NOTICE: This
opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes
of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested
to notify the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. 20570, of any typographical or other formal
errors so that corrections can be included in the bound volumes.
Clarke Manufacturing, Inc. and United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing,
Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union,
Local 2-200. Case 30–CA–17472
February 20, 2008
DECISION AND ORDER
By Members Liebman and Schaumber
On April 10, 2007, Administrative Law Judge Karl H.
Buschmann issued the attached decision.
The General Counsel and the Union each
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed answering
briefs. Additionally, the Respondent filed cross-exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered the
decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided
to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,
and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The
National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative
law judge and orders that the Respondent, Clarke Manufacturing, Inc., Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Order.
Dated, Washington,
D.C. February 20, 2008
______________________________________
Wilma B.
Liebman, Member
______________________________________
Peter C.
Schaumber, Member
Andrew S. Gollin, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Russ R. Mueller, Esq., of Glendale,
Wisconsin, for the Respondent.
Ernest L. Dex, Sub-District Director, of West
Allis, Wisconsin, for
the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
Karl H.
Buschmann, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
on October 25, 2006. The charge was
filed April 28, 2006, as amended on June 22, 2006, and the complaint was issued
on July 28, 2006. The complaint alleges
that the Respondent, Clarke Manufacturing, Inc., violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by prematurely declaring an
impasse in bargaining, by unilaterally replacing the United Healthcare plan for
its employees with a plan referred to as the Federated Plan #5677, and by
presenting a “postfinal offer” proposing the elimination of the union-security
provision and the elimination of the employees’ pension plan, i.e., submitting
regressive bargaining proposals. The
Respondent filed a timely answer admitting the jurisdictional allegations in
the complaint, as well as some of the factual aspects of the complaint, but
denying the commission of any unfair labor practices.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor
of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel
and the Respondent, I make the following
Findings of Fact
i.
jurisdiction
Clarke Manufacturing, Inc. is a Wisconsin corporation, engaged
in the operation of a machine shop at its facility in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, where it annually sold and shipped
goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located
outside the State of Wisconsin. The Company admits and I find that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act. The Union,
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial
and Service Workers International Union, Local 2-200, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
ii. alleged
unfair labor practices
For more than 20 years, the Union
has been the exclusive bargaining representative of the following unit of the
Respondent’s employees:
Production and maintenance employees of the Company, excluding
office clerical, management and professional employees, and guards and
supervisors.
The most recent of a series of collective-bargaining
agreements was effective March 1, 2003 to February 28, 2006 (Jt. Exh. 1). In a telephone conversation in early January,
Ernest Dex, union staff representative, requested Thomas Nelson, Respondent’s
president, to set dates for negotiations.
By letter of December 15, 2005, the union representative demanded certain
information from the Company and suggested several days in February for
contract negotiation meetings (GC Exh. 2).
Thereafter, the parties held eight negotiation sessions. The substance of the discussions during these
meetings is contained in the notes taken by Dex, as supported by his testimony
(GC Exh. 3). The testimony of Thomas
Nelson about the same negotiations was brief and differed in only minor
respects.
Attending the first meeting on February 21, 2006, as well
as most subsequent meetings, were Thomas Nelson, president, and Russ R.
Mueller, attorney, for the Company, Ernest Dex, union staff representative,
Maria Favell, chief steward, and Ray Gnadt, an employee, for the Union. The parties
discussed various issues, including the high cost of health insurance currently
in force, the Company’s arrears in the employees’ 401(k) plan and a date for
the next meeting (GC Exh. 3). The Respondent
submitted a contract proposal in the form of a 2-page document which
incorporated by reference certain articles of the expired contract (Jt. Exh.
6). At some point, the Respondent stated
that it was unable to meet for the next scheduled meetings during that week,
because it needed to go over health insurance information (Jt. Exh. 6). The Union
immediately accused the Respondent of committing an unfair labor practice. The Union
presented a comprehensive contract proposal which dealt with most terms and
conditions of employment. Of importance
was its proposal to eliminate the “right to change” provision in article IV,
section 6, under the heading “Medical-Hospital-Physician” of the expired
contract (Jt. Exh. 1). Ernest Dex, staff
representative of the Union, testified that the change was necessary, because
the Union believed that all changes needed to
be negotiated. The Union’s
position on that issue never changed during the subsequent negotiations.
