NOTICE: This
opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes
of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested
to notify the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
Pro-Tec Fire Services Ltd., a subsidiary of JJ Protective
Services, Inc. and International
Association of Firefighters Local No. 3694 affiliated with the International
Association of Firefighters. Cases 17–CA–21310 and 17–CA–21486
September 27, 2007
DECISION AND ORDER
By Chairman Battista and Members
Liebman and Schaumber
On August 1, 2002, Administrative Law Judge Lana H. Parke issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Respondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,[1] and conclusions[2] only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.
The judge
concluded that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by refusing
to consider or hire employee Robert Manley.
The Respondent has excepted. We
find merit in this exception.
i. background
The
Respondent provides aircraft rescue firefighting services at
ii. facts
In early
2001, Manley learned that the Respondent was planning to bid on the
On June
12, 2001,
On June
28, 2001, Rynerson and Cashman interviewed Manley. Each interviewer filled out two forms. One was
entitled “Interview Questions,” and the other contained rating numbers from 1–10
(10 being the highest). On both forms, the position “Captain” was circled.
Rynerson
rated Manley’s appearance as “not really” polished and noted that he was reserved. Rynerson gave Manley an overall rating of 7,
adding the comment: “appears to be authortative (sic) wants to be in control.” Cashman noted, under “body language” that
Manley had appeared “a little cocky and “[n]ot a lot of eye contact not sure
being honest with me.” Cashman gave Manley an overall rating of 6 to 7 and
placed a star over the number 6.
Later the
same day. the Respondent interviewed Lindstrom for the position of fire
chief. Then on June 29, 2001, Cashman
offered Lindstrom the position of fire chief.
Later that day, Cashman told Manley that she was unable to offer him
employment.
Cashman
initially testified that the Respondent considered Manley for any
position. But, in later testimony,
Cashman stated that the Respondent considered Manley only for the captain
position. At that point, Cashman said
that the Respondent was unwilling to consider Manley for a lesser position
because he had served as captain, and she believed that difficulties arose when
former supervisors return to the bargaining unit. Specifically, Cashman
testified that she had interviewed Manley for a captain position; however, she
also considered him for the position of firefighter. She stated: “I mean I wasn’t impressed with
him, so I wasn’t really considering him.
I guess the answer is no, I didn’t consider him for firefighter. I wasn’t impressed with him during the interview.”
Rynerson testified that, after looking at everything, he “would not select him
. . . for a captain’s position or any other position.”
In
subsequent months, various firefighter positions became available at the
Respondent and Lindstrom made recommendations for hire to those positions. The
Respondent did not consider Manley for these positions although it typically retains
employment applications on file for 6 months.
iii. the judge’s
decision
Applying
iv. analysis
We
conclude that the General Counsel has not established that Manley’s protected
activity motivated the Respondent’s decision not to hire him or to consider him
for hire. Concededly, the judge
discredited the testimony of Rynerson and Cashman that they refused to hire Manley
because of their concern that problems occur when a supervisor returns to the
unit as an employee. However, that
discrediting does not affirmatively establish that Rynerson and Cashman were
motivated by antiunion animus toward Manley.
To the contrary, the judge correctly found no evidence that Rynerson and
Cashman independently bore animus at all toward Manley for his prior union
activity. Thus, without speculating as
to why Rynerson and Cashman were untruthful as to the reason for not hiring
Manley, we can find no evidence that anti-union animus was the real reason.[4]
In concluding otherwise, the judge relied on seven circumstantial factors to impute
Lindstrom’s animus toward Manley’s union activities to Rynerson and Cashman. However, we find these factors inadequate to
establish the requisite link.
The first two factors cited by the judge (that Lindstrom bore
intense antiunion animus toward Manley and wished “to be free” of him as an
employee) deal exclusively with Lindstrom’s personal animus toward Manley and
his prior union activities. Without additional
evidence, however, these factors do not provide a basis for imputing
Lindstrom’s sentiments to the Respondent’s officials.
