NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes of NLRB decisions.  Readers are requested to notify the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.  20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can be included in the bound volumes.

RCC Fabricators, Inc. and Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters, Eastern Pennsylvania, State of Delaware and Eastern Shore of Maryland

 

RCC Fabricators, Inc. and Piledriver’s Local 454 a/w Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters, Eastern Pennsylvania, State of Delaware and Eastern Shore of Maryland and Construction and General Laborers Union Local 172 of South Jersey.  Cases 4–CA–31757, 4–RC–20569, and 4–RC–20572

June 9, 2008

DECISION, ORDER, AND CERTIFICATION
OF REPRESENTATIVE

By Chairman Schaumber and Member Liebman

On October 23, 2003, Administrative Law Judge Paul Buxbaum issued the attached decision.  The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General Counsel filed an answer, and the Respondent filed a reply.  On September 20, 2006, the National Labor Relations Board remanded the case to the judge for further consideration in light of the Board’s decisions in Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB No. 37 (2006), Croft Metals, Inc., 348 NLRB No. 38 (2006), and Golden Crest Healthcare Center, 348 NLRB No. 39 (2006). On January 30, 2007, Judge Buxbaum issued the attached supplemental decision.  The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief.

The National Labor Relations Board has considered the decision, the supplemental decision, and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs,1 and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,2 findings,3 and conclusions as modified, to adopt the recommended Order as modified below, and to issue a certification of representative.4 

We affirm the judge’s finding that Foremen Ronald Earley and James Phillips were statutory supervisors based on the judge’s finding that they exercised independent judgment when assigning, and effectively recommending the assignment of, employees to departments and significant overall tasks.  In light of that finding, we do not pass on the judge’s further finding that they possessed the power to discipline and effectively recommend discipline, and his alternative finding that foreman Phillips was the Respondent’s agent.  In addition, we affirm the judge’s finding that Phillips unlawfully interrogated employees about a union meeting; however, we reverse the judge and dismiss the allegation that Phillips’ questions about the union meeting created the impression of surveillance.  Finally, because of their supervisory status, the challenges to Earley’s and Phillips’ ballots are sustained.  Accordingly, we shall issue a certification of representation.

i. supervisory status

The Respondent manufactures railroad equipment and structural steel components in a plant in Southampton, New Jersey.  At all times relevant to these proceedings, Carl Baer was the shop manager.  Under his supervision, James Phillips was foreman in charge of railroad construction operations, and Ronald Earley was foreman in charge of structural steel operations.  We agree with the judge’s finding that the foremen possessed and exercised supervisory authority to assign and recommend assignment of employees to departments and significant overall tasks as defined by the Board in Oakwood Healthcare, supra, slip op. at 4.  We thus affirm the judge’s finding that the foremen were supervisors.5 

ii. the 8(a)(1) allegations

On the evening of October 9, 2002, most of the Respondent’s employees met with union representatives in a local pizza parlor.  The following morning, as several employees, including Phillips and Earley, gathered in the breakroom before work, an employee asked Phillips why he was not at the meeting the night before.  Phillips responded that he did not know about it and asked the other employees why he wasn’t invited.  As part of the discussion, he also asked who attended the meeting and what happened there.  In addition, the evidence shows that, on separate occasions during that day, Phillips raised the issue of the union meeting individually with employees Pohubka and Iannaco and asked about the meeting, who was there, and what was said.  We agree with the judge that Phillips unlawfully interrogated Pohubka and Iannaco in these individual conversations.6

The judge further found that Phillips’ interrogation of Pohubka and Iannaco created an impression of surveillance.  We disagree.  The undisputed evidence shows that Phillips did not know about the meeting beforehand, but rather learned about it the next morning during a breakroom conversation with several employees, including Iannaco, before work.  Phillips testified that the meeting was a topic of discussion around the plant during the day.  Under these circumstances, we do not find that Phillips’ questions to Pohubka or Iannaco would cause them to reasonably assume that their union activities had been placed under surveillance.  Park ‘N Fly, Inc., 349 NLRB No. 16, slip op. at 2 (2007).  We therefore reverse the judge and dismiss this allegation.

amended conclusion of law

We modify the judge’s Conclusions of Law by deleting paragraph 4 and renumbering the subsequent paragraph.

ORDER

The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Respondent, RCC Fabricators, Inc., Southampton, New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified.

1. Delete paragraph 1(b) of the judge’s recommended Order and reletter the subsequent tparagraph. 2.  Substitute the attached notice for that of the administrative law judge.

CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE

It is certified that a majority of the valid ballots have been cast for Piledrivers Local 454 a/w Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters, Eastern Pennsylvania, State of Delaware and Eastern Shore of Maryland, and that it is the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the following appropriate bargaining unit:

 

All full time Layout Men, Machinists, Mechanics, Shop Laborers, Welders, and Welders/Fitters employed by the Employer at its 2035 State Highway 206 South, Southampton, New Jersey facility, but excluding all other employees, including clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.

 

Dated, Washington, D.C.,   June 9, 2008

 

___________________________________

Peter C. Schaumber,                       Chairman

 

                                                                        _

Wilma B. Liebman,                            Member

 

(Seal) National Labor Relations Board

 

APPENDIX

Notice To Employees

Posted by Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

An Agency of the United States Government

 

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union

Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf

Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection

Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.

 

We will not coercively question you about your union support and activities or the union support and activities of other employees.

We will not in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Federal labor law.

 

RCC Fabricators, Inc.

 

Henry R. Protas, Esq. and Ann Marie Cummins, Esq., for the General Counsel.

John H. Widman, Esq. and Amy Niedzalkoski, Esq., of King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, for the Respondent.

Richard C. McNeill Jr., Esq., of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the Charging Party.

DECISION

Statement of the Case

Paul Buxbaum, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on April 8 and 10 and May 15, 2003. The charge was filed on November 25, 2002, and an amended charge was filed on January 28, 2003. The complaint was issued on February 19, 2003.

On October 25, 2002, the Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters, Eastern Pennsylvania, State of Delaware and Eastern Shore of Maryland filed a petition for certification as collective-bargaining representative of certain employees of the Company.1  Six days later, the Construction and General Laborers Union Local 172 of South Jersey filed a similar petition.2 The Regional Director consolidated these petitions on October 31, 2002.

A representation election was held on November 21, 2002. Sixteen votes were cast. Six votes favored the Carpenters, five votes were against any union representation, and no votes were cast in favor of the Laborers. Five ballots were challenged, a potentially determinative number. On March 6, 2003, the Regional Director issued an order consolidating the ballot challenges and the unfair labor practice allegations and scheduling a hearing.

The General Counsel alleges that an admitted supervisor told an employee that the Company would close if the employees selected a union as their bargaining representative. It is also alleged that a foreman interrogated employees regarding their union activities and created an impression that union activities were under employer surveillance. That foreman is alleged to be a supervisor and agent of the Company. Finally, the General Counsel contends that the Company discharged an employee, Daniel Pohubka, because of his involvement in union activities. The Company filed an answer, denying the material allegations of the complaint, including the contention that the foreman was a supervisor and agent.

Regarding the representation election, the Board agent challenged three ballots since the names of the prospective voters were not contained on the Excelsior list of voters.3  One of these prospective voters is Pohubka. His eligibility depends on a resolution of the unfair labor practice allegation that he was wrongfully terminated from employment due to his union activities. The remaining two prospective voters challenged by the Board agent were employees who were laid off prior to the election. The Union contends that these employees enjoyed a reasonable expectation of returning to work in the foreseeable future. The Company denies that such an expectation existed. Finally, the Union challenges the ballots of the two shop foremen, contending that they were supervisors within the meaning of the Act. The Company denies this assertion regarding their status.

As described in detail in the decision that follows, I conclude that the General Counsel has failed to prove that a supervisor threatened closure of the Company in the event the employees elected union representation. I further find that the foreman, a supervisor and agent of the Company, did unlawfully interrogate employees and create an impression that their union activities were under surveillance. I also conclude that, while the General Counsel met its initial burden regarding the discharge of Pohubka, the Company established that he would have been discharged regardless of his union sympathies and activities. It follows that Pohubka’s ballot in the representation election was properly subject to challenge. By the same token, I find that the remaining four ballot challenges should be sustained since the evidence establishes that the laid-off employees did not have any reasonable expectancy of return within the foreseeable future and that the two shop foremen were supervisors within the meaning of the Act.

