NOTICE: This
opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes
of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested
to notify the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
December 14, 2007
DECISION AND ORDER
By Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Walsh
On May 21, 2007, Administrative Law Judge George Carson II issued the attached decision. The Respondent and the General Counsel each filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Respondent filed a reply to the General Counsel’s answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended
Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, U.S. Recycling
and Disposal, LLC,
Dated,
Robert J. Battista, Chairman
Peter
C. Schaumber,
Member
Dennis
P. Walsh,
Member
(seal) National
Labor Relations Board
Dawn J. Blume, Esq., for the General Counsel.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
George Carson
II, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the following
Findings of Fact
i. jurisdiction
The Respondent, U.S. Recycling and Disposal, LLC, the
Company, is an
The Respondent admits, and I find and conclude, that General
Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers and Helpers Union Local 179, the
ii. alleged unfair labor practices
A. Background
Richard Grad founded the Company in September 2004. As
General Manager, he directs the Company’s operations from its
Two oral policies are relevant to this proceeding. The first relates to “pretripping,” the requirement that a driver perform an inspection of his truck before leaving the facility. The second relates to the reporting of accidents or damage to a company vehicle or to property.
On September 15, the
B. Facts
Driver Richard Mann was hired in the last week of June. Shortly after being hired, General Manager Grad questioned Mann about damage to a truck that Mann had previously driven. The driver who damaged the truck did not report the damage. In the conversation, Grad told Mann “that if anything like that ever happens to call him immediately.” Mann did so when he dented a fender on a truck in late July or early August.
In late August, Mann contacted the
On August 31, while picking up a dumpster at a construction site, Mann drove his truck over a new concrete sidewalk that was above ground level because the contractor had not yet brought the sidewalk to ground level by backfilling the area adjacent to the sidewalk with dirt. The sidewalk cracked. Mann was aware that his back tires had rolled over the sidewalk, but he was unaware that the sidewalk had been damaged. The contractor notified the Company of the damage, and Dispatcher Chris Collins called Mann on the cellular telephone in his truck, asking whether he was aware that he had damaged the sidewalk. Mann informed Collins that he “may or may not have” damaged the sidewalk, that he was “not aware that it broke.”
The Company salesperson, James Purvis, went to the site to inspect the damage and confirm that the Company was responsible. The cost of repair was $250. General Manager Grad spoke with Mann, telling him that he had “plenty of room to maneuver” and that he needed “to be more careful because that cost money.”
Grad testified that he gave Mann an oral warning and informed him that “the next time he does not report [an] incident immediately upon occurrence, he will be discharged.” Grad admitted that he did not fill out a warning document relating to the foregoing incident.
Mann denies that Grad informed him that he was being given an oral warning, that he was simply told to be more careful. Mann acknowledged that he was aware, on the basis of the damaged truck conversation with Grad shortly after being hired, that he must report “damage to [the] vehicle immediately.” I credit Mann. Grad’s claim that he gave Mann an oral warning is contradicted by the warning he issued Mann on October 27. On that warning, in response to the question “Has the employee been previously warned?” Grad circled “NO.”
In late September, Mann spoke with General Manager Grad.
He referred to the recently posted notice of election by asking “what the crap
was above the time clock.” Grad replied that he did not know, “[Y]ou tell me.
Your drivers, your fellow drivers are trying to bring the
Mann recalled that Grad was assisting him with a
mechanical problem at a location at the facility referred to as the quarry when
this conversation occurred. Grad denied having the foregoing conversation.
Drivers Steve Hudson and John Ellison both testified that Grad did not engage
in any conversation relating to the
Mann, in the foregoing conversation, did not reveal his
prounion sentiments. At the election on the morning of October 27, Mann served
as the election observer for the
Grad testified that he simply asked the business agents to leave. He denied “swearing.” The vulgar language which Grad used did not invoke a deity and did not constitute swearing. Thus, his denial that he swore is irrelevant. Driver Steve Hudson, who served as observer for the Company and appeared as a witness for the Respondent, was not questioned regarding the words used by Grad at the conclusion of the election. I credit Flynn and Mann.
