NOTICE: This
opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes
of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested
to notify the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
Glens Falls[1]
Building and Construction Trades Council and International Union of Bricklayers
and Allied Craftsmen, Local Union No. 6 and International Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of North America, Local Union No. 229 and International
Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, Local Union No.
40 and International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental
Ironworkers, Local Union No. 12 and Laborers International Union of North
America, Local Union No. 157 and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local Union No. 438 and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union
No. 106 and International Brotherhood of Painters, Allied Trades and Glaziers,
Local Union No. 466 and Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local
Union No. 83 and United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing Industry and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada,
Local Union No. 773[2]
and Indeck Energy Services of
Corinth, Inc.; Indeck Corinth Limited Partnership; Indeck Energy Services, Inc.[3] Case 3–CE–55
July 31, 2007
DECISION AND ORDER
By chairman Battista and Members
Schaumber and Kirsanow
A. Introduction
The complaint in this case alleges violations of Section
8(e) of the Act[4] by the
Respondent Unions. Specifically at issue
are the Respondents’ February 20, 1992 letter agreement with Indeck and a
subsequent 1992 agreement with Indeck’s contractor, CRS Sirrine, Inc.
(Sirrine), as they relate to the construction of a power cogeneration facility
in
The Respondents are alleged to have violated Section 8(e) by entering into the union signatory subcontracting provisions of the above agreements and by reaffirming them when filing a civil breach of contract action against Indeck in New York State Supreme Court on November 9, 1993. Under Section 8(e), the subject provisions are unlawful secondary restrictions on doing business unless, as the Respondents contend, they are exempt from the general prohibitions of Section 8(e) under the construction industry proviso to that section. We find the Respondents have failed to prove the affirmative defense of proviso coverage because the subject agreements did not arise in the context of a collective-bargaining relationship between the Respondents and Indeck and were not executed for the purpose of preventing conflict between union and nonunion labor on a common construction situs. We therefore find that the Respondents violated Section 8(e) as alleged.[5]
B. Procedural Background
On August 7, 1996, Administrative Law Judge James F.
Morton issued a decision in which he concluded that Indeck is an employer in
the construction industry within the meaning of the 8(e) proviso and that the Respondents
had not violated Section 8(e). On July
16, 1998, the Board remanded the proceeding to reopen the record for additional
evidence, some of which Judge Morton had erroneously excluded. 325 NLRB 1084 (Indeck I). In remanding, the
Board addressed only the judge’s evidentiary rulings. It did not pass on any other issues.
Judge Morton having retired, the case was assigned on remand to Administrative Law Judge Eleanor MacDonald. On February 15, 2000, she issued the attached supplemental decision, in which she concluded, like Judge Morton, that Indeck is an employer in the construction industry within the scope of the 8(e) proviso and that the Respondents had not violated Section 8(e) by entering into and reaffirming the letter agreement.[6]
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decisions and the record in
light of the exceptions and briefs[7]
and has decided to affirm the judges’ rulings, findings,[8]
and conclusions only to the extent consistent herewith.
