NOTICE: This
opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Executive
Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
Downtown
April 30, 2007
DECISION AND ORDER
By Chairman Battista and Members Liebman
and Walsh
On June 19, 2003, Administrative Law Judge Michael A. Marcionese issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions,2 the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions,3 the Respondent and the General Counsel filed answering briefs, and the Respondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,4 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modified below.
Applying
In Planned Building
Services, 347 NLRB No. 64 (2006), which issued after the judge’s decision,
the Board held that Wright Line, 251
NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989
(1982), provides the appropriate framework for deciding whether a successor
employer violated Section 8(a)(3) by refusing to hire employees of its
predecessor to avoid a bargaining obligation.
To establish a violation of Section 8(a)(3) under Wright Line where a refusal to hire is alleged in the successorship
context, the General Counsel has the burden of showing that the employer failed
to hire employees of its predecessor and was motivated by antiunion
animus. Planned Building Services, supra, 347 NLRB No. 64, slip op. at 4.5
Once the General Counsel has made this showing, the burden shifts to the
employer to demonstrate that it would not have hired the predecessor’s
employees even in the absence of its unlawful motive.
Here, the judge’s findings and conclusions fully satisfy
the analytical objectives of Wright Line. Thus, the judge found, and we agree, that
the General Counsel established that the Respondent’s decision not to hire its
predecessor’s employees was motivated by antiunion animus. We further agree with the judge that the Respondent
failed to meet its burden to establish that it would not have hired those employees
absent its hostility toward the
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended
Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the
Respondent, Downtown Hartford YMCA,
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(e).
“(e) Making statements to employees implying that they
will not be hired because of their affiliation with or representation by
Service Employees International Union, 32BJ District 531 (the
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(g).
“(g) Make whole unit employees for any loss of wages and other benefits resulting from the Respondent’s unilateral changes in the preexisting terms and conditions of employment, subject to the Respondent’s demonstrating in a compliance hearing that, had it lawfully bargained with the Union, it would have, at some identifiable time, lawfully imposed or reached agreement on less favorable terms than those that existed prior to its takeover of Pritchard Industries’ operations at its facility. Backpay shall be computed in the manner prescribed in Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), and Kraft Plumbing & Heating, 252 NLRB 891 fn. 2 (1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981), with interest as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). The Respondent shall also make all delinquent employee benefit fund contributions, including any additional amounts due the funds in accordance with Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB 1213, 1216 fn. 7 (1979).”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the administrative law judge.
Dated,
Robert J. Battista, Chairman
![]()
Wilma B. Liebman, Member
![]()
Dennis P. Walsh, Member
(seal) National
Labor Relations Board
APPENDIX
Notice To Employees
Posted by Order
of the
National Labor Relations
Board
An Agency of the
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
federal law gives you the right to
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
We will not promulgate or enforce discriminatory or overbroad rules prohibiting employees from engaging in union solicitation or distribution during nonworktimes and in nonwork areas of our facility.
We will not threaten employees with being sent home if they engage in union or other protected concerted activities.
We will not deny union representatives access to employees working at our facility.
We will not threaten to or cause the arrest of union representatives in the presence of employees.
We will not make
statements to employees implying that they will not be hired because of their
affiliation with or representation by Service Employees International Union,
32BJ District 531 (the
We will not refuse
to hire any employees of Pritchard Industries, who previously worked at our
facility and who were represented by the Union, in order to avoid having to
recognize and bargain with the
We will not refuse
to recognize and bargain in good faith with the
All housekeepers, custodians and laundry attendants,
employed by us at our
We will not establish wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment of our unit employees without first giving the Union prior notice and an opportunity to bargain about such subjects.
We will not in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights as set forth above.
We will rescind the discriminatory and overly broad no-solicitation/distribution rule announced on or about January 14, 2002.
We will, with within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer the following employees immediate instatement to the positions to which they applied or, if those positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
Adrian Caicedo Kathleen Nelson
Reese Dinkins Gabriella Ortiz
Fabiano
Filigrana Santiago Restrepo
Carmen Garcia Gustavo Sanchez
Jose Gavalo Ivan Sanchez
Eleazar Mendoza Jose Tobon
We will make the above-named employees whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from our discriminatory refusal to hire them, less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
We will, on
request, bargain with the
We will, on
request of the Union, rescind any departures from the terms and conditions of
employment that existed immediately prior to our takeover of Pritchard
Industries’ operations at our facility and restore, retroactively, the preexisting
terms and conditions of employment until we negotiate in good faith with the
We will make our unit employees whole for any loss of wages and other benefits resulting from our unilateral changes in the preexisting terms and conditions of employment, subject to our demonstrating in a compliance hearing that, had we lawfully bargained with the Union, we would have, at some identifiable time, lawfully imposed or reached agreement on less favorable terms than those that existed prior to our takeover of Pritchard Industries’ operations at our facility.
