC, 2017 WL 1758053, *4 (D. Oregon May 4, 2017); and City of Inglewood v. Time Warner NY Cable LLC, 2015 WL 12803767, *4 n. 4 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2015). See also Carlson v.
Likewise, the privilege normally would not apply if the communication was not to or from an attorney and did not reveal the attorney’s advice. Thus, in Smithfield Packing, above, the Board held that the privilege did not apply to a supervisor’s testimony about what her managers instructed her to do during a union campaign—notwithstanding the employer’s argument that the instructions may have resulted from privileged communications between the manager and the employer’s attorney—because the supervisor’s “testimony pertained only to her instructions from her management superiors, not to any communications to or from counsel.” 344 NLRB at 12 n. 57. Compare Swartwood v. County of San Diego, 2013 WL 6670545 at *9 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2013) (text of email circulated among defendant county’s employees was properly redacted as privileged because it mentioned the county’s attorney and repeated her legal advice to the county); and Santrade, Ltd. V. General Electric Co., 150 F.R.D. 539, 545 (E.D. N.C. 1993) (“a document need not be authored or addressed to an attorney in order to be properly withheld . . . . [D]ocuments subject to the privilege may be transmitted between non-attorneys (especially individuals involved in corporate decision-making) so that the corporation may be properly informed of legal advice and act appropriately”).

Communications vs. facts. The privilege applies only to communications and not to facts. Witnesses may not refuse to disclose facts within their own knowledge simply because they incorporated those facts into a communication with their attorney. Sunland Construction Co., 311 NLRB 685, 699–700 (1993), quoting from Upjohn, above, 449 U.S. at 396–397. Nor is factual information privileged merely because it was uncovered by the company while conducting an analysis at the direction of its attorney. See In re Six Grand Jury Witnesses, 979 F.2d 939, 944 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied 509 U.S. 905 (1993). See also Patrick Cudahy, above, 288 NLRB at 971 n. 13 (“It is communication between attorney and client related to the giving of legal advice that is privileged—not simply documents that pass between them. Thus, nonprivileged documents—e.g., ordinary corporate records such as payroll or personnel records—cannot be swept within the privilege simply by being transmitted from client to attorney or vice versa.”); and B.P. Exploration, Inc., 337 NLRB 887, 889 (2002) (Board held that the attorney-client privilege applied to safety reports because an attorney directed that the reports be created to provide legal advice regarding compliance with safety regulations and handling of citations; however, the Board emphasized that it was the reports, not the underlying information, that the union sought). Cf. Borgess Medical Center, 342 NLRB 1105, 1106 n. 5 (2004) (privilege did not apply to incident reports sought by union in connection with arbitration proceeding because they were not prepared by or with participation of attorney).

In-house counsel. One recurring type of privilege issue concerns the proper characterization of communications involving in-house counsel in circumstances where it is shown that the official performs both legal and regular business functions. For a case addressing this issue, see Adams & Associates, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 193 (2016), enf’d. 871 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2017). The ALJ in that case found that the respondent company was motivated by union animus in failing to hire several of its predecessor’s employees in part based on an email that the company’s CEO had sent to two company HR executives, and other communications between the HR executives, indicating the CEO’s displeasure that the transition team had failed to avoid a successorship bargaining obligation with the union. Although both of the HR executives were attorneys and one had a dual role as the company’s general counsel, after reviewing the communications in camera the ALJ ruled that the communications were not privileged because
they pertained principally to human resources or labor relations and not to legal advice. The Board affirmed the ALJ (see nn. 5 and 15 of the Board’s opinion), and the court likewise agreed with the ALJ’s determination after independently reviewing the communications (871 F.3d at 370 n. 3).

See also EEOC v. BDO USA, LLP, 856 F.3d 356, 364–366 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding that the company’s privilege log entries were too vague and conclusory because the subject communications occurred in the context of HR and involved in-house counsel, and a former HR officer submitted a sworn declaration that many of the communications were not made for the purpose of seeking and imparting legal advice); In re Sealed Case, above, (company could shelter former vice president-general counsel’s advice “only upon a clear showing that he gave it in a professional legal capacity”); In re Google, Inc., 462 Fed. Appx. 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2012) (same “clear showing” must be made even if the in-house attorney did not have distinct non-legal responsibilities); and Boca Investorings Partnership v. U.S., 31 F.Supp.2d 9, 11–12 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing additional cases).

Where the communication to or from the in-house attorney may have both a legal and a business purpose, see In re Kellog Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (communication is protected if obtaining or providing legal advice was “a primary purpose of the communication, meaning one of the significant purposes of the communication”), cert. denied 135 S.Ct. 1163 (2015).

Current and former employees. Another potential issue involves whether communications between an employer’s attorney and a current or former employee of the employer constitute privileged attorney-client communications. The Supreme Court in Upjohn, above, held that the privilege applies to communications from corporate employees to the corporation’s attorneys, regardless of the employee’s corporate position, if “the communications concerned matters within the scope of the employees’ corporate duties, and the employees themselves were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice.” 449 U.S. at 394. Lower courts have since held that the privilege also extends to former employees, provided the communication relates to the former employee’s conduct and knowledge gained during employment and is relevant and necessary for the attorney to provide advice to the corporation. See In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 605–606 (4th Cir. 1997); Admiral Insurance Co., v. U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, 881 F.2d 1486, 1493 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1989); MF Global Holdings Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 232 F.Supp.3d 558, 569 (S.D. N.Y. 2017); and Hanover Insurance Co. v. Piaquenmines Parish Government, 304 F.R.D. 494, 498 (E.D. La. 2015), and cases cited there.

Charging parties and discriminatees. Communications between individual charging parties or alleged discriminatees and the General Counsel may constitute privileged attorney-client communications on the ground that the General Counsel is their “de facto” attorney. See, e.g., Donovan v. Teamsters Local 25, 103 F.R.D. 550 (D. Mass. 1984) (rejecting the defendant union’s contention that the complaining witness in an action by the Department of Labor against the union under the LMRDA was not a true client of DOL’s legal staff, as his sole legal recourse was through DOL and he accepted DOL’s legal staff as his own lawyers in the case). Alternatively, the communications may be protected from disclosure under the “common interest” doctrine. See, e.g., U.S. v. Gumbaytay, 276 F.R.D. 671 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (attorney-client privilege protected communications between alleged victims of housing discrimination and government counsel who brought the discrimination action against the defendant on their behalf under the Fair Housing Act, as the alleged victims and the government had a common legal
interest). See also § 8–440, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, below, for a further discussion of the common interest doctrine.

Grievants. “It is well established, as a matter of law, that an attorney handling a labor grievance on behalf of a union does not enter into an ‘attorney-client’ relationship with the union member asserting the grievance.” Gwin v. National Marine Engineers Beneficial Assoc., 966 F.Supp. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1997), affd. per curiam 159 F.3d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1998). However, communications between a grievant and the union’s attorney may nevertheless be protected from disclosure under the “de facto” attorney or “common interest” doctrines discussed above. See also Cook Paint and Varnish Co., 258 NLRB 1230 (1981) (employer violated 8(a)(1) by demanding, prior to an arbitration hearing over an employee’s discharge, that the union steward disclose the substance of his conversations with the discharged employee and to produce his notes about the matter, as the union steward had the conversations with the employee and took the notes in his representational capacity, and compelling disclosure would “manifestly restrain[] employees in their willingness to candidly discuss matters with their chosen, statutory representatives”).


§ 8–435 The Privilege and Collective-Bargaining and Business Records

Where collective-bargaining information is sought, the Board applies the attorney-client privilege broadly in evaluating management communications with counsel. See Patrick Cudahy, 288 NLRB 968, 969–971 (1988), and § 8–425, above. See also Taylor Lumber & Treating, Inc., 326 NLRB 1298 n. 2 (1998) (privilege applied to confidential communications between respondent’s chief negotiator and members of respondent’s management control group because he was also engaged by respondent to provide legal services in connection with other employment relations matters).

However, the Board has emphasized that the analysis may be different in other situations. Patrick Cudahy, 288 NLRB at 971 n. 12. For example, a narrower or stricter analysis typically applied by the courts may be warranted in 8(a)(3) cases where the communication relates primarily to an employer’s antiunion campaign strategy rather than legal advice. See Humphreys, Hutcheson & Moseley v. Donovan, 568 F.Supp.161, 175 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (privilege was not applicable to communications between attorney and company where attorney acted as a labor consultant to persuade the company’s employees to reject the union, rather than as a lawyer), affd. 755 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1985). See also Matter of Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 626–628 (7th Cir. 1988) (“A business that gets marketing advice from a lawyer does not acquire a privilege in the bargain.”); and In re Lindsay, 158 F.3d 1263, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 996 (1998) (a lawyer’s “advice on political, strategic, or policy issues, valuable as it may have been, would not be shielded from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.”)

As discussed above, ordinary corporate records such as payroll or personnel records, cannot be swept within the privilege simply by being transmitted from the client to the attorney. Nevertheless, when legal advice relates to collective bargaining, the Board will not readily and broadly compel disclosure of confidential communications between attorney and client simply because the communications are intermixed with business and economic considerations. The notes of exchanges in a bargaining session with other parties are not protected, however, unless
they are intermingled with privileged communications. See *CNN America, Inc.*, above, 352 NLRB at 449; and *Patrick Cudahy*, above, 288 NLRB at 971 n. 13.

§ 8–440 Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege

Waiver of the attorney-client privilege may be found where the substance of the privileged communication has been previously disclosed, either deliberately or inadvertently or by failing to safeguard the material. For example, in *Helnick Corp.*, 301 NLRB 128, 130 (1991), waiver was found as to a particular conversation between the respondent’s owner and his lawyers where the owner volunteered information regarding the conversation during examination by the judge. See also *Farm Fresh, Inc.*, 301 NLRB 907, 917 (1991), where the Board held that the privilege did not apply when a document arguably subject to the privilege was stolen and given to the union, as the respondent was required to safeguard the document. Compare *Western United Life Assurance Co. v. Fifth Third Bank*, 2004 WL 2583916, *4* (N. D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2004), where the court held that disclosure of the mere fact that a conversation between attorney and client occurred, and what the topic of the conversation was, no more constituted a waiver of the privilege than mentioning and cursorily describing a document in a privilege log.

Generally, disclosing the communication to a third person who is not acting as an agent of either the client or the client’s attorney waives the privilege. See, e.g., *U.S. v. Evans*, 113 F.3d 1457, 1462–1467 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding waiver, notwithstanding that the third person was an attorney, as the credited testimony established that he was present only as a personal friend and witness). Compare also *Jenkins v. Bartlett*, 487 F.3d 482, 490–491 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1039 (2007) (presence of a union officer during the conversations between an employee and the attorney appointed by the union to represent the employee did not waive the privilege as the union officer was present to assist the attorney), with *Miller v. York Risk Services Group*, 2014 WL 11514550, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 22, 2014) (presence of at least five union members who were not plaintiffs at a pre-litigation union meeting with plaintiffs’ counsel waived the privilege).

However, under the so-called “common interest” or “joint defense” doctrine or rule, the privilege will not be waived if the disclosure is made in confidence to a third person having a common legal interest in furtherance of that interest. See *Parts Depot, Inc.*, 332 NLRB 670, 677 (2000), enf’d. 24 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and *NLRB v. Jackson Hospital Corp.*, 257 F.R.D. 302, 312–313 (D.D.C. 2009) (doctrine applies to communications between the charging party union and the General Counsel). See also *U.S. v. Schaeffler*, 806 F.3d 34, 40–41 (2d Cir. 2015); and *U.S. v. BDO Seidman, LLP*, 492 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1242 (2008).

The privilege may also be waived by providing the documents in other proceedings. See *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 348 NLRB 833, 834 (2006). However, FRE 502 places certain limitations on waiver with respect to both intentional and unintentional disclosures in federal and state proceedings. For example, FRE 502(b) provides that an “inadvertent” disclosure in a federal proceeding or to a federal officer or agency will not operate as a waiver of the privilege if “reasonable steps” were taken to prevent disclosure and to rectify the error. See § 16-502, below. As indicated in the Advisory Committee Notes a number of factors may be considered in applying this rule, including the number of documents to be reviewed and the time constraints for production.

For a case applying FRE 502(b), see *Church Square Supermarket*, 356 NLRB 1357, 1369 n. 40 (2011) (rejecting the employer’s contention that a document it had previously disclosed to the General Counsel in response to a subpoena was not admissible under FRE
502(b), as the disclosure was not “inadvertent” and/or the employer had failed to take reasonable steps to prevent disclosure).

Once waived, the attorney-client privilege is lost in all forums for proceedings running concurrent with or after the waiver occurs. See Wal-Mart Stores, above, 348 NLRB at 834. In that case, the Board held that the respondent’s production of subpoenaed documents in a state court proceeding constituted a waiver in the Board proceeding, even though the waiver came after the hearing closed and while the case was pending before the Board on the General Counsel’s exceptions to the ALJ’s decision. The Board therefore remanded the case to the ALJ to reopen the record to receive and evaluate the evidence.

§ 8–445  Crime/Fraud Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege

Attorney-client communications in furtherance of crimes or frauds are not protected by the attorney-client privilege. A sufficient showing of the applicability of the crime/fraud exception is made by evidence that, if believed, would prima facie establish the elements of an ongoing or future crime or fraud. See, e.g., Smithfield Packing Co., 344 NLRB 1, 14 n. 60 (2004) (testimony with respect to communications between the respondent’s former manager and the respondent’s attorney regarding the preparation of the manager’s affidavit, specifically as to whether the manager gave a false affidavit to the respondent’s attorney and whether the attorney knew it was false, came within crime fraud exception), enfd. 447 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

However, the Board has declined to apply the crime/fraud exception to attorney-client communications in furtherance of unfair labor practices. Patrick Cudahy, Inc., 288 NLRB 968, 972–974 (1988).

§ 8–450  Duration of Attorney-Client Privilege


§ 8–455  Work Product Doctrine

The work-product doctrine protects documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a party representative, regardless of whether the representative is an attorney. It was first recognized in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947), and is now codified in FRCP 26(b)(3) (Trial Preparation: Materials).

The burden is on the party asserting the work product doctrine to establish that it applies. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 364 NLRB No. 86, slip op. at 3 (2016). Specifically, the party must show that the materials were prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation, rather than in the ordinary course of business, i.e. they would not have been prepared but for the “fairly foreseeable” prospect of litigation. See cases cited in Central Telephone Company of Texas, 343 NLRB 987, 988 (2004).

For specific case examples, compare Central Telephone, above (finding that the privilege applied, and that the union was not entitled to copies of notes taken by respondent’s human resources specialist while investigating alleged misconduct that later became the subject
of a grievance, as the investigation was directed by in-house counsel, respondent did not ordinarily conduct such an extensive investigation, and its fear of litigation was “objectively reasonable” even though no litigation had been initiated and the employees had not yet been disciplined when the notes were prepared), with *Hawaii Tribune Herald*, 359 NLRB No. 39 (2012) (finding that the privilege did not apply to a statement given by an employee to a manager as part of the employer’s pre-disciplinary investigation of a union steward’s alleged misconduct, even though the manager met with the employee at the suggestion of the employer’s attorneys and, at some unspecified time after the meeting, handwrote on the statement that it was “prepared at the advice of counsel in preparation for arbitration”). See also *SFEG Corp. v. Blendtec, Inc.*, 2016 WL 2770661 (M.D. Tenn. May 13, 2016) (discussing and agreeing with the position of the majority of courts that once a statement or affidavit is signed by the witness it is no longer work product as a matter of law).

FRCP 26(b)(3)(A)(ii) provides for an exception upon a party’s showing that it has “a substantial need for the materials” and “cannot, without undue hardship obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.” For cases applying this exception, see *Central Telephone Company of Texas*, above (union failed to meet its burden as the respondent had provided the union with witness statements and the union was able to conduct its own witness interviews); and *Marian Manor for the Aged and Infirm, Inc.*, 333 NLRB 1084 (2001) (employer seeking copy of responses to union’s survey of employer’s nursing staff regarding supervisory indicia failed to show that it was unable to obtain the equivalent information by other means, including conducting its own survey of employees). See also *Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.*, 339 NLRB 829 (2003) (respondent failed to show substantial need for a copy of the position statement submitted by the charging party to the General Counsel in support of its charge during the investigation).

However, even if the exception is found to apply and trial preparation materials within the privilege are ordered disclosed, Rule 26(b)(3)(B) requires protection against disclosure of the “mental impressions, conclusion, opinions, or legal theories of a parties’ attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.” *Central Telephone Company of Texas*, above, 343 NLRB at 998.

§ 8–460 Waiver of Work Product Protection

For a Board case addressing waiver of work product protection, see *Ralphs Grocery Co.*, 352 NLRB 128, 129 (2008), reafld. 355 NLRB 1279 (2010) (finding that a limited waiver respondent executed in a federal criminal proceeding did not waive work product protection as to certain audit information as there was no evidence that the audit information was requested or inquired into by the U.S. Attorney).

With respect to position statements, compare *Kaiser Aluminum*, above (charging party does not waive work product protection by giving position statement to the General Counsel); with *Evergreen America Corp.*, 348 NLRB 178, 187 (2006) (contrary rule applies where respondent submits position statement to the General Counsel). See also § 16–801.3, Admission or Statement by Opposing Party.

As indicated by *Kaiser Aluminum* and *Evergreen America*, whether the distribution or disclosure of a document to third parties waives the protection may turn on whether the third party shares a common interest. Unlike with attorney-client communications, however, the common interest need not be a common legal interest. See § 8–440, Waiver of Attorney Client Privilege, above. This is because there is no waiver of work product protection unless the third party was an adversary or the document was shared or disclosed in a manner that would materially

As discussed in § 8–440 above, FRE 502 sets forth certain limitations on waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine in connection with intentional and inadvertent disclosures in federal and state proceedings. For a Board case applying FRE 502(b) (inadvertent disclosures), see Church Square Supermarket, 356 NLRB 1357, 1369 n. 40 (2011) (rejecting the employer’s contention that a document it had previously disclosed to the General Counsel in response to a subpoena was inadmissible under FRE 502).

§ 8–465 Reporter’s Privilege

In *CNN America, Inc.*, 352 NLRB 675, 676–677 (2008), supplemental proceedings 353 NLRB 891 (2009), final decision and order issued 361 NLRB No. 47 (2014), the Board did not specifically decide whether a reporter’s privilege applies in Board proceedings. However, assuming for sake of argument that it does, the Board endorsed a balancing test to determine whether the subpoenaed information must be provided. Relevant factors to consider are: whether or not the information is obtainable from alternative sources; whether it is crucial to establish the claim; and whether the need for the information outweighs the interest in protecting the substance of the reporter’s newsgathering. Applying these factors, the Board found that the balance tipped in favor of disclosure to the General Counsel, noting the absence of any claim by CNN that the information sought was obtained from a confidential source or would likely lead to discovery of confidential information or sources.

§ 8–470 Testimony by Board Agents and Privileged Files

Section 102.118(a) of the Board’s Rules provides that, except as provided under the Board’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) regulations (Sec. 102.117(a)–(c)), no person employed by the Agency or acting on its behalf shall produce or present files, reports, or records under the control of the Board or General Counsel in any legal proceeding, whether in response to a subpoena or otherwise, without the written consent of the Board or its Chairman (if the documents are in Washington, D.C. and in the Board’s control), or the written consent of the General Counsel (if the documents are in a Regional Office or in Washington, D.C. under the General Counsel’s control).

The same section also requires similar consent to obtain testimony by an Agency employee or agent. See also Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 327 NLRB 315, 316 (1998) (to avoid the appearance of partiality, the Board has a strong and longstanding policy against Board agents and employees appearing as witnesses in a legal proceeding); and Sunol Valley Golf Co., 305 NLRB 493, 495 (1991) (finding that balance weighed against requiring a Board agent to testify, and therefore quashing the respondent’s subpoenas), supplemented by 310 NLRB 357, 365, 368 nn. 7 and 8 (1993); enfd. 48 F.3d 444 (9th Cir. 1995). See also § 16–611.5, Failure to Call Witness: Adverse Inference, below.
The failure of the party serving the subpoena to seek and obtain written consent under Section 102.118 is grounds for revoking or quashing the subpoena. See, e.g., Howard Johnson Co., 250 NLRB 1412 n. 2 (1980), enfd. mem. 671 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1982); and J.C. Penney Co., 205 NLRB 1043, 1044 (1973), enfd. mem. 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974).

§ 8–475 Mediator Not Subject to Subpoena

Board policy does not permit a party to compel a mediator to testify in Board proceedings. Success Village Apartments, Inc., 347 NLRB 1065 (2006). Thus, a subpoena requiring the testimony of a mediator to testify must be quashed.

§ 8–480 State Confidentiality Rules Not Controlling

Evidence that is otherwise admissible is not rendered inadmissible in Board proceedings because it is privileged under State law. See R. Sabee Co., 351 NLRB 1350 n. 3 (2007) (judge properly accepted into evidence statements made during a state court injunction proceeding and a related court-ordered mediation of state law claims, despite a claim of privilege under Wisconsin law); North Carolina License Plate Agency # 18, 346 NLRB 293, 294 n. 5 (2006) (evidence from a state unemployment commission, which was privileged under state law, was nevertheless admissible in the Board proceeding), enfd. 243 Fed. Appx. 771 (4th Cir. 2007); and Diva Limousine, 22–CA–091561, unpub. Board order issued Dec. 3, 2013 (2013 WL 6328060) ("objections [to subpoenas] made solely on the basis of a state code of civil procedure . . . are not cognizable in a Board proceeding"). See also Miller v. St. John’s Health System, 2011 WL 3890315 (S.D. Ind. July 29, 2011) (denying motion to quash the employer’s subpoena in an ADEA wrongful termination action seeking documents from the state agency relating to the plaintiff employee’s application for unemployment benefits in order to determine what steps she had taken to mitigate damages by seeking employment), and § 16–501 (FRE 501), below.

§ 8–500 Jencks Statements Not Producible by Subpoena

A Jencks “statement” or affidavit given by a witness to the General Counsel is not subject to production by subpoena in advance of the hearing. H. B. Zachry Co., 310 NLRB 1037, 1037–1038 (1993). Nor is such statement or affidavit producible under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See Stride Rite Corp., 228 NLRB 224, 226 n. 3 (1977).

Such statements or affidavits are producible only after the witness has testified and for use on cross-examination of the witness. See Sec. 102.118(e) of the Board’s Rules.

For the origin of the rule, see Jencks v. U.S., 353 U.S. 657, 662 (1957). See also § 16–613.1, Jencks Statements, below, for a more detailed discussion of such statements.

§ 8–510 Tape/Video Recordings

Contemporaneous remarks captured on an audio or video tape are not a Jencks “statement” subject to Section 102.118(e) of the Board’s Rules because they are “not a description of a past event” but part of the substantive event itself. See Leisure Knoll Assn., 327 NLRB 470 n. 1 (1999) (tape recordings and transcripts of conversations between a supervisor and an employee); and Dickens, Inc., 355 NLRB 255 n. 7 (2010) (tape recordings of incidents occurring in the employer’s facility), citing with approval Delta Mechanical, Inc., 323 NLRB 76, 77 (1997).
However, such recordings may be subject to production pursuant to a subpoena. If the recording is in the sole possession of the General Counsel, a written request must be made pursuant to Section 102.118(a). See *Gallup, Inc.*, 349 NLRB 1213, 1218 (2007). In that case, the General Counsel refused to turn the tapes over to the respondent pursuant to either the respondent’s subpoena or the Jencks rule (as the recordings were not “statements” under that rule). The judge ruled that production was required pursuant to the subpoena, and therefore struck the witness’s testimony as a sanction for the General Counsel’s noncompliance. (See § 8–620, Failure to Produce Documents, below.) On special appeal, however, the Board reversed, and held that the respondent must first request the General Counsel’s consent to produce under Section 102.118(a). (See § 8–470, Testimony by Board Agents and Privileged Files, above.)

For a discussion of the admissibility of tape recordings, see § 16–402.8, below.

§ 8–600 Refusal to Honor Subpoena

§ 8–610 Failure of Witness to Appear and Testify

The failure of a party witness (i.e. an officer or agent of a party) to appear and testify in compliance with a subpoena may warrant evidentiary sanctions, including prohibiting the noncomplying party from calling the same witnesses and drawing adverse inferences against that party. *Rogan Bros. Sanitation, Inc.*, 362 NLRB No. 61, slip op. at 3 n. 9 (2015), enfd. 651 Fed. Appx. 34 (2d Cir. 2016), and cases cited there. See also *Carpenters Local 405*, 328 NLRB 788 n. 2 (1999).

If a subpoenaed nonparty witness appears but refuses to answer questions, the judge should advise the witness that, absent a Fifth Amendment or other valid privilege, he/she is required by the subpoena to answer any and all relevant and appropriate questions posed by counsel. If necessary, the judge should also inform the witness about the consequences of refusing to answer, including that the Board may request a federal court to enforce the subpoena, and to also impose contempt sanctions if the witness thereafter declines to obey the court’s order. See generally *Barnett v. Norman*, 782 F.3d 417, 422–424 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing a district court judge’s obligations if a subpoenaed witness refuses to testify).

§ 8–620 Failure to Produce Documents

A party has an obligation “to begin a good faith effort to gather responsive documents upon service” of a subpoena; accordingly, “a party who simply ignores a subpoena pending a ruling on a petition to revoke does so at his or her peril.” *McAllister Towing & Transportation*, 341 NLRB 394, 396–397 (2004) (upholding judge’s imposition of evidentiary sanctions against the respondent for failing to substantially comply with the subpoenas upon issuance of the judge’s order partially denying its petition to revoke on the first day of hearing), enfd. 156 Fed. Appx. 386, 388 (2d Cir. 2005). See also *San Luis Trucking*, 352 NLRB 211, 212 (2008), reaffd. 356 NLRB 168 (2010) (imposing evidentiary sanctions where respondent merely made 2471 boxes of documents “available” to the General Counsel the afternoon before the hearing, without making any effort to separate requested materials from unrequested materials, and did not produce the requested documents in the form required by FRCP 34 and 45 at the hearing, despite the judge’s denial of respondent’s petition to revoke at the outset thereof), enfd. without addressing the sanctions issue 479 Fed. Appx. 743 (9th Cir. 2012).
**Evidentiary Sanctions.** As indicated by *McAllister Towing* and *San Luis Trucking*, the Board has repeatedly affirmed the authority of ALJs to impose evidentiary sanctions against a noncomplying party where the General Counsel has elected not to initiate court enforcement proceedings (see § 8–700, below). And the D.C. Circuit and certain other circuit courts have generally agreed. See *Perdue Farms Inc. v. NLRB*, 144 F.3d 830, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and additional court decisions cited below. However, as discussed in §§ 8–405 and 8–410, above, the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held to the contrary.

Several sanctions are available where a party refuses or fails to timely or properly comply with a subpoena. The appropriate option, if any, is within the discretion of the judge, who may choose any or all of them, depending on the circumstances. *McAllister Towing & Transportation*, above. The judge may:

1) **Draw an adverse inference.** See, e.g., *Essex Valley Visiting Nurses Assn.*, 352 NLRB 427, 441–444 (2008), reafdf. 356 NLRB 146 (2010), enf'd. 455 Fed. Appx. 5 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (respondent's failure to produce subpoenaed documents warranted an adverse inference supporting the General Counsel's allegation of single-employer status); and *Metro-West Ambulance Service*, 360 NLRB 1029, 1030 and n. 13 (2014) (where the respondent in an 8(a)(3) discrimination case failed to produce accident reports over the previous 2 years in response to the General Counsel's subpoena, an adverse inference was proper that the respondent failed to show that it treated the discriminatee the same as other employees who engaged in comparable misconduct). See also *Auto Workers v. NLRB*, 459 F.2d 1329, 1338–1344 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

Of course, it is improper to draw an adverse inference if the subpoena request was not clear. See, e.g., *Sisters Camelot*, 363 NLRB No. 13, slip op. at 8 (2015) (unrepresented charging party could reasonably conclude that the respondent's subpoena did not seek certain emails he had forwarded to the General Counsel, as the subpoena's description of the requested documents suggested that it pertained only to personnel or work records).

It is likewise improper to draw an adverse inference if a satisfactory explanation is provided for the failure to produce the documents. See, e.g., *Hansen Bros. Enterprises*, 313 NLRB 599, 608 (1993) (discriminatee credibly testified that old tax returns did not exist); and *Champ Corp.*, 291 NLRB 803 (1988) (judge did not err in declining to draw an adverse inference from the charging party union's failure to produce meeting notes subpoenaed by the respondent, as the union presented credible testimony concerning its good-faith but unsuccessful search for the notes, and other evidence supported a reasonable inference that the notes could have been inadvertently destroyed or misplaced), enf'd. 933 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 502 U.S. 957 (1991).

An adverse inference is also inappropriate based on a party's mere invocation of the attorney-client privilege. See *Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.*, 191 F.3d 208, 225–226 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds 537 U.S. 418 (2003); and *Parker v. Prudential Insurance Co.*, 900 F.2d 772, 775 (4th Cir. 1990).

The judge may, in his or her discretion, also decline to draw an adverse inference under the particular circumstances presented. See *CPS Chemical Co.*, 324 NLRB 1018, 1019 (1997) (no prejudice suffered by nonproduction), enf'd. 160 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 1998). But see *Metro-West Ambulance Service*, above (drawing an adverse inference even though the judge found it unnecessary to do so); and *Zapex Corp.*, 235 NLRB 1237, 1239–1240 (1978) (holding that the judge improperly failed to draw an adverse inference that the respondent had not satisfied its
2) Bar a noncomplying party from presenting evidence about the subject matter sought by the subpoena. \textit{M.D. Miller Trucking}, 361 NLRB No. 141, slip op. at 1 n. 1, 5 (2014); and \textit{Perdue Farms}, 323 NLRB 345, 348 (1997), affd. in relevant part 144 F.3d 830, 833–834 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The judge may also preclude the noncomplying party from cross-examining witnesses about the same matter. \textit{NLRB v. C. H. Sprague \\& Son}, 428 F.2d 938, 942 (1st Cir. 1970). See also \textit{McAllister Towing \\& Transportation}, above, 341 NLRB at 396 (noting that, although the judge did not impose this particular sanction, judges have the authority to do so).

3) Permit the introduction of secondary evidence by the party who has been disadvantaged. See \textit{Bannon Mills}, 146 NLRB 611, 614 n. 4, 633–634 (1964); and \textit{American Art Industries}, 166 NLRB 943, 951–953 (1967), affd. in pertinent part 415 F.2d 1223, 1229–1230 (5th Cir. 1969) (permitting the General Counsel to present secondary evidence, including employee testimony, regarding the number of employees in the unit in lieu of employee payroll and other records that the respondent failed to produce). See also \textit{Roofers Local 30 (Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc.)}, 227 NLRB 1444, 1449 (1977) (permitting the General Counsel to introduce secondary evidence, including hearsay testimony, regarding the identity of those who were present during and participated in the alleged incidents, in lieu of subpoenaed evidence not produced by respondent).

4) Strike pleadings or the testimony of witnesses that related to the same subject matter as the undisclosed documents. See \textit{Equipment Trucking Co.}, 336 NLRB 277 n. 1 (2001) (striking respondent’s answer with respect to certain allegations); and \textit{Lenscraft Optical Corp.}, 128 NLRB 807, 817 (1960) (striking testimony of witnesses who failed to reappear for cross-examination after the documents were belatedly disclosed).

Sanctions against the Charging Party. As suggested in some of the cases cited above, one or more of the foregoing evidentiary sanctions are likewise available where a charging party contumaciously refuses to fully comply with a respondent subpoena. See also \textit{Teamsters Local 917 (Peerless Importers)}, 345 NLRB 1010 (2005) (judge could have imposed evidentiary sanctions against the charging party employer for refusing to comply with the respondent union’s subpoena duces tecum).

Sanctions against the General Counsel. An issue may occasionally arise whether sanctions should be issued against the General Counsel for the contumacious failure of a charging party or a discriminatee to fully comply with a respondent subpoena.

In \textit{Marquez Bros. Enterprises}, Inc., 21–CA–039581, unpub. order issued Sept. 7, 2017 (2017 WL 3953408), the Board majority ruled that it was improper for the ALJ to issue evidentiary sanctions against the General Counsel in response to the failure of individual discriminatees to fully comply with subpoenas duces tecum served on them by the respondent employer in the backpay proceeding. The ALJ had prohibited the General Counsel from questioning any witnesses other than the compliance officer concerning the discriminatees’ interim earnings. The majority reversed on the grounds that the General Counsel acts on behalf of the Agency in the public interest rather than to vindicate private rights, and that the Board’s backpay remedy is likewise a public rather than a private right. The Board found that the ALJ “therefore . . . improperly penalized the General Counsel for conduct that he did not control.” The majority also noted that the discriminatees were not represented, one of them lacked reasonable proficiency in English, both were willing to and did testify about their production of documents and attempts to
comply with the subpoena requests, and there was no indication that their failure to comply fully with the subpoenas was willful.