The third factor—that Lindstrom stated that if hired “he would
demand influence as to which employees were hired”—is equally unpersuasive. The testimony of witness Frank Prater is the
apparent source of the judge’s finding. Prater’s complete testimony, however,
is that, prior to Lindstrom being offered a position, Lindstrom told him that
he would present demands to the Respondent “if
given a chance.” However, nothing in
Prater’s testimony as to what Lindstrom told him establishes that the
Respondent, in fact, gave Lindstrom such a chance to assert his demands, much
less acceded to them.
The fourth factor cited by the judge is that the Respondent
chose Lindstrom as fire chief before it notified Manley that he would not be
hired. This chronology itself, however, is insufficient to establish even that
Lindstrom influenced the decision not to hire Manley. It falls woefully short
of establishing that Lindstrom’s personal animus towards Manley was a
substantial or motivating factor in the Respondent’s ultimate hiring decision.
The fifth factor is the judge’s finding that “upon being hired,
Chief Lindstrom told employees [that the] Respondent had met his demands.” But
there is no showing of precisely what “demands” Lindstrom allegedly made in his
interview or whether any of those demands were actually met by the Respondent.
The next factor cited by the judge is that “except for one
employee who was off on disability at the time of the hiring, Manley was the
only unit employee who was not offered employment.” Although correct, this finding is
incomplete. It does not reflect the import
of the undisputed evidence that the Respondent hired 23 out of 25 former
Wackenhut employees—all of whom were union members. Although the judge rejected the relevance of
this evidence “when there is evidence of specific animosity,” the General
Counsel failed to demonstrate any such specific animosity on the part of the
Respondent.
The last factor is the judge’s finding that Manley’s overall interview
rating “was as high, or higher” than that of other employees who were hired. The
judge’s observation, however, is true only insofar as it relates to applicant
Lance Joy. While the judge also
referenced applicant Ron Cummings, Rynerson gave Cummings a higher score than
Manley and, while Cashman gave Cummings no overall score, she gave him
individual ratings (8,7,6,8) that were higher than Manley’s (7,6,6,6). It is
true that both Rynerson and Cashman gave Joy a 6 rating while Rynerson gave
Manley a 7, and Cashman gave him a “6*–7.” However, Cashman’s interview notes
also indicated that Joy “appears to do as told” as well as “overall, could be a
good firefighter.” Cashman made no similar
comments about Manley. Indeed, she noted that Manley’s “Communication Style”
did not reflect “a lot of ‘team’ more I, authoritative?” Rynerson too indicated
that Manley appeared authoritative and wanted to be in control. Most
importantly, Manley’s interview preceded Lindstrom’s; therefore, none of
Lindstrom’s animus could have had a bearing on Cashman’s and Rynerson’s
interview notes.
In sum,
the circumstantial factors relied upon by the judge do not establish the necessary
antiunion animus. Accordingly, the
General Counsel failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that Manley’s
protected activity motivated the Respondent’s refusal to hire Manley in June
2001.
We reach
the same result with respect to the Respondent’s refusal to consider Manley for
hire in subsequent months. The General Counsel failed to show that the
Respondent’s original decision not to hire Manley was a product of antiunion
animus. In the absence of additional facts subsequent to June 2001 demonstrating
an unlawful motive, the mere fact of Lindstrom’s subsequent recommending the
hire of other employees (and not Manley) in later months can not convert the
Respondent’s originally lawful decision not to hire Manley into a subsequent
unlawful refusal to consider him for hire.
Because
the General Counsel failed to meet his burden, we do not pass on the
Respondent’s asserted defenses under
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended
Order of the administrative law judge as modified and orders that the Respondent,
Pro-Tec Fire Services Ltd., a subsidiary of JJ Protective Services, Inc.,
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Promulgating and
maintaining overbroad rules that unlawfully prohibit employees from engaging in
union activities and using company vehicles for union business.