We will make
whole the
Downtown
Darryl
Hale, Esq. and Quesiyah Ali, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Felix J.
Springer, Esq. and Stacy Babson-Smith,
Esq. (Day, Berry & Howard), of
Thomas
Meikeljohn, Esq. (Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meikeljohn & Kelly), of
DECISION
Statement of
the Case
Michael A. Marcionese,
Administrative Law Judge. I heard this case in
The complaint
specifically alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), on various
dates in January and early February, by restricting the Union’s access to
Pritchard’s employees who were working at its facility; by implementing discriminatory
no-solicitation and distribution rules affecting the same Pritchard employees;
by threatening to and causing the arrest of a union representative in the
presence of the employees; by threatening employees with being sent home if
they communicated with the Union’s representative or engaged in union
solicitation or distribution at the Respondent’s facility’; and by making
statements to Pritchard employees indicating that they would not be hired by
the Respondent because of their union membership and because the Union had
filed the charge in Case 34–CA–10011. The complaint further alleges that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) by failing and refusing to hire 12-named
Pritchard employees because of their membership in, support for, and concerted activities
on behalf of the Union. Finally, the complaint alleges that the Respondent, as
a successor to Pritchard, has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act,
since February 4, by failing and refusing to recognize the Union as the 9(a)
representative of its housekeeping, laundry, and janitorial staff and by
unilaterally establishing the rates of pay, benefits, hours of work, and other
terms and conditions of employment for those employees. The complaint does not
allege that the Respondent’s decision to take over the housekeeping, laundry,
and janitorial functions at its facility was unlawfully motivated or that the
Respondent had any obligation under the Act to bargain with the
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the following
Findings of
Fact
i. jurisdiction
The Respondent, a
branch of a nonprofit corporation, provides various services and programs to
individuals in the greater
ii. alleged
unfair labor practices
A. The
Respondent’s Decision to Take Over
Housekeeping, Janitorial and Laundry Services
The Respondent provides
a number of services to the community at its downtown
Until about 1996, the Respondent performed its cleaning, janitorial, and laundry services in-house. In about 1996, the Respondent hired Servus Corporation, a building maintenance company, to handle these functions. Servus, in turn, hired Pritchard, a general cleaning contractor, to provide the housekeepers, night custodians, and day porters (janitors) to clean the building, and the laundry attendants to clean the towels and linens used in the fitness center and residences. The Respondent continued to employ its own staff of skilled maintenance technicians to maintain the mechanical operations in the building. In January 2001, the Respondent replaced Servus with another building management company, O, R & L, which retained Pritchard as the cleaning contractor. In June 2001, still not satisfied with the services provided by O, R & L, the Respondent hired James O’Hair, who had experience managing hotels, to be the full-time building superintendent with overall responsibility for the maintenance of the facility, including the work of Pritchard’s employees. Shortly after he was hired, O’Hair terminated the services of O, R & L and brought in his own staff of mechanics to handle the in-house maintenance functions, including new Supervisor Ronald Gagnon. He retained Pritchard to do the cleaning, janitorial, and laundry work.
Pritchard has been a
union contractor since it was first hired to work at the Respondent’s downtown
branch. It has been signatory to successive collective-bargaining agreements
negotiated by the Union with an association of cleaning contractors in
Correspondence in evidence from 1999 and 2000 shows that the Respondent, directly and through its building managers, had continuously sought cost reductions from Pritchard that resulted in the reduction of the amount of services provided by Pritchard’s employees. At the same time, the Respondent continuously complained about the quality of the cleaning provided by Pritchard’s staff. In early 2001, after O, R & L was hired, Pritchard was forced to remove onsite supervision from the facility to meet O, R & L’s new bid specifications. This tension between the Respondent’s desire for a spotlessly clean facility and its unwillingness to pay Pritchard a fee which Pritchard considered sufficient to cover the cost of satisfying the Respondent’s demands is what ultimately led to the Respondent’s termination of Pritchard’s services.