C. Factual Background
Indeck designs, owns, and operates power cogeneration (“cogen”)
facilities, producing both steam for sale to manufacturers and electricity for
sale to public utilities. Most of its
work force consists of engineers. It
does not employ workers in the building and construction trades. In the early 1990s, Indeck was planning to
build cogens in
In September 1991, the
In an October 11, 1991 letter, Lindsay told Reilly that
Indeck was committed to doing the
Similar discussions took place concerning the planned
In December 1991, Paul Fingland, business representative
of Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 267 and also an official of the New York
State Pipe Trades Association (neither of which organizations are respondents
in this case[9]), told
Lindsay that the Respondents had trained people available to work on Indeck’s
proposed projects, the Respondents would like to become involved in the
projects, and the Respondents would try to do anything they could to help
Indeck. Fingland told Lindsay that the
Respondents had reservations about the quality of the employees and the safety
problems of some of the nonunion contractors that were building plants in the
area. Lindsay “indicated” to Fingland
that it was Indeck’s intention that the projected
On January 15, 1992, union attorney Reilly sent Lindsay a
copy of a proposed PLA for construction of Indeck’s
In late January 1992, Lindsay attended, but did not actively
participate in, a meeting in which Sirrine and the
Gillick wrote back to Allen on January 30, stating in
pertinent part that Indeck was committed to perform the construction on the
On February 5, Gillick met with Fingland, Allen, and about
15-20 local union business agents at the Carpenters Union Hall in
After this meeting, Fingland told Gillick that Indeck’s
January 30 commitment letter was not “strong enough,” and he asked Gillick to
give the Respondents a firmer commitment for a PLA. Fingland told Gillick that in return for a
stronger commitment letter the Respondents would not try to stop the
On February 20, Gillick sent a revised letter agreement,
which Fingland found to be an acceptable expression of Indeck’s commitment to
use union labor on the
In our earlier correspondence, Indeck has committed to
construct our project in
To further insure our commitment and good faith intentions, Indeck will instruct its contractor to execute the National Construction Stabilization Agreement as the Project Agreement.
In issuing the contractor this direction, it is understood by all parties that it is the Contractor’s and Building and Construction Trades Council’s responsibility to mutually agree on any modifications to this agreement prior to its execution.
We trust this further defines Indeck’s intentions relating to the Building and Construction Trades labor involvement in the execution of our Project.
Gillick testified that in return for the January 30 letter and the February 20 letter agreement, he was assured by Allen and Fingland that the Unions would do all that they could to support the project and that they would not hamper or intervene in regulatory proceedings that were going on at the time in regard to Indeck’s efforts to obtain permits to build the prospective New York State cogens. Gillick also testified that an advantage of a union contractor over a merit shop contractor was that a union contractor could provide a good flow of skilled craftsmen to do the project. He further testified, however, that he had “very little discussion with Fingland about supply of manpower.”
Fingland testified that the language in the letter agreement
“seemed to be the best agreement that we were able to get. I thought this would
be acceptable to the building trades.”
He had told Gillick that if a PLA was not reached on, inter alia, the
Indeck formally contracted with Sirrine to build the
In September, Sirrine and the Respondents concluded the
alleged 8(e) Sirrine - Trades Council agreement (which is not the PLA
itself). This agreement identifies Sirrine
as the “Project Manager” for construction of the
Sirrine agrees that any contractor or subcontractor which is employed on the Project shall be a signatory to and abide by all of the terms contained in the Project Labor Agreement for the Indeck - Corinth Limited Partnership Cogen Project, Corinth, New York (hereinafter “The Project Agreement”). A copy of the Project Agreement negotiated by Sirrine and the [Respondent Trades Council] is attached. Sirrine will not be a signatory to the Project Agreement itself.
The Corinth PLA, attached to the Sirrine - Trades Council agreement, states in pertinent part as follows:
Article XIX,
SUBCONTRACTING
Section 1. The Employer agrees that neither it nor any of its subcontractors will subcontract any work to be done on the project except to a person, firm, or corporation party to this Agreement. Any contractor or subcontractor working on a project covered by this Agreement shall, as a condition to working on said project, become signatory to and perform all work under the terms of this Agreement.
The PLA was signed by all of the Respondents. Neither Sirrine nor Indeck were
signatories. It was understood that
Sirrine and Indeck would not be employing any workers in the construction and
building trades on the
Before any construction work was done on the project, a
dispute developed between Indeck and Sirrine over the size of a contractually-generated
escalation in the price that Indeck would pay Sirrine for a delayed start. In April 1993, Indeck declared Sirrine in
default and canceled its contract for Sirrine to build the
The Respondents filed a breach-of-agreement lawsuit against Indeck in state court in November 1993, seeking $12 million in damages. As an affirmative defense to the lawsuit, Indeck alleged that the February 1992 letter agreement was unenforceable and void under Section 8(e) of the Act. Consistent with that defense, Indeck subsequently filed its 8(e) charge in the instant case. The lawsuit was removed to the United States District Court, Northern District of New York, where it was stayed pending resolution of this case.