The next meeting on February 24, 2006, dealt mainly with
health care issues. The Respondent
disclosed to the Union the costs incurred by
the Company for the employee’s benefits, including health insurance, pensions,
401(k), and wages (Jt. Exh. 9). The
Respondent furnished the Union with the health
care cost chart of the United Healthcare Plan and brought two representatives
from a new insurance carrier, Federated Insurance Company, to present their
plans (Jt. Exh. 10, GC Exh. 3). The
Respondent’s position was clear, that current health care costs were excessive
and that the negotiations depended on an acceptable insurance policy.
The parties met for their third meeting on February 27,
2006, for an extended session lasting into the afternoon, where the Respondent
presented additional and detailed information on the Federated Insurance
Plan. The Respondent also offered a
contract proposal for the renewal of the current agreement (Jt. Exh. 12). Attached to the proposal was a comprehensive
medical plan known as Defined Reimbursement Plan #5677 offered by Federated
Insurance. That plan differed from the existing health insurance plan, the
United Healthcare Plan. According to the Union,
the new plan was less advantageous for the employees and offered fewer benefits
than the existing one. “There were
higher deductibles, higher out of pocket expenses,” as recalled by Union
Representative Dex. The meeting ended
with an agreement to extend the current agreement until March 20, 2006 (Jt. Exh.
14).
On March 20, 2006, the parties met for their fourth
session. The parties continued to
discuss the alternatives to the employees’ medical insurance. The Union
adhered to its position that the United Healthcare Plan be retained. The Respondent submitted more information to
the Union about the Federated Defined
Reimbursement Plan #5677. In the
meantime, the Respondent had presented the Union
in advance of the session with detailed information about the two health
insurance plans, sending comparative charts showing monthly costs under the UHC
plan and the proposed Federated plan (Jt. Exhs. 18–24). Also sent to the Union
were detailed charts showing covered services, including deductible expenses
and options, as well as prescription drugs.
The Union indicated that the benefits offered by the Federated Plan
#5671 were similar to those under the existing UHC plan, except that the “deductibles
were somewhat higher than United Health and the out of pocket was somewhat
higher,” but the union representatives informed the Company that its proposal
was not acceptable (Tr. 56). The Union proposed again that the “right to change” language
be taken out of the contract. The Union requested a further extension of the existing
contract. The Respondent refused to
agree to another extension, and the Union
stated that it would seek authorization to strike.
The parties met again on April 3, 2006, and resumed negotiations,
even though the Union informed the Respondent
that the employees had authorized a strike.
According to Union Representative Dex, the Union
had hopes to reach an agreement. Again,
the main topic was health insurance. The
Respondent presented the Union with a second
complete proposal for renewal labor agreement (Jt. Exh. 27). Attached to the proposal was the Federated
Insurance Plan #5677. The Respondent
agreed not to make substantial changes in the level of health benefits and to
discuss any changes with the Union before any
changes, provided the Company had the right to change insurance carriers. The Company’s proposal also reflected
improvements on other terms, such as wages and grievance procedures. The Union
responded orally with counteroffers on several issues. It insisted again on eliminating the “right
to change” provision in the management rights clause contained in article IV,
section 6.
The sixth meeting was held on April 6, 2006. Initially, the parties discussed the
grievance procedure. The Respondent also
indicated that it needed a loan to cover the Company’s obligation under the
health insurance plan for the employees’ $2000 deductible amounts. The Union
expressed acceptance of the new insurance plan, provided that the 77 to 23
percent ratio in premiums in favor of the employees and the current benefits
would be retained. The Union
emphasized again the importance of eliminating the “right to change” language
of the old contract to ensure that the Company would not change any benefits. The Respondent presented its final offer for
renewal of labor agreement, which contained better and enhanced terms,
especially an increase in wages and an improved split on health care. The Respondent expressed hope that the Union would submit the package to its membership for
approval (Jt. Exh. 31). Instead the Union requested additional information about the effects
of the overtime proposal on the employees and the Company’s cost of the final
proposal, and promised to examine the Company’s final offer and submit a
counteroffer. The Respondent showed the Union a monthly cost comparison for each employee under
the two health insurance plans (Jt. Exh. 30).