The Board has not passed on whether an ALJ may apply evidentiary sanctions against the General Counsel when a charging party contumaciously fails to fully comply with a respondent subpoena. The Board’s reasoning in Marquez at least arguably suggests that the ALJ should not do so. However, the Board in Marquez did not specifically address the issue. See p. 2 fn. 1 of the Board’s order (distinguishing Encino Hospital Medical Center, 364 NLRB No. 128, JD slip op. at 18 n. 39 (2016), in part because it involved a “represented charging party union’s contumacious failure to comply with the respondent’s subpoena duces tecum,” and in part because no exceptions were filed to the ALJ’s issuance of sanctions against the General Counsel and the case therefore had no precedential weight on the issue).

For another pre-Marquez case where an ALJ issued evidentiary sanctions against both the General Counsel and the charging party in such circumstances, see *Station Casinos*, 358 NLRB 1556, 1572 (2012) (striking testimony of four witnesses called by the General Counsel). Note, however, that Board apparently did not pass on the judge’s sanctions ruling in that case either, as the charging party did not file exceptions and the General Counsel filed only limited exceptions.

**Dismissal of Complaint.** “The Board is careful not to impose drastic sanctions disproportionate to the alleged noncompliance.” Sisters Camelot, above. Thus, noncompliance with a subpoena normally does not by itself warrant the dismissal of a complaint. In Teamsters Local 917 (Peerless Importers), above, the Board reversed a judge who had dismissed the General Counsel’s complaint because the charging party failed to produce an unredacted copy of a document subpoenaed by the respondent relevant to its defense. Citing McAllister Towing, above, the Board noted that there were other less drastic sanctions available to the judge and observed that dismissing a complaint because of subpoena noncompliance would have been unprecedented. 345 NLRB at 1011.

§ 8–630  
**Interference with Subpoena Compliance**

It is a violation of the Act to state or imply that compliance with a subpoena is optional. Bobs Motors, Inc., 241 NLRB 1236 (1979). Attempting to dissuade an employee from speaking to a Board agent or appearing at a Board trial also violates the Act. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., 127 NLRB 803, 804 (1960); Certain-Teed Products Corp., 147 NLRB 1517, 1520 (1964); and Fitel/Lucent Technologies, Inc., 326 NLRB 46, 54 (1998). See also U.S. Precision Lens, 288 NLRB 505 n. 3 (1988) (treating a witness’s attendance at a Board trial as absences counting against her in the employer’s “excellent attendance” program violates Section 8(a)(4)). A judge who learns that witnesses are being subjected to retaliation for testifying should take steps to prevent retaliation by at least firmly warning against it.

With respect to destroyed evidence, see Akiona v. U.S., 938 F.2d 158, 160–161 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 503 U.S. 962 (1992) (“Generally, a trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from the destruction of evidence relevant to a case”). But see BP Amoco Chemical—Chocolate Bayou, 351 NLRB 614, 636 (2007) (no inference of unlawful intent was drawn from the supervisors’ destruction of their worksheets used during the selection process where the respondent had no legal duty to retain the records and there was no business or personal reason for the supervisors to keep them).
In certain circumstances, the judge may impose litigation costs against a party who violates a judge’s instructions regarding subpoenas. In *675 West End Owners Corp.*, 345 NLRB 324, 326, 327 n. 11 (2005), enf’d. 304 Fed. Appx. 911 (2d Cir. 2008), the Board approved such costs against a respondent who disobeyed the judge’s instructions that a revoked subpoena could not be served again and that issuance of a subpoena after the close of the hearing was “an abuse of Board process.” The Board agreed with the judge’s recommendation that a hearing be held to determine the litigation costs expended by the charging party and the General Counsel because of the respondent’s conduct, citing applicable authorities under the “bad faith” exception to the American Rule against awarding litigation costs. See also § 6–640, Awarding Litigation Costs, above.

§ 8–700     Enforcement of Subpoenas on Behalf of Private Party

Section 102.31(d) of the Board’s Rules provides that upon failure to comply with a Board subpoena issued on request of a private party, the General Counsel “shall,” in the name of the Board, institute a proceeding in district court, “unless enforcement of the subpoena would be inconsistent with the law and the policies of the National Labor Relations Act.” See also Sec. 11(2) of the Act (providing for federal district court jurisdiction “upon application by the Board” in the event of “contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person”).

The Board, however, has made clear that the General Counsel is not required to institute enforcement proceedings sua sponte, but only on request of the party on whose behalf the subpoena was issued. See *Best Western City View Motor Inn*, 325 NLRB 1186 (1998) (applying the same rule to subpoena enforcement contempt proceedings). Nor is the General Counsel required to initiate enforcement proceedings where the subpoena is incapable of being enforced. See *Champ Corp.*, 291 NLRB 803 (1988) (subpoena was incapable of being enforced as documents were unavailable), enfd. 933 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 502 U.S. 957 (1991). See also *Powerback Rehabilitation*, 365 NLRB No. 119, slip op. at 1 n. 2 (2017) (finding, in a postelection objections case, that the Acting Regional Director did not abuse his discretion by refusing to enforce the employer’s subpoena duces tecum on one of its supervisors to determine if she had made objectionable preelection prounion statements because the subpoena was “at best, a fishing expedition,” notwithstanding that the supervisor had not filed a petition to revoke the subpoena).

If asked to rule on whether the subpoenaed party has contumaciously refused to comply with the subpoena within the meaning of Section 11(2) of the Act and Section 102.31(d) of the Rules, the ALJ should normally do so. See *Station Casinos, LLC*, 28-CA-22918, unpub. Board order issued March 3, 2011 (2011 WL 828422) (granting the respondent’s request for special permission to appeal the Regional Director’s refusal to institute subpoena enforcement proceedings, and remanding the matter to the judge with instructions to address in the first instance, upon respondent’s request, whether the charging party had contumaciously refused to comply with those portions of the subpoena not previously quashed by the judge).

Where enforcement proceedings are initiated, an adjournment of the trial may be necessary until the subpoena issue is resolved. Often the judge may avoid the delay attendant to subpoena enforcement by convincing the parties to resolve the issue by agreement.
CHAPTER 9. SETTLEMENTS

§ 9–100 In General

“[T]he Board from the very beginning has encouraged compromises and settlements. The purpose of such attempted settlements has been to end labor disputes, and so far as possible to extinguish all the elements giving rise to them.” Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 253–254 (1944). As stated in the NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part One), Settlements, Section 10124.1:

It is the policy of the Board and the General Counsel to actively encourage the parties to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of issues as an alternative to litigation. Moreover, the Administrative Procedure Act (Sec. 5(b)) requires that the Agency consider “offers of settlement, or proposals of adjustment where time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest permit.” (5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(1)). Since voluntary remedial action is a high priority, diligent settlement efforts should be exerted in all meritorious cases. Settlement of a meritorious case is the most effective means to: 1) improve relationships between the parties; 2) effectuate the purposes of the Act; and 3) permit the Agency to concentrate its limited resources on other cases by avoiding costly litigation expenses.

§ 9–200 Promoting Settlement

§ 9–220 At Pretrial Conference

Normally the trial judge has his or her first contact with the parties by telephone in the pretrial conference call. By definition, at this stage of the proceeding a complaint has issued, the parties have not been able to settle the case, and the trial is imminent.

Consistent with the general policies set forth above, the judge at that time should emphasize the importance of pursuing settlement, and ensure that the parties are fully apprised of each other’s positions on settlement. The parties should also be encouraged to discuss their positions and settlement terms during the conference call, with the degree of judicial participation the parties and the judge find appropriate. Finally, the General Counsel should be asked to prepare a complete settlement package including, when appropriate, a calculation of all monetary obligations.

Parties, particularly respondents, may sometimes be reluctant to freely discuss the merits of the case during settlement discussions. However, they should be encouraged to do so, at least to some extent, as it will assist in identifying areas of disagreement and evaluating whether a settlement is possible.

It may be helpful to remind the parties of the many disadvantages of litigation, including: (1) the financial costs of trial; (2) the time that managers, supervisors, and employees will be absent from work to prepare for and attend the trial; (3) the delay in resolving the dispute, including the possibility of subsequent appeals and compliance proceedings; and (4) the risk of losing, and thereby either receiving nothing (if the charging party), or being ordered to pay additional backpay with interest (if the respondent), including medical expenses (see, e.g., Nortech Waste, 336 NLRB 554 n. 2 (2001); McDaniel Ford, Inc., 331 NLRB 1645 (2000); and Hansen Bros. Enterprises, 313 NLRB 599 (1993)).
If there is any possibility of settlement, the parties should be encouraged to continue settlement discussions after the conference call. If practical and potentially helpful, the judge should also attempt to schedule one or more follow-up conference calls. This will establish both a target date for the exchange of additional information or proposals and an agreed-upon time for further discussion.

Ordinarily such calls should include all parties, unless the judge secures permission to speak to one party separately. The judge should be careful not to discuss settlement offers directly with an alleged discriminatee in the absence of counsel for the General Counsel.

§ 9–230 At the Trial

How much time a judge should allow before going on the record or during the trial for settlement discussions will depend on all the circumstances. Relevant factors include the willingness of the parties to share information and offer reasonable terms, the complexities of the case, the likelihood of reaching a full or partial settlement that will significantly reduce the time needed for litigation, and the availability of witnesses if the trial is delayed.

The judge should carefully evaluate the circumstances to ensure that any significant delay is likely to be fruitful and minimally impact the flow of the trial in the event a final settlement is not realized.

§ 9–240 After the Trial

Parties may, of course, continue to engage in settlement discussions after the record is closed and while the judge is preparing a decision. Such discussions typically occur, if at all, without the judge, but the judge may participate if requested. If the parties desire an extension of time beyond the usual 35-day limit for the filing of posthearing briefs to engage in further settlement efforts, they may seek an extension from the Chief Judge or Deputy or Associate Chief Judge in the appropriate office.

§ 9–300 Judge’s Role in Approving Settlements

§ 9–320 Settlements Before Record Opens and Testimony Taken

Neither the judge nor the Board has any role in approving or rejecting an unfair labor practice settlement before the trial opens. Consideration and approval or rejection of a pretrial settlement are the sole province of the General Counsel and his/her agents, subject to the review procedures provided to parties adversely affected by the rulings. *NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers Local 23*, 484 U.S. 112, 124–126 (1987).

The Board has applied this same policy where the General Counsel seeks to withdraw the complaint after the hearing has opened but before any evidence has been introduced. See *Sheet Metal Workers Local 28 (American Elgen)*, 306 NLRB 981, 981–982 (1992) (reversing the judge and holding that, even if the trial has opened, the General Counsel retains sole, unreviewable authority to withdraw the complaint if no evidence has been introduced and no contention has been made that a legal issue was ripe for adjudication on the parties’ pleadings alone).

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However, if the settlement is non-Board, i.e. the General Counsel is not a party to the settlement, it may properly be submitted to the judge for review and approval after the hearing has opened, even if no evidence has been introduced. See *Flint Iceland Arenas*, 325 NLRB 318 (1998), where both the judge and the Board (on appeal) reviewed and applied the relevant factors in considering a non-Board settlement opposed by General Counsel that was executed at the beginning of the hearing and before any evidence was introduced.

§ 9–330 Settlements After Testimony Is Taken and Before Decision Issues

Section 101.9(d)(1) of the Board’s Statements of Procedure provides that if an informal settlement is reached after the trial opens and testimony is taken but before a decision is issued, it must be submitted to the trial judge for review and approval. This provision has been interpreted to apply to all settlements, including formal settlements providing for issuance a Board order. See NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part One), Sec. 10164.7(b). See also *Beverly California Corp.*, 326 NLRB 232, 236 n. 18 (1988); and *Today’s Man*, 263 NLRB 332 (1982). However, Section 101.9(d)(1) provides that a formal settlement must also be submitted to the Board for final approval after receiving approval from the judge.

If the judge approves the settlement over objection, or rejects the settlement, an aggrieved party may file a special appeal with the Board pursuant to Section 102.26 of the Board’s Rules. See § 10-600, “Interlocutory Special Appeals from Judges Rulings,” below.

§ 9–340 Settlement After Judge’s Decision Issues—ADR Program

After the judge issues a decision in a case, the matter is transferred to the Board and the judge has no further role. Therefore, any settlement proposal proffered to the judge after the decision has issued should be rejected as beyond the jurisdiction of the judge. The moving parties should be directed to take appropriate matters to the Executive Secretary of the Board.

The parties may also avail themselves of the Board’s voluntary Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) program, which applies to certain unfair labor practice cases pending before the Board on appeal. Details of the ADR program may be found in the Board’s March 24, 2009 press release announcing that the pilot program had been made permanent. See also the Board’s Oct. 23, 2012 press release announcing that the Board had contracted with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) to provide mediators to parties who participate in the Board’s ADR program. Both are available on the NLRB website. For more information, the parties should contact the Executive Secretary’s office.

§ 9–400 Standards for Approving or Rejecting Settlements

§ 9–410 Types of Settlements—Formal, Informal, and Non-Board

As indicated above, settlements may be either formal (providing for issuance of a cease-and-desist order by the Board and court enforcement) or informal (not involving the issuance of a Board order). Either type of settlement may be utilized at any time after a charge has been filed, although normally informal settlements are not accepted after the case has been heard and the Board has issued a cease-and-desist order on the basis of the record.

A third type of settlement, a non-Board settlement, involves an adjustment strictly between the respondent(s) and the other non-Board parties. The General Counsel is not a party to a non-
Board settlement, even though he/she may be involved in the settlement discussions and post-settlement compliance. Thus, the General Counsel cannot be found in breach of a non-Board settlement. See *Dilling Mechanical Contractors*, 348 NLRB 98, 103 (2006). See also § 9–620, below.

§ 9–420 Formal Settlements

The NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part One), Settlements, Section 10164.1 provides:

A formal settlement is a written stipulation providing that, on approval by the Board, a Board order in conformity with its terms will issue. Ordinarily, it will also provide for the consent entry of a court judgment enforcing the order. Sec. 101.9(b)(1), Statements of Procedure.

The Casehandling Manual also sets forth procedures for transferring formal settlements to the General Counsel’s Washington, D.C. office and the Board, as well as sample language appropriate for formal settlements. See Secs. 10164–10170.

Normally formal settlement agreements are drafted by the Regional Offices, using the procedural and technical language in the manuals, to meet the requirements for submission to the General Counsel and the Board for final review and approval. The judge should refrain from significantly reviewing nonsubstantive aspects of formal settlement agreements. But see *Pipefitters Local 290, UFCW*, 348 NLRB 998 (2006), where the Board majority rejected a proposed formal settlement because it did not contain provisions memorializing the parties’ reported agreement that the General Counsel would only seek enforcement of the order if the respondent failed to comply with it.

If the judge rules on a formal settlement during the trial, the judge should indicate approval or rejection on the record. Alternatively, such as during an adjournment or after the trial closes, the judge should issue an order and notification to the parties. The Regional Office thereafter assumes the responsibility for transmitting the stipulation and supporting documents to the General Counsel’s Division of Operations Management so that the procedure for obtaining approval of the General Counsel and the Board can be implemented.

§ 9–430 Informal and Non-Board Settlements

In *Independent Stave Co.*, 287 NLRB 740, 743 (1987), the Board set out the relevant considerations for approving non-Board settlements. The Board stated that it would not reject the parties’ non-Board settlement “simply because it does not mirror a full remedy”; rather, it would examine all the... circumstances including, but not limited to, (1) whether the charging party(ies), the respondent(s), and any of the individual discriminatee(s) have agreed to be bound, and the position taken by the General Counsel regarding the settlement; (2) whether the settlement is reasonable in light of the nature of the violations alleged, the risks inherent in litigation, and the stage of the litigation; (3) whether there has been any fraud, coercion, or duress by any of the parties in reaching the settlement; and (4) whether the respondent has engaged in a history of violations of the Act or has breached previous settlement agreements resolving unfair labor practice disputes.
Applying these factors, the Board approved the subject non-Board settlements in that case. Although the settlements were opposed by the General Counsel, resolved the 8(a)(3) refusal-to-hire allegations of only three of the four charging parties/discriminatees, provided for only 10 percent backpay, and did not provide for posting a notice, the Board approved the settlements as they were reached before the hearing, were signed by the three charging parties/discriminatees and approved by the union, and gave them employment with retroactive seniority.

See also McKenzie-Willamette Medical Center, 361 NLRB No. 7 (2014), where the Board applied the foregoing factors and approved a posthearing non-Board settlement of the 8(a)(5) failure-to-provide-information allegations over the General Counsel’s objection that it did not provide for posting a notice or otherwise fully remedy the allegations; and BP Amoco Chemical—Chocolate Bayou, 351 NLRB 614 (2007), where the Board applied the same factors and approved private termination agreements that waived or released any subsequent claims against the employer, including the right to file charges with or obtain any relief from the Board arising out of their prior employment. (A further discussion of such releases is found in §9–640, below.)

The Board also applies the Independent Stave factors to both informal and formal settlements. See, e.g., Kiss Electric, LLC, 4–CA–164351, unpub. Board order issued June 27, 2017 (2017 WL 2794211). In that case, the complaint alleged that the employer had unlawfully refused to consider and hire five union salts. The Board upheld the judge’s approval of a prehearing informal settlement of the allegations notwithstanding the General Counsel’s objections that the settlement did not provide backpay for the discriminatees, did not require instatement of one of the discriminatees, and did not include any provision for a default judgment. See also Woodworkers Local 3–433 (Kimtruss Corp.), 304 NLRB 1, 2 (1991) (upholding the judge’s approval of a post-hearing informal settlement of 8(b) allegations against the respondent union over the objections of the respondent employer in the companion 8(a) case); and KW Electric Inc., 327 NLRB 70 (1998) (approving a formal settlement over the charging party’s objection after the judge’s decision issued).

For other cases approving settlements applying the above factors, see Hospital Perea, 356 NLRB 1204, 1204–1205 (2011) (reversing the ALJ and approving a non-Board settlement of a 8(a)(5) unilateral change allegation over the General Counsel’s objection); American Pacific Pipe Co., 290 NLRB 623, 623–624 (1988) (approving a non-Board settlement of a backpay claim over the General Counsel’s objection); and Longshoremen ILA Local 1814 (Amstar Sugar), 301 NLRB 764, 764–765 (1991) (approving a non-Board settlement over the opposition of the General Counsel after the judge issued his decision).

For cases rejecting settlements, see International Shipping Agency, Inc., 24–CA–091723, unpub. Board order issued April 20, 2015 (2015 WL 1802717) (finding that the judge erred in approving a non-Board settlement in an 8(a)(5), (3), and (1) partial-closing case that was opposed by the General Counsel, did not provide for posting a notice, provided for only 32 percent backpay and a circumscribed preferential hiring remedy rather than a reinstatement remedy for the 28 alleged discriminatees, failed to address a large portion of the alleged violations, and required the employees to waive their right to strike); *Michels Corp., 30– CA–81206, unpub. Board order issued Dec. 19, 2012 (2012 WL 6625274) (finding that the judge improperly accepted a non-Board settlement over the General Counsel’s objections where the settlement provided only backpay and a neutral employment reference to the alleged discriminatee, did not provide for any notice to other employees of their rights, and included a broad confidentiality clause); Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 338 NLRB 275 (2002) (likewise
disapproving a non-Board settlement where the first and second factors weighed heavily against approval); and *Flint Iceland Arenas*, 325 NLRB 318, 318–319 (1998) (same).

See also *Goya Foods of Florida*, 358 NLRB 345 (2012) (finding that all four criteria favored rejecting the non-Board settlement); *Frontier Foundries, Inc.*, 312 NLRB 73 (1993) (rejecting a non-Board settlement that provided only 6 percent backpay plus additional amounts as "liquidated damages," allegedly to avoid being taxed as income, did not require posting any notices, and did not contain assurances against future misconduct); *Flyte Time Worldwide*, 362 NLRB No. 46 (2015) (Board declined to apply the Independent Stave analysis and denied the charging party’s unopposed request, following issuance of the ALJ’s decision, to withdraw his 8(a)(1) charge pursuant to a private settlement reached in a related class action wage and hour lawsuit, as the settlement did not even address, much less remedy, the 8(a)(1) allegation); and *Fred Meyer Stores, Inc.*, 19–CA–032908, unpub. Board order issued Oct. 20, 2015 (2015 WL 6156743) (Board declined to remand a pending proceeding where the parties refused to disclose the terms of their non-Board settlement).

Note that, in *International Shipping Agency*, above, the Board also held that the judge erred in rejecting certain financial and tax records the General Counsel offered into evidence to show, contrary to the charging party union’s assertion, that the respondent had the ability to pay a greater backpay amount than provided in the non-Board settlement.

§ 9–440 Settlement by Consent Order

A trial judge may also be asked by a respondent to approve a settlement by “consent order”—that is, a unilateral settlement offered by the respondent but not agreed to by either the General Counsel or the charging party.

The judge should apply the Independent Stave “all the surrounding circumstances” analysis in evaluating such proposed consent orders. See *UPMC*, 365 NLRB No. 153 (2017) (overruling the “full remedy” standard announced in *Postal Service*, 364 NLRB No. 116 (2016), and returning to the Independent Stave analysis applied in prior cases). Most importantly, the judge should consider the second of the four nonexhaustive factors listed in Independent Stave—whether the proposed resolution is “reasonable in light of the nature of the violations alleged, the risks inherent in litigation, and the stage of the litigation.” Id., slip op. at 8.

Applying the foregoing analysis, the Board in *UPMC* affirmed the judge’s approval of the offer submitted by respondent UPMC. The only allegation against UPMC was that it was a single employer with Presbyterian Shadyside (PS), the respondent company that allegedly committed the Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4) violations. Prior to litigating the single-employer allegation (which was severed pending resolution of related subpoena disputes to avoid delaying the substantive allegations against PS), UPMC offered to “guarantee the remediation of any violation” found against PS, and “as a guarantor . . . [be] liable for [PS’s] compliance with any remedy ordered” and to “take any necessary action to ensure compliance” “to the extent PS fails to remediate any unfair labor practices on its own.” The General Counsel and the union objected to UPMC’s offer because it was not equivalent to the full joint and several liability that would obtain if UPMC was ultimately adjudicated to be a single employer, which would allow the General Counsel to hold UPMC primarily and directly liable for any violations committed by PS. However, the Board majority found that the General Counsel’s and the charging party’s opposition were outweighed by the following “countervailing factors”: (1) UPMC’s remedial guarantee was “as effective as” a finding of single-employer status; (2) there was no allegation or evidence presented at trial that UPMC had independently committed any unfair labor practices, and thus
PS “should be primarily responsible to remedy its own violations”; (3) rejecting UPMC’s offer would run the risk that UPMC might ultimately be found not to be a single employer and thus bear no responsibility for remedying the alleged violations; and (4) accepting UPMC’s offer would greatly expedite the resolution of the proceeding by avoiding lengthy litigation of the single-employer allegation. Id. at 6–9.

For another example where the Board approved a consent order, see Laborers Local 872, 28–CB–118809, unpub. Board order issued Jan. 12, 2015 (2015 WL 153954). The complaint in that case alleged that the respondent union had unlawfully failed to provide certain hiring hall information to the individual charging party. Under the proposed informal consent order, the union agreed to provide the charging party with the requested information and to post a union notice in the hiring hall for a year stating that, on request, the union would promptly make hiring hall referral records available for review by anyone using the hall. Applying the Independent Stave factors, the judge approved the consent order, notwithstanding the General Counsel’s objection that it did not provide for posting an official Board notice that specifically addressed the refusal to provide information to the charging party. The Board upheld the judge’s ruling, finding that the consent order “substantially remedied” the alleged violations.

See also Heil Environmental, 10-CA-114054, unpub. Board order issued June 20, 2014 (2014 WL 2812204). The complaint in that case alleged a variety of 8(a)(1) violations during an organizing campaign. The General Counsel’s objected to the respondent’s proposed informal consent order on the grounds that it did not require the respondent to read the remedial notice and failed to include “default” language providing for a formal Board order in the event of noncompliance. The Board rejected the General Counsel’s objections, finding that “a recent non-Board settlement entered into by the Respondent and the Charging Party which no party seeks to set aside and a 30-year old unrelated unfair labor practice case are insufficient bases for concluding that the Respondent has a history of violations of the Act.”

For examples where proposed consent orders have been rejected, see Enclosure Suppliers, LLC, 9-CA-46169, unpub. Board order issued July 14, 2011 (2011 WL 2837659) (granting the General Counsel’s special appeal and finding that the judge abused his discretion in approving an informal consent order that did not require the respondent to comply with the 8(a)(1) cease and desist provisions beyond the 60-day notice posting period); Iron Workers Local 27 (Morrison-Knudson), 313 NLRB 215, 217 (1993) (rejecting a proposed consent order in an 8(b)(1)(A) hiring hall case because it did not provide for posting a notice), enf’d mem. 70 F.3d 119 (9th Cir. 1995); Food Lion, Inc., 304 NLRB 602 n. 4 (1991) (rejecting a proposed consent order in an 8(a)(1) denial of union access case because it contained various restrictions on union access); and Copper State Rubber, 301 NLRB 138 (1991) (rejecting a proposed consent order because it did not settle the allegations concerning one of the discriminatees, and settling the other allegations would not necessarily save the parties the time and expense of litigation as the evidence underlying those allegations could be used as background evidence to support the nonsettled allegations).

§ 9–500 Procedures for Considering, Accepting, or Rejecting Settlement

Preparation of written agreement. It is always wise to ensure that the parties prepare a legible and complete settlement with all elements included before the settlement is formally considered. Experience has shown that oral agreements are sometimes based on mutual misunderstandings. Indeed, even written settlements should be clear and understandable because the Board will set aside an ambiguous settlement where the Board concludes there has
been no meeting of the minds. See Local Union 290, UFCW, 348 NLRB 998 (2006); and Doubletree Guest Suites Santa Monica, 347 NLRB 782 (2006).

An informal settlement may be secured on Form NLRB 5378, “Settlement Agreement Approved by an Administrative Law Judge.” The forms are available in Regional Offices. The settlement agreement and the notice should be entered into evidence as exhibits so that the Board has a full record to review if there is an appeal.

Positions of Parties. The positions of all parties on the settlement should also be put on the record. When a party objects to the approval of a formal settlement, the party must be given a reasonable opportunity on the record to state its position and argument opposing the settlement. See NLRB Statements of Procedure, Sec. 101.9(d)(1). If the issues are somewhat complex, it may be appropriate to request briefs on the advisability of approving a settlement.

Positions of Discriminatees. In settlements involving discriminatees, their position(s) regarding approval of the settlement should also be put on the record, either directly or indirectly through the General Counsel or the charging party. In Flint Iceland Arenas, 325 NLRB 318, 320 (1998), a Board majority rejected a non-Board settlement in part on this basis. The Board majority held, among other things, that although it is not necessary that all discriminatees be notified and that they all agree to be bound, the views of named and otherwise identifiable discriminatees should be taken into account and, if those individuals have not been informed of the settlement or have not been given opportunity to express their views of the settlement on the record, this is a factor to be considered in evaluating the settlement. See also Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 338 NLRB 275 (2002) (affirming the judge’s rejection of a non-Board settlement, opposed by the General Counsel, where the settlement only partially remedied the unfair labor practices alleged and had the approval of only one of four discriminatees).

Judge’s Ruling or Order. As indicated in § 9–420, above, the judge’s ruling and reasoning in approving or rejecting the settlement should likewise be stated on the record for purposes of review. Alternatively, if the settlement occurs after the close of trial or during a hiatus in the case, a written order is appropriate. The judge should issue an order rather than a decision when approving a settlement agreement, even where the judge overrules an objection to the settlement.

Right to Appeal. As indicated in § 9–330, above, if the judge approves the settlement over objection or rejects the settlement, aggrieved parties should be advised of the right to file a special appeal with the Board pursuant to Section 102.26 of the Board’s Rules. See NLRB Statements of Procedure, Sec. 101.9(d)(2).

Recessing Trial Pending Compliance. Ordinarily, if a judge approves a settlement on the record, the judge should recess the trial indefinitely, pending compliance. The judge should ask that the General Counsel file a motion to dismiss when compliance has been completed. As indicated above, NLRB Form 5378 may be utilized in handling informal settlements. It provides that the settlement agreement is remanded to the regional director to secure compliance with its terms. Form 5378 also provides that, upon notification of compliance, a motion to withdraw the complaint should be filed and the judge should issue an order approving withdrawal of the complaint as well as the answer.

Alternatively, after the settlement is approved, the judge may remand the case to the Regional Director to handle compliance without further involvement by the judge. The parties should be informed that, in the event the Regional Director determines compliance has not been
achieved, the Regional Director may set aside the settlement and reissue the complaint, which
would be assigned for trial in the normal course, without automatic reassignment to the judge who
approved the settlement.

**Formal Settlements.** As indicated in § 9–420, above, if the judge approves a formal
settlement, it should be approved in writing and left with the Regional Office so that the procedure
in Section 10164.7 of the NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part One) for obtaining approval of the
Board can be implemented.

§ 9–550  **Summary Judgment to Enforce Settlement**

Settlement agreements, by their terms, may provide for summary judgment to enforce the
settlement in the event of noncompliance. See, e.g., *Great Northwest Builders*, 344 NLRB 969
(2005) (Board granted the General Counsel’s motion for summary judgment where the settlement
agreement provided that, in case of noncompliance, the respondent’s answer to the original
complaint would be withdrawn and the General Counsel could obtain an order to remedy the
allegations in the complaint through a motion for summary judgment). See also § 9–800, Setting
Aside Settlement Agreements, below.

§ 9–600  **Various Provisions of Settlement Agreements**

§ 9–610  **Nonadmission Clauses**

Inclusion of a nonadmission clause is not a valid basis for objecting to a proposed formal
settlement that provides for entry of an enforceable Board order and otherwise effectuates the
*Containair Systems Corp. v. NLRB*, 521 F.2d 1166, 1172 (2d Cir. 1975); *NLRB v. Oil
Workers (Catalytic Maintenance)*, 476 F.2d 1031, 1037 (1st Cir. 1973); and *Concrete
Materials of Georgia v. NLRB*, 440 F.2d 61, 68 (5th Cir. 1971). But cf. *Teamsters Local 115
(Gross Metal Products)*, 275 NLRB 1547 (1985) (upholding the judge’s rejection of a formal
settlement after the close of the hearing, which was opposed by the charging party, as it
contained both a narrow order and a nonadmission clause notwithstanding that the respondent
union was a recidivist, had allegedly again engaged in widespread picket line misconduct and
violence, and offered only a limited defense at trial).

Informal settlements containing such clauses are also frequently accepted by the General
Counsel and approved by judges and the Board, even over the objection of the charging party.
See, e.g., *Woodworkers Local 3–433 (Kimtruss Corp.)*, 304 NLRB 1, 2 (1991); and *Garment
Workers ILGWU Local 415–475 (Arosa Knitting) v. NLRB*, 501 F.2d 823, 826, 832–833 (D.C.
Cir. 1974). Although Section 10130.8 of the NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part One) states that
nonadmission clauses “should not be routinely incorporated in settlement agreements,” this
provision is apparently intended simply to make clear to regional office personnel that they can
reject such clauses in egregious cases. See *BPH & Co. v. NLRB*, 333 F.3d 213, 222 (D.C.Cir.
2003).

Nonadmission clauses, however, may not be included in the Board’s Notice to Employees
also *Teamsters Local 372 (Detroit Newspapers)*, 323 NLRB 278, 280 n. 4 (1997).
§ 9–620 Reservation Clauses: Settlement Bar Rule

A formal or informal Board settlement disposes of all issues involving presettlement conduct, unless prior violations were unknown to the General Counsel, were not readily discoverable by investigation, or were specifically reserved from the settlement by mutual understanding of the parties. Hollywood Roosevelt Hotel Co., 235 NLRB 1397 (1978), reaffd. in Park-Ohio Industries, 283 NLRB 571, 572 (1987). See also Ratliff Trucking Corp., 310 NLRB 1224 (1993) (finding that the issue was not specifically reserved, and that the settlement therefore barred the new complaint). Thus, where the issue is raised, the judge may have to determine the scope and meaning of the prior settlement agreement.

As indicated in § 9–410, above, however, a non-Board settlement does not preclude the General Counsel from re-alleging settled matters in subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings. Such a settlement is not approved by the Regional Director, even though withdrawal of a charge may have been approved, and therefore “does not estop the Regional Director from proceeding on any new charge alleging the same conduct as the withdrawn charges.” Auto Bus, Inc., 293 NLRB 855, 855–856 (1989), quoting the judge in Quinn Co., 273 NLRB 795, 799 (1984). See also KFMB Stations, 343 NLRB 748 n. 3 (2004) (citing Auto Bus with approval).

§ 9–630 Joint and Several Liability

A settlement proposal limited to one of a number of (potential) jointly and severally liable respondents does not extinguish the liability of the nonsettling respondents, unless that is the intention of the parties. See Urban Laboratories, 305 NLRB 987, 987–988 (1991), citing Zenith Radio v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 342–348 (1971) (an antitrust case).