D. Analysis
Preliminarily, we affirm Judge Morton’s finding, for the
reasons set forth in the “Analysis” section of his decision in Indeck I, 325 NLRB at 1095, that the
complaint is not time-barred under Section 10(b) of the Act, and that the
Respondents reaffirmed and reentered into their February 20, 1992 letter
agreement with Indeck by filing their state court breach-of-contract
lawsuit. We also affirm Judge Morton’s
finding that Indeck’s promise to the Respondents in the February 20, 1992
letter agreement, i.e., that Indeck’s contractor on the project in question
would deal only with subcontractors who had or would enter into a
collective-bargaining agreement with the Respondents, is within the scope of
the prohibitions of Section 8(e) because it constitutes an implicit agreement
by Indeck not to do business with another person—specifically, any contractor
who would subcontract to nonunion subcontractors.
We now turn to the central issue in this case, i.e., whether the otherwise prohibited letter agreement and the Sirrine - Trades Council agreement were protected under the construction industry proviso of 8(e). The Respondents, who bear the affirmative defense burden of proving proviso coverage, contend that the agreements and the lawsuit to enforce them were protected by the proviso because (1) Indeck is an employer in the construction industry within the scope of the proviso, and (2) the agreements were negotiated within a collective-bargaining context or (3) the agreements were specifically negotiated and executed to resolve the problems involved in permitting union and nonunion employees to work side by side at a common construction site.
The first prong of the Respondents’ defense relates to
the express statutory requirement
limiting proviso coverage to agreements “between a labor organization and an
employer in the construction industry.”
Depending on the circumstances, an employer can be in the construction
industry for a particular construction project even if it is not primarily
engaged in the construction business.
See, e.g., Carpenters Local 743
(Longs Drug), 278 NLRB 440
(1986). Both judges in this case have concluded
that Indeck was a construction industry employer within the meaning of the
proviso for the
Although Connell
was an antitrust case brought by nonunion contractors alleging a concerted
refusal to deal with them, it was necessary for the Court to decide whether a
union signatory subcontracting agreement between a general construction
contractor and a “stranger union” that did not represent the signatory
contractor’s employees was lawful under the 8(e) proviso and therefore entitled
to the nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust law. The Court found that the proviso did not
apply. It stated that the proviso “extends
only to agreements in the context of collective-bargaining relationships and,
in light of congressional references to the Denver
Building Trades problem, possibly to common-situs relationships on
particular jobsites as well.” 421
Neither Indeck’s February 20 letter agreement with the
Respondents nor the Respondents’ subsequent agreement with Sirrine arose in the
context of a present or prehire collective-bargaining relationship. While the Respondents claim an intent to
represent Indeck’s employees, the record clearly shows that at all relevant
times the parties involved understood that Indeck had no employees in the
building and construction trades and that Indeck and Sirrine would not employ
anyone in those trades on the
In the above-quoted language from Connell, the Court suggested, in dicta, that secondary union-signatory
clauses might be protected by the proviso even
without a collective-bargaining relationship if they were directed toward
the reduction of friction that may be caused when union and nonunion employees of
different employers are required to work together at the same jobsite.[12] The Board has yet to determine whether an
alternative basis for proviso coverage exists under this Connell common-situs dictum,[13]
and we find no need to do so here. The Respondents
have failed to prove that the Indeck letter agreement and the resultant
agreement with Sirrine were executed for the purpose of avoiding tensions that
might arise if union and nonunion workers of different employers were to work
side by side on the
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the February 20, 1992 letter agreement between Indeck and the Respondents, the July - September 1992 Sirrine - Trades Council agreement, and the Respondent’s lawsuit seeking to compel Indeck’s compliance with these agreements were not protected by the construction industry proviso. Consequently, the Respondents violated Section 8(e) as alleged.
Conclusions of Law
1. Each of the Respondents is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Indeck is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
3. The February 20, 1992 letter agreement between Indeck and the Respondents is within the scope of agreements prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act, and is not exempt from the prohibition of Section 8(e) of the Act under the first proviso to that section.