O’Hair testified that,
after he took over as building superintendent, he worked with Bertini to
develop an ideal set of cleaning specifications to achieve the level of service
the Respondent desired. In the process of doing this, O’Hair would frequently
advise Bertini of deficiencies he saw in the work being done by Pritchard’s employees.
There is no dispute that Bertini informed O’Hair that the lack of onsite
supervision was a significant factor in the problems O’Hair complained about.
Also during the first several months of O’Hair’s tenure, Pritchard sought some
assurance, in the form of a written contract, that the Respondent was going to
retain its services.[5]
The discussions between the Respondent and Pritchard reached a head on or about
September 27, 2001, when Pritchard’s vice president, Steven Sadler, sent O’Hair
a letter demanding a fee increase of $860/month, effective October 1, 2001, to
cover increased payroll-related expenses and increased operating expenses.
Attached to the letter was a financial summary purporting to show that
Pritchard was losing money attempting to satisfy the Respondent’s demands while
waiting for approval by the Respondent of Pritchard’s most recent bid proposal.
Sadler pointed out, in his letter, that the specifications under which it was
currently operating did not include adequate supervision or onsite management.
Sadler advised O’Hair that, if the Respondent did not agree to this increase,
O’Hair discussed Sadler’s demand with Andre Kennard, the Respondent’s executive director.[6] According to O’Hair, the Respondent agreed to pay the additional $860/month because of his conclusion that the Respondent would not have been able to replace Pritchard’s staff and maintain an acceptable level of cleaning in 30 days. The new monthly cost to the Respondent was about $29,000. When O’Hair communicated the Respondent’s agreement to Pritchard, he and Sadler agreed that Bertini would work with O’Hair on a new set of specifications to ensure that the Respondent got the level of service it desired. On October 19, 2001, Bertini and Pritchard’s estimator, David Berthold, met with O’Hair and presented a cost summary with the revised specifications. These specifications included provision for the return of onsite supervision. The total cost to Respondent proposed by Pritchard was more than $37,000/month, the bulk of which was payroll costs for Pritchard’s unionized work force.[7]
O’Hair concluded, after reviewing Pritchard’s proposal and discussing with Bertini the performance specifications, that the Respondent could do the work cheaper itself. O’Hair made this recommendation to Kennard who instructed him to come up with a proposal to take the cleaning, janitorial, and laundry services in-house. O’Hair continued to work with Bertini to “resolve their differences,” i.e., between the Respondent’s expectations of what was attainable and the reality of what could be accomplished under the current contractual arrangements. As part of this process, O’Hair and Rachel Soucy, the Respondent’s housing director, conducted a room-by-room inspection of the residential section of the facility with Bertini. During that inspection, many mechanical problems unrelated to the work of Pritchard’s employees were uncovered. The inspection also disclosed many issues regarding the cleanliness of the residential rooms and bathroom facilities that Bertini agreed to address. Bertini assigned a special crew to correct the areas noted on inspection at Pritchard’s expense.
While ostensibly working with Bertini to resolve the Respondent’s problems with the level of service it was getting from Pritchard, O’Hair developed his proposal to take these services in-house. O’Hair admitted that he used input from Bertini to develop the job descriptions and work schedules for the staff he intended to hire upon termination of Pritchard’s contract. According to O’Hair, Bertini was well aware that he was doing this at the time.
Sadler testified that,
on December 13, he and Berthold visited O’Hair at the Respondent’s facility to
check on the status of Pritchard’s proposal to continue performing services for
the Respondent. According to Sadler, at this meeting O’Hair asked Sadler what
would happen if the Respondent took over the cleaning, janitorial, and laundry
operations. Sadler replied that the Respondent might not achieve the cost
savings it was looking for because the employees were represented by the Union
and the
Shortly after this
meeting, O’Hair gave Pritchard its 30 days notice that it had decided to
terminate the laundry service provided by Pritchard. By letter dated December
20, 2001, Sadler advised the Respondent that the termination of the laundry
service would reduce the Respondent’s monthly fee by about $4300.[8]
On December 27, 2001, O’Hair notified Sadler, in writing, that the Respondent
was terminating Pritchard’s housekeeping and janitorial services effective
February 1. O’Hair also advised Sadler that the Respondent would be hiring
employees directly to perform these services. There is no evidence in the
record that Pritchard ever communicated to the
B. The
Upon learning of the Respondent’s
decision to end its relationship with Pritchard, the Union’s district supervisor,
Kurt Westby, assigned Sal Abate, a union delegate who is no longer employed by
the
According to Abate, he opened the conversation by introducing himself as a union delegate and telling O’Hair that he was calling to find out what was going on with the Respondent’s contract for cleaning services and the employees currently working there. O’Hair replied that the Respondent had made a decision to keep the cleaning services in-house. Abate recalled that O’Hair said that in the 8 years he had been with the Respondent, he had seen a transition to in-house services from outside contractors and that other departments that had made the change were running smoothly. Abate then suggested that they set up a meeting where he and the workers could present a copy of the collective-bargaining agreement for the Respondent to sign and whatever pension information O’Hair need to become a union signatory. O’Hair replied that there was an application process he had set up and that if any of the workers wanted to apply they could pick up an application at the front desk.[9] In response to this, Abate suggested that he and O’Hair set up a date and time when the Pritchard employees could be interviewed to ensure a fair and orderly process. Abate recalled, with asserted clarity, that O’Hair said he was “not interested in meeting with a group of union workers.”