(b) In any like or
related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following
affirmative action deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after
service by the Region, post at each of its
(b) Within 21 days after
service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of
a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps
that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated,
Robert J. Battista, Chairman
![]()
Wilma
B. Liebman, Member
![]()
Peter
C. Schaumer,
Member
(seal) National
Labor Relations Board
APPENDIX
Notice To Employees
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities
We will not promulgate and maintain overbroad rules that prevent employees from engaging in lawful union activities.
We will not discriminatorily prevent employees from using company vehicles for union business.
We will not in
any like or related manner restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
Pro-Tec Fire Services Ltd.
Charles T. Hoskins, Jr., Atty., for the General Counsel.
Robert W. Burns, Atty., of
Stephen Hammer, Secretary-Treasurer, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
Lana Parke, Administrative
Law Judge. This case was tried in
Issues
1. Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by refusing to hire and refusing to consider Robert Manley (Manley) for employment during the period June 29 through December?2
2. Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by discriminatorily restricting its employees’ use of company vehicles at
its place of business at the
3. Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act since
December 1 by orally promulgating and maintaining a rule prohibiting union
activity at the
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following
Findings of Fact
i. jurisdiction
Respondent, a corporation with its primary office and
place of business in
ii. alleged
unfair labor practices
A. Relevant Credible Evidence
1. Union activity at Wackenhut Corporation.
Before July 1, the Wackenhut Corporation (Wackenhut) held
a contract with
While union president, Manley had a stormy relationship with Lindstrom. In dealing with contract grievances, the two had several heated confrontations. Chief Lindstrom found Manley to be the “most confrontational of the IFF presidents.” In a deposition given May 17, 2002, Chief Lindstrom recalled his antagonism:
Q. Mr. Lindstrom, did you make a statement…that if you were hired by Pro-Tec, that you would like to have input as to who was going to be hired?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you indicate . . . there were some individuals that you wanted to get rid of?
A. In the form of fantasy.
Q. . . . What did you indicate . . . as to whom you would want to get rid of?
A. In a perfect world, if I had input, Manley.
. . . .
Q. And why would you want to get rid of Manley?
A. Because he kept the organization in turmoil.
In early 2001, Manley, a captain for Wackenhut as well as
union president, learned that Respondent was planning to bid on the
Manley met with Rynerson in April. Manley asked for a tentative labor agreement
or a commitment to retain all Wackenhut employees at the
2. Refusal to hire and to consider Manley for employment
On June 12,
On June 21, Manley applied for a position with Respondent
at the
At about the same time, Lindstrom applied to Respondent for the position of fire chief. Before doing so, he told his assistant chief, Frank Prater (Prater) that if hired, he had some demands including time off and the opportunity to “point . . . fingers” at whom Respondent did and did not hire.4
On June 28, at about 9:30 a.m., Rynerson and Cashman interviewed Manley for employment. In the course of Manley’s interview, both interviewers filled out two forms. One was entitled “Interview Questions” and the other contained rating numbers from 1 through 10 (10 being highest) for the following criteria: appearance, body language, communication style, and experience level.
The “Interview Questions” form filled out by Rynerson noted “position [applied for]: FF/Equipment Operator, Assistant Chief, Captain, Chief of Training.” The one filled out by Cashman noted, “Position: Assistant chief Captain.” On both, the position “Captain” was circled.
On the form completed by Rynerson, he noted that Manley’s appearance was “not really” polished and that he was “reserved.” He appeared somewhat confident but was not articulate in speech. From Rynerson, Manley received an overall rating of “7” with the comments “appears to be authortative [sic], wants to be in control.”
On the form completed by Cashman, she noted under the category Body Language that Manley had very little eye contact and appeared “a little cocky?” As an additional note, Cashman wrote, “Not a lot of eye contact not sure being honest w/ me.” Under “Communication Style,” she noted, “Not a lot of ‘team’ more I, authoritative?” Cashman gave Manley an overall rating of “6–7” with a star over the 6 and the following written comments: “Concerns w/ each shift completing driver operator (FF) experience training. Complained, no solutions. Gave example of ‘younger guys’ when coaching (in office). Not a big fan of CISD,5 kept asking me how I feel….” Cashman testified that her overall impression of Manley was that he was not someone she was looking for as an employee.