Prior to January 2007, the Company’s requirement that drivers complete a pretrip inspection was oral. Department of Transportation regulations require that drivers sign their inspection report only if a defect is noted; however, the Daily Report used by the Company, after blocks relating to various components that would be checked if there were a problem, has a block followed by the statement “Condition of the above vehicle is satisfactory” and a signature line. The memorandum of January 26, 2007, directs the drivers, even if there are “no issues” with their truck, to check the “satisfactory” box and, presumably, sign the document insofar as “all information on the driver’s daily sheet must be completed.” The memorandum does not set out what is included in a pretrip inspection. In practice, a minimal pretrip inspection includes checking the lights and tires of the vehicle. Some drivers also check the fluid levels.
Prior to October 27, no employee had ever been disciplined for failure to conduct a pretrip inspection. A total of 73 daily reports submitted by various drivers during the period from July 1, 2006, through January 31, 2007, are unsigned and the “satisfactory” box is unchecked. Thus, in each of those instances, there is no confirmation that the respective drivers conducted a pretrip inspection.
On October 27, following the election and dismissal of the union representatives, Mann performed a pretrip inspection, checking the lights and tires of his vehicle. He then departed on his route. He observed Grad in the area, but they did not speak. Mann’s daily report reflects that the condition of the vehicle was satisfactory and bears his signature.
General Manager Grad testified that he observed that Mann failed to perform a pretrip inspection, that he simply got into his vehicle and left. He did not warn him at that time. He did not speak with him on his cellular telephone because “I normally don’t confront people while they’re driving down the street on the Nextel [cellular telephone].”
Upon Mann’s return to the facility on the afternoon of October 27, Grad issued a written warning to him for failing to perform a pretrip inspection. Mann acknowledges that he signed the warning and wrote “I concur.” He explained that he did so because Grad is “a very confrontational, argumentative person,” and he, Mann, felt that he “had a bull’s eye on my back” and that the warning was “just retaliation.”
On October 30, at a construction jobsite in
Driver John Ellison, called as a witness by the Respondent, testified that Mann called him saying that he “had run over something at a jobsite within, I mean, nothing really specific.” Counsel then asked Ellison whether Mann said that “he knew he’d be in trouble.” Ellison answered that Mann “just mentioned that he thought he might be in trouble, but that again nothing really specific.” Mann denied the foregoing conversation. Ellison’s demeanor, the absence of any reference to the word “trouble” in his initial answer, and his qualification of both answers with the words “nothing really specific,” reflect adversely upon his credibility. I credit Mann and find that no such conversation occurred.
Jeff Wilson, vice president of Rock and Roll Concrete, was
not at the site when the foregoing occurred. When he arrived, the employee told
him what had happened.
Upon Mann’s return to the facility, Grad asked about the
job he had gone to in
Grad testified that he asked Mann whether “there was something that he wanted to tell me about the Cantore Construction site,” and that Mann looked “stupefied” and said, “No.” Grad then asked if Mann wanted “to talk about the roll of wire mesh,” and that Mann replied, “[O]h that, I’m going to take care of that personally with the customer.” Grad told Mann to give him the keys, “that he was through.” Grad testified that he discharged Mann not for causing damage but for “[n]ot reporting the accident.” A handwritten statement by Grad relating to this incident does not report that Mann stated that he was “going to take care of that personally with the customer.” There was no reason for Mann to have made such a statement since he had been told that the mesh was trash. I credit Mann and find that, when he began to explain what had occurred, Grad told him that he did not “want to hear it” and discharged him.
The policy relating to damage reports was unwritten; thus
there are varying versions of what was required. General Manager Grad testified
that he informed every driver that “[a]nytime there is any damage, whether it
be an accident, incident, whether there is a problem with a customer, that they’re
supposed to call the office immediately.” He expanded upon this, explaining
that any time there was a “problem with a customer, you always call in. I don’t
want the drivers confronting customers.” Despite this, driver Steve Hudson, who
served as the observer for the Company at the election, was not terminated for
an incident that occurred on January 30, 2007. Grad documented the incident
upon a warning notice that states: “Knocked over windows, glass everywhere,
gave our customer & the homeowner an attitude about ‘it not being his job.’”
Grad admitted that he learned of this altercation from the customer. Grad
explained that the glass had been thrown away and testified that
Although Grad testified that he personally informed each driver of the reporting policy, driver John Ellison testified that Grad “never said nothing to me about it,” that he received the information from fellow driver Jay Ellis. Ellison noted that he already knew what Ellis told him, that “[i]t was pretty much assumed that, well, anyplace you work, if there is an accident or anything like that, you’re supposed to report it.”