Abate testified that O’Hair also mentioned, in the course of the conversation, that the Respondent had received an “overwhelming” response to the ad. He further recalled O’Hair saying that, although the Pritchard employees could apply, he did not think he would be hiring many of them because he was not happy with the work they were doing. When Abate responded that was a management problem, that the employees were only following what their supervisors told them to do, O’Hair cut him off, saying, “[D]on’t use the ‘bad management’ argument,” that he had seen managers come and go and things never got any better. Abate reported the substance of this conversation to his boss, Westby, and, as will be discussed, with the Pritchard employees. He had no further conversations with O’Hair and only limited involvement in this matter thereafter.
O’Hair prefaced his
testimony regarding this conversation with testimony regarding conversations he
allegedly had with Sadler and Bertini in the nature of a warning, or “heads-up”
about the
O’Hair recalled that
Abate introduced himself and “immediately” asked if O’Hair was going to
consider hiring all of Pritchard’s employees. O’Hair said no, that he would consider
each person individually. According to O’Hair, Abate next wanted to set up a
group interview to discuss hiring these employees because they had been working
there for so long. O’Hair admittedly interrupted Abate and told him that he had
a procedure in place and that he was not going to hire anybody through the
Considering the
testimony and the demeanor of the witnesses, in the context of the other
evidence in the record, I find that Abate’s recollection of events is more
credible, to the extent there are any discrepancies. Abate, although employed
by another
The
Abate testified that, at the meeting he described, he relayed to the employees what O’Hair told him. When asked, on cross-examination, what he told the employees regarding his conversation with O’Hair, Abate testified that he told them that O’Hair was not interested in hiring them. Maran testified initially on cross-examination that Abate did not tell the employees about his conversation with O’Hair “in detail” and denied that he told the employees that O’Hair was not interested in hiring them. Later, also during cross-examination, she recalled that Abate did say this at some point, but claimed that she could not recall if he said it at a meeting of employees or in some other context. In any event, according to Maran, Abate’s statement was not translated for the Spanish-speaking employees in those words. Maran testified that the message that was conveyed to the employees at these meetings was that, if they wanted to keep their jobs, they would have to file an application. In fact, at the January 8 meeting, the employees were given applications to fill out and plans were made to present the applications to O’Hair as a group the next day.
The overall credibility of Maran’s testimony is affected by the same consideration as that of O’Hair. Maran also was present throughout the testimony of General Counsel’s witnesses as the designated representative under the sequestration ruling. She thus had ample time and opportunity to conform her answers to the many variations of these meetings and other incidents that had been described by the employee witnesses.[12] I also found her efforts to avoid conceding that Abate might have mischaracterized his conversation with O’Hair to be somewhat disingenuous. I find, as with the remainder of his testimony, that Abate was credible and candid in acknowledging that he essentially provided the employees with his interpretation of what O’Hair told him, i.e., that he wasn’t interested in hiring them. Whether this influenced how employees perceived their later encounters with O’Hair will be discussed shortly.