Cashman’s notations on interview forms for applicant Ron Cummings (Cummings), who was hired, show that she thought him “cocky maybe,” not really articulate, able to adapt to anyone’s program training, but appearing “to have a chip on his shoulder re: maybe longevity.” Cashman left his overall rating blank. Notations on interview forms for applicant Lance Joy (Joy), who was hired, record that he did not interview well, was not articulate, but “overall could be a good fire fighter, appears to do ‘as told’.” Cashman gave him an overall rating of 6, as did Tynerson.
On June 28, at about one p.m., Respondent interviewed
Lindstrom for the position of fire chief at the
At mid-morning on June 29, Cashman offered Lindstrom the position of fire chief. About an hour later, he accepted. Lindstrom announced to employees that Respondent had hired him and had met his demands.6
On June 29, at about 4 p.m., Cashman telephoned Manley and told him Respondent was unable to offer him employment, that he would get a letter in the mail, and if he had questions, he could contact corporate headquarters. Of employees in the bargaining unit, only Manley and Richard Spalding, who was on disability leave, were not hired.
Rynerson testified that Respondent did not permit
Lindstrom to have any input into the hiring process for the
In testifying that Respondent knew nothing of Manley’s conduct as union president, Chief Rynerson essentially denied that Respondent wanted to know anything about employees’ work records or conduct under Wackenhut. He agreed, however, that Respondent did want to know employees’ discipline history especially if discipline were currently pending. When asked how Respondent expected to find out whether an employee was involved in a disciplinary action, Rynerson said, “I don’t know that—I guess I have to go back to my statement that we weren’t concerned with what [Wackenhut] might provide to us and I think I have to go back to H[uman]R[esources] issue . . . it would be against the law for them to share with us past personal things that happened….”
Initially, Cashman testified that Respondent considered Manley for any position with the company. In later testimony, Cashman said that Respondent considered Manley only for the captain position. Cashman said Respondent was unwilling to consider Manley for a lesser position because he had served as a captain since 1998, and she believed it created difficulties when former supervisors returned to the employee unit. Rynerson testified, “I didn’t feel as if we’d hire him for a captain, nor would I—I had the same decision for a fire fighter.”
As to his interview perception of Manley, Rynerson said that Manley came across as authoritative, “I’m in control, I’m the boss,” which Rynerson considered a negative trait for a supervisory position such as captain. Rynerson also felt from the interview that Manley might lack empathy and understanding in dealing with critical incident stress debriefing. Rynerson testified that after looking at everything, he concluded he “would not select him . . . for a captain’s position or any other position. I would not hire him, period.” Cashman said that she interviewed Manley for a captain position. However, she also “took in consideration the position of fire fighter also. I mean I wasn’t impressed with him, so I wasn’t really considering him. I guess the answer is no, I didn’t consider him for a fire fighter. I wasn’t impressed with him during the interview.”
On July 1, Respondent began operations under its contract
with the
3. Restriction of company vehicles and rule
prohibiting
union activity
On November 28, off-duty employee, Steve Hammer (Hammer) who also serves as union secretary, asked Captain Will McDown (McDown) if he could get a ride to the terminal. Hammer wanted to obtain the public record of the airport’s contract with Respondent to use in collective-bargaining negotiations. McDown assigned an on-duty firefighter to drive Hammer to and from the terminal in a rescue vehicle.
Before December 1, Respondent had permitted on-duty employees
to use company vehicles for personal errands.
On December 1, Denny Clark (Clark), assistant chief, told Hammer that
per Lindstrom, company vehicles were not to be used for union business and “no
union activities could be done there at the station and nothing could be said
about . . . the union.” Lindstrom did
not testify concerning what, if anything, he told
Respondent did not discipline Hammer for using the vehicle. Since the December 1 directive from
B. Discussion
1. Respondent’s refusal to hire Manley
To establish a discriminatory refusal to hire, the General
Counsel must show (1) that Respondent was hiring or had concrete plans to hire;
(2) that the applicant had experience or training relevant to the known requirements
of the positions for hire; and (3) that antiunion animus contributed to the
decision not to hire the applicant. Once
the General Counsel has made this showing, the burden shifts to Respondent to
show that it would not have hired the applicant even in the absence of his
union activity.