The Union failed to receive the Respondent’s letter of
April 11, 2006, containing the cost calculation for the first year of the Company’s
final offer, the information requested by the Union
(Jt. Exh. 33). The Respondent sent the
letter again on April 20, 2006. It not
only provided the information, but also stated that any counterproposal by the Union greater than the Respondent’s final offer would
underscore the current impasse in the negotiations. It advised the Union
that Federated had offered a reduction in rates, effective May 1, 2006, which
would not be extended to June 2006 (Jt. Exh. 36).
By letter, dated April 17, 2006, the Respondent explained
its reasons for asking the Union’s acceptance
of the offer, stating as follows (Jt.
Exh. 34):
This is to request the Union’s
approval of the Implementation of the Federated Defined Reimbursement Plan
#5677, effective on May 1, 2006, as a substitute for the UHC Plan.
In response, the Union informed the Respondent by letter
of April 21, 2006, that “the Union is not interested in agreeing to implement
the Federated Defined Reimbursement Plan #5677 effective May 1, 2006,” that the
Union needed additional information for further negotiations, including
insurance, and that the Company’s position to retain “the right to change” insurance
benefits during the life of the contract amounted to “an unfair labor practice
and a violation of the National Labor Relations Act” (Jt. Exh. 38).
The Respondent provided the Union with additional information
and informed the Union by letter of April 21,
2006, that it would implement the Federated Defined Reimbursement Plan #5677,
effective May 1, 2006, in lieu of the insurance plan by United Health Care (Jt.
Exh. 37). The letter stated:
This implementation is made pursuant to the existing
impasse in the negotiations for terms of a renewal labor Agreement and as a
result of the Union’s refusal to approve the
same, which refusal was communicated in yesterday’s telephone conversation.
The letter stated five reasons for the “impasse in the
negotiations,” among them the Union’s insistence to delete “the right to change
language,” and to condition its acceptance of the health plan on that proposal,
the Union’s position to increase costs in areas other than wages and the Union’s proposal to require information to be
submitted to the International Union.
A comparison between the two insurance plans shows that
the benefits offered to the employees were substantially similar. In any case, the Respondent implemented the
Federated plan on May 1, 2006, based on the impasse in the negotiations.
The Company also sent a letter, dated April 24, 2006, to
the Union in response to the Union’s April 21 letter, in which the Union accused the Respondent of violating the Act. The Respondent stated that its rejection of
the Union’s proposal to eliminate the “right to change “provision in article
IV, section 6 of the prior agreement did not amount to an unfair labor practice, but that the Union’s insistence to
reverse its prior waiver on the subject contributed to the existing impasse in
the negotiations (Jt. Exh. 39).
The parties did not meet for several weeks. But in a letter, dated May 22, 2006, to the
Respondent, the Union requested dates in order to resume contract negotiations,
suggesting June 7 or 8, 2006 (GC Exh.
4). The parties met on June 8,
2006. The Union
presented a counterproposal to the Respondent’s final offer. The Respondent also made a proposal, entitled
statement of position in which the Company explained why the pension fund was a
bad investment which should be terminated and why the union-security provision,
requiring union membership, should be cancelled (Jt. Exh. 40). The Respondent also presented a “Post-Final
Offer Negotiation Proposal,” dealing with leave of absence, check-off, a 401(k)
plan, and a union pension fund, known as the PIUMPF plan (Jt Exhs. 41–44). The Union
considered the proposal as regressive, accused the Company of bargaining in bad
faith, and asked whether it was looking for a strike. The Respondent promised that it would respond
to the Union’s counterproposal and agreed to
meet again on June 19, 2006.
The next and final meeting was held on June 19, 2006. The Respondent provided the Union
with a postfinal offer, containing 14 specific provisions dealing with pay,
hours of work, 401(k) plan, vacations, leave of absence, pension fund, and
other terms of employment (Jt. Exh. 45).