4. The Respondents have violated Section 8(e) of the Act by entering into the February 20, 1992 letter agreement and the July - September 1992 Sirrine - Trades Council agreement pursuant to the February 20, 1992 letter agreement, and by reaffirming the provisions of those agreements and applying them to Indeck by filing a civil action against Indeck in New York State Supreme Court on or about November 9, 1993 (alleging that Indeck breached the February 20, 1992 letter agreement and caused a breach of the July - September 1992 Sirrine - Trades Council agreement), thus entering into, maintaining, and giving effect to an agreement in which Indeck agreed not to handle or otherwise deal in the products of another employer, or agreed not to do business with another person.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in unfair labor practices, we shall order that they cease and desist therefrom and that they take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.[14]
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Respondents, Glens Falls Building and Construction Trades Council; International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, Local Union No. 6; International Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of North America, Local Union No. 229; International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, Local Union No. 40; International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, Local Union No. 12; Laborers International Union of North America, Local Union No. 157; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 438; International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 106; International Brotherhood of Painters, Allied Trades and Glaziers, Local Union No. 466; Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local Union No. 83; and United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing Industry and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local Union No. 773, their officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from entering into the February 20, 1992 letter agreement and the July - September 1992 Sirrine - Trades Council agreement pursuant to the February 20, 1992 letter agreement, and from reaffirming the provisions of those agreements and applying them to Indeck by filing a civil action against Indeck in New York State Supreme Court on or about November 9, 1993 (alleging that Indeck breached the February 20, 1992 letter agreement and caused a breach of the July - September 1992 Sirrine - Trades Council agreement), and thus from entering into, maintaining, and giving effect to an agreement in which Indeck agreed not to handle or otherwise deal in the products of another employer, or agreed not to do business with another person.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Seek dismissal of their action in the United States District Court, Northern District of New York, Civil Action No. 93-CV-1534 (TJM/DJH), seeking an award of damages for Indeck’s alleged breach or causation of breach of the above-described agreements.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at their respective offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”[15] Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 3, after being signed by the Respondents’ authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondents and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondents have taken to comply.
Dated,
![]()
Robert J. Battista , Chairman
![]()
Peter
C. Schaumber, Member
![]()
Peter N. Kirsanow Member
(seal) National Labor Relations Board
APPENDIX
Notice To Members
Posted By Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with employers on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
We will not enter into, reaffirm, maintain, or give effect to our February 20, 1992 letter agreement with Indeck Energy Services of Corinth, Inc.; Indeck Corinth Limited Partnership; and Indeck Energy Services, Inc. or our July - September 1992 agreement with CRS Sirrine Engineers, Inc., and WE WILL NOT reaffirm the provisions of those agreements and apply them to Indeck by maintaining our civil court action against Indeck.
We will seek dismissal of our civil action in the United States District Court, Northern District of New York, Civil Action No. 93-CV-1534 (TJM/DJH), seeking an award of damages for Indeck’s alleged breach or causation of breach of the above-described agreements.
Alfred
M. Norek, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Francis
J. Martorana, Esq. and Gerard M. Waites, Esq. (O’Donoghue
& O’Donoghue), of
Richard
J. Reibstein, Esq. (Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen LLP) of
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
Statement of the Case
Eleanor Macdonald,
Administrative Law Judge. This case was reopened pursuant to a Remand Order
issued by the Board on July 16, 1998 at 325 NLRB 1084. The reopened hearing took place in
The Board’s Remand Order directed the taking of evidence from expert witnesses concerning what it defined as a “central issue” in the case: “whether Indeck is an employer in the construction industry within the meaning of the proviso to Section 8(e).”2 In writing this Supplemental Decision I shall deal only with the issue placed before me by the Board’s Order. I shall not repeat the myriad factual findings made by Judge Morton except where necessary to explain my own findings. I shall assume that any reader of this Supplemental Decision has already read Judge Morton’s Decision.