Salesperson Purvis, although not mentioning the word “damage,” recalled overhearing Grad tell Mann that “any time that an incident involving one of our trucks, an accident on the highway, an accident on a jobsite, anything, drivers were to stop, call it in immediately.”
Mann, on the basis of his conversation with Grad concerning the truck that Mann had previously driven, understood that he must report “damage to [the] vehicle immediately.”
On July 12, driver Edward Grebic was discharged. His timecard reflects that Grebic worked for the Company for 3 days, a total of 24.30 hours on July 10, 11, and 12. On his 3rd day of work, July 12, the truck he was driving sustained damage to both front fenders and the bumper, which had been pushed to within 1 inch of the left front tire. When asked about the damage, Grebic claimed that he “did not know” how this had happened. Grebic was discharged for failing to report an accident.
Although not clear from the record, it appears that the damage to the truck that Grebic was driving was the basis for the conversation between Mann and Grad in early July. Grad confirmed with Mann that the truck had not been damaged when Mann had last driven it.
C. Analysis and Concluding Findings
1. The 8(a)(1) allegations
The complaint alleges that, in late September, the Respondent,
by General Manager Grad, threatened employees with stricter enforcement of work
rules, loss of overtime, and reduction of hours if they selected the
“Employee-initiation of conversations about unions does
not provide a justification under the Act for ensuing unlawful statements which
supervisors choose to make, as such conversations progress.” Altorfer Machinery Co., 332 NLRB 130,
135 (2000). “[U]nlawful statements are no less unlawful because it
. . . [was not] the supervisor who
initiated discussion of a union or unions.” Ibid.
The Respondent’s brief does not discuss Grad’s statements to Mann. The brief states that Mann’s testimony was “inconsistent with GC’s [General Counsel’s] opening statement.” Opening statements are not evidence. My analysis and findings are based upon Mann’s credited testimony regarding what Grad said to him.
Grad’s statement that “the Union has their rules that he’ll
have to play by” and his rhetorical question as to whether “the drivers can
play by those rules,” referred to the rules of the
Similarly, the minimum hour requirement was stated in
terms of “whatever union contract is put in place.” The General Counsel argues
that the statement relating to minimum hours was the same as the threat to cut
working hours found in Felsa Knitting
Mills, Inc., 203 NLRB 504 (1974). In that case, the threat was of a
specific reduction to 35 hours, stated as “Union hours,” but without reference
to any contract.
Grad did threaten to reduce overtime. After referring to a
contractual minimum hour requirement, Grad added that the minimum hour
requirement was all the employees would get, that “overtime would be cut at
that point.” The cutting of overtime was an action that the Respondent would
take. The loss of overtime was not “carefully phrased on the basis of objective
fact to convey an employer’s belief as to demonstrably probable consequences
beyond his control . . . . “ NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395
The complaint also alleges one instance of interrogation in late September. The subpoenaed witness that the General Counsel anticipated would testify to the interrogation did not appear; thus there is no evidence in support of this allegation. Counsel for the General Counsel, in her brief, requests that I reconsider my ruling denying her motion for an adjournment to pursue subpoena enforcement. I have done so, and I reaffirm that ruling made pursuant to my authority under Section 102.35(6) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations to regulate the course of the hearing. On the first day of the hearing, counsel advised that she had two brief witnesses under subpoena who would not be present until the following day and that their testimony related to Mann’s “state of mind.” Nothing was said about a witness relating to the interrogation allegation. In view of the nature of the anticipated testimony, I requested the Respondent to proceed to present its evidence, although the General Counsel had not rested. If the two absent witnesses had been present, this hearing would have concluded in 1 day. On the morning of the 2nd day of hearing, one of the two witnesses appeared. The other did not. Counsel for the General Counsel moved that I adjourn the hearing in order to obtain subpoena enforcement upon not one, but two witnesses, the expected second witness and a third witness who had not previously been mentioned and whose testimony related to the allegation of interrogation. I accepted an offer of proof with regard to the testimony expected from the missing second witness, which, as stated in footnote 2, above, I have not relied upon insofar as I have credited Mann. I closed the hearing and denied the request to adjourn the hearing to permit subpoena enforcement with regard to the third witness, the existence of whom was not mentioned until 10 minutes prior to the close of the hearing and whom Counsel for the General Counsel acknowledged she “never expected . . . to show.” I reaffirm that ruling. I shall recommend that the allegation relating to interrogation be dismissed.