The General Counsel has established Manley’s union activity. Manley was, at material times, president of
the union representing Respondent’s future employees at
Whether the General Counsel has established employer animus is not so clear-cut. Although Respondent knew Manley held an official union position, there is no evidence that Rynerson or Cashman independently bore him any ill-will because of it. The inquiry does not end there, however.
During his tenure as fire chief for Respondent’s
predecessor, Wackenhut, Lindstrom unquestionably bore animosity toward Manley’s
union advocacy and unquestionably wanted to be rid of him. By his December 1 direction to
In the absence of direct evidence, the Board will infer animus
from circumstantial evidence and the record as a whole. Tubular Corporation of
The General Counsel having met its initial burden of persuasion, the burden of persuasion shifts to Respondent to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, its affirmative defense that it would have taken the same action even if Manley had not been an active union leader. Tim Foley Plumbing Service, above. In assessing Respondent’s defense, I am mindful that “[T]he defense does not fail simply because not all the evidence supports it, or even because some evidence tends to negate it.” Merillat Industries, 307 NLRB 1301, 1303 (1992). I also recognize that the Board does not determine whether a “nondiscriminatory reason for [employment action] is wise or well supported.” 6 West Limited Corp., 330 NLRB 527 at fn. 5 (2000). As Respondent points out (with appropriate authority),8 the Board may not substitute its own business judgment for that of Respondent or act as a “super-personnel” department. Even shortsighted or bad business judgments are permissible so long as they are not discriminatory.
The first prong of Respondent’s defense is that Manley made such an unfavorable impression in his employment interview that Respondent would not consider him for a fire captain position. Respondent argues that other applicants had qualifications that better fitted them for the captain positions. I accept Respondent’s arguments. The applicants selected for captain positions had more ARFF and airport experience than Manley. Further, Rynerson and Cashman articulated specific factors of the interviews that support a conclusion that Respondent, without regard to impermissible considerations, believed the three selected individuals were the best fire captain candidates. I find that Respondent would not have selected Manley as a fire captain regardless of his union activity.
The second prong of Respondent’s defense is that it declined to consider Manley for positions below that of fire captain because returning former supervisors to the employee corps created “difficulties.” That is not an unreasonable personnel decision. However, the testimony of Respondent’s witnesses did not consistently reflect such a decision. Rynerson said that he would not hire Manley as a captain, and he “had the same decision for a fire fighter” and concluded he “would not hire him, period.” Yet, Rynerson did not explain what defects precluded Manley’s working as a firefighter. Cashman first testified she did consider Manley for a firefighter position and then testified she did not. She also did not explain why Manley was unacceptable as a firefighter. In the absence of consistent testimony, I cannot accept Respondent’s claim that it rejected Manley as a firefighter because of his former captaincy.
The third prong of Respondent’s defense is that, even supposing Respondent considered Manley for a firefighter position, he made such a poor interview showing that neither Rynerson nor Cashman would hire him for any position whatsoever. As to the unfavorable interview impression, Respondent’s interview notes reflect that Rynerson and Cashman both had some reservations about Manley. However, the written comments and pertinent testimony relate primarily to Manley’s suitability for a supervisory position. Very little signals unfitness for a firefighter position especially when compared to the interview records of others. Manley’s interview score was higher than that of Joy who was hired, and Cashman noted criticisms similar to those leveled at Manley on Cummings’s interview form: “cocky maybe,” and “a chip on his shoulder.” Yet, Cummings was hired. This hiring disparity is evidence of unlawful motive.