§ 9–640 Releases

Release and discharge of the respondent from all claims by an employee is permissible as part of a settlement, unless it prohibits filing future unfair labor practice charges that are unrelated to the past dispute or employment. See First National Supermarkets, 302 NLRB 727, 727–728 (1991) (finding release lawful, as it was limited to claims arising out of the past employment relationship). See also BP Amoco Chemical–Chocolate Bayou, 351 NLRB 614, 615–616 (2007) (dismissing 8(a)(1) charges filed by 37 alleged discriminatees over their terminations, as a prior settlement agreement waived the right to file such charges in exchange for enhanced severance benefits); and Septix Waste, Inc., 346 NLRB 494 (2006) (dismissing 8(a)(1) charges filed by the union, as a prior settlement waived all such claims that “could have been made” as of that date and the new charges were all based on facts in existence at that time). Cf. Quality Roofing Supply Company, 357 NLRB 789 (2011) (distinguishing Septix and finding that the release did not waive the union’s right to file a charge regarding conduct that occurred before the settlement, as the conduct was different from any alleged in the settled charges and the release did not contain similar language waiving any charges that “could have been” raised at the time of the settlement.)

A release may also be found overbroad and unlawful if it prohibits the employee from providing evidence in the investigation of charges. See Clark Distribution Systems, Inc., 336 NLRB 747 (2001).
§ 9–650 Taxability

Backpay is generally taxable as income in the year it is received. See Tortillas Don Chavas, LLC, 361 NLRB No. 10, slip op. at 5 n. 24 (2014) (requiring respondents to compensate employees for the adverse income tax consequences of receiving lump-sum backpay awards in a calendar year other than the year in which the income would have been earned absent the violation).

A number of circuit courts have held that awards of back and front pay under Title VII, ADEA, and ERISA are “wages” subject to statutory withholding. See Noel v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 697 F.3d 209, 213 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing additional cases).

§ 9–700 Deferral to Grievance/Arbitration Settlements

The Board applies the same deferral principles to grievance/arbitration settlements as it does to arbitral awards. See Alpha Beta Co., 273 NLRB 1546 (1985), rev. denied 808 F.2d 1342, 1345–1346 (9th Cir. 1987) (deferring to a settlement, despite the lack of any backpay, as the contractual grievance proceedings were fair and regular, all parties agreed to be bound, the employees were fully informed and given the right to accept or reject the settlement, and the General Counsel failed to establish that the settlement was clearly repugnant to the Act).

As discussed in § 3–740, Deferral to Grievance Arbitration, above, the Board in Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co., 361 NLRB No. 132 (Dec. 15, 2014) adopted a new postarbitral deferral standard for future 8(a)(3) and (1) cases. Consistent with that standard, the Board held that, in such cases, it must be shown that the parties intended to settle the unfair labor practice issue; that they addressed it in the settlement agreement; and that Board law reasonably permits the settlement agreement. Slip op. at 13.

In evaluating grievance/arbitration settlements, the Board also considers the factors set forth in Independent Stave, 287 NLRB 740, 743 (1987) for evaluating unfair labor practice settlements. See Babcock & Wilcox, above; and Postal Service, 300 NLRB 196, 198, n. 13 (1990). For a discussion of those factors, see § 9–430, above.

§ 9–800 Setting Aside Settlement Agreements

Informal and non-Board settlements may be set aside if their provisions are breached, postsettlement unfair labor practices are committed, or the settlement is so ambiguous that there was no meeting of the minds.

Noncompliance with Settlement. Section 101.9(e)(2) of the Board’s Statements of Procedure specifically provides that if a respondent fails to comply with the terms of an informal settlement agreement, the Regional Director may set the agreement aside and institute further proceedings on the same charge. It is also well established that a Regional Director has the authority to reinstate a withdrawn charge following noncompliance with a non-Board settlement agreement, notwithstanding Section 10(b) of the Act, provided the original charge was timely filed. See Sterling Nursing Home, 316 NLRB 413, 416 (1995); and Norris Concrete Materials, 282 NLRB 289, 291 (1986).

The Regional Director’s action in setting aside the settlement and reactivating the case is reviewable by the judge and the Board in the proceeding on the new complaint. For cases upholding the Regional Director’s action, see Sidhal Industries, LLP, 356 NLRB 422 (2010)
(Regional Director set aside settlement and reissued complaint pursuant to the settlement’s default language, where the employer complied with the 8(a)(3) remedial provisions of the settlement, but not the 8(a)(5) provisions); Nations Rent, Inc., 339 NLRB 830, 831 (2003) (employer reinstated and made whole the employee, but continued to maintain an overbroad rule and failed to notify the employee in writing that his discipline had been expunged); and Postal Workers Local 735, 340 NLRB 1363, 1364–1365 (2003) (respondent union’s president published a post-settlement column, either during or immediately after the notice-posting period, which condemned the charging party and lauded the steward whose conduct led to the original charge). But see Courier Journal, 342 NLRB 1148, 1149–1150 (2004) (union’s failure to protest closure of the original case on compliance pursuant to a settlement agreement precluded an unfair labor practice complaint predicated on the company’s failure to furnish certain information not provided at the time of compliance).

Where a settlement has been set aside, a full remedy should normally be issued for the alleged presettlement conduct, less any amounts already paid pursuant to the settlement. See Sidhal Industries, above, at n. 2. But cf. Totilleria La Poblanita, 357 NLRB 191, 194 (2011) (construing the General Counsel’s motion for summary judgment as a request for enforcement of the provisions of the settlement, and therefore limiting the affirmative remedies to those specifically requested in the motion).


However, new unfair labor practices will not warrant setting aside a settlement if they are “isolated” or “insubstantial.” See Diamond Electric Mfg. Corp., 346 NLRB 857, 862–863 (2006) (finding a single post-settlement instance of discriminatory discipline insufficient), citing Coopers Int’l Union, 208 NLRB 175 (1974). See also Porto Mills, 149 NLRB 1454, 1470 (1964); and Wooster Brass Co., 80 NLRB 1633, 1635 (1948).

Ambiguous Agreement. An informal settlement may also be set aside if the agreement is so ambiguous that a conclusion is warranted that there was no meeting of the minds on a settlement. See Doubletree Guest Suites Santa Monica, 347 NLRB 782, 782–783 (2006) (setting aside a prior informal settlement on this basis, and therefore finding no settlement bar to issuing new complaint).

§ 9–900 Default Judgment for Noncompliance with Settlement

Informal settlements often include provisions for issuance of a default judgment if the respondent fails to comply with the settlement’s terms. However, the provisions typically require the Regional Director to give the respondent at least 14 days notice of such noncompliance before filing the motion for default judgment. Further, the Board has held that it is a denial of due process to issue a default judgment for noncompliance with a settlement without giving the respondent prior notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the alleged noncompliance. See ConAgra Foods, above, slip op. at 3.

If the respondent’s response raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the alleged noncompliance, the parties are entitled to a hearing on the disputed issue(s) before an ALJ.
However, if the respondent’s response fails to raise any such material factual issue, it is appropriate to rule on the General Counsel’s motion for default judgment without a hearing. For example, in *Bristol Manor Health Care Center*, 360 NLRB 38 (2013), the Board found that the respondent’s response, which asserted that certain requested information had been provided to the union as required by the settlement, but failed to directly deny that certain information had still not been provided, was insufficient to raise any material factual issue warranting a hearing. The Board therefore granted the General Counsel’s motion for default judgment pursuant to the noncompliance provisions of the informal settlement.

See also *Rogan Bros. Sanitation, Inc.*, 357 NLRB 1655 (2011). In that case, the respondent’s response contended that its general manager had lacked authority to enter into the settlement and was coerced into signing it by the Board agent’s alleged statement that, if he did not sign, the Board would issue a complaint and find that respondent violated the law. The Board found that neither contention raised a material factual issue because the respondent had ratified the agreement by its subsequent conduct and the Board agent’s alleged statement simply informed the manager of the Board’s processes and the possible consequences of refusing to settle.

Of course, a hearing is also unnecessary if the parties stipulate to the material facts. See *Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC*, 365 NLRB No. 127 (2017) (affirming the ALJ’s finding, based on a stipulated record, that the respondent employer breached an informal Board settlement by posting, next to the Board’s remedial notice, a side letter that undermined the effectiveness of the notice, and that a default judgment was therefore warranted pursuant to the noncompliance provisions of the settlement).

§ 9–1000 Decision Vacated by Settlement

Unless otherwise expressly provided, an order vacating a prior decision pursuant to a settlement vacates that decision “only insofar as there is no longer a court-enforceable order in the case and the decision has no preclusive effect on the parties.” *Caterpillar, Inc.*, 332 NLRB 1116 (2000). The decision remains published and “may be cited as controlling precedent with respect to the legal analysis therein.” Ibid. In this respect, it is distinguishable from a vacatur on the merits, which eliminates the prior decision for all purposes, including precedential effect.

§ 9–1100 Role of Settlement Judge

The role of a settlement judge is established and defined by Section 102.35(b) of the Board’s Rules:

Upon the request of any party or of the Administrative Law Judge assigned to hear a case, or upon the Chief Judge, Deputy Chief Judge or Associate Chief Judge’s own motion, the Chief Judge, Deputy Chief Judge or an Associate Chief Judge may assign a Judge other than the trial judge to conduct settlement negotiations. In exercising this discretion, the Chief Judge, Deputy Chief Judge, or Associate Chief Judge making the assignment will consider, among other factors, whether there is reason to believe that resolution of the dispute is likely, the request for assignment of a settlement judge is made in good faith, and the assignment is otherwise feasible. However, no such assignment will be made absent the agreement of all parties to the use of this procedure.
(1) The settlement judge shall convene and preside over conferences and settlement negotiations between the parties, assess the practicalities of a potential settlement, and report to the Chief Judge, Deputy Chief Judge, or Associate Chief Judge the status of settlement negotiations, recommending continuation or termination of the settlement negotiations. Where feasible, settlement conferences will be held in person.

(2) The settlement judge may require that the attorney or other representative for each party be present at settlement conferences and that the parties or agents with full settlement authority also be present or available by telephone.

(3) Participation of the settlement judge shall terminate upon the order of the Chief Judge, Deputy Chief, or Associate Chief Judge issued after consultation with the settlement judge. The conduct of settlement negotiations must not unduly delay the hearing.

(4) All discussions between the parties and the settlement judge will be confidential. The settlement judge must not discuss any aspect of the case with the trial judge, and no evidence regarding statements, conduct, offers of settlement, and concessions of the parties made in proceedings before the settlement judge will be admissible in any proceeding before the Board, except by stipulation of the parties. Documents disclosed in the settlement process may not be used in litigation unless voluntarily produced or obtained pursuant to subpoena.

(5) No decision of a Chief Judge, Deputy Chief Judge, or Associate Chief Judge concerning the assignment of a settlement judge or the termination of a settlement judge’s assignment is appealable to the Board.

(6) Any settlement reached under the auspices of a settlement judge shall be subject to approval in accordance with the provisions of Section 101.9 of the Board’s Statements of Procedure.

Although the rule provides that the settlement judge shall be “other than the trial judge,” the settlement judge may be assigned to hear the case in the absence of any objections. See *Kingsbridge Heights Rehabilitation and Care Center*, 353 NLRB 631, 633 (2008).
CHAPTER 10. MOTIONS AND SPECIAL APPEALS

§ 10–100  Motions In Limine

Judges have authority to rule on motions in limine seeking to limit the issues or evidence to be litigated or presented at a hearing. See, e.g., TNT Logistics, 356 NLRB 1301 n. 1 (2006) (ALJ properly granted the General Counsel’s prehearing motion in limine to strike seven of the respondent’s eight affirmative defenses as they were not relevant to the complaint allegations); Farm Fresh Company, Target One, 361 NLRB No. 83, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2014) (ALJ did not abuse his discretion by granting the General Counsel’s motion in limine to exclude certain direct questions about the alleged discriminatees’ immigration status); and Operating Engineers Local 18 (Nerone & Sons), 8–CD–135243, unpub. Board order issued July 12, 2016 (2016 WL 3743256) (ALJ did not abuse his discretion by granting the charging party employer’s prehearing motion in limine to bar the respondent union from relitigating in the 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) unfair labor practice proceeding threshold issues that had been addressed by the Board in the prior related 10(k) jurisdictional work-assignment proceedings).

See also Voith Industrial Services, 363 NLRB No. 109, slip op. at 1 n. 2 (2016) (judge granted General Counsel’s motion in limine to prevent relitigation of the respondent employer’s successorship status and duty to bargain, issues that had been previously litigated and decided by a different ALJ in a case that was pending before the Board on exceptions). For a discussion of relying on ALJ decisions that are pending before the Board on exceptions, see § 13–300, below.

§ 10–200  Motions for Decision Based on Stipulated Record

Under section 102.35(a)(9) of the Board’s Rules, a record may be stipulated directly to the Board for decision, provided the parties consent and waive a hearing and the issuance of a decision by the judge. Under the same section, the parties may also agree to waive a hearing and stipulate facts to the judge for issuance of a judge’s decision. When a case is stipulated to the judge, he or she should make sure that the stipulation is complete enough to support a decision on all relevant issues.

If the stipulated record is sufficient, the judge may approve it even over the objection of the charging party. However, the charging party should be given an opportunity to make an offer of proof regarding the contrary evidence or additional material facts it would introduce at a hearing. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 195, slip op. at 1 n. 2 (2016) (rejecting the charging party’s argument that the judge improperly approved the joint motion of the General Counsel and the respondent to resolve the case on a stipulated record, as the stipulation included sufficient evidence to evaluate the complaint, and the additional evidence that the charging party sought to introduce exceeded the scope of the General Counsel’s theory). See also Borg-Warner Corp., 113 NLRB 152, 154 (1955), petition for review denied 231 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 908 (1956).

§ 10–300  Motions to Dismiss

A respondent may move the judge to dismiss a complaint or portions of a complaint. In ruling on such a motion under Section 102.35(a)(8) of the Board’s Rules, the judge should follow the same standard the Board uses in ruling on motions to dismiss under Section 102.24; that is, the judge should “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the General Counsel, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the General Counsel can prove any set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief.” Detroit Newspapers Agency, 330 NLRB 524, 525 n. 7 (2000). See also Yale University, 330 NLRB 246, 247 n. 8 (1999) (Board is guided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in reviewing a respondent’s motion to dismiss for failure of proof).

For cases applying the foregoing standard, compare Central Telephone Company of Texas, 343 NLRB 987, 998, Appendix B (2004) (upholding the judge’s bench decision granting the respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint after the General Counsel rested), with St. Mary’s Nursing Home, 342 NLRB 979, 980 n. 6 (2004) (finding that the judge erroneously ruled from the bench that the General Counsel had failed to establish animus in a discrimination case).

The judge should also consider whether the General Counsel is seeking to pursue a new theory of violation that has not previously been considered by the Board. See Fry’s Food Stores, 358 NLRB 704, 705 (2012), reaaff. 362 NLRB No. 36 (2015) (discussing the Board’s earlier October 18, 2010 unpublished ruling granting the General Counsel’s special appeal of the judge’s order granting the respondent union’s motion to dismiss), vacated and remanded 851 F.3d 21 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

When granting a motion to dismiss, the judge should issue a “decision” under Section 102.45(a) of the Board’s Rules, so that the appropriate procedures for appealing under Section 102.46 will apply. See Technology Service Solutions, 332 NLRB 1096 (2000).

See also the cases cited in § 3–740 above, addressing motions to defer to arbitration, which are also essentially motions to dismiss.

§ 10–400  Motions for Summary and Default Judgment

A judge likewise has the authority to rule on motions for summary and default judgment under Section 102.35(a)(8) of the Board’s Rules. This authority exists notwithstanding the failure of the moving party to file such a motion directly with the Board at least 28 days prior to the hearing under Section 102.24 of the Rules. See Calyer Architectural Woodworking Corp., 338 NLRB 315 (2002). See also § 3–500, Answer to Complaint, above.

Summary judgment is warranted only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Security Walls, LLC, 361 NLRB No. 29, slip op. at 1 (2014) (granting General Counsel’s motion); Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 67 (2017) (denying General Counsel’s motion); and Leukemia and Lymphoma Society, 363 NLRB No. 124 (2016) (denying respondent’s motion). Further, Section 102.24(b) of the Board’s Rules states:

Neither the opposition nor the response must be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for hearing. The Board in its discretion may deny the motion where the motion itself fails to
§ 10–500  Motions to Reopen Record

After the close of the trial but before issuance of the judge’s decision, a party may file a motion with the judge to reopen the record on the basis of “newly discovered evidence.” The judge is authorized to rule on such a procedural motion under Section 102.35(a)(8) of the Board’s Rules.

The standards for ruling on such motions are set out in decisions addressing the Board’s similar authority under Section 102.48(c)(1) of the Board’s Rules.

First, the movant must demonstrate that the evidence is truly “newly discovered.” In *Fitel/Lucent Technologies, Inc.*, 326 NLRB 46 n. 1 (1998), the Board held that newly discovered evidence is “evidence which was in existence” at the time of the hearing, and the movant was “excusably ignorant” of it, i.e. the movant “acted with reasonable diligence to uncover and introduce the evidence.” Thus, evidence that did not exist at the time of the hearing because it relates to events that occurred after the hearing closed is not “newly discovered.” *Allis-Chalmers Corp.*, 286 NLRB 291 n. 1 (1987). See also *Planned Building Services, Inc.*, 347 NLRB 670 n. 4 (2006) (Board affirmed judge’s refusal to accept documents submitted by the respondent after the hearing closed as the evidence was not newly discovered).

Second, the movant must “demonstrate that the introduction of the [evidence in question] would require a different result than that reached by the judge.” *Fitel/Lucent Technologies*, above. See also *County Waste of Ulster*, 354 NLRB 392 (2009), reaaffd. 355 NLRB 413 (2010).

§ 10–600  Interlocutory Special Appeals from Judges Rulings

Section 102.26 of the Board’s Rules permits a party to file an interlocutory appeal from a judge’s ruling by “special permission of the Board.” A judge need not grant a recess in the hearing pending such an appeal and may continue with and close the hearing without waiting for the Board to rule on the appeal. See, e.g., *Custom Excavating, Inc.*, 228 NLRB 285, 286 (1977). However, if the judge has a genuine doubt about the ruling, any recess should allow adequate time for the Board to rule. It is suggested that the judge set a deadline for the special appeal to be filed and set a resumption date no less than one week later.

Note that Section 102.26 of the Board’s Rules requires service of the request and of any responses on the judge.
CHAPTER 11. SEQUESTRATION OF WITNESSES

§ 11–100 In General

The primary Board cases addressing separation of witnesses during trial are *Unga Painting Corp.*, 237 NLRB 1306, 1308 (1978) (addressing the rights of discriminatees under a sequestration order); and *Greyhound Lines*, 319 NLRB 554 (1995) (setting forth a model sequestration order).

Consistent with the statutory command to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence “so far as practical,” the Board has generally attempted to follow the “spirit” of FRE 615 (Exclusion of Witnesses) in fashioning its own rules in this area. Thus, as under FRE 615, the Board has held that exclusion of witnesses is a matter of right, and the judge therefore has no discretion to deny a request. *Unga Painting*, above.

In dealing with specific situations arising under the rule, however, the Board has attempted to balance the sometimes competing interests of openness and protecting the rights of parties and discriminatees on the one hand, and “minimiz[ing] fabrication,” “detecting inconsistent testimony,” and “ascertaining the truth” on the other. *Unga Painting*, above. Specific situations addressed by the Board and courts are discussed in the sections below.

§ 11–200 Scope of Order

The model sequestration order set forth in the Board’s *Greyhound* decision is quoted in full in § 1–300, above.

The “heartland” of FRE 615 is the exclusion of potential witnesses from the courtroom “so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.” *U.S. v. Sepulveda*, 15 F.3d 1161, 1175–1176 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied 512 U.S. 1223 (1994). However, under FRE 615, a court “retains discretion to add other restrictions or not, as it judges appropriate.” *U.S. v. Magana*, 127 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing cases). Examples are discussed below.

§ 11–210 Conferring with Counsel

Nonparty witnesses. The trial judge has discretion, pursuant to a sequestration order, to instruct nonparty witnesses not to discuss their testimony with anyone, including the parties’ counsel, during recesses in the witnesses’ testimony. *Geders v. U.S.*, 425 U.S. 80, 87–88, (1976).

Party witnesses. The judge likewise has discretion to instruct party witnesses not to confer with counsel during a short recess between direct and cross-examinations. *Perry v. Leeke*, 488 U.S. 272, 283–284 (1989). See also *United Chrome Products*, 288 NLRB 1176 n. 1 (1988), where the Board rejected the respondent’s contention that the judge improperly directed its general manager not to discuss his testimony with respondent’s counsel during a 10-minute recess. The Board noted that the recess occurred during the General Counsel’s direct examination of the general manager as a hostile witness; the judge stated that the general manager could talk with respondent’s counsel during the recess about anything except “what he testified and how to change it”; and the judge also stated that the general manager could be prepared for questioning by respondent’s counsel on completion of the General Counsel’s direct examination.
However, in *Geders*, above, the Court held that the trial judge deprived the criminal defendant of this Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel by prohibiting him from consulting with his counsel about anything during a 17-hour overnight recess after the conclusion of his direct testimony. The Court reasoned that it is common practice for an accused to discuss matters other than testimony with counsel during a long recess, including trial tactics and strategy and information relevant to the case.

The Fifth Circuit subsequently reached a similar conclusion in a civil case, based on the Fifth Amendment right to due process, holding that the trial judge erred in barring the defendant corporation’s president and sole shareholder from having any discussions with the corporation’s counsel from the time his testimony commenced until it was completed, which effectively barred him from talking to counsel for 7 days, including during several overnight recesses. *Potashnick v. Port City Construction Co.*, 609 F.2d 1101, 1117 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 820 (1980).

Opposing counsel “may cross-examine a defendant as to the extent of any ‘coaching’ during a recess, subject, of course, to the control of the court.” *Geders*, 425 U.S. at 89. Such questioning may properly include “whether [the defendant] met with his attorney and whether his testimony was discussed at those meetings”; however, questions about “the substance of the legal advice given to [the defendant]” may violate the attorney-client privilege. *U.S. v. Carrillo*, 16 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir.1994).

§ 11–220  **Showing Transcripts to Witnesses**

Where a sequestration order has issued, informing prospective witnesses of prior testimony, including by showing transcripts to them, is prohibited “without express permission of the administrative law judge”; however, “counsel for a party may inform counsel’s own witness of the content of testimony, including the showing of transcripts, given by a witness for the opposing side . . . to prepare for rebuttal of [the] testimony.” *Greyhound*, above, 319 NLRB at 554. *Greyhound* modifies the Board’s prior seemingly absolute prohibition on showing separated witnesses the transcripts of other witnesses’ testimony. See *El Mundo Corp.*, 301 NLRB 351 (1991). But, that modification appears confined to a showing by counsel and to only so much of the transcript as is needed for possible rebuttal of testimony recited in the transcript, as opposed to making the entire transcript available for open-ended perusal by a prospective witness.

§ 11–300  **Requests to Separate Witnesses**

As indicated above, if a request is made, the judge “shall” order witnesses excluded. FRE 615 and *Unga Painting*, above, 237 NLRB at 1307. No formal exceptions to this rule are recognized. However, the failure of the judge to issue a sequestration order on request will not require reversal in the absence of any prejudice. See *AEI2, LLC*, 343 NLRB 433 (2004) (finding no prejudice where there were only two other witnesses, one who would not have testified to the events, and the other who likely would have been designated as a party representative); and *Curlee Clothing Co.*, 240 NLRB 355 n. 1 (1979) (finding no prejudice where the judge in a pre- *Unga Painting* hearing denied a request because the large number of witnesses and severe spatial limitations rendered separation impossible), enfd. in relevant part 607 F.2d 1213 (8th Cir. 1979).

No time is specified for making the request to separate witnesses. See FRE 615. See also *AEI2*, above, 343 NLRB at 433 n. 4, and authorities cited there. But see *Alpert’s, Inc.*, 267 NLRB

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The judge also possesses authority to order witnesses excluded on his/her own motion, i.e. even if not requested. FRE 615.

§ 11–400 Who Should and Should Not Be Separated

All potential witnesses should be excluded from the trial. *Unga Painting*, above, 237 NLRB at 1307; and *Greyhound*, above, 319 NLRB at 554. Both FRE 615 and the Board, however, recognize several exceptions.

Party who is a natural person. See FRE 615(a) (“a party who is a natural person”) and *Greyhound*, above (“natural persons who are parties”).

Officer or employee of a non-natural party who is designated as its representative by its attorney. FRE 615(b). See also *Greyhound*, above (“representatives of nonnatural parties”). The Board reads this exception as limiting a corporate respondent to its attorney and one other representative. *Unga Painting*, above, 237 NLRB at 1308 n. 16. See also *Opus 3 Ltd. v. Heritage Park*, 91 F.3d 625, 630 (4th Cir. 1996), where the court held that the representative must be an employee, and that the corporation’s “mere designation of a person to act on its behalf at trial” does not convert the person into its employee.

Person essential to a party’s presentation. See FRE 615(c) (“a person whose presence a party shows to be essential to presenting the party’s claim or defense”); and *Greyhound*, above (“a person who is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party’s cause”). It must be shown that the presence is “essential,” rather than simply desirable. *U.S. v. Jackson*, 60 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 980, 1130, 1165 (1995 and 1996). See also *Opus 3*, above, 91 F.3d at 628 (the burden is on the party asserting that the witness’s presence is essential); and *Tasty Baking Co. v. NLRB*, 254 F.3d 114, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“the ALJ retains considerable discretion in determining which witnesses are ‘essential’ within the meaning of the rule”).

For guidance on whether a person is “essential,” see *U.S. ex rel. Bahrani v. ConAgra, Inc.*, 624 F.3d 1275,1296–1297 (10th Cir. 2010) (district court acted within its discretion in allowing witness to remain in courtroom throughout the trial as an “essential” person, given that he was, inter alia, “the person most knowledgeable about the history and complex factual details of the matters at issue, and with whom counsel needed to confer during trial”); and *Oliver B. Cannon & Son, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York*, 519 F.Supp. 668, 678–679 (D. Del. 1981) (“What must be shown is that a witness has such specialized expertise or intimate knowledge of the facts of the case that a party’s attorney could not effectively function without the presence and aid of the witness or that the witness would be unable to present essential testimony without hearing the trial testimony of other witnesses.”)

For a good overall discussion of this and the other exceptions in FRE 615, see 29 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. Sec. 6245 (2d ed. updated April 2017).

Alleged discriminatees. The Board allows a limited exemption for alleged discriminatees. They are exempted from exclusion except “during that portion of the hearing when another of the General Counsel’s or the charging party’s witnesses is testifying about events to which the
discriminatees have testified, or will or may testify, either in the case-in-chief or on rebuttal." Unga Painting, above, 237 NLRB at 1307. See also Greyhound, above.

However, the judge retains some discretion in applying this limited exemption. Thus, in Unga Painting, the Board stated that the judge may decline to follow the rule if in his/her judgment "there are special circumstances warranting the unrestricted presence of discriminatees or total exclusion when not testifying." 237 NLRB at 1307. The Board noted that the third exception in FRE 615 for "essential" persons "is broad enough to permit a showing of these special circumstances and allows the [judge] considerable discretion." Id. at n. 14.

Discriminatees designated essential representative. Notwithstanding the Board's footnote in Unga Painting, above, there appears to be some ambiguity regarding the right of a discriminatee who is also designated as the General Counsel's or the charging party's representative to stay throughout the hearing. The judge approved such a designation, and allowed the discriminatee to remain in the hearing room, in Impact Industries, 285 NLRB 5, 6 (1987), remanded on other grounds 847 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1988). But see Weis Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 265 F.3d 239, 245–246 (4th Cir. 2001), modifying in part 325 NLRB 871 (1998), where the court rejected the respondent's contention that it was prejudiced by the judge's allowing a discriminatee who was the General Counsel's designated representative to remain throughout the hearing, even while subsequent General Counsel witnesses testified to the same events, but expressed disapproval of the judge's "departure from Board precedent." In any event, as indicated above, the judge should require a showing that the discriminatee's unrestricted presence is "essential" in these circumstances.

§ 11–500 Violation of Sequestration Order

A prerequisite to finding a violation of a sequestration order is the issuance of the order itself. See U.S. v. Williams, 136 F.3d 1166, 1168–1169 (7th Cir. 1998) (the parties informed the judge that they had agreed to sequestration, but there was "no formal request for entry of an order," and "no sequestration order was ever entered"). Further, the parameters of the judge's sequestration order should be clearly defined. See Continental Winding Co., 305 NLRB 122, 129 (1991).

Once an order has issued, however, counsel are expected to police the rule, to inform any witnesses not present at the time the judge issues the order of their obligations under the order, and to bring any violations to the judge's attention. See Greyhound, above, 319 NLRB at 554.

When a witness has violated a sequestration order, the Board's preferred course appears to be "stricter scrutiny of the tainted testimony," without striking the testimony of that witness. Medite of New Mexico, Inc., 314 NLRB 1145, 1149 (1994), enfd. 72 F.3d 780 (10th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, violating a sequestration order "may warrant striking the tainted testimony if it can be demonstrated that a party was prejudiced by the violation of the rule." Suburban Trails, 326 NLRB 1250 n. 1 (1998).

If disregard of a sequestration order is revealed before a witness is called to testify, under FRE 615 that witness may be barred from testifying. U.S. v. Wilson, 103 F.3d 1402, 1406 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the trial court "clearly acted within its discretion in concluding that [the witness] could not be called to testify at the last minute after sitting in the courtroom and listening to much of the case"). Cf. North Hills Office Services, 342 NLRB 437 n. 2 (2004) (Board rejected the respondent's contention that the judge improperly allowed the attorney for the charging party, who had been present throughout the trial, to testify in violation of the
sequestration order, inasmuch as the judge had warned the parties that the “credibility of witnesses who were present during the testimony of other witnesses would be subject to attack," and “fairly applied the sequestration order to all parties”).

As discussed above in § 6–600, et seq. regarding attorney misconduct, violations of a sequestration order by counsel may warrant an admonishment or reprimand or referral to the General Counsel under Section 102.177 of the Board’s Rules. See Sargent Karch, 314 NLRB 482 (1994) (suspending the attorney for 6 months after his second violation).
CHAPTER 12. THE HEARING RECORD

§ 12–100 Public hearings

Section 102.34 of the Board's Rules provides that hearings “will be public unless otherwise ordered by the Board or the Administrative Law Judge.” Similarly, Section 101.10(a) of the Board's Statements of Procedure provides that “except in extraordinary situations the hearing is open to the public.”

§ 12–200 Opening a Hearing by Telephone or Mail

A judge may open a hearing by telephone or by mail in the interests of saving time and expenses for all concerned. See, e.g., Ironworkers Local 843 (Norglass, Inc.), 327 NLRB 29 (1998).

This is typically done in a situation where the charging party or the General Counsel is unwilling to join in a proposed settlement. See, e.g., Communications Workers Local 9403 (Pacific Bell), 322 NLRB 142 (1996). In such situations, one of the parties to the settlement makes a motion to open the hearing by mail, to receive the formal papers, and consider the proposed settlement agreement. The judge issues a show cause order, giving the parties a date to show cause why the motion should not be granted or to submit a statement why the settlement should be approved. Upon receipt of the statements, if the judge decides the settlement should be approved, he/she issues an order granting the motion to open the record, discusses the objections, approves the settlement, and adjourns the trial indefinitely, pending full compliance with the agreement.

If the parties are willing, this can be accomplished even more efficiently by considering the motion, the settlement agreement, and any objections in a telephone conference call, with a court reporter recording the proceedings.

A similar procedure is also used in lengthy hearings at a distant location involving the production of voluminous subpoenaed documents. The hearing is opened by telephone, and the judge rules on disputed issues raised in the petition to revoke the subpoena during the recorded conference call. The judge then travels to the hearing site when the parties are ready to resume.

§ 12–300 Testimony by Telephone

The Board has disapproved taking a witness’s testimony by telephone over the respondent’s objections. See Westside Painting, Inc., 328 NLRB 796, 796–797 (1999) (“under Section 102.30 of the Board’s Rules, witnesses in Board unfair labor practice proceedings may not testify by telephone”). The Board emphasized the importance of viewing the demeanor of the witness by the trier of fact, as well as the lack of sufficient safeguards that may have impaired the respondent’s right of cross-examination.

Nevertheless, judges have, on occasion, taken telephone testimony when all parties agreed to the procedure. See, for example, Team Clean, Inc., 348 NLRB 1231 (2006), where an entire trial—albeit a short one with simple issues—was conducted by telephone.
Testimony by Videoconference

Section 102.35(c) of the Board’s Rules, which was adopted effective September 29, 2017 (82 FR 43695), states:

Upon a showing of good cause based on compelling circumstances, and under appropriate safeguards, the taking of video testimony by contemporaneous transmission from a different location may be permitted.