In addition to directing me to hear the testimony of expert witnesses, the Board also directed that I hear the testimony of Jerry Calloway and the continued testimony of Victor Ranaletta. Their testimony is relevant to the issue whether Indeck is an employer in the construction industry.
i. the proviso
and its legislative history
The relevant portion of Section 8(e) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and void: Provided, that nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work.
The legislative history of Section 8(e) is based primarily on the statements of two Senators who favored passage of the 8(e) proviso. Senator Morse said:
The case of the building and construction industry represented probably the most flagrant injustice, where a general contractor is, in effect, entirely in control of the kind of labor relations taking place on a jobsite which he runs. He lets subcontracts based upon price, responsibility, and the ability to handle labor relations.
He lets those contracts, very well knowing the kind of labor relations which may exist within any of the subcontractor companies…. He is not innocent of any unfair labor policies on the part of a subcontractor. Vol. II, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, p. 1425(1).
Senator Kennedy said on page 1433(3):
Agreements by which a contractor in the construction industry promises not to subcontract work on a construction site to a nonunion contractor appear to be legal today. They will not be unlawful under section 8(e). The proviso is also applicable to all other agreements involving undertakings not to do work on a construction project site with other contractors or subcontractors regardless of the precise relation between them.
The legislative history does not contain any discussion of the definition of “an employer in the construction industry.”
The comments of Senators Morse and Kennedy indicate that Congress wished to deal with a situation where an employer promised to use union labor on a construction site but then reneged on its promise and had the work done by another contractor using non-union labor. Senator Morse’s comment characterized this as a “flagrant injustice” because the first contractor was “entirely in control” of labor relations on the jobsite and had given the work to the second contractor with full awareness of its labor relations. The proviso to Section 8(e) was intended to make the promise to use union labor enforceable. Clearly, the element of control of labor relations was key in the legislative scheme: an employer in the construction industry that controlled labor relations on the jobsite by its ability to select contractors and subcontractors could be held to its promise to employ union labor.3
It seems fair to conclude that Congress used the term “employer in the construction industry” to signify an employer with control over the labor relations of construction site employees.
ii. case
precedents
In its remand decision, the Board summarized the state of the law defining what is “an employer in the construction industry” within the meaning of the proviso to Section 8(e) by citing and quoting from Carpenters Local 743 (Longs Drug), 278 NLRB 440, 442 (1986). The Board stated that under its existing precedents resolution of this issue “is dependent on the degree of control over the construction-site labor relations” the employer elected to retain and also “on the circumstances of each situation, rather than on the principal business of the employer.” The Board’s remand decision observed that “there are only a very limited number of relevant Board decisions and none of them involve the construction of a cogeneration plant or a project of similar magnitude.”
The relevant Board decisions begin with
In
In Carpenters Local 743 (Longs Drug), supra, the Board affirmed without comment the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that the employer was not in the construction industry within the meaning of the proviso to Section 8(e). In Longs Drug, the employer operated numerous drug stores of which it was the owner or lessee. The employer engaged a non-union general contractor to construct a new store; it did not select any of the subcontractors used on the project. The employer’s own union employees were used to perform onsite installation of fixtures during the last two weeks of the construction period. The employer engaged an architect to design the project and it used its own project manager and project coordinator to oversee the project. During the eight months it took to complete the work, the employer’s project manager and project coordinator visited the site for a total of 28 days, a frequency which the ALJ termed “sporadic”. The actual day-to-day supervision of the construction was performed by an employee of the general contractor. The ALJ stated that the degree of control over the construction-site labor relations an employer elected to retain determines whether the employer is in the construction industry. If the employer acted as its own general contractor it would retain “absolute control” over construction-site labor relations. If the employer retained a general contractor but nonetheless regularly made “decisions, including the selection of subcontractors, normally within the scope of a general contractor’s duties and authority” the employer would be “tantamount” to a general contractor. Based on the limited scope of the employer’s actual construction work with its own employees and its lack of involvement in labor relations until the final two weeks of the project, the ALJ found that Longs was not an employer in the construction industry.