The inability of Rynerson and Cashman to provide consistent and congruent testimony regarding the interview process also suggests an unlawful motive. Rynerson gave Manley an interview score of 7. Cashman scored Manley at 6 to7, with a star over the 6, but insisted that the combination of hers and Rynerson’s scores was not more than 6. Rynerson considered the interview form to be very important in the hiring decision. But Cashman testified the scoring was only a general component and “just numbers.” Why Rynerson and Cashman rejected Manley is not a complex question, and the two relatively sophisticated witnesses should have been able to answer it with logical consistency. They failed to do so. Their testimonial tergiversation compels me to infer that a prohibited motive existed for their refusal to hire Manley as a firefighter.
The entire circumstances warrant a conclusion that Respondent’s refusal to hire Manley as a firefighter and its subsequent ongoing refusal to consider him for employment arose from antiunion animus. Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent failed to hire Manley as a firefighter on June 29, and failed to consider him for employment as a firefighter during the following 6-month period, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
2. Restriction of company vehicles and rule
prohibiting
union activity
The complaint alleges that on December 1, Respondent restricted employees’ use of company vehicles because of or to discourage their union activities in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act and, on the same day, orally promulgated and since then has maintained a rule prohibiting union activity in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Without providing evidence to refute Mr. Hammer’s testimony, Respondent contends that it never promulgated any unlawful rules. Respondent argues that it had valid reasons for prohibiting off-duty employee vehicle use. Respondent further argues that it never implemented a formal policy regarding company vehicle use and has not prohibited employees from engaging in union activity in the workplace during appropriate break times.
Respondent’s arguments are unavailing.
The rules regarding union activity and vehicle use promulgated
by
Conclusions of Law
(1) By refusing to hire and thereafter to consider hiring Robert Manley, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By its discriminatory restriction of company vehicle use and rules prohibiting union activities, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3. Respondent has not violated the Act as otherwise alleged in the complaint.
Remedy
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Respondent having refused to hire and, thereafter, to consider hiring employee Robert Manley because of his activities on behalf of or support for the Union, or because he engaged in other protected concerted activities, it must offer him employment in the position of firefighter, or if that position is no longer available, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from date of refusal to hire to date of proper offer of employment, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). Respondent also must expunge from its files any reference to the unlawful refusal to hire or consider Robert Manley for employment and thereafter notify him in writing that this has been done and that the refusal to hire or consider him will not be used against him in any way.
In the complaint, General Counsel sought an order
requiring Respondent to reimburse any discriminatee entitled to a monetary
award for any extra federal and/or state income taxes that might result from
the lump-sum payment of the award.
General Counsel has not repeated the request in his brief, and there is
no showing that such a remedy is appropriate. Ishikawa Gasket
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended10
ORDER
The Respondent, Pro-Tec Fire Services Ltd., a subsidiary of JJ Protective Services, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to
hire or to consider hiring employees because of their activities on behalf of
the
(b) Maintaining rules that unlawfully prohibit employees from engaging in union activities at work.
(c) Discriminatorily prohibiting employees from using company vehicles for union business.
(d) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Robert Manley employment in the position of fire fighter, or if that position is no longer available, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges he would have enjoyed had he been hired on June 29.
(b) Make Robert Manley whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against him in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from its files any reference to the unlawful refusal to hire or to consider Robert Manley for employment and within 3 days thereafter notify him in writing that this has been done and that the refusal to hire or to consider him for employment will not be used against him in any way.
(d) Rescind the
rules announced by
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(f) Within 14 days
after service by the Region, post at its
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, at
APPENDIX
Notice To Employees and Members
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the
The National Labor Relations Board had found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
We will not do anything that interferes with these rights.
We will not refuse to consider for employment or hire or otherwise discriminate against any of you for supporting International Association of Fire Fighters Local No. 3694, affiliated with the International Association of Fire Fighters or any other union.
We will not maintain rules that prevent employees from engaging in lawful union activities.
We will not discriminatorily prevent employees from using company vehicles for union business.
We will not in any like or related manner, restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
We will within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer employment to Robert Manley for the position of fire fighter, or if the position is no longer available, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to his seniority and any other rights and privileges.
We will make Robert Manley whole for any loss of pay and other benefits suffered by him, plus interest.