“Good cause based on compelling circumstances”. The standard for allowing testimony by videoconference is not further defined or explained in the Rule or the Federal Register notice announcing it. However, it is identical to the standard set forth in FRCP 43. The 1996 Advisory Committee Notes to FRCP 43 state:

Transmission cannot be justified merely by showing that it is inconvenient for the witness to attend the trial. The most persuasive showings of good cause and compelling circumstances are likely to arise when a witness is unable to attend the trial for unexpected reasons, such as accident or illness, but remains able to testify from a different place. Contemporaneous transmission may be better than an attempt to reschedule the trial, particularly if there is a risk that other—and perhaps more important—witnesses might not be available at that time. Other possible justifications for remote transmission must be approached cautiously.

See also Rodriguez v. SGLC, Inc., 2012 WL 3704922 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (denying the plaintiffs’ motion to permit them to testify from Mexico by videoconferencing, as they had shown only that it would be inconvenient for them to attend the trial, not that they could not have obtained a visa or could not afford to attend); SEC v. Yang, 2014 WL 1303457 (N.D. Ill. March 30, 2014) (denying the defendants’ motion to take testimony of witnesses in China by videoconference in the absence of a showing that they could not obtain a visa or that travel was prohibitively expensive for them); and Sille v. Parball Corp., 2011 WL 2680560 (D. Nev. July 8, 2011) (denying the plaintiff’s “blanket” motion to take testimony of virtually all of its witnesses in Norway and New York by videoconference, given the lateness of the motion and the absence of any unexpected circumstances).

But compare Great West Casualty Co. v. Ross Wilson Trucking, 2017 WL 707464, *6 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2017) (“[T]his Court regularly uses videoconferencing to avoid the cost of travel for parties, witnesses, and attorneys, even for purposes of trial.”); Ever Win International Corp. v. Prong, Inc., 2017 WL 1654063 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017) (finding that one witness’s “overseas residency” and another’s “East Coast residency” presented “good faith compelling circumstances” to grant the defendant’s request to permit both witnesses to testify by videoconference); FTC v. Swedish Match North America, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2000) (granting the plaintiff’s motion to permit a witness in Oklahoma to testify by videoconference to avoid the “serious inconvenience” of traveling “across the continent”); Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Yoak, 2014 WL 6796074 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 2014) (granting the plaintiff’s motion to permit a witness to testify by videoconference in order to “spare the witness the serious inconvenience in traveling from Seattle a second time”; witness had previously traveled to St. Louis to testify, but was unable to do so because of defendant’s motions to delay and continue the hearing); and Virtual Architecture, Ltd. v. Rick, 2012 WL 388507 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2012) (granting the plaintiff’s motion to permit a witness in Seychelles to testify by videoconference given the long distance and flight time and the
witness’s assertion that it would be “virtually impossible” for him to obtain a visa in time to testify in person).

See also the following Board decisions that issued a year or two before 102.35(c) was adopted: Oncor Electric Delivery Co., 364 NLRB No. 58 (2016) (affirming the judge’s ruling granting the General Counsel’s motion, over the respondent’s objection, to allow a former employee of the respondent to testify regarding certain background facts by videoconference from the NLRB Regional Office in Denver rather than testify in person at the hearing in Fort Worth); EF International Language Schools, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 20, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2015) (affirming the judge’s ruling in an 8(a)(3) discharge case permitting the General Counsel to take the testimony of a corroborating witness who resided in Madrid, Spain by videoconference from the U.S. Embassy there), enfd. 673 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017); and MPE, Inc., 9–CA–084228, unpub. Board order dated Jan. 29, 2015 (2015 WL 400660) (reversing the judge and ruling that the General Counsel should be permitted to take the testimony of the alleged discriminatee by videoconference because he was incarcerated in federal prison several hundred miles from the hearing site and was not scheduled to be released for over a year).

If all parties agree to videoconferencing a witness’s testimony, the 1996 Advisory Committee Notes to FRCP 43 state that “good cause and compelling circumstances may be established with relative ease.” The judge “is not bound by a stipulation, however, and can insist on live testimony,” considering, “among other factors, . . . the apparent importance of the testimony in the full context of the trial.”

For examples where ALJs have approved taking testimony by videoconference in the absence of any objection, see Spurlino Materials, LLC, 357 NLRB 1510 (2011) (by agreement of all parties, the ALJ held the last day of hearing, which followed a 3-week recess and was relatively short, by video), enfd. 805 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2015); SRC Painting, 357 NLRB 27 (2011) (ALJ conducted the entire hearing, which lasted less than 1 hour, by video where neither the General Counsel nor the charging party objected and the respondent did not respond to the judge’s notice to show cause or appear at the hearing); and *M.V.M., Inc., 352 NLRB 1165 n.1 (2008) (the testimony of one witness was taken by video without objection, where the original testimony of the witness had erroneously not been transcribed).

“Appropriate safeguards.” Section 102.35(c)(2) states that appropriate safeguards “must ensure that the [ALJ] has the ability to assess the witness’s credibility and the parties have a meaningful opportunity to examine and cross-examine the witness.” The safeguards must also include “at a minimum” measures ensuring that:

- party representatives have the opportunity to be present at the remote location,
- the judge, participants, and the reporter are able to hear the testimony and observe the witness,
- the camera view is adjustable to provide a close-up view of counsel and the witness and a panoramic view of the room,
- exhibits used in the witness’s examination are exchanged in advance of the examination, and
- video technology assistance is available to assist with technical difficulties that arise during the examination.
ALJs may also impose additional safeguards.

**Application for videoconferencing testimony.** Section 102.35(c)(1) states that applications to take testimony by videoconference must be in writing, be simultaneously served on all parties, and set forth:

- the compelling circumstances for such testimony,
- the witness’s name and address,
- the location where the video testimony will be held,
- the matter concerning which the witness is expected to testify,
- the conditions in place to protect the integrity of the testimony,
- the transmission safeguards, and
- the electronic address from which the testimony will be transmitted.

§ 12–500  **Tape Recorders in Hearing**

The use of a tape recorder by parties to record the hearing is within the discretion of the judge. Compare *Red & White Supermarkets*, 172 NLRB 1841, 1846 (1968) (use of tape recorder permitted), with *Marriott Corp.*, 172 NLRB 1891, 1892 n. 1 (1968) (permission to use tape recorder denied), enfd. in part 417 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1969).

Although the reviewing court in *Marriott* found no prejudice from the judge’s ruling, it indicated that a recorder should be permitted to the extent that it does not interfere with or slow down the hearing. 417 F.2d at 178. Nevertheless, the Board subsequently upheld a judge’s discretion to deny a respondent’s request to use a tape recorder in *Daisy’s Originals, Inc.*, 187 NLRB 251 n. 1 (1970). The judge denied the request on the ground he would not be able to police its use, and the Board further noted that the judge and the parties are bound by the transcript prepared by the official reporting service.

Obviously, if a tape recording is permitted, it would be subject to the restrictions imposed by a sequestration order.

§ 12–600  **Television Cameras in Courtroom**

The Board’s policy is that its hearings may not be televised. That policy is reflected in a June 10, 1991 letter from the Deputy Executive Secretary to a television station that had requested permission to televise a hearing. The letter states that the policy may be reviewed later; however, there has been no change to date.
§ 12–700 Correcting the Transcript

The judge should attempt to make sure, to the extent possible, that the testimony is correctly and adequately transcribed during the hearing, particularly that the witness’s testimony is audible.

If transcription errors occur, the judge should not unilaterally correct the transcript except for obvious typographical errors. Corrections should be made pursuant to a motion by a party or, if there is none, after issuance of an order to show cause. Serv-Air, Inc., 161 NLRB 382 n. 1 (1966); and W. B. Jones Lumber Co., 114 NLRB 415 n. 1 (1955), enfd. 245 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1957).

See also Teamsters Local 705 (Pennsylvania Truck Lines), 314 NLRB 95 n. 2 (1994). In that case, the Board rejected the General Counsel’s attempt, for the first time on exceptions to the judge’s decision, to supply the surname of an additional discriminatee whose name was inaudibly described in the transcript. The Board stated that “the burden was on the General Counsel, not the court reporter, to identify the discriminatees,” and indicated that the General Counsel should have filed a posthearing motion or proposed stipulation to clarify the matter.

§ 12–800 Redacting Private Information (Social Security Numbers)

Sensitive personally identifiable information (SPII) should not be submitted by the parties into the public record or used by judges in decisions. The Agency defines SPII as an individual’s name in combination with one or more of the following:

- Date of birth
- Social Security number
- Driver’s license number
- Financial account number
- Credit or debit card number

See NLRB E-File Terms and Conditions, https://apps.nlrb.gov/eservice/efileterm.aspx. If a party submits an exhibit that contains irrelevant SPII, the judge should direct that the SPII be redacted. If the SPII is relevant to the issues in the case, or irrelevant SPII was inadvertently admitted into the hearing record, the judge should take steps to protect against public disclosure of the SPII. See, e.g., Doe v. U.S., 210 F.Supp.3d 1169 (W.D. Mo. 2017) (court sealed unredacted deposition transcripts containing SPII that the FTC had inadvertently attached as exhibits to its preliminary injunction brief). See also § 8–415, Protective Orders, above.
CHAPTER 13. BOARD PRECEDENT AND RELITIGATION OF ISSUES

§ 13–100 Binding Board Precedent, Judge Required to Follow

The judge is bound to apply established Board precedent that neither the Board nor the Supreme Court has reversed, notwithstanding contrary decisions by courts of appeals. See, e.g., Western Cab Co., 365 NLRB No. 78, slip op. at 1 n. 4 (2017); Pathmark Stores, Inc., 342 NLRB 378 n. 1 (2004); Waco, Inc., 273 NLRB 746, 749 n. 14 (1984); Los Angeles New Hospital, 244 NLRB 960, 962 n. 4 (1979), enf'd. 640 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981); and Iowa Beef Packers, 144 NLRB 615, 616 (1963), enf'd. in part 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964).

Of course, a judge is also bound to follow particular Board findings in a prior case, where appropriate, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 300 NLRB 1024, 1024–1025, n. 3 (1990), enf'd. 967 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1992). See also § 13–600, Relitigation of Issues, below.

§ 13–200 Adopted Judge Decisions, When Not Binding Precedent

When the Board has adopted all or even a portion of a judge’s decision to which no exceptions have been filed, that decision or portion is not binding precedent in other cases. Operating Engineers Local 39 (Mark Hopkins Intercontinental Hotel), 357 NLRB 1683 n. 1 (2011); and Trump Marina Associates LLC, 354 NLRB 1027 n. 2 (2009), reaf'd. 344 NLRB 585 (2010), enf'd. 435 Fed.Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Carpenters Local 370 (Eastern Contractors Assn.), 332 NLRB 174, 175 n. 2 (2000); Watsonville Register-Pajaronian, 327 NLRB 957, 959 n. 4 (1999); and Colgate-Palmolive Co., 323 NLRB 515 n. 1 (1997).

In reviewing prior decisions to determine whether any of the ALJ’s findings or analyses have precedential value, it is important to check:

1) which party or parties filed exceptions to the ALJ’s decision (this is usually stated in the first paragraph of the Board’s decision);

2) whether no exceptions were filed to any of the judge’s findings or analyses (this is usually stated in a footnote in the Board’s decision);

3) whether the Board did not pass on any of the judge’s findings or analyses for some reason (this is also usually stated in a footnote); and

4) whether the Board affirmed any of the findings on different grounds than the ALJ.

§ 13–300 Reliance on Prior Findings of Another Judge

Credibility determinations. It is “generally inappropriate” to base credibility determinations solely on credibility determinations made in a prior case. Electrical Workers (Nixdorf Computers Corp.), 252 NLRB 539 n. 1 (1980). See also Fluor Daniel, Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.3d 961, 972 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1089 (2005) (judge was “under no obligation to consider determinations made by another ALJ in a wholly different case regarding the credibility of a particular witness”).
ALJ decisions adopted in the absence of exceptions. Although lacking precedential legal authority, a judge’s decision that has been adopted by the Board in the absence of exceptions may properly be relied on in a subsequent case involving the same parties, at least where all the required elements of collateral estoppel are met. See *Moulton Mfg. Co.*, 152 NLRB 196, 207–209 (1965) (rejecting the respondent’s argument that such decisions should be given no more effect than a settlement agreement); and *Operating Engineers Local 12 (Associated Engineers)*, 270 NLRB 1172, 1172–1173 (1984) (prior ALJ decision may be relied on to show respondent has a proclivity to violate the Act, even if the decision was adopted by the Board in the absence of exceptions). See also *Hitchens v. County of Montgomery*, 98 Fed. Appx. 106 (3d Cir. 2004) (hearing officer’s proposed decision that was adopted by the state labor agency in the absence of exceptions was a final order sufficient to bar relitigation of the same issues in a subsequent federal action against the same party or party in privity).

ALJ decisions pending before the Board on exceptions. An ALJ decision that is pending before the Board on exceptions is not binding authority and should not be cited as such. See *Healthbridge Management, LLC*, 362 NLRB No. 33, slip op. at 1 n. 3 (2015), enf’d. per curiam 672 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Nevertheless, the trial judge appears to have the discretion to rely on factual findings made by another ALJ in a prior case even if the case is still pending before the Board on exceptions. See *Wynn Las Vegas, LLC*, 358 NLRB 690 n. 1 (2012) (holding that the trial judge properly barred respondent from relitigating the lawfulness of a suspension, as that issue had already been decided by another ALJ in a prior case that was pending before the Board on exceptions, and the Board had since affirmed the ALJ’s decision).

See also *Voith Industrial Services, Inc.*, 363 NLRB No. 109, slip op. at 1 n. 2 (2016) (trial judge properly relied on a finding by another ALJ in a previous case that the respondent was a legal successor, even though that finding was pending before the Board on exceptions, as the Board subsequently affirmed that finding); *Longshoremens ILWU (ICTSI Oregon, Inc.)*, 363 NLRB No. 47, slip op. at 1 n. 3 (2015) (same, where the judge relied on the findings by another ALJ in an earlier 8(b)(4) secondary boycott case against the respondent union), enf’d. per curiam --- Fed. Appx. ---, 2017 WL 5664741 (D.C. Cir. 2017); *Detroit Newspapers Agency*, 326 NLRB 782 n. 3 (1998) (same, where the trial judge relied on an earlier decision by another ALJ that a strike was an unfair labor practice strike), enf’d. denied on other grounds 216 F.3d 109 (D.C Cir. 2000); and *Grand Rapids Press of Booth Newspapers*, 327 NLRB 393, 394–395 (1998) (same, where the trial judge relied on another ALJ’s findings in an earlier case as evidence of animus), enf’d. mem. 215 F.3d 1327 (6th Cir. 2000).

This approach advances judicial efficiency, and avoids inconsistent results and delays attendant to awaiting the Board’s review of the judge’s decision in the earlier case. However, the judge should keep in mind that, if the Board reverses the earlier judge’s findings on review, the judge’s findings in the second case may likewise be vulnerable to reversal. See, e.g., *Detroit Newspapers*, above; and *Ironworkers Local 103*, 195 NLRB 980, 983 (1972).

§ 13–400 Reliance on Settlements

Informal settlements, and formal settlements that contain a nonadmission clause, may not be relied on in subsequent cases involving the same parties. See *Sheet Metal Workers Local 28 (Astoria Mechanical Corp.)*, 323 NLRB 204 (1997). However, formal settlements that do not contain a nonadmission clause may be relied on in subsequent cases to show that the respondent has a proclivity to violate the Act. *Teamsters Local 122*, 334 NLRB 1190, 1192 n. 11 (2001); *Painters District Council 9 (We’re Associates)*, 329 NLRB 140, 143 (1999); and
§ 13–500 Reliance on Portions of Other Records

In Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services, 335 NLRB 635, 639 n. 26 (2001), enfd. in part, 317 F.3d 316 (D.C. Cir. 2003), the Board stated that it expects parties to introduce all nontestimonial evidence on which they rely in the form of exhibits. They cannot “incorporate by reference” portions of other records, even those of Board cases involving the same parties.

§ 13–600 Relitigation of Issues

In the absence of newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence or special circumstances, the respondent in a Section 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice case may not relitigate issues that were or could have been litigated in a prior representation proceeding. Nursing Center at Vineland, 318 NLRB 901, 903 (1995), enfd. mem. 151 LRRM 2736 (3d Cir. 1996).

Nor may the respondent relitigate in the compliance proceeding matters decided in the underlying unfair labor practice proceeding. Task Force Security & Investigations, 323 NLRB 674 n. 2 (1997). See also Lorge School, 355 NLRB 558 n. 1, 563 (2010) (issues in the underlying case, including the authority of the two-Member Board to issue the decision, are barred by res judicata where the decision has been judicially enforced).

With respect to issues actually litigated in prior unfair labor practice cases, see Stark Electric, Inc., 327 NLRB 518 n. 1 (1999); Planned Building Services, Inc., 347 NLRB 670 n. 2 (2006); and Success Village Apartments, Inc., 348 NLRB 579 n. 4 (2006) (judge may rely, at least in part, on findings in prior Board decisions involving the same respondent to find animus). See also Casino Pauma, 363 NLRB No. 60, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2015) (respondent tribal casino was collaterally estopped from contesting jurisdiction where the issue had been litigated and decided in a prior case); Allied Mechanical Services, Inc., 352 NLRB 662, 664 (2008), reconsideration denied 356 NLRB 2 (2010) (respondent was collaterally estopped from alleging that its bargaining relationship with a union was based on Section 8(f) rather than Section 9(a) because a prior Board decision involving the same parties was necessarily premised on the existence of a Section 9(a) relationship and a prior settlement agreement confirmed such a relationship); and Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 300 NLRB 1024, 1025, nn. 3 and 4 (1990) (respondent was collaterally estopped from relitigating facts relating to its duty to bargain as a successor, which were fully and fairly litigated and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding involving the same parties), enfd. 967 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Compare Harvey’s Resort, 271 NLRB 306 (1984) (collateral estoppel is inapplicable where the matter was not put in issue in the prior case). See also National Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 167, 172–175 (2d Cir. 1960).

With respect to issues fully litigated before another judge but still pending before the Board on exceptions to the judge’s decision, see § 13–300, Reliance on Prior Findings of Another Judge, above.

With respect to the application of collateral estoppel and res judicata to the General Counsel or Board, see Precision Industries, 320 NLRB 661, 663 (1996), enfd. 118 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 1997). In that case, the Board held that prior age and race discrimination charges filed
with the EEOC by several discriminatees did not judicially estop the General Counsel from asserting that the failure to hire them was based on antiunion animus, as neither the General Counsel nor the Charging Party Union were parties in the EEOC proceeding.

The Board in *Precision Industries* also rejected the respondent’s res-judicata argument that the complaint was barred because respondent had prevailed in an ERISA suit brought by the union and certain former employees and retirees. The Board cited “the general rule that the Government is not precluded from litigating an issue involving the enforcement of Federal law that a private party has litigated unsuccessfully, when the Government was not a party to the private litigation.” Ibid., citing *Field Bridge Associates*, 306 NLRB 322 (1992), enfd. sub nom. *Service Employees Local 32B–32J v. NLRB*, 982 F. 2d 845 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 509 U.S. 904 (1993).

See also *Roadway Express*, 355 NLRB 197 (2010), enfd. 427 Fed. Appx. 838 (11th Cir. 2011), where the respondent employer argued that a court’s dismissal of the alleged discriminatee’s hybrid Sec. 301/DFR claim against the employer and union collaterally estopped the General Counsel from subsequently opposing deferral of the related 8(a)(3) allegations against the employer on the ground that the union had breached its DFR in the prior grievance proceeding. Relying on the same “general rule” above, the Board rejected the respondent’s argument as the General Counsel was neither a party to the unsuccessful lawsuit nor in privity with the alleged discriminatee (since the Board acts in the public interest) and the court dismissed the DFR claim on the ground that the discriminatee had waived it, rather than on the merits.

The Board’s application of its general policy has been rejected by two circuit courts. See *NLRB v. Donna-Lee Sportswear*, 836 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1987); and *NLRB v. Heyman*, 541 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that where the existence of a contract has been decided by a district court in actions brought under ERISA or Sec. 301, the Board is precluded from relitigating that issue in a later 8(a)(5) case). However, in subsequent cases, the Board has distinguished these two circuit court decisions based on their particular facts. See *Field Bridge Associates*, above, 306 NLRB at 323 n. 2 (the existence of the contract was “the essence of the unfair labor practice charge,” rather than just one aspect of the allegations, and did not have “implications concerning Section 8(a)(3) of the Act”); *Precision Industries*, above, 320 NLRB at 663, n. 13 (“the issue in the unfair labor practice case—the existence, vel non, of a contract—was the same as the one that had been decided in the court proceeding”); and *Roadway Express*, above (the Board’s unfair labor practice findings depended “entirely” on the existence of a contract, and the courts’ prior findings on that issue represented “a minimal intrusion into the Board’s jurisdiction” as “no broad policy question” was implicated in that determination). See also *Galaxy Towers Condominium Assn.*, 361 NLRB No. 36, slip op. at 1 n. 3 (2014) (“We adhere to the general rule not to apply judicial estoppel where the Government was not a party to the prior proceeding.”).
CHAPTER 14. SUPPLEMENTAL OR RELATED PROCEEDINGS

§ 14–100   Remands

On a remand for further hearing, the judge is limited to considering only those matters specified by the Board’s order and cannot expand the scope of the trial. Monark Boat Co., 276 NLRB 1143 n. 3 (1985), enf'd. 800 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1986).

§ 14–200   Compliance Proceedings

Special procedural rules govern supplemental backpay proceedings, particularly regarding the allocation of the burden of proof on various issues. For a list of these burden-of-proof rules, see Minette Mills, Inc., 316 NLRB 1009, 1010–1011 (1995). See also St. George Warehouse, 351 NLRB 961 (2007) (modifying the traditional rule and shifting the burden of going forward to the discriminatee and the General Counsel to present evidence that the discriminatee took reasonable steps to apply for substantially equivalent jobs), enf'd. 645 F.3d 666 (3d Cir. 2011); and Grosvenor Resort, 350 NLRB 1197 (2007) (holding that, absent circumstances justifying a longer delay, discriminatees should begin their search for interim work within 2 weeks of discharge).

With respect to imposing special remedies in the compliance proceeding, see 2 Sisters Food Group, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 158, slip op. at 1 n. 3 (2013), reaff'd. 361 NLRB No. 152 (2014) (judge should not have considered the charging party’s request for numerous additional notice remedies in the compliance proceeding where the additional remedies could have been but were not sought at the unfair labor practice stage of the case). But cf. Gimrock Construction, 356 NLRB 529 (2011) (judge properly granted the General Counsel’s request in the compliance proceeding for special bargaining remedies, including a specific bargaining schedule and mandatory progress reports, notwithstanding that the underlying court-enforced Board order contained only a traditional bargaining order), enf. denied in relevant part 695 F.3d 1188, 1193 (11th Cir. 2012).

§ 14–300   Bankruptcy Proceedings

“It is well established that the institution of bankruptcy proceedings does not deprive the Board of jurisdiction or authority to entertain and process an unfair labor practice case to its final disposition. Board proceedings fall within the exception to the automatic stay provision for proceedings by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory powers.” Consumer Product Services, LLC, 357 NLRB No. 87, slip op. at 1 n. 2 (2011) (citing cases). See also NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 1981). Collection of backpay, however, requires a separate application to the bankruptcy court. NLRB v. Continental Hagen Corp., 932 F.2d 828, 832–833 (9th Cir. 1991); and NLRB v. 15th Avenue Iron Works, 964 F.2d 1336, 1337 (2d. Cir. 1992).
CHAPTER 15. ORAL ARGUMENT, BRIEFS, JUDGES DECISIONS

§ 15–100   Pretrial or Trial Briefs

The Board’s Rules contain no specific provision for pretrial or trial briefs. However, Section 102.35(a)(12) provides that judges have authority “to request the parties at any time during the hearing to state their respective positions concerning any issue in the case or supporting theory(ies).” Further, the Third Edition of the U.S. Administrative Conference Manual for Administrative Law Judges (https://archive.org/details/gov.acus.1993.manual), states at 47:

Some cases, particularly complex ones, can be facilitated by trial briefs stating the principal contentions of the parties, the evidence to be presented and the purposes for which it is submitted. [The] briefs may also present the results of research the judge has requested on legal or technical problems. The judge may instruct each party to include in the brief any procedural motions and requests, such as provisions to bar proposed written evidence.

See also Bunge Milling, Inc., 33-CA-15997, unpub. Board order issued Dec. 30, 2011 (2011 WL 6886297) (ALJ did not abuse his discretion by requiring the parties to submit prehearing briefs on whether the Board should defer to an arbitrator’s decision and award).

§ 15–200   Oral Argument

Section 102.42 of the Board’s Rules specifically provides that “any party is entitled, upon request, to oral argument, for a reasonable period at the close of the hearing, . . . [which] will be included in the transcript of the hearing.”

§ 15–300   Posthearing Briefs

Section 102.42 of the Board’s Rules provides that the judge has discretion whether to allow time for parties to file posthearing briefs. See also K.O. Steel Foundry & Machine, 340 NLRB 1295 (2003) (upholding judge’s discretion to allow oral argument in lieu of briefs). In most cases, judges will allow parties to file posthearing briefs, as they can be quite helpful. But see § 15–500, Expedited Decision Without Briefs; and § 15–600, Bench Decision, below.

Time to File. Section 102.42 provides that the judge may fix a reasonable time for filing the briefs, but not in excess of 35 days of the close of trial (counting intermediate weekends and holidays, see Sec. 102.2(a)). Requests for extension of time must be filed with the Chief, Deputy Chief, or Associate Chief Judge, as appropriate.

Parties should be informed that the Board and its chief judges will not lightly grant postponements for the submission of briefs and that motions for extension of time should, on their face, explain the reason for the request and indicate whether the other parties object to the proposed extension. See § 1–200, Closing Statement by Judge, above.

Where Briefs Are to be Filed. The judge should inform the parties at the beginning of the hearing that briefs should be filed in the office to which the judge is assigned. Motions for extension of time should be directed to the Chief, Deputy, or Associate Chief Judge at that office as well.
Filing and Service Requirements. See CHAPTER 4, “Filing and Service of Documents,” above.

Reply or Answering Briefs. There is no provision in the Board’s Rules for the filing of posthearing reply or answering briefs. However, the trial judge has the discretion to ask for them, or grant a motion for leave to file them, in an appropriate case. See Gallup, Inc., 349 NLRB 1213, 1217 (2007), and cases cited there.

NOTE: Judges should not use excerpts from the briefs of the parties as a substitute for their findings and legal analysis in the written decision. Extensive and verbatim copying from the brief of the prevailing party in the judge’s decision not only creates the appearance of partiality, but also gives the impression that the judge failed to conduct “an independent analysis of the case’s underlying facts and legal issues.” Dish Network Service Corp., 345 NLRB 1071 (2005). See also § 2–410, Grounds Asserted for Disqualification, above.

§ 15–400 Briefs Not Part of Official Record

Briefs to the judge do not normally become part of the official record in the case. See Sec. 102.45(b) of the Board’s Rules. See also Stagehands Referral Service, LLC, 356 NLRB 1221 (2011); and Vanguard Fire & Security Systems, 345 NLRB 1016, 1020 (2005).

§ 15–500 Expedited Decision Without Briefs

The Board allows the issuance of an expedited decision, without waiting for the filing of briefs, upon due notice to the parties. Section 102.42 of the Board’s Rules provides that:

In any case in which the Administrative Law Judge believes that written briefs or proposed findings of fact and conclusions may not be necessary, the Judge must notify the parties at the opening of the hearing or as soon thereafter as practicable that the Judge may wish to hear oral argument in lieu of briefs.

Thus, after giving the required notice to the parties and after hearing the oral arguments in lieu of briefs, the judge may proceed to read the transcript, exhibits, and applicable authorities, and prepare a written expedited decision in the usual manner.

An expedited decision may be preferred as an alternative to a bench decision, discussed below in §15–600. It avoids the sometimes hurried approach and potential pitfalls of a bench decision, which must be delivered orally at the close of the trial.

§ 15–600 Bench Decision

§ 15–610 In General

Section 102.35(a)(10) of the Board’s Rules provides that administrative law judges shall have authority “to make and file decisions, including bench decisions delivered within 72 hours after conclusion of oral argument, in conformity with Public Law 89–554, 5 U.S.C. § 557.” This procedure has received court approval. See NLRB v. Beverly Manor Nursing Home, 174 F.3d 13, 35 (1st Cir. 1999), enfg. 325 NLRB 598 (1998).
§ 15–620   Deciding to Issue Bench Decision

Whether to issue a bench decision is within the informed discretion of the trial judge. However, bench decisions should not be issued in complex cases. Des Moines Register and Tribune Co., 339 NLRB 1035 n. 1 (2003) (cautioning that judges should not issue bench decisions in complex cases, but should invite briefs and conduct a more thorough analysis in a written decision), petition for review denied, 381 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2004). Rather, they should be rendered only in those cases that “turn on a very straightforward credibility issue; cases involving one day hearings; cases involving a well settled legal issue when there is no dispute [over] the facts; short single issue cases; or cases in which a party defaults by not appearing at the hearing . . . [i]n more complex cases, including cases with lengthy records, [bench decisions] would likely not be appropriate.” Proposed Board Guidelines on Bench Decisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 65, 942 – 965, 943 (Dec. 22, 1994), adopted as a final rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 6941 (1996).

As indicated above, the judge should put the parties on notice as soon as practicable that a bench decision is contemplated and that oral argument instead of posthearing briefs will be required. Thus, if possible, the judge should notify the parties at the opening of the hearing, or even earlier at the pretrial telephone conference, that a bench decision will be rendered. However, there may be circumstances where later notice is appropriate. See NLRB v. Beverly Manor Nursing Home, above, 174 F.3d at 36 (approving mid-trial notice where the determination and announcement to the parties had been made by the judge as soon as practicable as the case evolved).

§ 15–630   Procedures for Issuance of Bench Decisions

Oral argument should be heard following the presentation of all evidence. The parties may request a brief time to outline and finalize their oral argument.

The judge’s bench decision is delivered orally on the record. Under Section 102.35(a)(10) of the Board’s Rules, the decision may be issued up to 72 hours after the conclusion of oral argument. See E-Z Recycling, 331 NLRB 950 n. 1 (2000). However, the decision should ordinarily be delivered immediately following oral argument.

The court reporter prepares the transcript of the proceedings, including the transcription of the orally delivered bench decision. Section 102.45(a) of the Board’s Rules provides, in part:

If the Judge delivers a bench decision, promptly upon receiving the transcript the Judge will certify the accuracy of the pages of the transcript containing the decision; file with the Board a certified copy of those pages, together with any supplementary matter the Judge may deem necessary to complete the decision; and serve a copy on each of the parties. Upon the filing of the decision, the Board will enter an order transferring the case to the Board, setting forth the date of the transfer and will serve on all the parties copies of the decision and the order. Service of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision and of the order transferring the case to the Board is complete upon mailing.

The judge should be very attentive to the time restrictions of these provisions and comply with them.

The certification may include corrections of the transcript. Although the judge should avoid wholesale revision of the oral decision, some correction or clarification of the decision is also
permitted. In addition, if the judge concludes in reviewing the transcript that the oral decision was inadequate, the certification process provides opportunity for inclusion of “supplementary matter the judge may deem necessary to complete the decision.” Thus, the certification process may be utilized as necessary to eliminate faults or inadequacies in the oral decision. For example, the certification might include a formal order and notice that had been described only in summary fashion in the oral decision, or may include omitted case citations.

Judges must always be mindful of the potential for errors in bench decisions. Transcripts of bench decisions often contain numerous and critical typographical errors. The errors necessitate substantial corrections. To eliminate the need for extensive corrections, judges have made their prepared remarks a record exhibit or have provided the court reporter a copy of their remarks for guidance.

Under section 102.46 of the Board’s Rules, the time for filing exceptions to a bench decision runs from the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board. Thus, the date of the transfer shown on the Order Transferring the Case to the Board (which accompanies the judge’s certification of the bench decision and supplement)—not the date of oral delivery of the bench decision—controls the submission of exceptions to the bench decision.

§ 15–700   Contents of Judge’s Decision

Section 102.45(a) of the Board’s Rules requires that decisions “will contain findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the reasons or grounds for the findings and conclusions, and recommendations for the proper disposition of the case.” See also NLRB Statements of Procedure, Sec. 101.11(a). Decisions which fail to make specific factual findings regarding issues raised by complaints, and which fail to include analysis of contentions, do not satisfy the obligations imposed on judges and may be remanded. See Webb Furniture Enterprises, 272 NLRB 312 (1984).

A bench decision should contain all the elements that would appear in a regular written decision, including appropriate credibility determinations, necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law, and adequate rationale on all relevant issues. Every effort should be made to render the decision complete and unabbreviated. The Board will remand bench decisions that do not make necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law, do not properly deal with relevant contested testimony or other evidence, or fail to consider the contentions of the parties or present sufficient legal analysis. See, e.g., Dynatron/Bondo Corp., 326 NLRB 1170 (1998).