The Rowley-Schlimgen company sells office supplies, furniture and draperies and designs office interiors. Included in its services is the sale and installation of contract floor covering at construction and other commercial sites. At the time relevant to the litigation discussed below, the company subcontracted the work of installing the flooring to a non-union contractor owned and operated by a person whom it employed part-time as a scheduler of floor covering installation. The company was a signatory to the Association of General Contractors Commercial Carpenters Agreement. The District Council of Carpenters sought to enforce that part of the agreement mandating union-signatory subcontracting by filing grievances and a court action which resulted in a decision by the 7th Circuit.
In District Council of Carpenters v. Rowley-Schlimgen, 2 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 1993), the court reviewed Board precedents and what it termed the “vague and inconclusive” legislative history. Rejecting the employer’s argument that the proviso is applicable only to employers who act as their own general contractors the court held that
[T]he availability of Sec. 158(e)’s exemption in favor of the construction industry must be driven by its purposes: the desire to reduce construction site tensions and the development of a uniform and ready supply of skilled labor. Accordingly, we conclude that whenever an employer is able to determine the nature of the workers who will be employed at a construction site through its selection of a subcontractor, the employer is, to that extent, an “employer in the construction industry” within the meaning of [the] proviso.4 2 F.3d at 769
After the court’s decision was rendered, the Board decided the unfair labor practice case in District Council of Carpenters (Rowley-Schlimgen), 318 NLRB 714 (1995). Reaffirming its earlier holdings that whether an employer is in the construction industry is dependent on the circumstances of each situation, the Board held that as long as an employer performs more than a de minimis amount of construction site work it may be covered by the 8(e) proviso. The employer will be covered if it exercises control over labor relations at the construction site. The Board held that although the company was neither a general contractor nor a direct employer of the construction site employees, it was nevertheless an employer in the construction industry because it controlled the work force through its relationship with the contractor who installed the flooring. Moreover, the company was aware of the labor relations of the contractor because its bids and prices were based in part on the contractor’s labor costs.5
iii. indeck
literature
The Indeck Energy Services, Inc. brochure is directed at its customers: “electric utilities, industrial energy users and communities they serve.”6 The first page of text in the brochure introduces Indeck as a “developer, owner and operator” of cogeneration plants offering “full scope project development and execution.” This page lists the advantages to electric utilities of choosing Indeck: Indeck provides low cost power “and undertakes the construction and operation risks.”
The brochure describes Indeck’s “Development and Engineering” expertise as being due to “a comprehensive engineering staff at the corporate headquarters covering mechanical, electrical, environmental, chemical and civil/structural disciplines. In fact, 75% of Indeck’s professional staff is made up of engineers. . . .”
A section of the brochure entitled “Construction Management” states that “[T]he detailed engineering and construction of Indeck’s plants is performed by experienced design/build contractors under the close scrutiny of Indeck’s construction management staff.” Indeck “prepares the specifications and selects major equipment. . . . ” Indeck “assigns site management and headquarters staff to the project throughout its construction to provide overall management.” The brochure lauds “Indeck’s expertise in construction and construction management” and cites the fact that Indeck’s first cogen projects “were also constructed directly by Indeck as the general contractor.”