It was also at these
meetings, on January 7 or 8, that the
Abate and Maran
testified that they returned to the Respondent’s facility on January 9 in order
to implement the strategy agreed to at the employee meetings of presenting the
employees’ applications as a group. Abate referred to this, in his testimony
and pretrial affidavit, as a “march on the boss,” a tactic often utilized by
unions as a way of demonstrating employee solidarity. After meeting a group of five
or six employees in the cafeteria, they proceeded to O’Hair’s office, which is
on the second floor, across from the basketball court. O’Hair was not in his
office. Maran and Abate testified that they waited for some time, either 10 or
45 minutes, respectively, and left when O’Hair did not appear. Maran returned
to the facility the next day, this time alone, to try again to present the
applications that had been collected from the employees.[13]
This time, O’Hair was present. Maran and several employees testified about this
incident for the General Counsel.[14]
There were almost as many variations as there were witnesses. O’Hair was the
only witness to testify about this incident for the Respondent. The Respondent
suggests, in its brief, that it is not necessary to make any credibility
resolutions regarding the “march on the boss” in order to reach a decision in
this case. The Respondent argues, alternatively, that the testimony of the
General Counsel’s witnesses should not be credited because their recollection
of the event was colored by “psychological pre-conditioning” by the
Maran testified that
she had the applications in a purple folder and that she gave the folder to
Carmen Garcia as they were walking toward O’Hair’s office. She recalled that
Garcia in turn gave the folder to Tobon, who was the
Tobon testified that
he introduced himself to O’Hair as the
Garcia’s recollection was significantly different. She recalled that she was the one with the applications in hand and that she served as the employees’ spokesmen, without the aid of a translator. She initially testified that Tobon played no role during this incident. After being asked three times by the General Counsel whether Tobon said anything, Garcia finally said that, if he did say anything, she could not now recall it. Garcia contradicted herself by initially claiming that she could not recall whether Tobon said anything because everybody was speaking at once only to testify later that only one person spoke to O’Hair. According to Garcia, O’Hair’s response to whoever it was that tried to give him the applications was that he was not going to hire them because they had a union. On cross-examination, Garcia did corroborate Maran’s and Tobon’s testimony that O’Hair called Maran back as they waited for the elevator. She testified that she heard O’Hair tell Maran: “Remember, I don’t want a union in the building.”
Ortiz, testifying
through a translator, recalled that O’Hair refused to accept the applications
from Maran, saying he did not want them because he did not want the Union, that
he had problems with the
O’Hair testified that
he was confronted by a group of people within three steps of leaving his
office. He recognized only a couple of them. He recalled that several people
started talking at the same time, most of them in Spanish. He focused on Maran
because she introduced herself and was speaking English. O’Hair had not met
Maran before. According to O’Hair, Maran was holding a blue folder, which she
tried to give him as she spoke. After introducing herself, Maran said she
wanted to present him with applications of a group of people the
While there are almost as many variations as there were witnesses regarding the “march on the boss,” there is no dispute that O’Hair rebuffed the Union’s attempt to submit applications for employment in the Respondent’s new in-house janitorial and housekeeping department on behalf of the employees as a group, and that O’Hair told Maran that he would not accept applications from the Union. While it is also undisputed that O’Hair told Maran and the employees who were with her that they could submit the applications at the front desk, and that he would interview employees individually, the evidence in the record establishes that the Respondent had already filled almost all of the positions in its new housekeeping and janitorial department. What is in dispute is whether O’Hair explicitly stated that he did not want to hire the employees because of their union affiliation, as Maran and several employees claimed and O’Hair denied.
The variations in the witnesses’ testimony regarding this incident is understandable when one considers the passage of time and the effect of individuals’ background and perspective on how they view any given situation. I do not subscribe to the Respondent’s theory of “psychological pre-conditioning.” The employees who were there with their union representative did not need to be told by anyone that the Respondent was not interested in hiring them. As Caicedo said, it would have been obvious to anyone seeing the ad in the previous Sunday’s newspaper that the Respondent had no interest in hiring the employees currently performing the housekeeping and janitorial work at the YMCA. If it had such an interest, one would expect that the Respondent would have let these employees know about the availability of the new jobs directly. Similarly, the employees did not have to be told by anyone that O’Hair did not want to hire them because of their affiliation with the Union because his admitted gestures and statement, i.e., refusing to accept applications proffered by their union repre-sentative while saying he would not accept applications from the Union, would reasonably lead them to that conclusion. Although I am not convinced that O’Hair said, in heac verba, “I do not want to hire a bunch of union employees,” I find that he clearly conveyed this impression to Maran and the employees by his words and gestures. His response to the “march on the boss” must also be viewed in the context of the Respondent’s efforts, to be detailed infra, to fill as many positions as possible before the ad even appeared in the paper.