After a decision issues, the judge may issue an erratum. Daniel Construction Co., 239 NLRB 1335 n. 2 (1979), enf’d mem. 634 F.2d 621 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 918 (1981). But, an erratum may not be used as a means for making substantive changes in a decision. “Under Sections 102.35 and 102.45 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, [the] judge is authorized to issue post-decisional errata to correct material typographical errors, but not to change matters of substance, such as findings on the merits.” Wilco Business Forms, 280 NLRB 1336 n. 2 (1986). An erratum may also be utilized to correct obvious omissions, but only ones explicitly encompassed by what has been said in the decision, such as correcting a notice so that it conforms to the remedy and recommended order. An erratum may not be utilized to add names of discriminatees who were never mentioned in the decision. For those changes, parties “should seek correction . . . either through exceptions . . . or by motions to the Board.” Ibid.
CHAPTER 16. EVIDENCE

§ 16–100 Federal Rules Apply “So Far As Practicable”

Section 10(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), states: “Any [unfair labor practice] proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States.” See also NLRB Rules and Regulations, Sec. 102.39, and Statements of Procedure, Sec. 101.10(a).

The Board holds that it is not required to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) strictly. *International Business Systems*, 258 NLRB 181 n. 6 (1981), enfd. mem. 659 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1981). In general, the courts agree. See *NLRB v. St. George Warehouse*, 645 F.3d 666, 674 (3d Cir. 2011) (hearsay testimony of deceased discriminatee’s mother was properly admitted in backpay proceeding regarding discriminatee’s post-termination search for work); and *NLRB v. Augusta Bakery Corp.*, 957 F.2d 1467, 1479 (7th Cir. 1992) (dictum, but cases cited). But not always. See *NLRB v. United Sanitation Service*, 737 F.2d 936, 940–941 (11th Cir. 1984) (Board erred in admitting the affidavit of an alleged discriminatee who had died before trial as the affidavit did not fall within the limited hearsay exceptions contained in FRE 804(b)(5)).

The Board is not bound by state rules of evidence. *R. Sabee Co.*, 351 NLRB 1350 n. 3 (2007). See also § 8–480 (State Confidentiality Rules); and §§ 16–501 (FRE 501), and 16–804.2 (Deceased Declarant).

§ 16–102 FRE 102. Purpose

FRE 102 states that the Federal Rules of Evidence:
should be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.

§ 16–102.1 Taut Record

Ideally, the judge will receive evidence that is competent, relevant, and material, and exclude that which is not, resulting in a taut record. However, the judge may be presented with circumstances where the evidence is relevant but could result in significant delay in the hearing. In these circumstances, the judge should also refer to FRE 403, which states that relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues . . . undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” See §16–403, below.

§ 16–103 FRE 103. Rulings on Evidence

FRE 103 states in relevant part:
(a) Preserving a Claim of Error. A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party and:
(1) if the ruling admits evidence, a party, on the record:

2 The organization of this chapter follows the Federal Rules of Evidence. All of the evidentiary rules are included except certain rules (302, 407, 409–415, 606, and 1008) or provisions (indicated by ellipses) that are applicable only to criminal, tort, or jury trials.
(A) timely objects or moves to strike; and
(B) states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context; or
(2) if the ruling excludes evidence, a party informs the court of its substance by
an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from the context.
(b) Not Needing to Renew an Objection or Offer of Proof. Once the court rules
definitively on the record — either before or at trial — a party need not renew an
objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.
(c) Court's Statement About the Ruling; Directing an Offer of Proof. The court
may make any statement about the character or form of the evidence, the
objection made, and the ruling. The court may direct that an offer of proof be made
in question-and-answer form.

(e) Taking Notice of Plain Error. A court may take notice of a plain error affecting
a substantial right, even if the claim of error was not properly preserved.

§ 16–103.1 Offers of Proof

When the judge sustains an objection to a question propounded to a witness, the
proponent may make an offer of proof to show the substance of the excluded evidence. FRE
103(a)(2).

However, the judge may inquire of counsel (usually outside the presence of the witness)
regarding the basis for anticipating an answer, particularly if the offer of proof is made on cross-
examination, or on direct examination of an adverse witness. The judge will then be in a position
to determine whether the offer of proof is genuine or a mere speculative declaration by counsel.
See Union Electric Steel Corp., 140 NLRB 138 n. 1 (1962); and Auto Workers v. NLRB, 231
F.2d 237, 242-243 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 77 S.Ct. 146 (1956) (finding that offers of proof based
on anticipated testimony by adverse witnesses were properly rejected under the circumstances).
See also Duncan Foundry & Machine Works v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 1972)
(Board properly rejected proffer that “consisted of argument and conclusory matter, rather than
evidence”).

On the request of a party, documents offered as part of a rejected offer of proof should be
placed in the rejected exhibits file. Crown Corrugated Container, Inc., 123 NLRB 318, 320
(1959). See also Omaha World-Herald, 357 NLRB 1870, 1872 n. 13 (2011) (judge erred in not
placing rejected exhibits in a rejected exhibits file).

Narrative or Q & A offers of proof. Counsel normally makes a narrative offer by stating
what the witness would testify if permitted to answer. See NLRB v. Augusta Bakery Corp., 957
F.2d 1467, 1479–1480 (7th Cir. 1992). However, the judge may also direct that the offer be made
by questions and answers (Q & A). FRE 103(c). See, e.g., Smithfield Packing Co., 344 NLRB 1,
13–14, n. 60 (2004) (judge properly permitted a testimonial offer of proof with respect to
communications between respondent’s former manager and respondent’s attorney regarding the
preparation of the manager’s affidavit, specifically as to whether the manager gave a false
affidavit to respondent’s attorney and whether the attorney knew it was false, in order to
determine whether the evidence came within the crime fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege), enfd. 447 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

The Q & A procedure can be useful if the judge is doubtful about his or her ruling.
Sometimes the questions and answers will suggest that a different ruling should be made. In that
event, the evidence will already be in the record if the judge reverses himself or is later reversed by the Board. For another example where a judge permitted an offer of proof in question and answer form, see *Metropolitan Transportation Services*, 351 NLRB 657, 670 (2007).

However, the negatives associated with a Q & A offer of proof usually outweigh the benefits. First, it will usually take more time than a simple narrative and the record may be unnecessarily expanded. Second, the parties are likely to be encouraged to litigate a “shadow” record through a series of offers of proof. The opponent will then seek to make offers rebutting the other party’s offers of proof, arguing that the judge should allow the rebuttal offers so that the Board can see that there is no merit to the offers of the proponent. See, e.g., *Smithfield Packing*, above, 344 NLRB at 186.

**Waiver of objection to offer of proof.** If a party opposing the offer of proof later enters the same area as covered by the offer of proof, the objection is considered waived and the proffered matter may be considered as evidence. See *Goski Trucking Corp.*, 325 NLRB 1032 (1998), where the charging party, in the absence of an objection from the General Counsel, cross-examined the witness on the same subject addressed in the respondent’s offer of proof.

### § 16–104  FRE 104. Preliminary Questions

FRE 104 states in relevant part:

(a) In General. The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.

(b) Relevance That Depends on a Fact. When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist. The court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced later.

Note that the authenticity of a document is considered a question of relevance governed by FRE 104(b). This is because evidence can only have a tendency to make the existence of a disputed fact more or less likely if the evidence is what its proponent claims. See *U.S. v. Browne*, 834 F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied 137 S.Ct. 695 (2017); *U.S. v. Branch*, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370 (4th Cir. 1992); and *U.S. v. Sliker*, 751 F.2d 477, 497–499 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied 470 U.S. 1058 and 472 U.S. 1137 (1985). See also § 16–901, Authenticating or Identifying Evidence, below.

### § 16–104.1  Voir Dire Examination

A party may request an opportunity to conduct voir dire examination of a witness to determine if testimony or documentary evidence proffered by another party is admissible. The questions on voir dire should be limited to the relevant preliminary or foundational facts. See 1 *McCormick on Evidence* § 53 (7th ed., updated June 2016) (“In effect, the voir dire is a mini cross-examination. During the voir dire, the opponent questions the witness solely about the foundational fact which the proponent attempted to establish, not the historical merits.”); and 45 *Am. Jur. Trials 1*, § 62 (updated Aug. 2017) (“[T]he scope of voir dire examination is severely limited. The voir dire is not intended to permit a wide-ranging cross-examination of the witness on the merits of the case.”).
§ 16–105  **FRE 105. Limiting Evidence That Is Not Admissible Against Other Parties or for Other Purposes**

**FRE 105** states in relevant part:

If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a purpose — but not against another party or for another purpose — the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope . . .

§ 16–106  **FRE 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements**

**FRE 106** states:

If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part — or any other writing or recorded statement — that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.

For a case applying **FRE 106**, see *RHCG Safety Corp.*, 365 NLRB No. 88 (2017). There, the Board rejected the respondent’s contention that the judge erred in receiving a screenshot of a text message containing an alleged interrogation without requiring the General Counsel to move into evidence 10 additional text messages that were exchanged between the employee and the supervisor. The Board noted that the text message itself was not incomplete, the General Counsel did not have possession or access to the additional text messages, and the respondent could have questioned the employee about his communications with the supervisor at the hearing.

§ 16–201  **FRE 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts**

**FRE 201** states in relevant part:

(a) **Scope.** This rule governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact.

(b) **Kinds of Facts That May Be Judicially Noticed.** The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it:

   (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or

   (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

(c) **Taking Notice.** The court:

   (1) may take judicial notice on its own; or

   (2) must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.

(d) **Timing.** The court may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding.

(e) **Opportunity to Be Heard.** On timely request, a party is entitled to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed. If the court takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be heard.

. . . .

Under **FRE 201**, adjudicative facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute may be given judicial notice (sometimes referred to “official” or “administrative” notice) at any stage of the proceedings, with or without a request by one of the parties.
For examples where the ALJ or the Board took judicial notice, see *Bud Antle, Inc.*, 359 NLRB No. 140, slip op. at 1 n. 3 (2013), reaf’d. 361 NLRB No. 87 (2014) (distances between cities based on Google Maps); *San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino*, 341 NLRB 1055 n. 3 (2004) (finding that casino was located on the tribal reservation based on two Federal Agency publications and a court decision), enf’d. 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007); and *Drummond Coal Co.*, 277 NLRB 1618 n. 1 (1986) (an arbitral award issued after close of hearing, despite party’s objection). See also *Metro Demolition Co.*, 348 NLRB 272 n. 3 (2006) (Board may take administrative notice of its own proceedings).

ALJs and the Board have routinely taken judicial notice of relevant federal and state statutes and regulations. See, e.g., *Taylor Mfg. Co., Inc.*, 83 NLRB 142 n. 5 (1949) (affirming the ALJ’s taking judicial notice of applicable statutes and regulations issued by the Veterans Administration); and *Yellow Cab Co.*, 229 NLRB 1329 n. 2 (1977) (granting the charging party’s request to take judicial notice of certain new Chicago regulations affecting the taxicab industry). The courts have too. See, e.g., *Martinez v. Welk Group, Inc.*, 2011 WL 90313, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2011) (“Courts routinely take judicial notice of state or federal statutes and regulations”).

However, it may be unnecessary to take judicial notice of such materials. See *St. Vincent Medical Center*, 338 NLRB 888 (2003), where the Board ruled that it was “not necessary” to take judicial notice of California State statutory authority, as the Respondent’s citation to that authority in its brief in opposition to the General Counsel’s exceptions “was sufficient to draw it to [the Board’s] attention.” See also *Romero v. Bestcare, Inc.*, 2017 WL 1180518, at *3 n. 5 (E.D. N.Y. March 23, 2017) (noting that it is unclear if judicial notice of such materials is required as the facts contained therein are legislative rather than adjudicative facts covered by FRE 201). It may depend on what the statute or regulation is being used for. See *Toth v. Grand Trunk Railroad*, 306 F.3d 335, 349 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hether a fact is adjudicative or legislative depends upon the manner in which it is used. A legal rule may be a proper fact for judicial notice if it is offered to establish the factual context of the case, as opposed to stating the governing law.”) (citation omitted).

For a full discussion of the difference between adjudicative facts and legislative or “background” facts that are not subject to the requirements of FRE 201, and other considerations, including the applicability of the hearsay rules, see *Goode & Wellborne, Courtroom Handbook on Federal Evidence* 268–272 (West 2012); and 21B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. §§ 5103.2 and 5104 (2d ed., updated April 2017).

§ 16–301 FRE 301. Presumptions in Civil Cases Generally

FRE 301 states:
In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these rules provide otherwise, the party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption. But this rule does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it originally.

§ 16–400 Relevancy

§ 16–401 FRE 401. Test for Relevant Evidence

FRE 401 states:
Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.

§ 16–402  FRE 402. General Admissibility of Relevant Evidence

FRE 402 states:
Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.

§ 16–402.1  Parol Evidence

Although evidence outside an agreement is inadmissible to vary or contradict its clear and unambiguous terms, extrinsic evidence may be introduced for the purpose of clearing up ambiguities or ascertaining “the correct interpretation of the agreement.” Don Lee Distributor, Inc., 322 NLRB 470, 484–485 (1996), enfd. 145 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1102 (1999).

Parol evidence is also admissible to show mutual mistake of the parties to a contract. London v. Grandview Building Assoc., 183 U.S. 308, 341 (1902); Federated American Insurance Co., 219 NLRB 200, 203 (1975); and NLRB v. Cook County School Bus, Inc., 283 F.3d 888, 893 (7th Cir. 2002). See also Contek International, Inc., 344 NLRB 879, 883–884 (2005) (a unilateral mistake may also be grounds for rescission if it is so obvious as to put the other party on notice of the error).

Parol evidence is likewise admissible to show past practices inconsistent with an expired contract. See Church Square Supermarket, 356 NLRB 1357, 1359 (2011) and cases cited therein.

For a case addressing a respondent’s argument that parol evidence should be admitted to show “fraud in the execution” of an agreement, see Sheehy Enterprises, Inc., 353 NLRB 803 (2009), reaaffd. 355 NLRB 478 (2010) (Board found it unnecessary to decide whether parol evidence is admissible under Board law to prove the defense, since, even if the evidence were considered and credited, it failed to establish the defense). See also Horizon Group of New England, 347 NLRB 795 (2006) (same).

§ 16–402.2  Evidence of Animus and Discrimination

To show animus, the General Counsel may offer unalleged statements indicating opposition to unionization. The Board relies on such statements as evidence of animus, notwithstanding Section 8(c) of the Act. See Aliente Casino & Hotel, 364 NLRB No. 78, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2016); Gallicks, Inc., 355 NLRB 366 n. 3 (2010), enfd. in relevant part 671 F.3d 602, 609 (6th Cir. 2012); Sunshine Piping, Inc., 351 NLRB 1371, 1378 n. 28, 1387 (2007); Tejas Electrical Services, 338 NLRB 416, 417 (2002); Tim Foley Plumbing Services, 337 NLRB 328, 329 (2001); Stoody Co., 312 NLRB 1175, 1176–1177, 1182 (1993); and Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083, 1090 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899, 907 n. 14 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). See also NLRB v. Relco Locomotives, Inc., 734 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2013). And cf. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 289 (1965) (citing the company’s “more than amicable”
relationship with the union in finding insufficient evidence that the company was motivated by union animus).

Some courts of appeals have disagreed with the Board’s reliance on such statements. See cases listed in *Tim Foley Plumbing Services*, above, 337 NLRB at 329 n. 5; and *Norton Audubon Hospital*, 338 NLRB 320 n. 1 (2002). However, NLRB judges are bound to apply established Board law. See § 13–100, above.

With respect to the ultimate issue of whether a respondent’s alleged actions against an employee were discriminatory, it is irrelevant whether the employee personally believes that the employer’s actions were discriminatory. *Professional Medical Transport, Inc.*, 362 NLRB No. 19, slip op. at 9 n. 25 (2015).

§ 16–402.3 Evidence of Coercion

The test to determine coercion under Section 8(a)(1) is an objective test, not a subjective one. See, e.g., *Multi-Ad Services*, 331 NLRB 1226, 1228 (2000), enf’d. 255 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, testimony about what an employee understood or subjectively interpreted the supervisor’s statement to mean may not be relied on and is normally not admissible. *Miami Systems Corp.*, 320 NLRB 71 n. 4 (1995), enf’d. in relevant part 111 F.3d 1284 (6th Cir. 1997). Compare *NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.*, 395 U.S. 575, 608–609 (1969). Rather, the “full context” in which the alleged unlawful conduct occurred should be evaluated to determine if it would tend to coerce a reasonable employee. *Westwood Health Care Center*, 330 NLRB 935, 940 n. 17 (2000).

§ 16–402.4 Background Evidence: Section 10(b)

It is well established that evidence of events occurring more than 6 months before the charge may be considered as background to shed light on a respondent’s motivation for conduct within the 10(b) period. See, e.g., *Wilmington Fabricators*, 332 NLRB 57 n. 6 (2000); and *Douglas Aircraft Co.*, 307 NLRB 536 n. 2 (1992). See also § 3–620, above, regarding admission of evidence concerning events outside the 10(b) period.

§ 16–402.5 Evidence of Presettlement Conduct

Under well-established Board law, presettlement conduct may properly be considered as background evidence to establish the motive for the Respondent’s postsettlement conduct. See *Ambrose Auto*, 361 NLRB No. 104, slip op. at 1 n. 2 (2014), and cases cited there.

For example, in *Monongahela Power Co.*, 324 NLRB 214, 214–215 (1997), the Board held that, in determining whether settlements of alleged discrimination had been breached by the postsettlement suspension and reassignment of two union supporters, the judge could consider evidence of presettlement statements by the respondent reflecting union animus, as “shedding light” on the respondent’s motivation. The Board cited its decision in *Special Mine Services*, 308 NLRB 711, 720–721 (1992), enf’d. in part 11 F.3d 88 (7th Cir. 1993), in which it agreed with the judge that the respondent’s presettlement conduct evidenced “strong union animus” for the alleged unlawful subcontracting.

Presettlement conduct can be used to show motive even without a reservation-of-rights clause in the settlement. See *St. Mary’s Nursing Home*, 342 NLRB 979, 979–980 (2004), aff’d.
Further, if the settlement agreement does specifically reserve the General Counsel’s right to use the evidence obtained in the settled case for any purpose in the litigation of any other case, the General Counsel may present that evidence, and the Board may make findings and conclusions thereon, in a subsequent case. Thus, in *Outdoor Venture Corp.*, 327 NLRB 706, 708–709 (1999), the Board held that the settled conduct in a prior case could be used to establish that a strike was prolonged by unfair labor practices and thereby converted to an unfair labor practice strike.

Normally, evidence of settlement discussions is inadmissible to prove or disprove liability under FRE 408, but not if the evidence is used for other legitimate purposes. See § 16–408, below.

§ 16–402.6 Evidence Affecting Remedy

In *Planned Building Services, Inc.*, 347 NLRB 670, 672 (2006), the Board modified the respondent’s burden in the compliance proceeding under *FES* in cases involving a successor employer’s failure to hire. See also *W & M Properties of Connecticut, Inc. v. NLRB*, 514 F.3d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 2008), affg. 348 NLRB 162 (2006) (upholding Board’s modification).

Reinstatement. In an 8(a)(3) case in which denial of reinstatement is affirmatively alleged in the complaint, the better practice is to admit the respondent’s testimony of unconditional offers of reinstatement, because the Board must fashion a remedy. *Charles E. McCauley Assocs., Inc.*, 266 NLRB 649 (1983); and *Kelley Bros. Nurseries*, 145 NLRB 285 n. 2 (1963), enf. denied 341 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1965).
However, where the matter has not been fully litigated in the merits hearing, the Board has found no prejudice by deferring the matter to the compliance proceeding. See Charles E. McCauley, above; Baker Mfg. Co., 269 NLRB 794 n. 2, 813 (1984), enf’d. in part 759 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1985). See also Solutia, Inc., 357 NLRB 58, 65 n. 20 (2011) (ordering reinstatement and backpay remedy, but deferring to compliance whether individual employees who opted to retire after the employer unilaterally transferred their work were entitled to the remedy, where all parties agreed to defer litigation of the issue), enf’d. 699 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2012).

Discriminatee misconduct/after-acquired evidence. If an employer establishes that the discriminatee engaged in unprotected conduct for which the employer would have discharged or refused to hire any employee, reinstatement is not ordered and backpay is terminated on the date that the employer first acquired knowledge of the misconduct. See, e.g., Marshall Durbin Poultry Co., 310 NLRB 68, 69–70 (1993) (declining to issue a reinstatement and full backpay order where the employer discovered, during its investigation of a post-discharge EEOC charge, that the discriminatee had engaged in repeated on-the-job sexual harassment).

Thus, if the issue arises at or before the merits hearing, the judge should normally receive and consider evidence on the issue, including the nature of the misconduct, when the respondent first learned of it, and whether the respondent would have discharged or refused to hire the employee had respondent known of it earlier. See Tel Data Corp., 315 NLRB 364, 366–367 (1994) (judge erred in failing to consider whether the discriminatee’s falsification of a timecard, which the employer discovered after his discharge, warranted denial of reinstatement and full backpay), enf’d. in part 90 F.3d 1195 (6th Cir. 1996). See also Bob’s Ambulance Service, 183 NLRB 961 (1970), where the Board granted the respondent’s motion to reopen the record and remanded the proceeding to the judge to decide if reinstatement was an appropriate remedy, noting that “the issue of employee misconduct which may warrant forfeiture of reinstatement goes to the remedy and not to the issue of compliance with the remedy.”

For a case where the misconduct was first discovered in the compliance proceeding, see First Transit, Inc., 350 NLRB 825 (2007). In that case, the discriminatee admitted during the compliance hearing that she had a prior felony conviction for second degree robbery. The Board found that this warranted denying her reinstatement, as she had failed to disclose the prior felony conviction on her original employment application, and the employer would not have hired her if it had known she was a felon and had lied on the application. However, the Board awarded her full backpay because the employer did not discover the misconduct until after the end of the backpay period covered by the compliance specification).

Undocumented workers. Although undocumented workers are employees entitled to exercise their rights under the Act, they are not entitled to backpay or reinstatement during the period when they are not authorized to be present in the United States. See Domsey Trading Corp., 351 NLRB 824, 825 (2007), citing Hoffman Plastics Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). This is true regardless of whether the employee or the employer violated the immigration laws. Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 NLRB 376 (2011), supplemental proceedings 362 NLRB No. 41 (2015).

Nevertheless, it is appropriate to issue a backpay and unconditional reinstatement order at the merits stage, leaving to the compliance stage whether backpay and reinstatement or conditional reinstatement is actually warranted consistent with Hoffman. See Tuv Taam Corp., 340 NLRB 756, 760-761 (2003). See also Mezonos Maven Bakery, above; Farm Fresh Co., Target One, LLC, 361 NLRB No. 83, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2014); and Concrete Form Walls, 346
Thus, evidence regarding an employee’s immigration status is normally irrelevant at the merits stage of the proceeding. *Tuv Taam Corp.*, above. See *Concrete Form Walls*, above (undocumented status is not a defense to an alleged discriminatory discharge if it was not the moving cause of the discharge or was used as a pretext for discrimination); and *Farm Fresh Co.*, above (judge did not abuse his discretion in preventing the respondent employer from questioning the alleged discriminatees about their immigration status in the merits proceeding, even though the employer contended that they voluntarily quit to avoid going through the E-Verify process, because the respondent was permitted to ask them questions about why they resigned). See also § 16–608.1, Impeachment on Collateral Matters, below.

In the backpay proceeding, if the employer fails on request to articulate a factual basis for its affirmative defense that a discriminatee lacks immigration status, the defense should be stricken. See *Flaum Appetizing Corp.*, 357 NLRB 2006 (2011). In that case, the employer asserted, as an affirmative defense to the compliance specification, that the discriminatees (who had Hispanic surnames) were undocumented aliens, and served trial subpoenas on each of them seeking various documents relating to that defense. The Board struck the employer’s affirmative defense as applied to most of the discriminatees on the ground that, in response to the General Counsel’s motion for a bill of particulars, the employer “had articulated no factual support (or reason to believe it could obtain such factual support)” for applying the defense to those individuals. The Board stated that “a reasonable belief that evidentiary support exists and can be obtained through . . . trial subpoenas . . . requires some articulable reason to believe that is the case.” Id. at 2010–2011.

For a discussion of what limits, if any, the ALJ and Board may properly place on employers in questioning employees about their immigration status in the backpay proceeding, see *NLRB v. Domsey Trading Corp.*, 636 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2011) (employer was entitled to ask discriminatees direct questions in the backpay proceeding about their immigration status and to introduce testimony of its immigration expert).

§ 16–402.7 Stolen Evidence


§ 16–402.8 Tape Recordings

General Rule. Tape recordings are generally admissible in Board proceedings, even if made without the knowledge or consent of a party to the conversation, and even if the taping violates state law. *Times Herald Record*, 334 NLRB 350, 354 (2001), enf'd. 27 Fed. Appx. 64 (2d Cir. 2001); *Williamhouse of California, Inc.*, 317 NLRB 699 n. 1, JD n. 2 (1995); and *Wellstream Corp.*, 313 NLRB 698, 711 (1994).

A different result possibly might obtain if the federal wiretapping statute were violated: that is, if the recording was secretly made in conjunction with the interception of a telephone conversation between two or more other parties. But the interception of a conversation over a cordless phone’s radio wave has been held not to violate the federal wiretapping law. *In re

Tape recording issues frequently arise when an employee has secretly taped remarks of a manager made during a meeting or conference held on the jobsite. In McAllister Bros., 278 NLRB 601 n. 2 (1986), enf’d. 819 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1987), the Board expressly disavowed the judge’s statement that the Board historically has taken a dim view of personnel who tape-record meetings with their employer. Indeed, citing cases, the Board stated that it “has sometimes found tape recordings of employee meetings to be the best evidence of what was said.” Ibid.

Such conduct, however, is not a basis to discredit the individual who made the recording. See Fleming Companies, 336 NLRB 192 n. 2 (2001) (Board stated that it did not rely on a witness’s surreptitious taping of a conversation with management representatives as a basis for discrediting the witness’s testimony), enf’d. in part 349 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2003). See also Hawaii Tribune-Herald v. NLRB, 677 F.3d 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (rejecting the employer’s argument that secretly recording a meeting is “so fundamentally dishonest and deceitful that it should be deemed categorically unprotected,” even in the absence of any company policy or law prohibiting secret audiotaping), enfg. 356 NLRB 661 (2011).

Collective-Bargaining Exception. As a policy matter, the Board excludes secret tape recordings of negotiations because they “would inhibit severely the willingness of parties to express themselves freely.” Carpenter Sprinkler Corp., 238 NLRB 974, 974–975 (1978), affd. in relevant part 605 F.2d 60, 65–66 (2d Cir. 1979).

Authentication. Tape recordings may be authenticated by presenting testimony by a witness with knowledge that supports a finding that the recording is what the party claims it is. See H & M International Transportation, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 139, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2016).

Like other documents or things, tape recordings may also be authenticated by circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., U.S. v. Carrasco, 887 F.2d 794, 803–804 (7th Cir. 1989) (audiotape); and U.S. v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 628 (6th Cir. 2005) (videotape). However, any editing must be explained by someone with knowledge of the editing. See Medite of New Mexico, Inc., 314 NLRB 1145, 1146 n. 7 (1994) (affirming judge who excluded an edited videotape taken by a guard, because the guard did not do the editing and could not describe what was edited), enf’d. 72 F.3d 780, 787 (10th Cir. 1995).

Defects in Recording. Proffered recordings in many of our cases are of less than perfect quality, with some words or passages being garbled or inaudible. However, unless the defects are so substantial that they render the entire recording untrustworthy, any defects go to weight, not to admissibility. See U.S. v. Parks, 100 F.3d 1300,1305, n. 2 (7th Cir. 1996).

NOTE. Often the best way to receive evidence of a tape recording is to obtain a stipulation for receipt of a written transcript into evidence, along with the tape if requested.

§ 16–402.9 State Agency Decisions

The Board receives in evidence and considers decisions in State unemployment compensation proceedings, but does not give the decisions controlling weight on unfair labor practice issues. See Cardiovascular Consultants of Nevada, 323 NLRB 67 n. 1 (1997)
(reversing the judge, the Board received a State unemployment compensation decision into evidence because established Board law holds them to be admissible but not controlling); and

_Whitesville Mill Service Co._, 307 NLRB 937, 945 n. 6 (1992) (a state agency decision that the employee was not fired for union activities was considered but found not to be persuasive because, at the state hearing, the plant manager refused to answer questions concerning his knowledge of union activity).

§ 16–403 FRE 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons

FRE 403 states:

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues . . . undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.

FRE 403 creates a balancing test, and necessarily involves the exercise of discretion. Although the rule generally favors admission, evidence that has scant probative value may be excluded under the rule. See 22A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid., § 5214 (1st Ed., database updated April 2017); and Goode and Wellborne, Courtroom Handbook on Federal Evidence 285–289 (West 2012).

For cases upholding the judge’s exercise of discretion, see, e.g., _J.S. Troupe Electric, Inc._, 344 NLRB 1009, 1010 (2005) (Board cited both FRE 403 and FRE 608(b) in upholding the judge’s exclusion of primary and secondary evidence of the alleged discriminatee’s false claim for unemployment or workers compensation benefits, notwithstanding that the judge broadly credited the discriminatee); _Dickens, Inc._, 355 NLRB 255, 257 (2010) (judge properly exercised his discretion in terminating the unrepresented respondent’s cross-examination of the alleged discriminatee, directing him to present his own testimony at that time, and subsequently cutting off his narrative testimony after several hours); _University Medical Center_, 335 NLRB 1318 n. 1, 1342–1343 (2001) (upholding judge’s imposition of time limits on the presentation of the respondent’s case), enf’d in part 335 F.3d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2003); _Teamsters Local 122 (August A. Busch & Co. of Massachusetts)_ , 334 NLRB 1190, 1193, 1255 (2001) (same; also ordering litigation costs for delaying trial); and _NLRB v. Champa Linen Service_, 324 F.2d 28, 30 (10th Cir. 1963) (endorsing the judge’s refusal to permit cross-examination of the truth of a statement, which was alleged to be an 8(a)(1) violation, that a union official “stole a million dollars”).

Note that there is some authority that evidence should not be excluded in a bench trial solely on the basis of “unfair prejudice” under FRE 403. The rationale is that “a trial judge is able to discern and weigh the improper inferences, . . . balance those improprieties against probative value and necessity . . . [and] exclude those improper inferences from his mind in reaching a decision.” _Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Ecodyne Corp._, 635 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1981). Accord: _Schultz v. Butcher_, 24 F.3d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1994).

See also §§ 2–300 (Duties of Trial Judge) and 16–102 (FRE 102), above.
§ 16–404 FRE 404. Character Evidence; Crimes or Other Acts

FRE 404 states in relevant part:

(a) Character Evidence.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.

(3) Exceptions for a Witness. Evidence of a witness’s character may be admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609.

(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses . . . . This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. . . .

See, e.g., Sunshine Piping, 351 NLRB 1371, 1375 (2007) (evidence that two of the General Counsel’s witnesses had engaged in drug-related activity and other misconduct while employed by respondent was not admissible under Rules 404(b) or 608(b), as their prior conduct was neither “a material issue in the case” nor “a ‘crime of dishonesty’ (such as forgery) tending to impugn their credibility”). See also §§ 16–607, 608, and 609, below.

§ 16–405 FRE 405. Methods of Proving Character

FRE 405 states:
(a) By Reputation or Opinion. When evidence of a person’s character or character trait is admissible, it may be proved by testimony about the person’s reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination of the character witness, the court may allow an inquiry into relevant specific instances of the person’s conduct.

(b) By Specific Instances of Conduct. When a person’s character or character trait is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, the character or trait may also be proved by relevant specific instances of the person’s conduct.

See, e.g., Ponderosa Granite Co., 267 NLRB 212 n. 1 (1983) (judge in 8(a)(3) discharge case erred in admitting testimony by a deputy sheriff and employee of another store about specific instances where the alleged discriminatee had written bad checks, as the discriminatee’s character was not an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense as required by FRE 405(b)).

§ 16–406 FRE 406. Habit; Routine Practice

FRE 406 states:
Evidence of a person’s habit or an organization’s routine practice may be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the person or organization acted in accordance with the habit or routine practice. The court may admit this evidence regardless of whether it is corroborated or whether there was an eyewitness.
To qualify as evidence of “habit” or “routine practice,” the evidence must show a regular semi-automatic practice of meeting a specific situation with specific conduct. See, e.g., *Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC*, 382 F.Supp.2d 536, 541–542 (S.D. N.Y. 2005). In that case, the defendant-employer asserted that the plaintiff was terminated for insubordination rather than for discriminatory reasons in violation of Title VII as she alleged. In support, the employer sought to introduce evidence that she had been insubordinate at her previous employer. The employer argued that the evidence was admissible under FRE 406 to show that she had a habit of acting insubordinately. The court rejected the employer’s argument, both because the prior instance did not involve the same specific circumstances and because it was insufficient to establish the type of frequent semi-automatic conduct envisioned under the rule.