An insert to the brochure describes the
iv. selected
contracts
The witnesses for the Charging Party and the Respondents
agreed that there were three major components of the
A. Gas Facilities Interconnection Agreement
The Gas Facilities Interconnection Agreement between Indeck-Corinth Limited Partnership and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation dated January 27, 1993 obligated Indeck to construct a gas pipeline so that Niagara Mohawk could transport gas to the cogen pursuant to the gas transportation agreement of the same date. Niagara Mohawk was to “own, operate, repair and maintain” the pipeline and related facilities while Indeck was responsible for the “design and construction” subject to Niagara Mohawk’s approval. Indeck had to obtain Niagara Mohawk’s approval for the selection of consultants and contractors, for the periodic review of design milestones and for the acceptance of calculations and drawings. Indeck was obligated to acquire the rights of way for the pipeline and to conduct soil studies for the presence of hazardous substances on the rights of way. Once Indeck had obtained the required regulatory approvals, the agreement required that the pipeline “shall be constructed . . . by Indeck-Corinth or by a third-party contractor” selected by Indeck and approved by Niagara Mohawk. The agreement provided milestone payments from Niagara Mohawk to Indeck according to a detailed construction schedule. Indeck was responsible for costs it incurred in excess of the payments provided in the agreement. Indeck was responsible for completion of construction by the end of 1993: in the event it was unable to achieve completion Niagara Mohawk had the right to “remove Indeck-Corinth as construction contractor. . . .” If Indeck were removed, and Niagara Mohawk completed the pipeline itself, then Indeck would be responsible for costs and expenses to the extent that they were in excess of Niagara Mohawk’s expected costs “if Indeck-Corinth had not been removed as construction contractor.” The Interconnection Agreement provided that Indeck had to pay financial penalties to Niagara Mohawk if it failed to achieve completion of construction within 6 months from the start. Niagara Mohawk could terminate the Agreement if construction was not complete by July 5, 1995. Ranaletta testified that Niagara Mohawk paid Indeck a lump sum for the construction of the pipeline. The amount of the payment was redacted out of the Interconnection Agreement as admitted into evidence. Indeck and not Otis Eastern, the contractor which supplied most of the labor to build the pipeline, purchased the over $400,000 worth of pipe required to construct the pipeline.
After Indeck selected Otis Eastern to perform construction work on the pipeline, Indeck conducted a preconstruction meeting with representatives of Otis Eastern and Niagara Mohawk on November 12, 1993. At the meeting, David Rubado was designated as the person to receive emergency calls relating to construction of the gas pipeline. Rubado would respond to an emergency call by visiting the site of the complaint. He would also relay information about the calls to Niagara Mohawk and Otis Eastern. Ranaletta testified that Indeck performed the construction management for the pipeline.7
B. Electric Interconnection Facility Agreement
The Electric Interconnection Facility Agreement dated June
12, 1992 provided for Niagara Mohawk to transmit electricity produced by Indeck
to Con Ed, the purchaser of the electric power.
In order for Niagara Mohawk to fulfill this function, Indeck was
obligated to “design and construct” an interconnection facility, to be owned,
operated and maintained by Niagara Mohawk.
Indeck was required to post a deposit which Niagara Mohawk would retain
if Indeck failed “to achieve commencement of construction” by a certain date or
failed “to meet the commercial operations date” of the plant. The interconnection facility consisted of a
transmission line from the cogen to the Niagara Mohawk Spier Falls Substation,
a new breaker at the Spier Falls Substation and modifications to the Mohican
substation. The final design of the
interconnection facility was subject to Niagara Mohawk’s approval. Indeck was obligated to acquire the rights of
way for the transmission line, to conduct soil testing for hazardous materials,
and to obtain necessary permits. After
completion of the transmission line, Indeck was to convey it to Niagara
Mohawk. Niagara Mohawk was to design and
construct the modification at its
v. ownership
of the cogen
Indeck was required to file certain documents with the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission in order to maintain its status as a qualifying
cogeneration facility under PURPA. The
application for recertification filed June 7, 1994 restated and expanded upon
information provided in previous filings with FERC. The application set forth the following facts
concerning the building of the
vi. indeck
exercise of control over labor relations
As discussed in Judge Morton’s Decision, Indeck wished to
build four cogens in
As set forth in detail in Judge Morton’s Decision, Indeck’s
president Russell Lindsay conducted two meetings with representatives of the
Lindsay testified that Indeck had awarded a contract to
CRSS for
As set forth in Judge Morton’s
Decision, Lindsay spoke by telephone with Paul Fingland, one of the Respondents’
business representatives. Lindsay told
Fingland that all the Indeck projects in
By letter of January 30, 1992 Gillick wrote to Philip Allen, President of the Glen Falls Building & Construction Trades Council:
As we discussed this morning, Indeck is committed to perform the Construction on our Corinth Project utilizing a contractor who will employ members of the Glen Falls Bldg. and Construction Trades Council.