Before detailing my findings of fact, I must address preliminary matters regarding the state of the record. As is virtually inevitable, there are errors in the transcription of the testimony. Those significant errors involving testimony given on April 8 and 10 were corrected on the record during the second portion of the trial conducted in May. (Tr. 463–465.) Several errors relating to the testimony on May 15 require correction. The witness was actually asked if Pohubka often “didn’t” punch in on time. (Tr. 543, l. 10.) The witness testifies that he observed Pohubka “wandering.”4  (Tr. 580, l. 14.)  Three other errors can be seen in a more lighthearted vein. The Company’s comptroller is reported to have testified that he was a “beam counter.” (Tr. 609, l. 9–10.) This would be logical given the Company’s involvement in the structural steel industry. Nevertheless, in referring to his duties as financial analyst, he actually said he was a “bean counter.”  (Tr. 670, l. 13.)  Counsel for the Union characterizes the Company as asserting a “Great Wine Defense.” While such a defense would certainly be interesting, counsel’s reference was, of course, to a Wright Line defense. Finally, at the conclusion of the hearing, it is reported that I promised the parties that I would strive for a decision that was both just and “fear.”  (Tr. 677, l. 21.)  Naturally, I expressed my hope that the eventual decision would be just and “fair.”

On June 5, 2003, the Company filed a motion to reopen the record and admit newly discovered evidence. This evidence consists of a decision of the Appeal Tribunal of the State of New Jersey Department of Labor regarding the disposition of Pohubka’s claim for unemployment compensation benefits. On June 11, 2003, counsel for the Union filed an opposition to this motion, contending that the decision did not constitute newly discovered evidence and was “at best . . . marginally relevant.” The General Counsel takes a somewhat different view, conceding that the document is admissible, but asserting that it should be accorded no probative worth.

Counsel for the Union argues that the Department of Labor’s decision cannot be deemed newly discovered evidence since the Company was aware of the pendency of the unemployment compensation claim throughout the hearing in this matter and could have offered to introduce evidence regarding “the possibility of the issuance of a decision favorable to RCC” by the Appeals Tribunal. I find this argument to be unpersuasive. Counsel does not cite, and I am not aware of, any principle in the law of evidence that would authorize the submission into evidence of a “possibility” that a party may at some future date prevail in a pending lawsuit whose outcome could affect these proceedings. Evidence of such a contingency would fail the test for relevancy since it would not have

 

[A]ny tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

 

Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 401. As a result, I attach no significance to the Company’s failure to mention the pending unemployment case during the trial of this matter.

The Company has filed an affidavit from its comptroller, Frank Santos, indicating that he received the decision of the Appeals Tribunal upon returning to his office after attendance at the final day of trial in this case on May 15, 2003. The Appeals Tribunal decision states that it was mailed to the parties on May 13, 2003. This is entirely consistent with Santos’ uncontroverted affidavit. By unfortunate coincidence, it appears that the Company received the document immediately after the trial concluded and the record was closed. From this it follows that the Appeals Tribunal decision was newly discovered evidence that could not reasonably have been produced during the trial in this matter.5

I must next address the question of whether the Appeals Tribunal decision is relevant to the issues under consideration. Both counsel for the Union and counsel for the General Counsel concede that the document is at least marginally relevant. More importantly, the Board had addressed this issue on several occasions. In Western Publishing Co., 263 NLRB 1110 (1982), it observed that

 

We have long held that [unemployment compensation decisions by state departments of labor], although not controlling as to the findings of fact or conclusions of law contained therein, have some probative value and are admissible into evidence.

 

Id. at fn. 1.  The Third Circuit has described the Board’s view as being that the decisions of state unemployment compensation agencies, although not controlling, “may be judicially noticed.” NLRB v. Duquesne Electric & Mfg. Co., 518 F.2d 701, 703 (3d Cir. 1989). Under the Board’s longstanding policy authorizing admission of unemployment compensation decisions, I will reopen the record and admit the decision of the Appeals Tribunal into evidence. At the appropriate time, I will discuss the weight I have assigned to this document.

Finally, I note that, on June 19, 2003, the General Counsel filed an errata to counsel for the General Counsel’s brief to the administrative law judge. This contains only technical corrections. No party has objected to this submission, and I grant leave to file this document.

On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Company and the oral closing argument presented by counsel for the Union, I make the following

Findings of Fact

i. jurisdiction

The Company, a corporation, manufactures railroad equipment and structural steel components at its facility in Southampton, New Jersey, where it annually purchases and receives at the facility goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of New Jersey. The Company admits and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.6

ii. alleged unfair labor practices

A. The Factual Background

Alphonso Daloisio Jr. is the owner of RCC Fabricators, Inc. The firm’s acronym is an abbreviation of “Railroad Construction Company.” Daloisio’s family has a long history in this field of endeavor. His grandfather started the original company in 1926, with exclusive focus on the railroad industry. Over time, the nature of the business expanded to include road, bridge, and site work, as well as, building construction. In 2000, the original company was divided into a number of separate entities. Historically, these companies have had work forces represented by a variety of unions. Daloisio testified that the family of companies currently has 27 agreements with unions, including the operators, teamsters, iron workers, laborers, dock builders, and carpenters.