FRE 406 is often used when a witness has no present recollection of a particular event or action, but can testify about the habit or routine practice. The rule allows the testimony as affirmative evidence of what actually occurred. See, e.g., *Johnson v. Cook, Inc.*, 587 F.Supp.2d 1020, 1026 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (HR generalist who reviewed applications for the employer, but did not specifically recall reviewing plaintiff’s application, was properly allowed to testify that his rejection of the application was in conformity with his usual habit or practice of rejecting overqualified candidates for the START training program), aff’d. 327 Fed. Appx. 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 558 U.S. 1155 (2010).

§ 16–408 FRE 408. Compromise Offers and Negotiations

FRE 408 states in relevant part:

(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible—on behalf of any party—either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction:

(1) furnishing, promising, or offering—or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept—a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and

(2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim . . . .

(b) Exceptions. The court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.

FRE 408 prohibits use of offers of settlement or other statements during settlement discussions as admissions, but does not prohibit their use for other purposes. Thus, for example, alleged threats made during informal grievance settlement discussions may be admitted in a subsequent NLRB case. *Miami Systems Corp.*, 320 NLRB 71 n. 2 (1995), modified but affirmed on point, *Uforma/Shelby Business Forms v. NLRB*, 111 F.3d 1284, 1293–1294 (6th Cir. 1997). See also *R. Sabee Co.*, 351 NLRB 1350 n. 3 (2007) (antiunion statements by the respondent’s negotiator during mediation of state claims were admissible in NLRB proceeding); and *St. George Warehouse, Inc.*, 349 NLRB 870, 874 (2007) (“if a respondent engages in independently unlawful conduct during a settlement discussion, evidence of that conduct can be introduced and the matter can be adjudicated”).

§ 16–501 FRE 501. Privileges in General

FRE 501 states:
The common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.

As the committee and conference reports on FRE 501 indicate, in civil cases state law on privileges chiefly applies in diversity cases, with federal law applying otherwise. Hence, in unfair labor practice trials before the NLRB, federal law applies. See Quarles Mfg. Co., 83 NLRB 697, 699 n. 8 (1949), citing Section 10(b) of the Act in declining to apply the Texas “Dead Man’s” statute, as discussed in § 16–804.2, below. See also R. Sabee Co., above, and § 8–480 (State Confidentiality Rules), above.

For a more detailed discussion of privileges, including the attorney-client privilege, the work-product privilege, the reporter’s privilege, privileges connected with the production of Board files and testimony of Board agents, and the mediator’s privilege, see § 8–400 et seq., above, dealing with subpoenas. The same principles apply where parties attempt to submit testimony or evidence involving such privileges during the hearing.

Protective orders may also be appropriate when testimony or evidence is offered that may include confidential information. For a more detailed discussion of protective orders, see § 8–415, above.

§ 16–501.1 Fifth Amendment Claims

No requirement to stay proceeding. There is no deprivation of rights under the Fifth Amendment simply because a civil or administrative proceeding goes forward while a criminal proceeding involving the same party is in progress. See United States v. White, 589 F.2d. 1283, 1286 (5th Cir. 1979); Diebold v. Civil Service Commission of St. Louis County, 611 F.2d 697, 700–701 (8th Cir. 1979). “At the administrative hearing [the individual] will have a ‘free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.’ This is full vindication of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” Luman v. Tanzler, 411 F.2d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 929 (1969).

No duty to advise of constitutional rights. Because Board proceedings are not criminal cases (in which witnesses or parties may be taken into custody or deprived of their freedom), Board agents have no duty to warn charged parties of their constitutional rights. F. J. Buckner Corp. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1084 (1969).

Adverse Inference may be drawn. In civil cases, the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from the invocation of a privilege under the Fifth Amendment, at least where there is independent evidence of the fact sought to be elicited. See, e.g., Doe v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2000); and LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 389–391 (7th Cir. 1995). See also Sunshine Piping, Inc., 351 NLRB 1371, 1378 n. 28 (2007) (Board relied on the supervisor’s initial invocation of the Fifth Amendment as evidence that she sincerely believed that she had done something wrong).

Grant of immunity. Under section 102.31(c) of the Board’s Rules, if an individual has or is likely to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a Board proceeding, any party may request an order requiring that individual to give testimony or provide other information
in the proceeding. Such requests should be filed directly with the Board prior to the hearing, and with the judge during the hearing.

Section 102.31(c) states that such orders may only be issued by the Board with the approval of the Attorney General. Accordingly, the rule provides:

If the Administrative Law Judge deems the request appropriate, the Judge will recommend that the Board seek the approval of the Attorney General for the issuance of the order, and the Board will take such action on the Administrative Law Judge’s recommendation as it deems appropriate. Until the Board has issued the requested order, no individual who claims the privilege against self-incrimination will be required or permitted to testify or to give other information respecting the subject matter of the claim.

In evaluating such requests, the judge should consider the factors considered by the Attorney General in requesting use immunity from a court under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6005. See *Greenwood 2, Inc.*, 22-CA-029249, unpub. Board order issued April 30, 2012 (2012 WL 1515342) (remanding to judge “for the purpose of receiving and considering a proffer from the Respondents concerning the nature and content of the testimony [the witness] would provide, if immunity were granted, and how that testimony would support a finding that the Respondents had not violated the [NLRA], as alleged”). A representative list of such factors may be found on the DOJ website, http://www.justice.gove/usao/eousa/foiarending room/usam/title9/23mcrm.htm.

For an example of a case where the Board issued such an order upon the recommendation of the judge and the approval of the Attorney General, see *Health Care Employees District 1199 (Frances Schervier Home)*, 245 NLRB 800, 801 (1979). There, the respondent union in an 8(b)(1)(A) violence case requested a grant of immunity for several witnesses who were named as participants in the alleged violence, and both the General Counsel and the charging party employer concurred in the request.

For an example where the Board found that such an order was not warranted, see *Carnegie Linen Services, Inc.*, 2-CA-39560; 2-RC-23436. In that case, the 8(a)(1) and (3) complaint alleged that the respondent’s owner had inflicted bodily injury on an employee and discharged him because of his union activities. A related objection in the consolidated representation case alleged that the owner physically assaulted the employee by throwing coffee in his face. The respondent requested that the hearing be postponed until the related criminal charge against the owner involving the same incident was resolved. However, at the request of the charging party union, and over the respondent’s objection, the judge recommended to the Board that it seek approval from the Attorney General to issue an order requiring the owner to testify at the Board hearing. The judge reasoned that the owner’s testimony was “necessary to the public interest” under Section 102.31(c) because of the interest in expeditiously resolving the unfair labor practice issues and because the representation proceeding had been blocked pending resolution of those issues.

However, by unpublished order dated Oct. 28, 2010, the Board panel summarily rejected the judge’s recommendation. It directed the judge to “proceed to hear the case as promptly as possible,” and stated that “all parties may present whatever admissible evidence is available to them and make any appropriate legal arguments, including arguments concerning what, if any, inferences should be drawn based on any assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination.” The judge thereafter proceeded to hear the case and issued a decision finding the alleged
violations, without drawing any adverse inferences based on the owner’s failure to testify, which the Board affirmed. See 357 NLRB 2222 n. 1, 2230 (2011)).

As indicated in Section 102.31(c), absent a Board order, a witness asserting the privilege should not be asked or permitted to testify about the subject matter of his Fifth Amendment claim. See Domsey Trading Corp., 351 NLRB 824, 897 n. 76 (2007). See also North Hills Office Services, Inc., 344 NLRB 1083 n. 1 (2005).

§ 16–502  FRE 502. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product; Limitations on Waiver

FRE 502 states:
The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection.
(a) Disclosure Made in a Federal Proceeding or to a Federal Office or Agency; Scope of a Waiver.
When the disclosure is made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency and waives the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or information in a federal or state proceeding only if:
(1) the waiver is intentional;
(2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject matter; and
(3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.
(b) Inadvertent Disclosure. When made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding if:
(1) the disclosure is inadvertent;
(2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and
(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).
(c) Disclosure Made in a State Proceeding. When the disclosure is made in a state proceeding and is not the subject of a state-court order concerning waiver, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal proceeding if the disclosure:
(1) would not be a waiver under this rule if it had been made in a federal proceeding; or
(2) is not a waiver under the law of the State where the disclosure occurred.
(d) Controlling Effect of a Court Order. A federal court may order that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the court—in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding.
(e) Controlling Effect of a Party Agreement. An agreement on the effect of disclosure in a federal proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is incorporated into a court order.
(f) Controlling Effect of this Rule. Notwithstanding Rules 101 and 1101, this rule applies to state proceedings and to federal court-annexed and federal court-mandated arbitration proceedings, in the circumstances set out in the rule. And
notwithstanding Rule 501, this rule applies even if State law provides the rule of decision.

(g) Definitions. In this rule:

1. “attorney-client privilege” means the protection that applicable law provides for confidential attorney-client communications; and

2. “work-product protection” means the protection that applicable law provides for tangible material (or its intangible equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.

For a Board case applying FRE 502(b) (inadvertent disclosures), see Church Square Supermarket, 356 NLRB 1357, 1369 n. 40 (2011) (rejecting the employer’s contention that a document it had previously disclosed to the General Counsel in response to a subpoena was inadmissible under FRE 502). See also §§ 8–440 and 8–460, above.

§ 16–600 Witnesses

The general rules governing witnesses are set forth in FRE 601–706.

§ 16–601 FRE 601. Competency to Testify in General

FRE 601 states:

Every person is competent to be a witness unless these rules provide otherwise. But in a civil case, state law governs the witness’s competency regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.

State law on competency of witnesses does not apply in Board proceedings, because the Act is a federal statute and Section 10(b) of the Act provides that the federal rules of evidence, “so far as practicable,” shall apply to Board proceedings. See also § 16–501, above. As a result, most objections to competency are eliminated, and are properly treated instead as bearing on credibility and weight.

§ 16–601.1 Trial Attorney for Party

Unlike the courts, the Board does not pass on, and leaves to state bar associations to decide, questions of ethical propriety of a party’s trial attorney testifying in a Board proceeding. Thus, when the trial attorney’s testimony is otherwise relevant and competent, judges should overrule objections based on canons of ethics. Reno Hilton, 319 NLRB 1154, 1185 n. 18 (1995); Page Litho, Inc., 311 NLRB 881 n. 1, 889 (1993), enfd. in part mem. 65 F.3d 169 (6th Cir. 1995); and Operating Engineers Local 9 (Fountain Sand), 210 NLRB 129 n. 1 (1974). See also § 6–201, Attorney as Witness, above.

§ 16–601.2 Interested Parties

Testimony by an interested party in the case may be relied on by the judge, even if self-serving and uncorroborated, if it is “reasonably deemed to be credible and trustworthy . . . and is not undermined by evidence to the contrary.” Sam’s Club v. NLRB, 141 F.3d 653, 658 (6th Cir. 1998). See also Ferguson Enterprises, Inc., 355 NLRB 1121 n. 2 (2010).
§ 16–602  FRE 602. Need for Personal Knowledge

FRE 602 states:
A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony. This rule does not apply to a witness’s expert testimony under Rule 703.

A witness’s personal knowledge may include inferences and opinions, provided they are grounded in personal observation and experience. See, e.g., U.S. v. Flores-Rivera, 787 F. 3d 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2015); and U.S. v. Whittemore, 776 F.3d 1074, 1082 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied 136 S.Ct. 89 (2015).

For a Board case applying FRE 602, see Comet Fast Freight, Inc., 262 NLRB 430, 432 n. 11 (1982). In that case, the Board held that a witness had the requisite personal knowledge under FRE 602 to testify that “other drivers did not mind driving the red truck like I did.” The Board found that the record established sufficient factual predicates for the witness’s testimony; specifically, that the witness was employed as a driver at the same terminal as the other drivers, the truck was driven by other drivers, and none of them ever complained that it was unsafe.

§ 16–603  FRE 603. Oath or Affirmation to Testify Truthfully

FRE 603 states:
Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress that duty on the witness’s conscience.

See § 1–400, above, for a discussion of witness oaths in Board hearings.

§ 16–604  FRE 604. Interpreter

FRE 604 states:
An interpreter must be qualified and must give an oath or affirmation to make a true translation

See § 1–500, above, for a sample interpreter’s oath.

§ 16–604.1  Simultaneous or Consecutive Interpretation

The Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1827(k), states as follows with respect to interpretation in federal court proceedings:

The interpretation provided by certified or otherwise qualified interpreters pursuant to this section shall be in the simultaneous mode for any party to a judicial proceeding instituted by the United States and in the consecutive mode for witnesses, except that the presiding judicial officer, sua sponte or on the motion of a party, may authorize a simultaneous, or consecutive interpretation when such officer determines after a hearing on the record that such interpretation will aid in the efficient administration of justice.

The Board has not passed on whether simultaneous or consecutive interpretation is preferred or presumptively appropriate in unfair labor practice proceedings. Like other issues relating to the method or manner of presenting testimony and other evidence, this is an issue left to the sound discretion of the judge. See, e.g., *Dickens, Inc.*, 355 NLRB 255, 256–257 (2010) (judge acted within his discretion and in a commonsense manner to expedite the trial by ordering that tape recordings of alleged incidents be played in open court with simultaneous translation).

§ 16–604.2 Objections to Interpretation

Interpreters should strive to translate exactly what was said, without comment or embellishment. Generally, there is no objection over the use of interpreters, although sometimes questions arise over the accuracy of the translation. In such cases, the version of the official interpreter governs, unless the judge, after due consideration, decides otherwise. See *NLRB v. Bakers of Paris, Inc.*, 929 F.2d 1427, 1436 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging “the need for the trier of fact in any judicial proceeding to consider the accuracy of the translations presented” and suggesting that the presence of an “official” translation may not always resolve the issue). See also *Coastal Insulation Corp.*, 354 NLRB 495, 497 (2009) (judge advised that the interpreter’s translation would constitute the transcribed record, but allowed the charging party an opportunity to challenge the translation).

Particular care should be given to the use of interpreters when assessing the credibility of a witness. It may be appropriate for the judge to restrict the use of interpreters in certain circumstances; for example, when alleged threats are made in English, the witness should be able to recount what was said in English. See *Northern Cap Mfg. Co.*, 146 NLRB 198, 201–204 (1964). See also *UNF West, Inc.*, 363 NLRB No. 96, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2015), enfld. 844 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 2016); and *Yaohan U.S.A. Corp.*, 319 NLRB 424 n. 2 (1995), enfnd. mem. 121 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding in both cases that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in restricting the use of interpreters for witnesses who demonstrated some ability to converse in English).

Where interpretation is necessary, the judge should carefully monitor the translation process to ensure that both the interpreter and the witness understood the questions asked and that the witness’s answers were accurately interpreted. See *NLRB v. Del Ray Tortilleria, Inc.*, 787 F.2d 1118, 1121-1122 (7th Cir. 1986), enfg. 272 NLRB 1106, 1115 n. 21 (1984).

§ 16–604.3 Translation of Documents.

In appropriate circumstances, to avoid delay in the hearing, the official hearing interpreter may be asked to translate documents or recordings. See *Dickens, Inc.*, 355 NLRB 255, 256–257 (2010) (judge acted within his discretion and in a “commonsense” manner to expedite the progress of the trial by having the hearing interpreter translate a tape recording that the judge had ordered the General Counsel to turn over to respondent’s counsel).

In *NLRB v. Doral Building Services*, 666 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1982), the court held that the General Counsel erroneously failed to provide an official translation of non-English language affidavits of his witnesses. The court indicated that it is not adequate to simply provide the original native-language affidavit and “unofficial” English translation prepared by a Board agent to the respondent and leave it up to the respondent to provide its own translator. The case
was remanded so that the respondent could be provided with an “official” English translation of the original foreign language statements.

What constitutes a sufficient “official” translation was subsequently addressed in *International Medication Systems*, 274 NLRB 1197, 1199, n. 4 (1985). There, the Board agent who translated the affidavits certified at the bottom that he or she was bilingual in English and Spanish and had translated the affidavits correctly. The employer argued that this was insufficient under *Doral*. However, the judge stated that the Board agent’s certification appeared to be “as ‘official’ as the Board can get.” The judge further noted that an official translator was present at the hearing, who could have addressed any questions as to the accuracy of the Board agent’s translation. Accordingly, he denied the employer’s motion to strike the witness’s testimony. The judge’s ruling was later noted, without any expressed disapproval, in *NLRB v. Bakers of Paris, Inc.*, 929 F.2d 1427, 1436 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1991). See also § 16–613 (FRE 613), below, regarding use of prior statements for impeachment.

§ 16–604.4 Assisting Hearing Impaired Witness

A court has discretion whether to appoint an interpreter or facilitator under FRE 604 and 611(a) to assist a hearing impaired witness. See *U.S. v. Damra*, 621 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S.Ct. 2930 (2011).

In *Manno Electric*, 321 NLRB 278 n. 7 (1996), the Board held that respondents were not denied due process when the judge failed to provide or offer special auditory enhancement devices to assist the company president who was hearing impaired. Although respondents’ counsel informed the judge of the problem, counsel made no request for the equipment. The judge on several occasions instructed witnesses to speak louder and there were no contemporaneous complaints that those instructions were not sufficient to reasonably accommodate the president’s hearing problems. The Board also noted that neither the Act nor the Board’s Rules require an unsolicited offer to provide this equipment.

§ 16–604.5 Appointment and Payment of Interpreter

In *George Joseph Orchard Siding, Inc.*, 325 NLRB 252, 252–253 (1998), the Board upheld the discretion of the judge to order the General Counsel to provide an interpreter in the unfair labor practice proceeding. Specifically, the Board (over the dissent of two Members) found: (1) that administrative law judges have “discretionary authority” to appoint interpreters in unfair labor practice cases, and (2) that the General Counsel “failed to establish that the judge abused his discretion by ordering the Agency to provide [and pay for] an interpreter in this case.”

In a later backpay case involving about 200 unfair labor practice strikers, the Board also upheld the discretion of the judge to decline to order the General Counsel to provide and pay for an interpreter. *Domsey Trading Corp.*, 325 NLRB 429, 429–432 (1998). The judge declined to order the General Counsel to pay an interpreter for discriminatees called by the respondent employer because it was the respondent’s burden to establish interim earnings and failure to mitigate its backpay liability, and requiring the Agency to pay the cost of interpreters would “in essence, give the Respondent a blank check to spend the Government’s money to defend itself.” The Board (with the dissenters in *George Joseph* now in the majority) found that the judge properly exercised his discretion under the circumstances. See also *Ji Shiang, Inc.*, 357 NLRB 1292, 1293 n. 4 (2011) (likewise rejecting the respondent’s assertion that the General Counsel was required to pay for interpretation of its witnesses in the backpay proceeding).
§ 16–605 FRE 605. Judge’s Competency as a Witness

FRE 605 states:
The presiding judge may not testify as a witness at the trial. A party need not object to preserve the issue.

§ 16–607 FRE 607. Who May Impeach a Witness

FRE 607 states:
Any party, including the party that called the witness, may attack the witness’s credibility.

§ 16–607.1 Impeachment Generally

Subject to certain limitations (see, e.g. § 16–607.2, below), the judge should be careful not to unduly restrict questions or evidence pertaining to impeachment. See, for example, Halstead Industries, 299 NLRB 759 n. 1 (1990). In that case, the judge, affirmed by the Board, refused to receive evidence in support of Halstead’s offer of proof that the General Counsel's main witness was biased against Halstead and in favor of the alleged discriminatee because of the witness’s “intimate relationship” with the company's former employee relations director who had demonstrated hostility toward the company. The company argued that the former director was using the General Counsel's main witness to give false testimony to show an unlawful motive by the plant manager. The court remanded the case so that the impeachment evidence could be considered and weighed. Halstead Metal Products v. NLRB, 940 F.2d 66, 72–73 (4th Cir. 1991) (“Impeachment evidence is crucial in Board proceedings, because the [judge] sits as judge and jury.”)

§ 16–607.2 Limitations on Impeachment: Names of Pro-Union Employees

In National Telephone Directory Corp., 319 NLRB 420, 422 (1995), the Board held that the respondent company could not obtain the identity of current employees who had signed authorization cards or attended union meetings. The Board held that the potential chilling effect on union activity outweighed the employer’s right to test the credibility of the General Counsel’s witnesses during cross-examination, and that the employees’ confidentiality interests could only be waived by the employees themselves. See also the additional cases cited in § 8–420, Identity of Union Supporters Protected (Authorization Cards), above.

§ 16–608 FRE 608. A Witness’s Character for Truthfulness or Untruthfulness

FRE 608 states:
(a) Reputation or Opinion Evidence. A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character. But evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of:
the witness; or
another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has
testified about.
By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive any privilege against
self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to the witness’s character for
truthfulness.

§ 16–608.1 Impeachment on Collateral Matters

Under FRE 608(b), a judge has discretion to disallow impeachment of a witness on a
collateral matter that is not probative of the witness’s propensity to testify untruthfully concerning
a material issue. See New York Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 243 NLRB 967 n. 3 (1979) (“It is well
within the discretionary authority of [the ALJ] . . . to apply the general evidentiary limitation on
impeachment of a witness on a collateral matter.”). See also Sunshine Piping, Inc., 351 NLRB
1371, 1374–1376 (2007) (judge could have excluded cross-examination of witness’s prior drug
related acts as it was not relevant to alleged alteration of attendance records); and J.S. Troup
Electric, Inc., 344 NLRB 1009, 1009–1010 (2005) (application of FRE 608(b) is subject to Rule
403, which permits a judge to bar cross-examination of a witness about specific bad acts if its
probative value is outweighed by considerations of undue delay or waste of time).

With respect to questioning witnesses in the merits proceeding about whether they had
made prior false statements about their immigration status and eligibility to work, see Farm Fresh
Company, Target One, LLC, 361 NLRB No. 83, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2014), discussed in § 16–
402.6, above (judge did not abuse his discretion in preventing the respondent employer from
questioning the alleged discriminatees about their immigration status in the merits proceeding).

See also Double D Construction Group, 339 NLRB 303 (2003). In that case, the Board
found that the judge erred in discrediting the discriminatee solely on the basis that he admitted
giving the respondent a false Social Security number to obtain employment, without considering
other credibility factors. The Board noted (n. 14) that the judge “arguably” could have refused to
admit the evidence under FRE 608, citing Enterprise Industrial Piping Co., 117 NLRB 995 n. 2
(1957) (trial examiner did not abuse his discretion in refusing to permit cross-examination
concerning an employee’s false statements on an unemployment insurance claim).

For a court case discussing this issue, see U.S. v. Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d 1162, 1174–
1175 (8th Cir. 2008). The court held that the magistrate judge’s inquiry about the circumstances
under which the witnesses entered the country was not plain error, citing FRE 608(b) and two
cases where unlawful entry or other violations of immigration laws was considered admissible
because relevant to truthfulness (U.S. v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 557 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 120
denied 100 S.Ct. 2163 (1980)). However, the court noted that “the use of such evidence is
fraught with the danger of prejudice to a defendant by introducing the possibility of invidious
discrimination on the basis of alienage. See FRE 403.” It added that “the relevance of an
immigration violation to character for truthfulness is at the least debatable and would depend on
the facts of the particular violation since many immigration violations do not involve a false
statement.” See also Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004); and Rengifo
subpoenas seeking information about the plaintiff’s immigration status, notwithstanding its
asserted relevance to credibility, because of the potential chilling effect it would have on the
willingness of plaintiffs to bring civil rights claims).
§ 16–608.2 Use of extrinsic evidence

Even if testimony on such collateral matters is allowed, the use of “extrinsic” evidence to impeach is generally prohibited (unless it involves a criminal conviction, see §16–609, below). Thus, admission of extrinsic evidence of specific acts to attack the witness’s response is not permitted, unless it tends to show bias or motive to testify untruthfully. See Sunshine Piping, and J.S. Troup Electric, above.

§ 16–608.3 Evaluating Credibility Based on Specific Acts

With respect to the appropriate weight to give specific prior acts in evaluating credibility, see Double D Construction, above, in which the Board criticized a judge for discrediting a witness for lying about his social security number in the past, without taking into account all of the factors tending to support his credibility at the time of his testimony. See also Boardwalk Regency Corp., 344 NLRB 984 n. 1 (2005), petition for review denied, 196 Fed. Appx. 59 (3d Cir. 2006) (Double D Construction stands for the proposition that “a judge should not rely solely on a single prior act of falsification” in making credibility determinations; if there are other factors supporting the witness’s credibility, “they too must be considered”).

§ 16–609 FRE 609. Impeachment by Evidence of a Criminal Conviction

FRE 609 states in relevant part:
(a) In General. The following rules apply to attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction:
   (1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence:
      (A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case . . . ;
      . . . and
   (2) for any crime regardless of the punishment, the evidence must be admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime required proving—or the witness’s admitting—a dishonest act or false statement.
(b) Limit on Using the Evidence After 10 Years. This subdivision (b) applies if more than 10 years have passed since the witness’s conviction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later. Evidence of the conviction is admissible only if:
   (1) its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and
   (2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use.
(c) Effect of a Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible if:
   (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding that the person has been rehabilitated, and the person has not been convicted of a later crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year; or
   (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of a juvenile adjudication is [not] admissible under this rule [in a civil case] . . . .
(e) Pendency of an Appeal. A conviction that satisfies this rule is admissible even if an appeal is pending. Evidence of the pendency is also admissible.

Under FRE 609, a witness may be impeached, subject to FRE 403, by reference to prior criminal convictions (not merely arrests) if: (1) they are punishable by death or imprisonment over 1 year, or (2) the elements of the crime required proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement. See Service Employees (GMG Janitorial), 322 NLRB 402, 406 (1996) (mail fraud and conspiracy convictions were admitted and considered under FRE 609).

FRE 609 also sets forth time limits: if more than 10 years have passed since the witness’s conviction or release from confinement, whichever is later, the evidence of conviction is admissible only if “its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect,” and the proponent gives the adverse party “reasonable notice” of the intent to use it. See Pessoa Construction Co., 361 NLRB No. 138, slip op. at 1 n. 1, JD at 4 n. 6 (2014) (judge in the supplemental backpay proceeding did not abuse his discretion in excluding evidence of the discriminatee’s prior criminal convictions given, inter alia, the passage of time and respondents’ failure to provide reasonable written notice of its intent to use the evidence), enfd. 632 Fed. Appx. 760, 768 (4th Cir. 2015).

The judge may, of course, still credit a witness notwithstanding such convictions. See Franklin Iron & Metal Corp., 315 NLRB 819 n. 1 (1994) (judge considered a felony conviction within the last 10 years for carrying a concealed weapon, but nevertheless credited the substantially corroborated testimony of the witness), enfd. 83 F.3d 156 (6th Cir. 1996).

§ 16–610 FRE 610. Religious Beliefs or Opinions

FRE 610 states:
Evidence of a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions is not admissible to attack or support the witness’s credibility.

See Rike’s, 241 NLRB 240 n. 1 (1979) (citing FRE 610 in finding that the trial judge erred by crediting a witness based in part on her “religious convictions”).

FRE 610 does not preclude evidence of religious beliefs or opinions to show motive or bias. See Firemen’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Thien, 63 F.3d 754, 760–761 (8th Cir. 1995).

For a discussion of whether the judge should exclude evidence that a witness is a full or part-time minister, see U.S. v. Davis, 779 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2015) (FRE 610 does not bar such evidence, but the judge has discretion to exclude it under FRE 403 where it has limited probative value that is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice), cert denied 136 S.Ct. 97 (2015).

§ 16–611 FRE 611. Mode and Order of Examining and Presenting Evidence

FRE 611 states:
(a) Control by the Court; Purposes. The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to:
(1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth;
(2) avoid wasting time; and
(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
(b) **Scope of Cross-Examination.** Cross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the witness’s credibility. The court may allow inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.

(c) **Leading Questions.** Leading questions should not be used on direct examination except as necessary to develop the witness’s testimony. Ordinarily, the court should allow leading questions:
(1) on cross-examination; and
(2) when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party.

§ 16–611.1 **Order of Examination**

FRE 611(a) grants the trial judge wide discretion to allow witnesses to testify out-of-turn, for example to save time, avoid confusion, or accommodate the schedule of a critical witness. See 28 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 6164 (2d ed., database updated April 2017); and Goode & Wellborne, Courtroom Handbook on Federal Evidence 410 (West 2012). But see Boetticher & Kellogg Co., 137 NLRB 1392 n. 1, 1398–1399 (1962) (judge erred in precluding a respondent from conducting any cross examination of a General Counsel witness after the respondent refused the judge’s direction to cross examine the witness before the charging party union had questioned the witness).

§ 16–611.2 **Cross-Examination Beyond the Scope**

FRE 611(b) gives a judge discretion to “allow inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination,” and judges often do so (for example, to develop a full record without recalling witnesses). The judge should use his or her best judgment in the circumstances.

§ 16–611.3 **Rebuttal and Surrebuttal Testimony**

FRE 611 makes no mention of redirect and recross examination. However, the judge has broad discretion in deciding whether rebuttal and surrebuttal testimony would be helpful in developing the evidence, or whether it would inappropriately and unnecessarily prolong the trial. See Garden Ridge Management, Inc., 347 NLRB 131 n. 3 (2006) (“the admissibility of evidence on rebuttal is within the discretion of the judge, even if the evidence is not technically proper rebuttal evidence”), citing Water’s Edge, 293 NLRB 465 n. 2 (1989) (judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting testimony by a General Counsel witness on rebuttal, even though it was technically not proper rebuttal because it was not introduced to refute evidence provided by the respondent’s witness), enfd. in part 14 F.3d 811 (2d Cir. 1994). See also Bethlehem Temple Learning Center, Inc., 330 NLRB 1177 n. 1 (2000) (judge did not abuse his discretion in rejecting, as too late, respondent’s proffer of evidence on surrebuttal that the charging party/alleged discriminatee had a criminal conviction to attack her credibility), citing U.S. v. Mitan, 966 F.2d 1165, 1176 (7th Cir. 1992) (trial court has broad discretion to reject rebuttal and surrebuttal testimony and does not abuse it where the party had an opportunity to introduce the evidence at an earlier point); and First Class Maintenance, 289 NLRB 484 n. 4 (1988) (judge properly refused to allow certain rebuttal testimony offered by the General Counsel, as the evidence would have been cumulative and the General Counsel had 9 days notice that he might desire the testimony).
§ 16–611.4 Leading Questions/Hostile Witnesses

Under FRE 611(c), leading questions (i.e. questions that suggest the answer) ordinarily are not permitted on direct examination or examination of a friendly witness regarding facts in controversy, except as may be necessary to develop the witness’ testimony (e.g., to refresh recollection). However, they are permitted on cross-examination or examination of a hostile or adverse witness. See 28 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 6168 (2d ed., database updated April 2017).

Leading questions may impair the probative value of the testimony. Greyston Bakery, 327 NLRB 433, 440 n. 13 (1999). Even when there is no objection to leading questions on direct, the better practice is for the judge first to warn counsel not to lead. Liberty Coach Co., 128 NLRB 160, 162 n. 7 (1960). But see W & M Properties of Connecticut, Inc., 348 NLRB 162 (2006) (no error for judge to permit the General Counsel to ask leading questions on direct examination “to develop the witness’s testimony” after several nonleading questions were unsuccessful in eliciting certain testimony), enf’d 514 F.3d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

No advance request or ruling is necessary before beginning examination of a hostile or adverse witness under FRE 611(c). The test of that right comes when the opponent objects that a question is leading. Omaha Building Trades Council (Crossroads Joint Venture), 284 NLRB 328, 329 n. 4 (1987), enf’d. 856 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1988).

Generally, after direct examination of the adverse witness under 611(c), the nonadverse party may not ask leading questions on cross-examination. Nevertheless, the judge retains discretion to allow it. See 28 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 6168, above.

A charging party discriminatee is an adverse party under FRE 611(c) (formerly FRCP 43(b)) and can be called as an adverse witness by the respondent. Security Services, Inc., 198 NLRB 1166 (1972) (it was reversible error for the judge to preclude the respondent from calling the charging party discriminatee as an adverse witness rather than its own witness).

§ 16–611.5 Failure to Call Witness: Adverse Inference

Although not addressed in FRE 611, a judge may draw an adverse inference when a party fails to call witnesses reasonably assumed to be favorably disposed toward the party. International Automated Machines, 285 NLRB 1122, 1123 (1987) (adverse inference was warranted for respondent’s failure to call its production manager to testify about significant disputed matters), enf’d. mem. 861 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1988); *Parksite Group, 354 NLRB 801, 805 (2009) (failure of respondent to call its manager who evaluated the alleged discriminatees for rehire was subject to an adverse inference; the General Counsel was not required to subpoena the manager); and Government Employees (IBPO), 327 NLRB 676, 699 (1999), enf’d. mem. 205 F.3d 1324 (2d Cir. 1999). But see Riverdale Nursing Home, 317 NLRB 881, 882 (1995) (it is improper for the judge to rely on an adverse inference to fill an evidentiary gap in the General Counsel’s case); and Ridgewell’s, Inc., 334 NLRB 37, 42 (2001) (denying respondent’s request for an adverse inference against the General Counsel for failing to present any evidence on a particular issue, as respondent had the burden of proof on that issue), enf’d. 38 Fed. Appx. 29 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Compare also Advocate South Suburban Hospital v. NLRB, 468 F.3d 1038, 1048, n. 8 (7th Cir. 2006) (an adverse inference is warranted only when the missing witness was peculiarly in the power of the other party to produce).
A party’s failure to explain why it did not call the witness may support drawing the adverse inference. See *Martin Luther King, Sr. Nursing Center*, 231 NLRB 15 n. 1 (1977) (judge properly drew an adverse inference in the absence of an explanation). But see *Roosevelt Memorial Medical Center*, 348 NLRB 1016, 1022 (2006) (judge abused his discretion by drawing an adverse inference from the respondent’s failure to call a manager; the circumstances indicated the manager was not called because his testimony was unnecessary, not because it would have been adverse). Accord: *One Stop Kosher Supermarket*, 355 NLRB 1237, 1238 n. 3 (2010) (finding, for the same reason, that no adverse inference was warranted from the failure of the General Counsel or the charging party to call a rebuttal witness). Conversely, of course, an adverse inference would normally not be appropriate where an adequate explanation is provided.