At this time, we are not able to name our chosen contractor, however, you have our assurance that an Agreement between the parties will be reached.
I look forward to meeting with you and members of the council next week to discuss our project and how we can assist each other.
On February 5, 1992, the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation held a hearing on the Indeck proposal to build the
Lindsay testified that the building trades in
In our earlier correspondence, Indeck has committed to construct
our project in
To further insure our commitment and good faith intentions, Indeck will instruct it’s (sic) contractor to execute the National Construction Stabilization Agreement as the Project Agreement.
In issuing the contractor this direction, it is understood by all parties that it is the Contractor’s and Building and Construction Trades Council’s responsibility, to mutually agree on any modifications to this agreement prior to its execution.
This letter constitutes the alleged unlawful agreement that is the substance of the instant proceeding.
As set forth by Judge Morton, CRSS and the Respondents
negotiated a project labor agreement for the
Jerry C. Calloway, the CRSS senior vice president handling
the Indeck construction, was called by the Charging Party to testify at the
reopened hearing in support of the Charging Party’s contention that Indeck did
not dictate the use of union labor at
Calloway testified that CRSS vigorously and aggressively
pursued Indeck as a source of business and was awarded the EPC contracts for
both the
The record shows that on January 15, 1992, Lindsay received from union attorney Reilly and then transmitted to Calloway a sample Project Labor Agreement.11 The cover sheet addressed to Calloway from Lindsay stated:
Testifying on December 15, 1998 in response to questions
on direct examination by Counsel for Indeck, Calloway stated that he did not
recall and had not seen the January 1992 cover sheet from Lindsay. Calloway testified that he recalled the Stone
& Webster PLA because CRSS had already done its own labor survey when he
received the PLA from Lindsay. Calloway
explained that CRSS usually contracts work to local contractors: it hardly ever
performs construction using directly hired labor. Calloway stated that the first or second time
he spoke with Lindsay about Indeck’s upstate
On cross-examination by Counsel for the Respondent, Calloway stated that a client’s preference about whether a job should be done union or non-union was not a primary factor in a CRSS decision whether to use union labor. Calloway made the determination based on what the area provided in terms of the quality of craftsmen. But Calloway acknowledged that if CRSS wanted to get the job, the client’s preference would be a primary factor in his decision. Calloway also acknowledged that when he received the PLA from Lindsay the cover sheet may have been attached to it. Calloway recalled that Lindsay told him that Stone & Webster had given him a price for the project and that CRSS had to beat that price. Calloway recalled using the Stone & Webster PLA as a reference.
After testifying as described above, Calloway was shown a September 26, 1991 letter to him from Wayne R. Grayczyk, Indeck’s vice-president for purchasing. The letter states:
This is to confirm our verbal offer of September 25, 1991
in which Indeck Energy Services, Inc. offers to enter into contract
negotiations with CRS Sirrine Engineers, Inc., for the engineering-procurement-construction
services for the Indeck Olean and
Calloway maintained despite this letter that CRSS had decided on its own to use union labor and that Indeck did not instruct CRS that it had to use union labor. Calloway did not explain this major inconsistency in his testimony: he maintained that a labor survey done in 1992 had independently convinced him and Lane to utilize union labor while the documentary evidence shows that as early as September 1991 Indeck was instructing him that negotiations would be based on utilizing union labor.
On November 15, 1991 Lindsay wrote to Calloway accepting
the lump sum price of $119,600,000 for the
On February 26, 1992 Indeck sent identical letters to
Calloway at CRSS and to another company named Zurn/NEPCO requesting proposals
for construction of the
Calloway did not recall this letter.
When pressed again to recall when CRSS began its labor survey, Calloway stated that CRSS did not start its labor survey before Indeck said it wanted the project done with union labor.
On March 16, 1992 Lindsay wrote to Calloway accepting a
lump sum price for the