2. The 8(a)(3) allegations
The complaint alleges that Richard Mann was warned and
discharged because of his union activities in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act. In assessing the evidence
pursuant to the analytical framework prescribed in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981), I find that Mann’s presence at the election as the observer for the
With regard to the warning, prior to October 27, no driver
had been warned for failing to perform a pretrip inspection. I find it
incredible that, over the 2 year period since September 2004, Grad had not
become aware of any occasion upon which a driver had not performed a pretrip inspection.
A total of 73 unchecked and unsigned driver daily reports establish a lack of
enforcement of the policy. Even if I were to have found that Mann did not
perform a pretrip inspection, the timing of the warning, on the day that Mann
served as observer for the
General Manager Grad claims that he observed Mann get into his truck without conducting a pretrip inspection and drive off. He made no attempt to stop him. Insofar as Grad was in a position to observe the alleged dereliction, he was in a position to rectify the situation at that time. Indeed, Grad testified that, if he observed a driver not performing a pretrip inspection, he would “[g]o right to them and tell them that . . . they got to do it.” He did not tell Mann anything. Even if Grad could not have been heard if he had shouted at Mann, he could have called Mann on his cellular telephone. His testimony that it is not his practice to call drivers on the street misses the point. Mann was still at the facility. I do not credit Grad’s testimony.
The brief of the Respondent asserts that Mann, “in his exuberance
[following the election victory of the
The brief of the Respondent does not address the daily report signed by Mann that reflects that he did conduct a pretrip inspection and that the condition of the vehicle was satisfactory. Mann was not warned for falsifying a document. When the reason given for a disciplinary action is either false, or does not exist, the Respondent has not rebutted General Counsel’s prima facie case. Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 NLRB 722 (1981). I find that the Respondent issued the warning for failure to perform a pretrip inspection to Mann in retaliation for his union activity and that, by doing so, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
The Respondent contends that Mann was discharged because he violated the oral policy requiring the immediate reporting of damage to property. Mann understood that he was to report any accident resulting in damage to his vehicle. So far as Mann knew, there was no damage. He was told by the individual present that the mesh was used and was going to be thrown away. There was no accident; thus there was nothing to report.
The requirement for a report was an oral policy that was
stated differently by every witness who testified. According to Grad, “Anytime
there is any damage, whether it be an accident, incident, whether there is a
problem with a customer, . . . they’re
supposed to call the office immediately.” Purvis understood that any time there
was “an incident involving one of our trucks, an accident on the highway, an
accident on a jobsite, anything, drivers were to stop, call it in immediately.”
Driver John Ellison knew that “[i]t was pretty much assumed that, well,
anyplace you work, if there is an accident or anything like that, you’re
supposed to report it.” Driver Steve Hudson understood that if a driver did not
immediately report an accident or damage to property, the driver “would be
expecting a write up or if it was an accident involving the vehicle, probably
termination.” Contrary to the statement in the Respondent’s brief that
On April 20, the Respondent had issued a written memorandum advising employees that they would be individually responsible for the cost of any damage to culverts. The memorandum is silent regarding any reporting requirement.
Mann was not involved in an accident on October 30. So far as he knew there was no damage to anything. If he called every time he “ran over trash, . . . [he] would be on the phone all day.”
The Respondent could certainly choose to believe the complaint of Vice President Jeff Miller of Rock and Roll Concrete if it had a rational basis for doing so after investigating the matter. Unlike the situation regarding the sidewalk that Mann had broken in August, prior to the Respondent’s knowledge of his union activity, the Respondent did not investigate to determine whether the damage reported by Miller had, in fact, occurred as he claimed.
I have credited the testimony of Mann that Grad cut him off as he was attempting to explain what occurred. He did not “want to hear it.” Purvis was not sent to the jobsite to determine what had occurred. The Respondent lost no money because Rock and Roll Concrete never sought reimbursement. Whether the failure of Rock and Roll Concrete to bill the Respondent was, as Miller testified, due to his being too “busy . . . forgot,” or upon his determining that the mesh was used is not established. Investigation by Purvis would have established how it was possible for Mann to have damaged only one roll of mesh in a pile containing some 30 rolls of mesh unless that roll was not in the pile and had been used and was to be thrown away as Mann was told by the employee with whom he spoke.