**Effect or scope of adverse inference.** An adverse inference that a nontestifying witness would not have supported a party’s witness(es) does not necessarily warrant an inference that the nontestifying witness would have supported the opposing party’s witness(es). The judge may properly consider all the circumstances in evaluating the effect or scope of the adverse inference. See *Spurlino Materials, LLC*, 357 NLRB 1510, 1521 (2011) (General Counsel’s failure to call fellow strikers who witnessed the striker’s conversation with a supervisor warranted an adverse inference that their testimony would not have supported the striker’s version of the conversation; however, the circumstances did not warrant an inference that their testimony would have supported the supervisor’s version as that version was not believable and there were reasons to question the supervisor’s own credibility), enfd. 805 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

**Bystander employees.** Bystander employees are not presumed to be favorably disposed toward any party and no adverse inference is drawn against a party for not calling them. *Torbitt & Castleman, Inc.*, 320 NLRB 907, 910 n. 6 (1996), affd. on point, 123 F.3d 899, 907 (6th Cir. 1997). However, the judge may weigh the General Counsel’s failure to call an identified, potentially corroborating bystander as a factor in determining whether the General Counsel has established by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation has occurred. *C & S Distributors*, 321 NLRB 404 n. 2 (1996), citing *Queen of the Valley Hospital*, 316 NLRB 721 n. 1 (1995). Accord: *Stabilus, Inc.*, 355 NLRB 836, 840 n. 19 (2010).

**Former Supervisors.** No adverse inference is drawn from the failure of a respondent to call a former co-owner, manager, or supervisor when the record does not show it is reasonable to assume that the person is favorably disposed toward the respondent. See *Goldsmith Motors Corp.*, 310 NLRB 1279 n. 1 (1993); and *Christie Electric Corp.*, 284 NLRB 740, 784 n. 137 (1987) (declining to draw an adverse inference from the failure to call a former supervisor).

**Board agents.** As discussed in § 8–470, above, ordinarily a Board agent cannot be required to testify in a Board proceeding. It is also improper for the judge to draw an adverse inference from the General Counsel’s failure to call a Board agent to testify. *Independent Stations Co.*, 284 NLRB 394 n. 1, 412, 415 (1987).

§ 16–612 FRE 612. Writing Used to Refresh a Witness’s Memory

FRE 612 states in relevant part:

(a) Scope. This rule gives an adverse party certain options when a witness uses a writing to refresh memory:
   (1) while testifying; or
   (2) before testifying, if the court decides that justice requires the party to have those options.
(b) Adverse Party’s Options; Deleting Unrelated Matter. . . . [A]n adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness about it, and to introduce in evidence any portion that relates to the witness’s testimony. If the producing party claims that the writing includes unrelated matter, the court must examine the writing in camera, delete any unrelated portion, and order that the rest be delivered to the adverse party. Any portion deleted over objection must be preserved for the record.

(c) Failure to Produce or Deliver the Writing. If a writing is not produced or is not delivered as ordered, the court may issue any appropriate order. . . .

It is generally held that the recollection of one’s own nonadverse witness should not be refreshed until the witness’s memory has been exhausted. The recollection of the witness may then be refreshed by leading questions or any artificial aid if appropriate and not improperly suggestive. See 28 Fed. Pract. & Proc. Evid. § 6184 (2d ed., database updated April 2017); and Goode & Wellborne, Courtroom Handbook of Federal Evidence 418 (West 2012).

Adverse Party’s Right to Introduce Refreshing Document. See, e.g., J. G. Braun Co., 126 NLRB 368, 369 n. 3 (1960) (where the respondent on cross-examination had read portions of an affidavit into the record to refresh the recollection of a witness, it was error for the judge to reject the General Counsel’s offer of the entire affidavit into evidence); and Baker Hotel of Dallas, 134 NLRB 524 n. 1 (1961), enf’d. 311 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1963). See also FRE 106 (Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements).

In Camera Inspection and Redaction. In *CNN America, Inc.*, 352 NLRB 265 (2008), supplemental proceedings 352 NLRB 448 (2008), 352 NLRB 675 (2008), and 353 NLRB 891 (2009), final decision and order issued 361 NLRB No. 47 (2014), the Board indicated that, with respect to documents used in preparation for testifying, the judge’s review should be done after the witness has testified. In that case, the Board reversed a judge’s ruling that the respondent was required, before the witness testified, to provide opposing counsel with all documents that had been reviewed by the witness within 6 months prior to the hearing. The Board held that the judge read Rule 612(2) too broadly. For the rule to apply, the documents must have been viewed for the purpose of refreshing a witness’s recollection and the refreshing must be undertaken for the purpose of testifying. The Board held that the judge should only order documents to be turned over under Rule 612 after the witness has testified so that the judge may properly apply the conditions set forth in the rule.

§ 16–613 FRE 613. Witness’s Prior Statement

FRE 613 states:

(a) Showing or Disclosing the Statement During Examination. When examining a witness about the witness’s prior statement, a party need not show it or disclose its contents to the witness. But the party must, on request, show it or disclose its contents to an adverse party’s attorney.

(b) Extrinsic Evidence of a Prior Inconsistent Statement. Extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if justice so requires. This subdivision (b) does not apply to an opposing party’s statement under Rule 801(d)(2).
FRE 613 addresses situations where a party seeks to impeach a witness by proof of the witness’s prior inconsistent statement. Subsection (a) of the rule requires the party in such circumstances to show or disclose the statement to the adverse party’s counsel during the examination.

Although FRE 613 does not itself place any limitations on a judge’s consideration of prior inconsistent statements, the judge should carefully weigh the circumstances and relevance of the alleged contradictions. See Advocate South Suburban Hospital v. NLRB, 468 F.3d 1038, 1046 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[W]here a contradiction goes to the heart of a witness’s story, belief can be error. But crediting the witness makes sense when the impeaching statements differ only with respect to minor aspects of the story or where the discrepancies are easily explained.” [citations omitted]). The judge, of course, should also consider the manner in which the statement was taken—such as whether it was recorded in the witness’s native language so that the witness could read it before signing—in weighing the effect of the prior statement on credibility. NLRB v. Bakers of Paris, Inc., 929 F.2d 1427, 1436 (9th Cir. 1991). See also § 16–604.3, Translation of Documents, above.

Of course, the judge must also be evenhanded and apply the same standards in evaluating inconsistent prior statements or testimony by General Counsel or charging party witnesses and by respondent witnesses. See Alta Bates Summit Medical Center v. NLRB, 687 F.3d 424, 437–438 (D.C. Cir. 2012), remanding 357 NLRB 259 (2011).

§ 16–613.1 Jencks Statements

The following rules otherwise apply to disclosure of prior statements given to the General Counsel (referred to as Jencks statements).

Disclosure required only on request after witness testifies. There is no general requirement in Board proceedings that the General Counsel disclose a witness’s prior statement before the witness has testified. Under Section 102.118(e) of the Board’s Rules, pretrial statements given by a witness called by the General Counsel in an unfair labor practice case need not be released or produced unless and until disclosure has been requested after the witness has testified.

The proper time for a disclosure request is at the close of the direct examination; it is premature to demand production earlier. U.S. v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 384, 390–391 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1031 and 1085 (1998 and 1999). See also H. B. Zachry Co., 310 NLRB 1037, 1038 (1993) (production cannot be required by subpoena on the theory that the employee witness waived confidentiality by giving a copy to the union); and Edwards Trucking Co., 129 NLRB 385, 386 n. 1 (1960).

Similarly, the judge may properly deny a request for production after the witness has completed testifying and been excused. Walsh Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 NLRB 294, 296 (1960) (upholding judge’s denial of the respondent’s request for any pretrial statements by two witnesses after the witnesses had been fully cross-examined and excused). See also Earthgrains Co., 336 NLRB 1119, 1122 (2001) (request for affidavits was untimely when made immediately prior to the close of trial after the last witness had been excused); and SBC California, 344 NLRB 243 n. 3 (2005) (request for affidavit was untimely when made at the close of respondent’s case).
The Board has also upheld the judge’s discretion to deny a belated request for production even where the witness has not yet been excused. See Raymond Engineering, 286 NLRB 1210, 1214 n. 7 (1987) (judge declined to order production of a witness’s affidavit after the General Counsel finished questioning the witness on redirect examination), cited with approval in SBC California, above. See also I-O Services, 218 NLRB 566 n. 1 (1975), where the Board held that the judge did not abuse her discretion under the circumstances by denying a respondent’s request that was made “well into” the cross-examination of the witness. The Board noted that the respondent had failed to show prejudice, as the witness’s testimony was “in many respects merely cumulative and fully corroborated by other witnesses, including witnesses presented by the Respondent.”

Disclosure limited to Jencks “statements.” Section 102.118(g) defines a Jencks “statement” to mean:

(1) A written statement made by the witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the witness; or

(2) A stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by the witness to an agent of the party obligated to produce the statement and recorded contemporaneously with the making of the oral statement.


If notes taken by a Board agent (or a memo made of an interview with the witness) are not adopted or approved by the witness, they are not a Jencks “statement” and are therefore not producible under Section 102.118(e). Caterpillar, Inc., 313 NLRB 626 n. 2, 627 n. 4 (1993); and Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 250 NLRB 1341, 1342 (1980). See also National Specialties Installations, Inc., 344 NLRB 191 (2005) (written notice from a third party to a witness, such as a notice from a witness’s bank, is not a “statement made by said witness” within the meaning of the Rule; and since it was not adopted by the witness, it is not producible).

Regarding notes passed by a witness to counsel during trial, see Wabash Transformer Corp., 215 NLRB 546 n. 3 (1974), enf. 509 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 827 (1975). In that case, the respondent requested all notes that a witness had passed to the General Counsel during the trial. The General Counsel produced the notes in his possession, but stated on the record that he had probably discarded the others, because he did not consider them to be Jencks “statements” and the respondent had not previously shown any interest in them. Assuming arguendo that the notes constituted “statements,” the Board found no basis for rejecting the witness’s testimony under the circumstances.

Regarding tape or video recordings, see § 8–510, above.

Disclosure limited to related statements. The entire statement need not be produced unless the entire contents relate to the subject matter about which the witness testified. Thus, in Caterpillar, Inc., 313 NLRB 626 (1993), the Board held that when the General Counsel asserts that material in a Jencks statement does not relate to the subject matter of the witness’s testimony on direct examination, the judge must inspect the statement in camera and excise any portion of the statement that does not relate to the testimony. The judge may exercise discretion in this respect, and retain portions that relate to the pleadings, even if not to the testimony. See
also Tejas Electrical Services, Inc., 338 NLRB 416 n. 2 (2002) (judge erred in summarily denying the respondent’s request for production of affidavits given by the General Counsel’s witnesses in other cases, without making a determination, through in camera inspection, that the affidavits were not relevant to issues raised in the case).

**Limitations apply to copies in possession of others.** No waiver results from the General Counsel’s witnesses giving copies of their affidavits to the charging party union, i.e. the respondent is not entitled to the affidavits until after the witness is called and testifies on behalf of the General Counsel, even if the affidavits are not exclusively in the General Counsel’s possession. H. B. Zachry Co., 310 NLRB 1037, 1038 (1993) (reversing judge and quashing the respondent’s subpoenas on the union to the extent they sought production of statements by individuals who were not called to testify).

A respondent likewise may not subpoena the affidavits from the witnesses themselves; indeed, an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by subpoenaing Board affidavits given by its employees. See Santa Barbara News-Press, 358 NLRB 1539 (2012), reaaff. 361 NLRB No. 88 (2014).

Respondent not entitled to statements never in the General Counsel’s possession. The Jencks rule does not compel disclosure of a pretrial witness statement that was given to the charging party and was never in the possession of the General Counsel. See Tidelands Marine Service, Inc., 140 NLRB 288, 289 n. 4 (1962), enfd. 338 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1964).

Respondent not entitled to statements of its own witness. Respondents are not entitled to Jencks statements of their own witnesses. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 346 NLRB 696 n. 1 (2006). This is true even if called as an adverse or hostile witness under FRE 611(c). See Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc., 149 NLRB 910, 911 n. 2 (1964) (respondent was not entitled to a Jencks statement given by the charging party, as the charging party was called by respondent as an adverse witness). See also NLRB v. Duquesne Electric Co., 518 F.2d 701, 705 (3d Cir. 1975). The court there upheld the ALJ’s application of Kenrich Petrochemicals where the respondent called a discriminatee to testify, noting that FRCP 43(b) [now FRE 611(c)] only authorizes leading questions, not cross-examination. However, the court suggested that respondent might have been entitled to the discriminatee’s affidavit to impeach if “she had given testimony damaging to the [respondent]’ case, which she never did.” 518 F.2d at 705.

Charging Party entitled to statements given by Respondent’s witness. A charging party is entitled, on request and for the purpose of cross-examination, to a pretrial statement given to the General Counsel by an agent who testifies on behalf of the respondent. See Sentiner Volkswagen Corp., 257 NLRB 178 n. 1, 186–187 (1981), enfd. 681 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1982), where the Board upheld the judge’s ruling that allowed the charging party to utilize for cross-examination the pretrial affidavit given by a respondent witness. See also NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part One), Sec. 10394.7.

Board law is somewhat unclear whether a charging party may demand a copy of a witness’s Jencks statement before or after calling the witness as an adverse or hostile witness under FRE 611(c). However, based on the holdings in Kenrich Petrochemicals and Duquesne Electric, above, it appears likely that the Board and the courts would uphold a judge’s ruling or order declining to require disclosure of the statement.

Charging party entitled to statements given by 611(c) witness called by General Counsel. In Parts Depot, Inc., 332 NLRB 670, 678 (2000), enfd. 24 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the
judge ruled that the union was entitled to the pretrial affidavit of respondent’s supervisor after he testified as a 611(c) witness called by the General Counsel. The judge reasoned that there was “no doubt” the union “needed to impeach [the supervisor]—an adverse witness to both the General Counsel and the union—for [his] testimony, if credited, would severely damage [the discriminatee’s] case.”

Duty to search for statements. In *Albertson’s, Inc.*, Case 27–CA–13390, unpub. Board order issued January 29, 1999, the Board ruled that the General Counsel is obligated to search its files (before, it is implied, the witness testifies) for any statements in cases involving charges filed by the charging party union against the respondent during the period covered by the pending charges. Further, the Board denied the General Counsel’s request to restrict the search to the same Regional Office where the pending charges were filed. However, it ruled that the General Counsel was not required to search files in cases involving charges against other employers.

Right to sufficient time to study statements. A judge’s denial of 15 minutes time to study the statement after production was found to be prejudicial error requiring a remand in *A. R. Blase Co.*, 143 NLRB 197, 197–198 (1963), enf. denied 338 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1964). Normally, the General Counsel should not oppose a request for a reasonable time for study. See NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part One), Sec. 10394.9.

Copying and retaining statements. There is no absolute right to make copies of the statements, unless the statements are admitted into evidence. This is within the judge’s discretion. *Manbeck Baking Co.*, 130 NLRB 1186, 1189–1190 (1961). However, Section 10394.9 of the NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part One) now provides that, for witness statements required to be produced by the General Counsel to a respondent, the General Counsel will produce both the original and a copy.

With respect to retaining the statement, in *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 339 NLRB 64 (2003), the Board held that a Jencks witness statement may not be retained after the close of the trial. After the witness has testified, the exception to the general prohibition against using Board files under Section 102.118 of the Board’s Rules no longer applies and the prohibition of the rule is restored. Nonetheless, the Board confirmed that a judge may, in his or her discretion, permit counsel to copy the statement and to retain it throughout the hearing “for any legitimate trial purpose.” *Id.* at n. 3. See also NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part One), Sec. 10394.9 (providing that, on request, the respondent may retain the copies throughout the trial for legitimate trial purposes, returning them at the close of the trial (unless, of course, the statement has been made an exhibit)).

Because some counsel may make notes that they would be reluctant to disclose to the General Counsel, it is prudent to establish a procedure in advance, such as an agreed upon destruction of copies with attorney notes, to avoid later controversy and dispute.

§ 16–614 FRE 614. Court’s Calling or Examining a Witness

FRE 614 states:
(a) Calling. The court may call a witness on its own or at a party’s request. Each party is entitled to cross-examine the witness.
(b) Examining. The court may examine a witness regardless of who calls the witness.
(c) Objections. A party may object to the court’s calling or examining a witness either at that time or at the next opportunity when the jury is not present.
Section 102.35(a)(11) of the Board’s Rules similarly provides that the judge may “call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses and . . . introduce into the record documentary or other evidence.” See § 2–300, Duties of Trial Judge, above.

§ 16–615 FRE 615. Excluding Witnesses

FRE 615 states:
At a party’s request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony. Or the court may do so on its own. But this rule does not authorize excluding:
(a) a party who is a natural person;
(b) an officer or employee of a party that is not a natural person, after being designated as the party’s representative by its attorney;
(c) a person whose presence a party shows to be essential to presenting the party’s claim or defense; or
(d) a person authorized by statute to be present.

As fully discussed in Chapter 11, Sequestration of Witnesses, the Board has generally attempted to follow the “spirit” of FRE 615 in fashioning its own rules in this area. See also § 1–300 (Model Sequestration Order).

§ 16–700 Opinions and Expert Testimony

§ 16–701 FRE 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses

FRE 701 states:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is:
(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

See, e.g., UCSF Stanford Health Care, 335 NLRB 488, 532 (2001) (finding that the testimony of the respondent’s witnesses did not qualify as lay opinion testimony under FRE 701 because the testimony was not based on first-hand knowledge or observations).

§ 16–702 FRE 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses

FRE 702 states:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
For examples where FRE 702 has been applied in Board proceedings, see Chemical Solvents, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 164, slip op. at 23 (2015) (rejecting the respondent’s proffered expert witness testimony, in an 8(a)(3) and (5) plant-closure case, that the respondent realized cost savings after the closure, as the expert’s after-the-fact assessment could not have played any part in the respondent’s decision and, in any event, would not be a defense to the allegations); National Extrusion & Mfg. Co., 357 NLRB 127, 154–155, n. 29 (2011) (rejecting, in a case alleging an 8(a)(5) refusal to provide health insurance-information, the General Counsel’s proffered expert witness testimony that health insurance companies usually provide plan documents to prospective purchasers, as such generalized testimony did not directly address the respondent’s evidence that it was unable in this particular instance to obtain the plan documents from the insurance company); and UCSF Stanford Health Care, above, 335 NLRB at 531–532 (rejecting the respondent’s proffered expert witness testimony regarding the effect of union or employee solicitation and distribution on patients and their families, as respondent had not shown that the testimony was based on more than subjective belief or was reliable).

See also Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 31–CA–143038, unpub. Board order issued Dec. 1, 2015 (2015 WL 7769416). The complaint in that case alleged that the respondent’s mandatory arbitration provision violated 8(a)(1) because it would reasonably be construed by employees to preclude the filing of NLRB charges. Respondent sought to call two witnesses: 1) its recruitment manager, to testify that the company’s employees are proficient in English and have completed high school; and 2) a linguistics expert, to testify that a reasonable employee having these characteristics would not interpret the respondent’s mandatory arbitration provision to preclude the filing of NLRB charges. The Board held that the ALJ did not abuse his discretion in barring the testimony of both witnesses as irrelevant.

§ 16–702.1 Polygraph Evidence


However, other circuits have rejected a per se rule excluding polygraph evidence. For example, the Fifth Circuit has indicated that it is generally proper for a judge to admit such evidence in a civil bench trial. See Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210 F.3d 491, 500 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the judge properly admitted polygraph evidence in an ERISA action, particularly since the judge, rather than a jury, was the trier of fact). See also § 16–403, above (citing cases that distinguish between judge and jury trials in evaluating whether admission of evidence would be unfairly prejudicial under FRE 403). And the Eleventh Circuit has held that a district court may admit polygraph evidence, even in a criminal trial, if: 1) the parties stipulate the test’s circumstances and scope of its admissibility, or 2) the evidence is introduced to impeach or corroborate the testimony of the witness at trial, the opposing party was provided adequate notice and an opportunity to have its own expert administer a similar polygraph test, and the court is satisfied that the evidence is both reliable and relevant under FRE 702. See U.S. v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1303 (11th Cir. 2005), cert denied 126 S.Ct. 1331 (2006) (holding that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding the evidence, as “reasonable judges can disagree over the reliability of polygraph methodology”). See also U.S. v. Lea, 249 F.3d 632, 638–639 (7th
Cir. 2001) (admissibility of polygraph evidence is within the trial judge’s discretion, using FRE 403 as a guide).


For a Board case addressing polygraph evidence, see J.C. Penny Co., 172 NLRB 1279 (1968), enf’d. in relevant part 416 F.2d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 1969). The ALJ in that case admitted a polygraph and gave it some, but not controlling weight, i.e. he discredited the witness despite the polygraph results indicating that the witness testified truthfully. See also Ackerman Mfg. Co., 241 NLRB 621, 622 n. 1 (1979). In that case, the ALJ rejected a certified polygraph report to the extent it was submitted by the respondent to show that the witness was truthful in his statements to the polygraphist about observing the discriminatees removing company property. However, the ALJ admitted it for purposes of evaluating the respondent’s investigative efforts and “bona fides” in failing to recall the discriminatees.

§ 16–702.2 Prior Notice to Opponent

Prior notice should normally be given by a party intending to use an expert witness at the trial so that the opposing party may have time to obtain its own expert. The failure to do so may be considered by the judge in ruling on the admissibility of the expert testimony under FRE 403. See National Extrusion, 357 NLRB 127, 155, n. 29 (2011). See also §§ 16–102 and 16–403, above.

However, there is no requirement to create and produce an expert’s report in the manner required by FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) in the context of federal civil discovery. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2–CA–093893, unpub. Board order issued Jan. 16, 2018 (2018 WL 447422) (holding that “there is no demonstrated need for an expert report that cannot be met by alternative measures such as granting a continuance, if appropriate, after the . . . expert has testified, despite the inherent delay that would result”).

§ 16–703 FRE 703. Bases of an Expert’s Opinion Testimony

FRE 703 states:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.

Where expert testimony has been received, the judge may disregard it if the premises for the expert’s analysis and conclusions are flawed. See Raley’s, 348 NLRB 382, 562–563 (2006) (handwriting expert’s testimony about signatures on a petition was based on flawed premises); H. B. Zachry Co., 319 NLRB 967, 979–980 (1995) (basis for management professor’s opinion about the union members’ motive for applying for work was flawed), modified on different point, 127 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1997); Fluor Daniel, Inc., 304 NLRB 970, 971 n. 10, 975, 978, 980 (1991) (statistical consultant’s conclusions about the employer’s hiring decisions were based on flawed assumptions), enf’d mem. 976 F.2d 744 (11th Cir. 1992).
See also Parts Depot, Inc., 348 NLRB 152 n. 6 (2006) (judge in the backpay proceeding properly refused to permit an expert witness to opine, based on an analysis of employment trends, that employees did not make reasonable efforts to seek interim employment, as Board precedent requires consideration of an individual’s particular circumstances rather than just probabilities).

The foregoing rulings are consistent with the Supreme Court's expression in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997), that a “court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”

§ 16–704    FRE 704. Opinion on an Ultimate Issue

FRE 704 states in relevant part:
(a) In General — Not Automatically Objectionable. An opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.

Under FRE 704, an opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue. However, as indicated in the advisory committee notes, to be admitted, the testimony must still satisfy the standards set forth in Rule 702 (as well as 403). Thus, expert opinions on ultimate legal issues are properly excluded as within the exclusive province of the judge and Board. See Roundy’s Inc. v. NLRB, 674 F.3d 638, 647, 648 (7th Cir. 2012), enfg. in relevant part 356 NLRB 126 n. 4 (2010). The issue in that case was whether the employer had unlawfully excluded union representatives from handbilling in common areas outside its stores. Citing the advisory committee notes to FRE 704, the court held that the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to permit the employer to call an alleged expert on Wisconsin real estate law to testify about the nature of the employer's property interest at the stores. The court also found that the employer had suffered no prejudice as the judge permitted the employer to include the alleged expert's interpretation of the law in its posthearing brief.

See also Nationwide Transport Finance v. Cass Information, 523 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (commercial law expert's legal conclusions about the applicability of the UCC to the facts of the case were inadmissible); and Gilson v. Sirmons, 520 F.3d 1196, 1243 (10th Cir. 2008) (expert testimony on witness’s credibility was inappropriate).

§ 16–705    FRE 705. Disclosing the Facts or Data Underlying an Expert’s Opinion

FRE 705 states:
Unless the court orders otherwise, an expert may state an opinion—and give the reasons for it—without first testifying to the underlying facts or data. But the expert may be required to disclose those facts or data on cross-examination.

§ 16–706    FRE 706. Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses

FRE 706 states:
(a) Appointment Process. On a party’s motion or on its own, the court may order the parties to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed and may ask the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert that the parties agree on and any of its own choosing. But the court may only appoint someone who consents to act.
(b) Expert’s Role. The court must inform the expert of the expert’s duties. The court may do so in writing and have a copy filed with the clerk or may do so orally at a conference in which the parties have an opportunity to participate. The expert:
(1) must advise the parties of any findings the expert makes;
(2) may be deposed by any party;
(3) may be called to testify by the court or any party; and
(4) may be cross-examined by any party, including the party that called the expert.
(c) Compensation. The expert is entitled to a reasonable compensation, as set by the court. The compensation is payable as follows:
(1) in a criminal case or in a civil case involving just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, from any funds that are provided by law; and
(2) in any other civil case, by the parties in the proportion and at the time that the court directs—and the compensation is then charged like other costs.

(e) Parties’ Choice of Their Own Experts. This rule does not limit a party in calling its own experts.

§ 16–800  Hearsay

§ 16–801  FRE 801. Definitions; Exclusions from Hearsay

FRE 801 states:
(a) Statement. "Statement" means a person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. "Declarant" means the person who made the statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" means a statement that:
(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay:
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement:
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition;
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered:
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; or
(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked on another ground; or
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier.

(2) An Opposing Party’s Statement. The statement is offered against an opposing party and:
(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity;
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true;
(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the subject;
(D) was made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed; or
(E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

The statement must be considered but does not by itself establish the declarant’s authority under (C); the existence or scope of the relationship under (D); or the existence of the conspiracy or participation in it under (E).

§ 16–801.1 Purpose of Evidence: Truth of the Matter Asserted

As indicated in FRE 801(c)(2), a statement is hearsay only if it is offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” See, e.g., Salem Hospital Corp., 363 NLRB No. 56, slip op. at 1 n. 1 (2015). In that case, the Board rejected the respondent’s argument that the judge improperly relied on the hearsay testimony of a union official about what some nurses had reported to a union organizer about the employer’s plans to close certain units. The Board found that the testimony was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to show the effect it had on the hearer, citing Hebert Industrial Insulation Corp., 312 NLRB 602, 608 (1993). It further found that the testimony was admissible “in any event” because the respondent did not object to the testimony at the hearing, citing Alvin J. Bart & Co., 236 NLRB 242, 243 (1978), enf. denied on other grounds 598 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1979). See also U.S. v. Safavian, 435 F.Supp.2d 36, 44 (D.D.C. 2006) (emails were admissible as non-hearsay because they were offered to provide context or to show that the statements were made, not to establish the truth of the statements).

§ 16–801.2 Affidavit of Recanting Witness

Where an employee witness gives testimony inconsistent from his/her pretrial affidavit, the Board has permitted the affidavits to be introduced as substantive evidence to allay concerns over witness intimidation. The Board has suggested that the affidavits may be sufficiently similar to depositions to constitute nonhearsay under FRE 801(d)(1)(A). But, even assuming they are hearsay, the Board has admitted them where corroborated. See Conley Trucking, 349 NLRB 308, 309–313 (2007), enf. 520 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2008), and cases cited there. See also § 16–802, Corroborated Hearsay, below. For pretrial statements of respondent supervisors or agents, see § 16–801.3, Admission or Statement by Opposing Party, below.

For a case involving a posthearing recanting affidavit, see Southdown Care Center, 313 NLRB 1114, 1114–1115, 1118 (1994). In that case, the Board remanded for consideration of the posthearing affidavit of a major witness indicating that most of her testimony at the hearing was false. On remand the judge, disbelieving the recanting affidavit, reaffirmed his original findings, which the Board adopted.
§ 16–801.3 Admission or Statement by Opposing Party

Admissions and statements by a party or its agents are covered by FRE 801(d)(2). Ferguson Enterprises, Inc., 355 NLRB 1121 n. 2 (2010) (supervisor’s statements to an employee were nonhearsay admissions under FRE 801(d)(2)); and Times Union, 356 NLRB 1339 n. 1 (2011) (article by respondent’s business reporter quoting respondent’s publisher fell within exception to hearsay rule set forth in FRE 801(d)(2)(D) for statements by a party agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship).

Statements by supervisors. Pretrial affidavits given to the General Counsel by supervisors while employed by the respondent concerning matters within the scope of employment are nonhearsay statements by a party opponent under FRE 801(d)(2). See, e.g., Fredericksburg Glass & Mirror, 323 NLRB 165, 175–176 (1997) and cases cited there.

Party position statements. Many cases find attorney statements, both in and out of court, to be admissions. For example, it is well-established Board law that a lawyer’s position letter can be received as an admission if it contains a statement or statements conflicting with the party’s position. See, e.g., Raley’s, 348 NLRB 382, 501–502 (2006); McKenzie Engineering Co., 326 NLRB 473, 485 n. 6 (1998); Hogan Masonry, 314 NLRB 332, 333 n. 1 (1994); United Technologies Corp., 310 NLRB 1126, 1127 n. 1 (1993), enf’d. mem. 29 F.3d 621 (2d Cir. 1994); and Massillon Community Hospital, 282 NLRB 675 n. 5 (1987). See also MPCA v. NLRB, 813 F.3d 475, 493 n. 13 (3d Cir. 2016). Indeed, it is reversible error for the judge to refuse to admit into evidence such a position paper. Massillon Community Hospital, above; Florida Steel Co., 235 NLRB 1010, 1011-1012 (1978); and Ablon Poultry & Egg Co., 134 NLRB 827 n. 1 (1961). The rule applies even to respondent position statements submitted by former counsel. See United Scrap Metal, Inc., 344 NLRB 467, 467–468, n. 5 (2005); and Optica Lee Borinquen, 307 NLRB 705 n. 6 (1992), enf’d. mem. 991 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1993). It also applies to position statements previously submitted in representation proceedings. See Evergreen America, 348 NLRB 178 (2006). See also Bliss & Laughlin Steel Co., 266 NLRB 1165, 1167 n. 2 (1983), enf’d. 754 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1985).

As previously discussed in § 8-455 (Work Product Privilege), the Board in Kaiser Aluminum, 339 NLRB 829 (2003), held that a charging party does not waive the work product privilege by giving a position statement to the General Counsel. However, the Board did not overrule or otherwise signal that it was retreating from the cases cited above involving respondent position statements. See the judge’s discussion in Evergreen America, above, 348 NLRB at 187–188.

It is unclear what, if any, weight the judge may give a position statement that has been disavowed by the attorney prior to trial. See Orland Park Motor, 333 NLRB 1017 n. 1, 1024–1026 (2001). However, the Board has held that an admission in an answer filed in a prior proceeding may properly be considered notwithstanding counsel’s assertion that the prior pleading was “simply a clerical error that was never remedied.” Spurlino Materials, LLC, 357 NLRB 1510 n. 1, 1514 n. 18, 1516 n. 20 (2011), enf’d. 805 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Board has also held that a lawyer’s position letter can be used to impeach the lawyer’s conflicting testimony at the trial. Harowe Servo Controls, Inc., 250 NLRB 958, 1033 (1980). See also Performance Friction Corp., 335 NLRB 1117, 1149 (2001), describing other ways an attorney can make admissions in Board proceedings.
A party may not affirmatively rely on its own assertions in position statements or briefs to help establish a point on which it carries the burden of proof. See *Cannondale Corp.*, 310 NLRB 845, 852 (1993) (attorney’s position letter); *Domsey Trading Corp.*, 310 NLRB 777, 814 n. 35 (1993) (attorney’s letter to the judge in the nature of a supplemental brief), enfd. 16 F.3d 517 (2d Cir. 1994); *Auburn Foundry*, 274 NLRB 1317 n. 2 (1985), enfd. 791 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1986) (a statement in the lawyer’s brief to the judge); and *Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank*, 30 F.3d 339, 343 (2d Cir. 1994) (a statement made in the counsel’s opening statement).