For example, the Respondent increased the first year’s wages. Except for the specific provisions enumerated
in the postfinal offer, the proposal stipulated that the terms of the expired
contract would remain the same. The
Respondent asked for the Union’s reaction. But the Union
again requested more information in order to make an informed response. The Company indicated that it was not
interested in a counterproposal, because it needed to get on with its other
business, including getting sales and production.
In sum, the parties held eight meetings from February 21,
to June 19, 2006, in order to negotiate a contract. Each side made concessions on terms and
conditions of employment. From the
outset, the Respondent provided extensive and exhaustive information to the Union on what the Company considered the most important
issue, namely medical insurance for the employees. Only after the Union
had repeatedly rejected the Company’s proposal to change insurance plans from
United Health Care to the Federated Plan #5677, did the Company implement the
plan based on the assumption that the negotiations had reached an impasse. Another point of contention beginning with
the first meeting on February 21, 2006, was the Union’s
insistence that the “right to change” language which had been in all prior
contracts between the parties be deleted.
This proviso had been part of article IV, section 6, entitled “Medical-Hospital-Physician,”
and provided in substance that the Company had the right to change insurance
carriers and the means of providing benefits, including the level of benefits,
without causing a substantial lowering of benefits and without prior notice to
the Union (Jt. Exh. 48).
Analysis
The complaint alleges that the Respondent failed and
refused to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act by proposing to replace the United Healthcare Plan with the Federated Plan
#5677, declaring an impasse in bargaining for a successor agreement, by
implementing the Federated Plan, and by proposing in its “postfinal offer” the
elimination of the union security provision and the employees’ pension benefit
plan. The General Counsel argues that
the Respondent failed and refused to bargain in good faith by (1) prematurely
declaring an impasse in the negotiations, (2) unilaterally changing health
insurance plans and implementing its Federated Plan #5677, and (3) by
submitting regressive proposals. The Respondent
counters and refers to a deadlock generated by the Union’s
inflexible and uncompromising positions, especially the demand to eliminate the
“right to change” language, and the refusals to approve the change in insurance
plans, all of which made a continuation of any further discussions hopeless.
The record, as summarized above, is not in dispute. Two factors changed the dynamics of the
parties’ longstanding bargaining relationship, first, the health insurance
issue, and second, the change in management involving Tom Nelson as the new
president. As to the former, the record
shows that the Company struggled with the health insurance plans, and made it
clear from the inception of the negotiations that medical insurance would be a
deciding factor. It invited the Union at
the outset to participate and to get involved, providing the Union
with all relevant information, such as cost comparisons and charts showing the
insurance coverage for each employee and more.
The Company invited representatives from a new insurance carrier under
consideration to explain the benefits. Indeed,
the Respondent had included the Union from the
outset in its selection process of other insurance companies to provide the employees
with adequate, but lower cost health benefits.
The Union was not impressed, although receptive at one point during the
fifth meeting, it subsequently rejected the Company’s offer to accept the new
plan, even though the benefits were substantially the same under either plan.
The other concern which affected the negotiations was the Union’s distrust of Tom Nelson, the new president. In his brief, the General Counsel frankly
stated that the Union was so concerned about the new president that it decided “to
propose more explicit, limiting language for the new contract” by insisting to
eliminate the “right to change” language from the agreement which would have
authorized the Respondent to change insurance carriers so long as the benefits
remained substantially the same. The General
Counsel conceded that the Union wanted that proposal, and that it was important
to the Union.
Clearly, the Union never conceded its position
on that issue.
In all other respects, the Respondent did not appear to be
evasive, dishonest, or uncooperative. It
gave no indication to the Union that it was
not interested in reaching an agreement.
To the contrary, the Union unjustly
accused the Company repeatedly with engaging in unfair labor practices, and
threatened to strike at a time when such a threat was unjustified. In spite of a confrontational demeanor by the
Union, the Respondent agreed to meet at
reasonable times and for reasonable durations to negotiate. It made significant concessions in its
proposals on economic issues to meet the Union’s
demands. I cannot find fault with the
Respondent’s manner of bargaining, with one important caveat, the regressive
proposals at the June 8, 2006 meeting.