Although RCC Fabricators, Inc. has a venerable corporate ancestry; the Company itself is quite new. Its immediate predecessor was a corporation known as RCC Materials and Equipment, located in North Carolina. Daloisio owned this company in conjunction with his brother, James. The company manufactured railroad equipment, but it was not a profitable enterprise. Daloisio testified that in the fall of 2001, it was decided to combine the North Carolina production with a steel fabrication operation intended to supply the building component of the RCC family of companies. It was further decided to locate this new company in New Jersey. As a result, Daloisio established the Company as a New Jersey corporation engaged in the manufacture of railroad equipment and structural steel components for the building industry.

A suitable facility for the Company was purchased. Located in Southampton, New Jersey, the property consists of 16 acres, including a 53,000 square foot manufacturing plant. Several veteran employees from the former North Carolina plant were recruited for operations in Southampton. Among those who transferred to New Jersey for this purpose were two who figure prominently in this case, Carl Baer and James Phillips. Along with several other employees, they were housed in a residence located on the Company’s property. Baer was hired as the shop superintendent. Daloisio testified that Phillips was initially hired to be a “jack of all trades” and did not have a formal title.

(Tr. 42.) As the autumn of 2001 progressed, additional employees were hired, including principal management officers. Among them was Dave Puza, the Company’s vice president. He testified that one of his initial impressions was a concern that the Company lacked formal disciplinary procedures for employees. He believed that the absence of such procedures was a cause of developing disciplinary problems. As a result, he directed that disciplinary forms be obtained from other components of the RCC family of companies.

In November 2001, operations began. Originally, these consisted of the cleaning and painting of the shop facility. At this time, Phillips was appointed as a foreman. He was told that he “would be working, as well.” (Tr. 403.) The hiring process also continued. In December, Ronald Earley was hired as a welder and fitter. He had extensive prior experience, having risen from laborer to foreman in the defunct company that had been the prior occupant of the Southampton plant. Less than a year after he was hired, Earley was promoted to be the second shop foreman. At that point, the two foremen, Phillips and Earley, were each given responsibility for a facet of the Company’s operations. Phillips dealt with the production of railroad equipment, while Earley was foreman of the structural steel operation. Both men reported to Baer.

By January 2002, the Company was fully operational and was manufacturing its products. The first billing was generated in that month. At the same time, the Company implemented use of the disciplinary form provided by the human resource manager of the RCC family of companies.

In the following month, Daniel Pohubka, another important participant in the events involved in this case, was hired. His job was as a laborer and the duties consisted of painting, sweeping, and, as he put it, “a little welding” and “whatever [else] I was told to do.” (Tr. 169.)

At the approximate time that Pohubka began his employment with the Company, the question of union representation for the work force first arose. Daloisio testified that he serves as co-chair of Project Build, a cooperative union-management committee that resolves jurisdictional disputes among unions in New Jersey. His co-chair is Frank D’Antonio, the president of Laborers Union Local 172. On the occasion of a Project Build meeting in February 2002, Daloisio told D’Antonio that he had opened a new shop. Daloisio testified that D’Antonio responded by asking, “hey, do you want me to get a shop agreement, you know, for down there also?” (Tr. 43.) Daloisio reports that he told D’Antonio that he was uncertain about the Company’s viability. As a result, he suggested,

 

[W]hy don’t you give us a year or two and we’ll definitely,

we’ll talk about it, there’s no question that if the co-workers7

are interested[,] that we’d be interested.

 

(Tr. 44.) Daloisio indicated that subsequent to this conversation, D’Antonio would occasionally ask him about the status of the Company.

Pohubka testified that in March 2002, he began speaking to his fellow employees regarding the question of union representation. He reported that the idea for such representation came to him after employees of another RCC company took him to task, telling him that he was doing union work and should be getting paid union wages. Pohubka asserts that in the following month he asked Baer why there was no union at the plant and Baer responded by telling him that Daloisio would “shut down the shop” if a union came in. (Tr. 219.) Baer flatly denies any such conversation.

There is general agreement that Pohubka raised a peripheral issue regarding union representation during a meeting in April. Puza testified that during the meeting Pohubka asked why the employees were not being paid union wages when the material they were fabricating was being used on union contract jobs. Puza responded by noting that the contracts were prevailing wage contracts and that the Company was complying with this requirement. Puza opined that this response appeared to satisfy Pohubka, “because I was never asked about it again.” (Tr. 640.)