Statements in pleadings. Generally, documents contained in General Counsel’s Exhibit 1 are limited to the so-called “formal papers” (charges, pleadings, motions, orders, and other similar documents), and are therefore offered and received as merely procedural documents. *Dynatron/Bondo Corp.*, 324 NLRB 572 n. 5 (1997), enfd. in part and denied in part 176 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, they generally do not constitute substantive evidence unless they contain an admission.

The Board has repeatedly held that admissions in an answer are binding even where the admitting party later attempts to produce contrary evidence. *C.P. Associates, Inc.*, 336 NLRB 167 (2001); *Consolidated Bus Transit, Inc.*, 350 NLRB 1064, 1065 n. 6 (2007), enfd. 577 F.3d 467 (2d Cir. 2009); and *Lorge School*, 355 NLRB 558, JD at n. 3 (2010) (answer to compliance specification). See also *T. Steele Construction, Inc.*, 351 NLRB 1032 n. 12 (2007) (rejecting respondent’s argument that its previous admission in its answer should be amended to a denial to conform to the evidence presented at trial); and *Boydston Electric, Inc.*, 331 NLRB 1450, 1451 (2000) (holding that the judge erred in finding, based on the evidence at trial, that the alleged discriminatee was not discharged, in light of the respondent’s previous admission to the discharge in its answer).

With respect to admissions in withdrawn or superseded answers, see *Graham, 6 Handbook of Fed. Evid. § 801:26* (7th ed., database updated Oct. 2017) (admissions in superseded or withdrawn pleadings are considered evidentiary rather than binding admissions and may be controverted or explained by the party).

With respect to an admission in a previous case, see *Spurlino Materials*, above.

Statements in form of opinion or legal conclusion. See *Casino Pauma*, 362 NLRB No. 52, JD. at n. 7 (2015) (tribal casino’s prior memos to its employees stating that they were protected by the NLRA, which were offered by the union and received into evidence without objection, could properly be considered in evaluating the casino’s argument that the Board lacked jurisdiction).

Statements by noncharging-party discriminatee. Affidavits or statements of a noncharging-party discriminatee generally are not admissible as substantive evidence because such an individual is not a “party opponent” under FRE 801(d)(2). See *Performance Friction Corp.*, 335 NLRB 1117, 1120 n. 20 (2001); and *Vencor Hospital Los Angeles*, 324 NLRB 234, 235 n. 5 (1997). But see § 16–801.1, Pretrial Statement of Recanting Witness, above.

Documents in personnel files. Under FRE 801(d)(2), a document in an employee’s personnel file may be received as substantive evidence for the truth of the matters asserted therein if it constitutes a statement by the respondent employer. *Laidlaw Transit, Inc.*, 315 NLRB 509, 512 (1994) (a memo in an employee’s personnel file, signed by the employee’s manager
and dated 10 days after the discharge, warrants an inference that the document, describing the termination interview, was company generated).

Note that memos and other documents in an employee's personnel file may also be admissible under FRE 803(6), the hearsay exception applicable to "records of regularly conducted activity" (business records), discussed more fully below in § 16–803.4.

§ 16–802 FRE 802. The Rule Against Hearsay

FRE 802 states:

Hearsay is not admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise:

a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

As with other rules of evidence, the Board applies the hearsay rules “so far as practicable.” See § 16–100, above. However, like other administrative agencies, the Board does “not invoke a technical rule of exclusion but admit[s] hearsay evidence and give[s] it such weight as its inherent quality justifies.” *Midland Hilton & Towers*, 324 NLRB 1141 n. 1 (1997), citing *Alvin J. Bart & Co.*, 236 NLRB 242 (1978), enf. denied on other grounds 598 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1979).

§ 16–802.1 Corroborated hearsay

Hearsay evidence is admissible in Board proceedings “if rationally probative in force and if corroborated by something more than the slightest amount of other evidence.” *Midland Towers*, above, citing *RJR Communications, Inc.*, 248 NLRB 920, 921 (1980). See also *Rome Electrical Systems*, 356 NLRB 170 n. 4 (2010) (Board "may consider probative hearsay testimony that is corroborated by other evidence or otherwise inherently reliable"); *RC Aluminum Industries, Inc.*, 343 NLRB 939, 940 (2004) (affirming the judge’s ruling admitting corroborated hearsay); and *Dauman Pallet, Inc.*, 314 NLRB 185, 186 (1994) (overturning the judge’s exclusion of corroborated hearsay and according it weight). Cf. *W. D. Manor Mechanical Contractors, Inc.*, 357 NLRB 1526 (2011) (uncorroborated hearsay is entitled to “little weight”); and *NLRB v. First Termite Control Co.*, 646 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the evidence supporting legal jurisdiction was hearsay and remanding the case to the Board).

§ 16–802.2 Double hearsay

Double hearsay is inadmissible, unless both parts satisfy the Board’s requirements. See *Auto Workers Local 651 (General Motors)*, 331 NLRB 479, 481 (2000) (an employee’s uncorroborated testimony that a second employee told her that he heard a supervisor call her a “voodoo sister” was unreliable hearsay and did not support a finding that the supervisor was in fact hostile to her); and *T.L.C. St. Petersburg*, 307 NLRB 605 (1992), affd. mem. 985 F.2d 579 (11th Cir. 1993) (judge properly accorded no weight, on the issue of the company’s good faith doubt of the union’s majority status, to the company president’s testimony concerning statements allegedly made by employees to an employee and a supervisor that they subsequently conveyed to him). Cf. *Kamtech, Inc.*, 333 NLRB 242 n. 4 (2001) (purported “double hearsay” statements were actually a party admission not barred by the hearsay rule). See also FRE 805, set forth in § 16–805, below.
§ 16–803 FRE 803. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay — Regardless of Whether the Declarant Is Available as a Witness

FRE 803 states in relevant part:
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:

(1) **Present Sense Impression.** A statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.

(2) **Excited Utterance.** A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.

(3) **Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.** A statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant’s will.

(4) **Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.** A statement that:
   - (A) is made for — and is reasonably pertinent to — medical diagnosis or treatment; and
   - (B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause.

(5) **Recorded Recollection.** A record that:
   - (A) is on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall well enough to testify fully and accurately;
   - (B) was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness’s memory; and
   - (C) accurately reflects the witness’s knowledge.

If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may be received as an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.

(6) **Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity.** A record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if:
   - (A) the record was made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge;
   - (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;
   - (C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
   - (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and
   - (E) the opponent does not show that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

(7) **Absence of a Record of a Regularly Conducted Activity.** Evidence that a matter is not included in a record described in paragraph (6) if:
   - (A) the evidence is admitted to prove that the matter did not occur or exist;
   - (B) a record was regularly kept for a matter of that kind; and
   - (C) the opponent does not show that the possible source of the information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

(8) **Public Records.** A record or statement of a public office if:
   - (A) it sets out:
     - (i) the office’s activities;
(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not including, in a criminal case, a matter observed by law-enforcement personnel; or

(iii) in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, factual findings from a legally authorized investigation; and

(B) the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

(9) Public Records of Vital Statistics. A record of a birth, death, or marriage, if reported to a public office in accordance with a legal duty.

(10) Absence of a Public Record. Testimony — or a certification under Rule 902 — that a diligent search failed to disclose a public record or statement if the testimony or certification is admitted to prove that:

(A) the record or statement does not exist; or

(B) a matter did not occur or exist, if a public office regularly kept a record or statement for a matter of that kind.

(11) Records of Religious Organizations Concerning Personal or Family History. A statement of birth, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, death, relationship by blood or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization.

(12) Certificates of Marriage, Baptism, and Similar Ceremonies. A statement of fact contained in a certificate:

(A) made by a person who is authorized by a religious organization or by law to perform the act certified;

(B) attesting that the person performed a marriage or similar ceremony or administered a sacrament; and

(C) purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time after it.

(13) Family Records. A statement of fact about personal or family history contained in a family record, such as a Bible, genealogy, chart, engraving on a ring, inscription on a portrait, or engraving on an urn or burial marker.

(14) Records of Documents That Affect an Interest in Property. The record of a document that purports to establish or affect an interest in property if:

(A) the record is admitted to prove the content of the original recorded document, along with its signing and its delivery by each person who purports to have signed it;

(B) the record is kept in a public office; and

(C) a statute authorizes recording documents of that kind in that office.

(15) Statements in Documents That Affect an Interest in Property. A statement contained in a document that purports to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the document’s purpose — unless later dealings with the property are inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.

(16) Statements in Ancient Documents. A statement in a document that was prepared before January 1, 1998, and whose authenticity is established.

(17) Market Reports and Similar Commercial Publications. Market quotations, lists, directories, or other compilations that are generally relied on by the public or by persons in particular occupations.

(18) Statements in Learned Treatises, Periodicals, or Pamphlets. A statement contained in a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet if:

(A) the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness on cross-examination or relied on by the expert on direct examination; and
(B) the publication is established as a reliable authority by the expert’s admission or testimony, by another expert’s testimony, or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit.

(19) Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History. A reputation among a person’s family by blood, adoption, or marriage — or among a person’s associates or in the community — concerning the person’s birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, death, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history.

(20) Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General History. A reputation in a community — arising before the controversy — concerning boundaries of land in the community or customs that affect the land, or concerning general historical events important to that community, state, or nation.

(21) Reputation Concerning Character. A reputation among a person’s associates or in the community concerning the person’s character.

(22) Judgment of a Previous Conviction. Evidence of a final judgment of conviction if:
   (A) the judgment was entered after a trial or guilty plea, but not a nolo contendere plea;
   (B) the conviction was for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than a year; [and]
   (C) the evidence is admitted to prove any fact essential to the judgment; . . . . .

The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.

(23) Judgments Involving Personal, Family, or General History, or a Boundary. A judgment that is admitted to prove a matter of personal, family, or general history, or boundaries, if the matter:
   (A) was essential to the judgment; and
   (B) could be proved by evidence of reputation.

(24) [Other Exceptions.] [Transferred to Rule 807.]

§ 16–803.1 State of Mind: Motive

Issues frequently arise regarding a person’s state of mind at the time of the alleged events. FRE 803(3) provides that a “statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed . . . .” are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even if the declarant is available as a witness. See, e.g., International Business Systems, 258 NLRB 181 n. 6 (1981) (prior statements attributed to strikers, which articulated their fears, grievances, and intent to strike, constituted statements of then-existing state of mind or emotion, and thus were admissible under FRE 803(3) to establish that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike), enfd. mem. 659 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1981); and Global Recruiters of Winfield, 363 NLRB No. 68, slip op. at 6 n. 10 (2015) (prior emails from the respondent company’s owner to corporate staff about how to work with the alleged discriminatee, which were offered into evidence by the respondent itself, were not excluded by the hearsay rules as they were offered for the purpose of establishing the owner’s state of mind when he wrote the emails and his motivation for the various actions that he subsequently took regarding the discriminatee).

See also Lightner v. Dauman Pallet, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 249, 252 n. 2 (D. N.J. 1992), affd. mem. 993 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1993); and Garcia v. Green Fleet Systems, LLC, 2014 WL 5343814 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (testimony that employees had expressed fear of losing their jobs or
other retaliation for supporting the union is admissible under the FRE 803(3) “state of mind” exception to the hearsay rule to show that the employer’s alleged unfair labor practices had a chilling effect and that an interim injunction against the employer under Section 10(j) of the Act is therefore just and proper).

§ 16–803.2 Recorded Recollection

Under FRE 803(5), the contents of a memorandum or record written, signed, or adopted by a witness reciting events which occurred in the past, but of which the witness has insufficient present recollection, are admissible in evidence as substantive proof of the events. See J. C. Penney Co. v. NLRB, 384 F.2d 479, 484 (10th Cir. 1967) (distinguishing between writings admitted as past recollection recorded and writings used to stimulate memory [present recollection revived] or to determine truthfulness [prior inconsistent statements]).

Foundation Required. Normally, a foundation must be laid, through testimony of the witness, that at the time of the memorandum he had a recollection of the events, and that he made or adopted them believing them to be true. J.C. Penney, above. But cf. Three Sisters Sportswear Co., 312 NLRB 853, 865 (1993), enf'd mem. 55 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 1093 (1996), where the pretrial affidavit of a frightened witness (a current employee), who claimed not to remember anything about her affidavit other than her signature, was received in evidence as past recollection recorded under FRE 803(5).

Reading Document vs. Submitting as Exhibit. If admissible under FRE 803(5), the memorandum or record may be read into the record by the party offering it as substantive evidence, and the adverse party may actually submit it as an exhibit. See, e.g., J. G. Braun Co., 126 NLRB 368, 369 n. 3 (1960) (judge erred in rejecting the General Counsel’s offer of a witness’s pretrial affidavit into evidence after the respondent on cross-examination had read portions of the affidavit into the record to refresh the witness’s recollection).

§ 16–803.3 Bargaining Notes

Bargaining notes have been held admissible as substantive evidence under one or more of the exceptions listed in FRE 803. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 179 NLRB 1, 2 n. 9 (1969); and NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472, 483 (5th Cir. 1963) (citing 803(5)); Pacific Coast Metal Trades Council (Lockheed Shipbuilding), 282 NLRB 239, JD at n. 2 (1986) (citing 803(6)), and Mack Trucks, 277 NLRB 711, 725 (1985) (citing both 803(1) and 803(6)). In some cases the parties will stipulate to the receipt of the bargaining summaries of one or more parties, with the qualification that all parties are free to contest any entry and to advance their own version of the meetings. See Formosa Plastics Corp., Louisiana, 320 NLRB 631, 641 (1996).

§ 16–803.4 Business Records

As noted in § 16–801.3, above, memos and other documents in an employee’s personnel file may be admitted as records of regularly conducted business activity under FRE 803(6), provided the conditions set forth in that rule are met. See Affinity Medical Center, 362 NLRB No. 78, JD at n. 8 (2015) (document purporting to be a verbal warning prepared 4 months after the event did not meet the requirements of FRE 803(6) because it was not prepared at or near the time of the incident and the circumstances of preparation indicated a lack of trustworthiness). See also Pierce v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe, 110 F.3d 431, 444 (7th Cir. 1997) (trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding a manager’s memo that was placed in theplaintiff-
employee’s personnel file and summarized manager’s meetings with plaintiff, as it “was not created with the kind of regularity or routine that gives business records their inherent reliability,” and “it was obviously to memorialize an unusual incident . . . that [the manager] may have been concerned could have some litigation potential to it.”).

§ 16–804 FRE 804. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay — When the Declarant Is Unavailable as a Witness

FRE 804 states in relevant part:

(a) Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant:

(1) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant’s statement because the court rules that a privilege applies;
(2) refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so;
(3) testifies to not remembering the subject matter;
(4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness; or
(5) is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement’s proponent has not been able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure:
   (A) the declarant’s attendance, in the case of a hearsay exception under Rule 804(b)(1) or (6); or
   (B) the declarant’s attendance or testimony, in the case of a hearsay exception under Rule 804(b)(2), (3), or (4).
But this subdivision (a) does not apply if the statement’s proponent procured or wrongfully caused the declarant’s unavailability as a witness in order to prevent the declarant from attending or testifying.

(b) The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

(1) Former Testimony. Testimony that:
   (A) was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given during the current proceeding or a different one; and
   (B) is now offered against a party who had — or, in a civil case, whose predecessor in interest had — an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.
(2) Statement Under the Belief of Imminent Death. In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil case, a statement that the declarant, while believing the declarant’s death to be imminent, made about its cause or circumstances.
(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement that:
   (A) a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant’s claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability; . . . .
   (4) Statement of Personal or Family History. A statement about:
      (A) the declarant’s own birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history, even though the declarant had no way of acquiring personal knowledge about that fact; or
      (B) another person concerning any of these facts, as well as death, if the declarant was related to the person by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so
intimately associated with the person’s family that the declarant’s information is likely to be accurate.

(5) [Other Exceptions.] [Transferred to Rule 807.]

(6) Statement Offered Against a Party That Wrongfully Caused the Declarant’s Unavailability. A statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused — or acquiesced in wrongfully causing — the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.

§ 16–804.1 Declarant Unavailable

For Board cases applying the FRE 804 unavailability requirement, see Park Maintenance, 348 NLRB 1373 n. 2 (2006) (reversing the judge’s ruling which admitted affidavits in the absence of a showing that the affiants were unavailable to testify); and Marine Engineers District 1 (Dutra Construction), 312 NLRB 55 (1993) (holding that the judge properly struck the non-Board affidavit of a nonappearing witness, offered in support of an affirmative defense, as the respondent did not allege that the affiant was unavailable to testify).

§ 16–804.2 Declarant Deceased

FRE 804 provides that certain statements, including former testimony and statements against interest, are excepted from the hearsay rule where the declarant is deceased. The Board will also generally admit into evidence other statements by a deceased person where the requirements of the residual hearsay exception (now FRE 807) are satisfied. See Weco Cleaning Specialists, 308 NLRB 310, 311 n. 7, 314–315 (affidavit of a deceased company agent—which was taken by the union’s attorney using the same procedures he used as a former Board agent—was admissible under the residual hearsay exception as the affidavit was supported by circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and corroborated by other evidence). See also NLRB v. St. George Warehouse, 645 F.3d 666 (3d Cir. 2011) (court declined to follow contrary decisions in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and held that the hearsay testimony of the deceased discriminatee’s mother regarding her son’s post-termination search for alternative work was admissible in the backpay proceeding to show that the discriminatee had engaged in a reasonably diligent search for work), enfg. 355 NLRB 474 (2010).

Because unfair labor practice proceedings before the Board derive substantively and procedurally from a federal statute, state law does not supply the “rule of decision” under FRE 601. Accordingly, the Board is not bound to apply state “dead man’s” statutes excluding “statements attributed to deceased persons or those too ill to testify.” Quarles Mfg. Co., 83 NLRB 697, 699 n. 8 (1949), remanded at request of Board to vacate order and dismiss complaint 190 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1951).

However, the Board subjects such a statement to “the closest scrutiny before deciding what weight to give it.” West Texas Utilities, 94 NLRB 1638, 1639 (1951), enfd. 195 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1952). See also Ann’s Laundry, 276 NLRB 269, 270 n. 3 (1985) (same).

§ 16–804.3 Affidavits

It is well established that “a party may use an affidavit to refresh a witness’s recollection, to rehabilitate a witness’s direct examination testimony on cross-examination, or to prove a witness’s prior statements when a witness’s testimony at hearing differs from that witness’s affidavit.” W & M Properties of Connecticut, Inc., 348 NLRB 162 (2006), enfd. 514 F.3d 1341
Unless used for one of these purposes, affidavits generally are received substantively only if the declarant is deceased or unavailable, or the taking of testimony poses a threat to the health of the witness. This is because there is no opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine or the judge to observe demeanor. *Weco Cleaning Specialists*, above, and *Colonna’s Shipyard*, 293 NLRB 136, 143 n. 2 (1989), enfd. mem. 900 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1990).

§ 16–805  **FRE 805. Hearsay Within Hearsay**

FRE 805 states:
Hearsay within hearsay is not excluded by the rule against hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule.

See § 16–802.2, Double Hearsay, above.

§ 16–806  **FRE 806. Attacking and Supporting the Declarant’s Credibility**

FRE 806 states:
When a hearsay statement—or a statement described in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E)—has been admitted in evidence, the declarant’s credibility may be attacked, and then supported, by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness. The court may admit evidence of the declarant’s inconsistent statement or conduct, regardless of when it occurred or whether the declarant had an opportunity to explain or deny it. If the party against whom the statement was admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party may examine the declarant on the statement as if on cross-examination.

§ 16–807  **FRE 807. Residual Exception**

FRE 807 states:
(a) In General. Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804:
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness;
(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and
(4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice.

(b) Notice. The statement is admissible only if, before the trial or hearing, the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer the statement and its particulars, including the declarant’s name and address, so that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.

§ 16–807.1  **Notice Not Required**

“The Board does not require adherence to the [Federal Rules of Evidence] requirement that the proponent of a hearsay statement make known to the adverse party, with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, of the intention to offer the statement, and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.” *Sheet Metal Workers Local 28* (Borella
The judge, however, may exercise his or her discretion to impose a notice requirement in circumstances indicating that a lack of some notice will prejudice the adverse party or prolong the trial.

§ 16–900 Authentication and Identification

§ 16–901 FRE 901. Authenticating or Identifying Evidence

FRE 901 states:
(a) In General. To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.
(b) Examples. The following are examples only — not a complete list — of evidence that satisfies the requirement:
   (1) Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be.
   (2) Nonexpert Opinion About Handwriting. A nonexpert’s opinion that handwriting is genuine, based on a familiarity with it that was not acquired for the current litigation.
   (3) Comparison by an Expert Witness or the Trier of Fact. A comparison with an authenticated specimen by an expert witness or the trier of fact.
   (4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.
   (5) Opinion About a Voice. An opinion identifying a person’s voice — whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording — based on hearing the voice at any time under circumstances that connect it with the alleged speaker.
   (6) Evidence About a Telephone Conversation. For a telephone conversation, evidence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time to:
      (A) a particular person, if circumstances, including self-identification, show that the person answering was the one called; or
      (B) a particular business, if the call was made to a business and the call related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone.
   (7) Evidence About Public Records. Evidence that:
      (A) a document was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by law; or
      (B) a purported public record or statement is from the office where items of this kind are kept.
   (8) Evidence About Ancient Documents or Data Compilations. For a document or data compilation, evidence that it:
      (A) is in a condition that creates no suspicion about its authenticity;
      (B) was in a place where, if authentic, it would likely be; and
      (C) is at least 20 years old when offered.
   (9) Evidence About a Process or System. Evidence describing a process or system and showing that it produces an accurate result.
(10) **Methods Provided by a Statute or Rule.** Any method of authentication or identification allowed by a federal statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court.

**§ 16–901.1 Circumstantial Evidence**

Pursuant to FRE 901(b)(4), a document may be identified and authenticated by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. See *Sunland Construction Co.*, 311 NLRB 685, 692-698 (1993). See also cases cited in *Goode & Wellborne, Courtroom Handbook on Federal Evidence 529* (West 2012); and *Graham, 6 Handbook of Fed. Evid. § 901:4* (7th ed., database updated Oct. 2017). This is true with respect to electronically stored information (ESI), such as email communications, social media posts, and cellular text messages, as well as more traditional documents. See *U.S. v. Browne*, 834 F.3d 403, 411–415 (3d Cir. 2016); and *Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co.*, 241 F.R.D. 534, 546–548 (D. Md. 2007), and cases cited there (describing the various types of evidence that have been found sufficient to authenticate ESI).

**§ 16–901.2 Handwriting/Union Authorization Cards**

Board cases indicate that there are several alternative ways union authorization cards may be authenticated. Cards may be authenticated by the card signers themselves; by a witness who observed the cards being signed; or by the person who solicited the cards and received them back, even if the solicitor did not actually observe the cards being signed. See, e.g., *Novelis*, 364 NLRB No. 101, slip op. at 3 (2016); *Evergreen America Corp.*, 348 NLRB 178, 179 (2006), enfd. 531 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2008); and *McEwen Mfg. Co.*, 172 NLRB 990, 992 (1968), enfd. 419 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied 90 S.Ct. 1120 (1970), and cases cited there. See also *Stride Rite*, 228 NLRB 224, 235 (1977) (cards were adequately authenticated by the solicitor under the circumstances despite “some confusion” in her testimony regarding who returned cards to her).

Cards may also be authenticated by comparing handwriting and signatures with authenticated specimens. Either an expert or the judge may perform this task. “[T]he Board has long held, consistent with Section 901(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, that a judge or a handwriting expert may determine the genuineness of signatures on authorization cards by comparing them to W-4 forms in the employer’s records.” *Novelis*, above; and *Parts Depot, Inc.*, 332 NLRB 670, 674 (2000), enfd. 24 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See also *Traction Wholesale Center Co.*, 328 NLRB 1058, 1059–1060 (1999) (judge properly compared the signature on the authorization card to signatures on the employee’s employment application and work rules forms, which respondent kept and relied on in the ordinary course of business and produced pursuant to a subpoena), enfd. 216 F.3d 92, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

**§ 16–902 FRE 902. Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating**

FRE 902 states:

The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted:

(1) **Domestic Public Documents That Are Sealed and Signed.** A document that bears:

(A) a seal purporting to be that of the United States; any state, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession of the United States; the former Panama Canal Zone; the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; a political
subdivision of any of these entities; or a department, agency, or officer of any entity named above; and

(B) a signature purporting to be an execution or attestation.

(2) **Domestic Public Documents That Are Not Sealed but Are Signed and Certified.** A document that bears no seal if:

(A) it bears the signature of an officer or employee of an entity named in Rule 902(1)(A); and

(B) another public officer who has a seal and official duties within that same entity certifies under seal—or its equivalent—that the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is genuine.

(3) **Foreign Public Documents.** A document that purports to be signed or attested by a person who is authorized by a foreign country’s law to do so. The document must be accompanied by a final certification that certifies the genuineness of the signature and official position of the signer or attester — or of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness relates to the signature or attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness relating to the signature or attestation. The certification may be made by a secretary of a United States embassy or legation; by a consul general, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States; or by a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If all parties have been given a reasonable opportunity to investigate the document’s authenticity and accuracy, the court may, for good cause, either:

(A) order that it be treated as presumptively authentic without final certification; or

(B) allow it to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without final certification.

(4) **Certified Copies of Public Records.** A copy of an official record — or a copy of a document that was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by law — if the copy is certified as correct by:

(A) the custodian or another person authorized to make the certification; or

(B) a certificate that complies with Rule 902(1), (2), or (3), a federal statute, or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court.

(5) **Official Publications.** A book, pamphlet, or other publication purporting to be issued by a public authority.

(6) **Newspapers and Periodicals.** Printed material purporting to be a newspaper or periodical.

(7) **Trade Inscriptions and the Like.** An inscription, sign, tag, or label purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and indicating origin, ownership, or control.

(8) **Acknowledged Documents.** A document accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment that is lawfully executed by a notary public or another officer who is authorized to take acknowledgments.

(9) **Commercial Paper and Related Documents.** Commercial paper, a signature on it, and related documents, to the extent allowed by general commercial law.

(10) **Presumptions Under a Federal Statute.** A signature, document, or anything else that a federal statute declares to be presumptively or prima facie genuine or authentic.

(11) **Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity.** The original or a copy of a domestic record that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown by a certification of the custodian or another qualified
person that complies with a federal statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court. Before the trial or hearing, the proponent must give an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record—and must make the record and certification available for inspection—so that the party has a fair opportunity to challenge them.

(12) **Certified Foreign Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity.** In a civil case, the original or a copy of a foreign record that meets the requirements of Rule 902(11), modified as follows: the certification, rather than complying with a federal statute or Supreme Court rule, must be signed in a manner that, if falsely made, would subject the maker to a criminal penalty in the country where the certification is signed. The proponent must also meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11).

(13) **Certified Records Generated by an Electronic Process or System.** A record generated by an electronic process or system that produces an accurate result, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The proponent must also meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11).

(14) **Certified Data Copied from an Electronic Device, Storage Medium, or File.** Data copied from an electronic device, storage medium, or file, if authenticated by a process of digital identification, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The proponent also must meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11).

§ 16–902.1  **Newspaper/Television Reports**

Newspaper articles and job advertisements are self-authenticating under FRE 902(6). Self-authenticating documents, however, are not necessarily admissible. See, for example, *Sheet Metal Workers Local 15*, 346 NLRB 199, 202 (2006) (excluding a newspaper article’s quotation of the CEO as hearsay), enf. denied on other grounds 491 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2007). See also *B. N. Beard Co.*, 248 NLRB 198, 199 n. 9 (1980), where the Board avoided the hearsay problem presented with an article quoting the respondent’s president by disregarding the quote and instead considering only the newspaper reporter’s credited testimony describing what the president told him.

Television interviews may require different treatment. TV videotapes are not listed in FRE 902 as self-authenticating. But see *Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC*, 97 F.Supp.3d 287, 342 n. 28 (E.D. N.Y. 2015) (finding that a CNN video was “effectively self-authenticating,” as it bore CNN logos, showed no signs of being edited, and “forging such a video would be extremely difficult”), appeal filed June 22, 2016.

§ 16–903  **FRE 903. Subscribing Witness’s Testimony**

FRE 903 states:
A subscribing witness’s testimony is necessary to authenticate a writing only if required by the law of the jurisdiction that governs its validity.

§ 16–1000  **Contents of Writings, Recordings, and Photographs**

§ 16–1001  **FRE 1001. Definitions That Apply to This Article**

FRE 1001 states:
In this article:

(a) A “writing” consists of letters, words, numbers, or their equivalent set down in any form.

(b) A “recording” consists of letters, words, numbers, or their equivalent recorded in any manner.

(c) A “photograph” means a photographic image or its equivalent stored in any form.

(d) An “original” of a writing or recording means the writing or recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by the person who executed or issued it. For electronically stored information, “original” means any printout — or other output readable by sight — if it accurately reflects the information. An “original” of a photograph includes the negative or a print from it.

(e) A “duplicate” means a counterpart produced by a mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent process or technique that accurately reproduces the original.

§ 16–1002 FRE 1002. Requirement of the Original

FRE 1002 states:
An original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to prove its content unless these rules or a federal statute provides otherwise.

§ 16–1003 FRE 1003. Admissibility of Duplicates

FRE 1003 states:
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original's authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.

§ 16–1004 FRE 1004. Admissibility of Other Evidence of Content

FRE 1004 states:
An original is not required and other evidence of the content of a writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if:

(a) all the originals are lost or destroyed, and not by the proponent acting in bad faith;

(b) an original cannot be obtained by any available judicial process;

(c) the party against whom the original would be offered had control of the original; was at that time put on notice, by pleadings or otherwise, that the original would be a subject of proof at the trial or hearing; and fails to produce it at the trial or hearing; or

(d) the writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to a controlling issue.

§ 16–1005 FRE 1005. Copies of Public Records to Prove Content

FRE 1005 states:
The proponent may use a copy to prove the content of an official record —or of a document that was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by law—if these conditions are met: the record or document is otherwise admissible; and the copy is certified as correct in accordance with Rule 902(4) or is testified to be
correct by a witness who has compared it with the original. If no such copy can be obtained by reasonable diligence, then the proponent may use other evidence to prove the content.

§ 16–1006  FRE 1006. Summaries to Prove Content

FRE 1006 states:
The proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court. The proponent must make the originals or duplicates available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place. And the court may order the proponent to produce them in court.

Summaries of documents are often prepared and offered in evidence where the documents themselves are too voluminous or complicated to be conveniently presented in their entirety. Under FRE 1006, such summaries are admissible if the underlying documents would be admissible and have been made available to opposing counsel for examination, and a proper foundation for the summary is established (usually by the person who prepared the summary).

A party may also offer a summary of documents that are already in the record. In such circumstances, the judge may properly consider whether admission of the summary is warranted under FRE 611(a). Other types of summaries or compilations may require evaluation under one or more rules, such as FRE 803(5) (recorded recollection) or FRE 803(6) (summaries or compilations made at or near the time of the events and kept in the regular course of business).

Regardless of which type of summary is involved, in evaluating its admissibility and/or probative weight, the judge should carefully consider the circumstances under which the summary was prepared, and whether it reflects the author’s subjective view or interpretation of the underlying information. See Monfort of Colorado, 298 NLRB 73, 82 n. 37 (1990).

§ 16–1007  FRE 1007. Testimony or Statement of a Party to Prove Content

FRE 1007 states:
The proponent may prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph by the testimony, deposition, or written statement of the party against whom the evidence is offered. The proponent need not account for the original.

§ 16–1101  FRE 1101. Applicability of the Rules

FRE 1101 states:
(a) To Courts and Judges. These rules apply to proceedings before:
United States district courts; United States bankruptcy and magistrate judges;
United States courts of appeals; the United States Court of Federal Claims; and
the district courts of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
(b) To Cases and Proceedings. These rules apply in: civil cases and proceedings, including bankruptcy, admiralty, and maritime cases; criminal cases and proceedings; and contempt proceedings, except those in which the court may act summarily.
(c) Rules on Privilege. The rules on privilege apply to all stages of a case or proceeding.
(d) Exceptions. These rules — except for those on privilege — do not apply to the following:

(1) the court’s determination, under Rule 104(a), on a preliminary question of fact governing admissibility;

(2) grand-jury proceedings; and

(3) miscellaneous proceedings such as: extradition or rendition; issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search warrant; a preliminary examination in a criminal case; sentencing; granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and considering whether to release on bail or otherwise.

(e) Other Statutes and Rules. A federal statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court may provide for admitting or excluding evidence independently from these rules.