It is well settled that an employer’s unilateral changes
during the course of a collective-bargaining relationship concerning mandatory
subjects of bargaining is unlawful.
Health insurance is a recognized subject of bargaining. Recognized exceptions to an employer’s
unilateral action are those instances where an impasse is reached or where a
waiver can be established. Here, under
the terms of the expired contract, namely the “right to change” language, the Union had waived its right to bargain over the employer’s
right to change insurance plans.
However, the Board has held that such a waiver does not survive the expired
contract. And the record does not show
whether the Respondent relied on that waiver of the expired contract. The issue is whether the parties have reached
a lawful impasse. Paperworkers v. NLRB, 981
F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1992). In other words, a party which prematurely
declares an impasse and makes unilateral changes in health care coverage
violates the Act. Torrington Extend-A-Care Employee Assn. v. NLRB, 17 F.3d 580 (2d Cir. 1994); CBC Industries, 311 NLRB 123 (1993). Whether or not an impasse is reached is a
question of various factors. Taft
Broadcasting Co., 163 NLRB 475 (1967).
In NLRB v. Triple A Fire Protection, Inc., 136 F.3d
727, 738 (11th Cir. 1998), the
Court stated as follows:
The determination of impasse involves an inquiry into “a
myriad of circumstances,” including (1) the background and relationship of the
parties, (2) their willingness to negotiate, (3) the extent and frequency of
bargaining, (4) the integrity of the bargaining, and (5) the good or bad faith
of the parties.
Applying that test to the instant situation, I find that
the declaration of the impasse was not unlawful. Here, the parties had a well established and
successful bargaining relationship, as exemplified by a series of
collective-bargaining agreements. Dex
testified that Robert Nelson, the Company’s past president, was tough but fair,
and that he had a cordial relationship with him. As already observed, the Union
was not convinced that his son, Thomas, was of equal caliber. Nevertheless, the course of the negotiations
do not justify the Union’s changed attitude
vis-à-vis this Employer.
The second element, the parties’ willingness to negotiate,
is shown by the Respondent’s cooperation in agreeing to set dates and in
attending meetings. Both parties
presented proposals based on the expired contract and made concessions. The Respondent furnished detailed
information, especially on the health insurance plan, and gave serious
consideration to the Union’s proposals.
Unlike the circumstances in Triple A Fire Protection, Inc.,
supra, where the respondent
attended only one negotiation session, here the Company attended a total of
eight meetings, and declared the impasse after the sixth meeting. The record does not show that the Respondent
rejected the Union’s invitation to meet even
after May 1, 2006, when the Respondent had implemented the new insurance plan.
The fourth criterion, the integrity of the bargaining, was
shown by the sincerity of the parties in attempting to arrive at an agreeable
solution to the problems. There is no
dispute that the Respondent was faced with increasing cost of the existing
health plan, and tried to involve the Union
from the outset in the negotiations, by supplying financial information, by presenting
insurance representatives, and by making significant concessions. Significantly, the Respondent acted honestly
and kept the Union informed at all stages, even though the Union
accused the Company of bad faith and threatened a strike.
Finally, as to the good faith of the parties, the General
Counsel faults the Company for overemphasizing the insurance issue at the
expense of other outstanding issues. To
be sure, the parties could have come to an agreement on a few other outstanding
issues, such as life and sickness insurance, the pension plan, the elimination
of the management right clause, and other, more minor matters. But it is also clear that the parties were deadlocked
on two issues and unable to overcome their differences. At one point the Union
had indicated its acceptance of the new Federated Health Plan after the Company
had agreed to substantially identical benefits of the existing UHC plan. But
the Union changed its position and rejected
the Company’s request to accept the proposal.
The record suggests that the Union
conditioned its acceptance on the elimination of “the right to change”
language. That issue was never resolved,
although the parties had come close to an agreement at one point on the health
plan. The parties resumed negotiations
with revised proposals on two occasions, but were unable to overcome their
fundamental differences and remained deadlocked. Bottom
Line Enterprises, 302 NLRB 373 (1991), enfd. 15 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1994).