On July 2, 2002, Pohubka became involved in an event that resulted in his first formal disciplinary sanction. Foreman Phillips discovered Pohubka and another employee, Shawn Mace, sleeping in the parts room 10 minutes after the conclusion of an employee breaktime. Phillips testified that he told both men that they owed the Company 10 minutes of work time. He told both men to make up the 10 minutes and then “forget about it.” (Tr. 482.) Pohubka refused to make up the lost time and told Phillips he was being “anal” about the episode.8  By contrast, Mace readily agreed to make up the time.

Phillips instructed Pohubka to return to the welding job that he had been performing. Pohubka testified that approximately 1 hour later, he became angry that he was being required to perform a welder’s duties but was not being compensated at a welder’s level of pay. He took this complaint to Phillips. Pohubka conceded that he behaved poorly, intentionally dropping a 30-pound piece of metal and cursing at Phillips.9  Phillips ordered Pohubka to report to Baer’s office. Pohubka was given formal notice that he was being suspended for 3 days. The suspension was memorialized and explained on a written “Corrective Action Notice” form. The nature of the misconduct was characterized as “insubordination” and “inadequate work performance.” Pohubka was warned that he must improve both his attitude and his performance. (GC Exh. 4, p. 24.)

As mentioned, another employee, Mace, was discovered sleeping in the parts room at the same time as Pohubka. The corrective action notice issued to Mace is significantly different from Pohubka’s. The level of discipline is listed as a verbal warning that Mace must be “more aware of scheduled break time.” In addition, Baer added a comment that Mace deserved commendation for “the manner in which he handled this incident.” (GC Exh. 4, p. 14.)

In his testimony regarding these events, Baer evinced a bit of difficulty in articulating his reasoning underlying Pohubka’s suspension. At first, he contended that the suspension was imposed for the offense of sleeping on work time. Later, he testified that “[a]ttitude was the major reason” for the suspension. (Tr. 410.) Interestingly, Pohubka chose the same word to describe his conduct on this date, testifying that he gave his supervisors “attitude” and that he “yelled back at them.” (Tr. 201.) I conclude that the best explanation for Pohubka’s suspension is found in the reasons enumerated on the contemporaneously prepared corrective action notice, particularly the offense of insubordination. Emphasis on Pohubka’s poor attitude as demonstrated by his insubordinate refusal to make up the lost time and his cursing at his foreman satisfactorily account for the difference in severity and tone between his discipline and that issued to Mace.10

In the following months, the new company continued to experience a variety of growing pains. Santos testified that among these was an increase in employees’ tardiness. He described this problem as a spreading cancer. In mid-July, Santos drafted six identical corrective action notices addressing this tardiness. Among the six employees cited in these notices was Pohubka. Santos gave the draft notices to Baer for issuance to the employees. Baer did not issue them. In fact, he threw all of them away, including the one addressed to Pohubka.11  

In early October 2002, the first concrete action was taken regarding union representation for the Company’s employees. One of those employees, Brian VanNortwick, contacted the Carpenter’s Union through his son’s teacher’s husband, a union member. VanNortwick discussed the issue of representation with his coworkers. Pohubka testified that he escalated his own similar discussions after VanNortwick made contact with the Union. He indicated that he spoke to all but two of his coworkers about the issue, albeit doing so “a little secretly.” (Tr. 186.) Paradoxically, Pohubka also testified that at this time he had a similar conversation with Phillips and Baer in Baer’s office. He asked them why they opposed a union, and suggested to them that a union would benefit them. Pohubka testified that Phillips made no response, but Baer told him that Daloisio would close the shop if the employees chose union representation. Baer denied the existence of any such conversation, testifying that he never discussed union issues with any employees.

VanNortwick took the next step by scheduling a meeting between interested employees and representatives of the Union.12  Pohubka suggested that VanNortwick hold the meeting at a local pizzeria owned by Pohubka’s friend. The meeting was scheduled for October 9 at the pizza shop. Approximately 13 employees attended the meeting. This represented the great majority of the Company’s work force. All of those in attendance, including Pohubka and VanNortwick, signed cards authorizing the Union to act as their collective-bargaining representative.

There is no evidence to suggest that company officials had any advance notice that the Carpenters were meeting with employees. On the other hand, it is clear that immediately after the meeting the Company learned about it from a number of sources. Phillips testified that three employees told him about it either later that evening or the following day. Indeed, he reported that “lots of