Accepting one version of an event without obtaining or considering all the facts suggests a discriminatory motive. As stated, with Board approval, in Bantek West, Inc., 344 NLRB 886, 895 (2005:
“The failure to conduct a meaningful investigation or to
give the employee [who is the subject of the investigation] an opportunity to
explain are clear indicia of discriminatory intent. K & M Electronics, 283 NLRB 279, 291 fn. 45 (1987). When addressing
discriminatory discipline, the Respondent “not only must separate its tainted
motivation here from any legitimate motivation, but it must persuade that its
legitimate motivation outweighs its unlawful motivation so much that the
Company would have imposed the discipline even in the absence of any union
activities.”
The Respondent has not persuaded “that its legitimate motivation
outweighs its unlawful motivation so much that the Company would have imposed
the discipline even in the absence of any union activities.” There was no
accident. Mann was told that there was no damage. The Respondent did not, as it
had in August, send a representative to the jobsite to confirm that there was
damage for which the Respondent was responsible. The discharge of Mann 3 days
after the election victory of the Union at which he served as observer for the
The Respondent argues that the facts of this case “are
identical” to the facts in Grocery
Haulers, Inc., 315 NLRB 1312 (1995). Contrary to that argument, the cases are not
identical. In Grocery Haulers, Inc.,
the Company had documentary photographic evidence of the damage, a 2½ foot
section of stockade fence that had been flattened by the trailer of the truck
that had backed into the fence. When confronted with his failure to report the
damage, the driver denied being aware that he had damaged the fence.
A more applicable case is Thurston Motor Lines, 263 NLRB 1101 (1982), in which the respondent never sought the employee’s “version of the ‘accident’ or the reasons why he did not report it.” In that case, in which the employee had chipped a brick on a loading dock, the respondent did investigate and determined that the employee had chipped a brick. The Board found that the respondent “seized upon a trifling incident, called it an ‘accident,’ and used it as a pretext to discharge” the employee for his union activity. Ibid. In this case the Respondent discharged Mann with no investigation whatsoever.
The Respondent argues that its discharge of employee Edward Grebic establishes an absence of disparity. I disagree. The Respondent’s investigation of the damage caused by Grebic was instantaneous; it had only to look at his truck. The Respondent did not see the damage that Mann had allegedly caused, and it sent no representative to the jobsite to confirm the damage reported by Miller. The discharge of a 3 day employee who denied knowing how damage to two fenders and the bumper of his truck occurred does not establish consistent enforcement of the Respondent’s oral policy relating to the immediate reporting of accidents or damage. The Respondent has not established that Mann would have been discharged in the absence of his union activity. I find that the Respondent discharged Richard Mann because of his union activity in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Conclusions of Law
1. By threatening employees with loss of overtime if they selected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By warning Richard Mann on October 27, 2006, because of his union activities, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3. By discharging Richard Mann on October 30, 2006, because of his union activities, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent having discriminatorily warned and discharged Richard Mann, it must rescind the warning and offer him reinstatement and make him whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from October 30, 2006, to date of proper offer of reinstatement, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
The Respondent must also post an appropriate notice.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended[3]
ORDER
The Respondent, U.S. Recycling and Disposal, LLC,
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees with loss of overtime if they selected
the
(b) Warning, discharging, or otherwise discriminating against any employee for supporting General Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers and Helpers Union Local 179, or any other union.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, rescind the written warning issued to Richard Mann on October 27, 2006.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order offer Richard Mann full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
(c) Make Richard Mann whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against him in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from its files any reference to the unlawful warning and unlawful discharge, and within 3 days thereafter notify Richard Mann in writing that this has been done and that the warning and discharge will not be used against him in any way.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
It is further ordered that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
Dated,
APPENDIX
Notice To Employees
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the
The National Labor Relations Board had found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
We will not
threaten you with loss of overtime if you select the
We will not warn, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against any of you for supporting General Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers and Helpers Union Local 179, or any other union.
We will, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, rescind the warning issued to Richard Mann on October 27, 2006.
We will, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order offer Richard Mann full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed and we will make him whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against him, less any net interim earnings, plus interest, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision.
We will, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlawful warning and discharge of Richard Mann and we will, within 3 days thereafter, notify him in writing that this has been done and that the warning and discharge will not be used against him in any way.
We will not in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce any of you in the exercise of your rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.