We will remove from our files any reference to the unlawful refusal to hire and to consider Robert Manley for employment and notify him in writing that this has been done, and the refusal to hire and to consider him for employment will not be used against him in any way.
We will rescind our rule preventing employees from engaging in lawful union activities.
Pro-Tech Fire Services Ltd., a subsidiary of JJ
Protective Services, Inc.
[1] The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us they are correct. Standard Drywall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
[2] We adopt the judge’s findings that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by banning all union activities at the workplace and by disparately restricting the personal use of company vehicles to nonunion business. There is no exception to the judge’s recommended dismissal of the allegation that the vehicle restriction also violated Sec. 8(a)(3).
[3] There are no exceptions to the judge’s finding that the Respondent would not have selected Manley to be fire captain regardless of his union activity. Therefore, the refusal-to-hire or consider-for-hire allegation involved herein pertains solely to his application for the firefighter position.
[4] We recognize that the giving of a false reason can be a factor to support a finding of unlawful motive. However, where as here, there is no evidence of antiunion animus, we do not believe that the General Counsel has established his case.
[5] Contrary to her colleagues, Member Liebman would adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3) by refusing to hire Manley as a firefighter. In Member Liebman’s view, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent’s refusal to hire Manley was motivated by antiunion animus toward Manley’s union activity. Thus, the record establishes that: (1) Chief Lindstrom had for years born intense animosity toward Manley’s union activity; (2) Lindstrom admitted that if hired by the Respondent he wanted input as to who the Respondent hired, and that he would advise the Respondent to get rid of Manley; (3) Lindstrom told Assistant Chief Frank Prater that he would have some demands of the Respondent if hired, including the opportunity “to point fingers” at whom the Respondent should not hire; (4) Lindstrom was hired, and upon being hired he advised the employees that his hiring demands had been met; (5) later the same day that Lindstrom was hired the Respondent notified Manley that he would not be hired; (6) Manley was the only former Wackenhut employee not offered employment, except for one employee who was out on disability; (7) Manley’s overall employment interview rating was as high as, or higher, than that of other employees hired. Member Liebman agrees with the judge that this evidence strongly supports an inference that Lindstrom advised the Respondent not to hire Manley because of his union activities, and that the Respondent refused to hire Manley for that reason. Finally, Member Liebman agrees with the judge’s rejection of the Respondent’s argument that it declined to consider Manley for the firefighter position because returning former supervisors to the employee corps creates “difficulties.” The testimony of the Respondent’s witnesses on this issue was inconsistent.
[6]
If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a
2 At the hearing, I granted the General Counsel’s motion to amend the complaint to allege an extended time period during which Manley was not considered for hire and hired. The amended period corresponds with the length of time Respondent keeps employment applications.
3 Where not otherwise noted, the findings herein are based on the pleadings, the stipulations of counsel, and/or unchallenged credible evidence.
4 Although Prater has a pending action of employment discrimination against Respondent, I credit his testimony based on manner and demeanor.
6 Lindstrom did not specifically admit he told employees that Respondent had met his demands. However, when questioned whether he had done so, he answered “[I]f I had made any comments, it would have been after [11:30 a.m., June 29].” I take his answer to be a tacit admission that he told employees Respondent had met his demands.
7 It is irrelevant that the majority of the Wackenhut employees Respondent hired were union members. It is not necessary, contrary to Respondent’s argument, to show general union animosity when there is evidence of specific animosity.
8 Respondent cites NLRB v. GATX Logistics, Inc., 160 F.3d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 1998), enfg. 323 NLRB 328 (1997); McCoy v. WGN Continental Broad Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992); Furr v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996).
9 The General Counsel inadvertently miscited St. Joseph’s Hospital, as 263 NLRB 275, 277 (1982), and I am unable to review the intended case. CVN Cos., 301 NLRB 789 (1991) cited by the General Counsel concerns an employee disparately required to follow a procedure intended to deter and discourage her from pursuing union activities, which constituted unlawful discrimination within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The present situation differs from CVN Cos. Respondent has not required any employee action.