Mindful that parties deadlocked on certain issues are not
free to implement, unless an overall impasse is reached, I am convinced that
further meetings would not have been productive. Here, any further negotiations were futile,
because the parties were simply unable to
resolve the fundamental issues and any agreements on other issues would not, in
my opinion, have resolved the impasse.
I accordingly find that the evidence does not indicate
that the Respondent declared the impasse prematurely and I find that the
unilateral implementation of the Federated Plan did not violate the Act. I would therefore dismiss those allegations
in the complaint.
However, I agree with the General Counsel that the Respondent
violated the Act after the parties had resumed negotiations at the behest of
the Union.
By submitting regressive proposals, the Respondent did not bargain in
good faith. The Respondent admits that
it presented four proposals at the last negotiation session on June 8, 2006,
among them the proposal to terminate the pension plan, and the union security
provision. In its post-final offer,
dated June 8, 2006, the Respondent proposed that upon ratification by the
employees of the renewal labor agreement, “the Company’s participation in
Pension Fund will be terminated” (Jt. Exh. 42).
And the other proposal states that employees do not have to be a member
of the Union.
Clearly, those provisions would have changed two important and longstanding
terms of employment.
The Company’s explanation that it considered to make the
pension fund issue as an initial proposal, because it is in financial trouble
seems like an afterthought and clearly designed to undermine the bargaining
relationship. The Respondent’s demeanor
was also inconsistent with its earlier dealings involving the health plan,
where the Company gave advanced notice and kept the Union
fully informed. With regard to the union-security
issue, the Company referred to certain antiunion sentiment expressed by
employees earlier in the year to a supervisor.
Again, the Respondent’s explanation seems contrived and farfetched. Even if true, it was out of place at that
juncture to present an issue designed to undermine the Union’s
position. The Respondent offered no
evidence to support its explanations.
The law is clear: “Where the proponent of a regressive proposal fails to
provide an explanation for it, or the reasons appears dubious, the Board may
weigh that factor in determining whether there has been bad-faith bargaining.” Mid-Continent
Concrete, 336 NLRB 258, 260 (2001).
On that basis I find that the Respondent failed to bargain in good
faith.
Conclusions of Law
1. The Respondent
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following
employees of the Respondent constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
Production and maintenance employees of the Company, excluding
office clerical, management, and professional employees, and guards and
supervisors.
4. By submitting
regressive proposals during the negotiations without sufficient explanations,
the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
5. The unfair labor
practices found above affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that the Respondent failed to
bargain in good faith with the Union by making regressive proposals during the
negotiations, the Respondent must be ordered to cease and desist and be ordered
to bargain in good faith with the Union as the
collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees. On these findings of fact and conclusions of
law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended
ORDER
The Respondent, Clarke Manufacturing, Inc., Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist
from
(a) Making regressive proposals in terms and conditions of
employment during the negotiations
without sufficient explanations.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the
following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Union
as the exclusive representative of the employees in the following appropriate
unit concerning terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is
reached, embody the understanding in a signed agreement:
Production and maintenance employees of the Company, excluding
office clerical, management and professional employees, and guards and
supervisors.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.” Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 30, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by the Respondent at any time since June 8, 2006.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with
the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form
provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
(d) It is further
ordered that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
Dated, Washington,
D.C. April 10, 2007
APPENDIX
Notice To
Employees
Posted
by Order of the
National
Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations
Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post
and obey this notice.
federal law gives you
the right to
Form, join, or assist a
union
Choose representatives to
bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other
employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any
of these protected activities.
We will not make regressive proposals in terms and
conditions of employment during the negotiations without sufficient
explanations.
We will not in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
We will on request, bargain with the Union as the
exclusive representative of the employees in the following appropriate unit
concerning terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is
reached, embody the understanding in a signed agreement:
Production and maintenance employees of the Company, excluding
office clerical, management and professional employees, and guards and supervisors.
Clarke Manufacturing, Inc.