I also find, based on
Maran’s testimony, corroborated by Garcia, that O’Hair told Maran that he didn’t
want “a” or “the” Union in the building. The fact that Maran included this statement
in a leaflet prepared shortly after the incident rebuts any suggestion that she
fabricated the testimony to support the allegations in the complaint. Although
Garcia’s testimony was not always reliable, her recollection as to this
statement appeared to be genuine. Finally, the statement, which was not
specifically denied by O’Hair, is consistent with the subsequent attempts of
the Respondent, and O’Hair in particular, to keep the
The complaint specifically alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act during this incident by O’Hair informing employees that they would not be hired because of their union membership. Because of the conflicting evidence as to what O’Hair said, I find that the General Counsel has not met his burden of proof and shall recommend dismissal of the complaint as to this allegation. I will, however, consider the evidence regarding O’Hair’s statements and conduct during the march on the boss, and the inferences to be drawn from such evidence, on the issue of animus.
C. The
Respondent’s Alleged Interference with
the
Although Pritchard’s
collective-bargaining agreement with the Union did not contain a specific
provision regarding union access at the worksite, the testimony of Bertini,
Abate, Maran, and others establishes that there was a practice of allowing the
The Respondent’s
attitude toward the
On January 14, Maran
went to the Respondent’s facility to meet with the day-shift employees. She
arrived at the facility around noon and met the three housekeepers, Garcia,
Nelson, and Ortiz, in the cafeteria. Garcia, Nelson, and Ortiz were on their
lunchbreak. Maran and the three employees went from the cafeteria to the lobby
and began leafleting near the main entrance. The leaflets were intended to
inform the public, including members of the YMCA arriving to use the
facilities, about the Respondent’s termination of its contract with Pritchard
and the impact on the employees represented by the
Maran returned to the
Respondent’s facility that evening, around 9:30–10 p.m. to meet with the night-shift
employees. She approached the employee at the front desk, who was identified
for the record as Rick Oney.[21]
Oney told her that she could not be in the building and could not meet with the
employees. According to Maran, he also told her that if any employees did speak
to her in the building, they would be thrown out. Maran testified that she
waited in the lobby for Reese Dinkins and Eleazar Mendoza to arrive for work.[22]
While she was waiting, Dinkins arrived for work and greeted her. As she approached
him, Maran heard Oney tell Dinkins that he shouldn’t talk to her. Maran asked
Dinkins to meet her outside and left the building. After speaking to Dinkins,
she asked him to tell steward Jose Tobon to meet her outside and Dinkins said
he would. Dinkins then went back into the building to punch in. Maran testified
that, as she was leaving the building, she saw
Dinkins substantially corroborated Maran’s testimony. According to Dinkins, he saw Maran standing outside the building as he arrived for work. Dinkins testified that Maran accompanied him into the building. Dinkins was going to talk to Maran after he punched in. Dinkins testified that Oney stopped him and said if Dinkins spoke to Maran on Y property that Oney would have to take his keys and send him home and that, if Maran was on Y property, Oney would have her arrested. Dinkins testified further that before this incident, Maran would come into the building to talk to the night crew “all the time” without incident. In fact, Dinkins had attended a meeting in the conference room with Maran and other union staff earlier in January and had filled out his application there.
Oney was called to testify by the General Counsel as a hostile witness under Rule 611(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Oney identified himself as the “front desk clerk.” He was still working for the Respondent at the time of the hearing and claimed to have retained Respondent’s counsel as his lawyer before the hearing. Oney worked from 3:30–11 p.m. in January and reported to Rachel Soucy, the Respondent’s residence director. He described his duties as answering phones, taking in cash for the various departments, such as payments for rooms, renting out rooms, and handling security in the lobby. The Respondent also had a security guard, Willie Sampson, working in the evenings. According to Oney, after 9 p.m., he and Sampson were the only employees of the Respondent in the building along with the Pritchard night crew. Oney conceded that while he can consult with his manager by phone, he is authorized to handle certain security functions, including calling police if someone not authorized to be in the building refuses to leave upon request.
Oney testified that O’Hair
had spoken to him on January 14 about the
Oney testified further that Dinkins came to the front desk after Maran left and Maran came back into the building, apparently to speak to Dinkins. According to Oney, he told Maran again that she had to leave and he told Dinkins to be careful not to hand out leaflets, that he could get in trouble. Oney claimed that he said this to Dinkins because the Respondent had a policy prohibiting the handing out of flyers without approval. When pressed as to the origin of this policy, Oney claimed he learned of it by “word of mouth.” The Respondent did not offer any evidence that such a policy in fact existed before the union issue arose in January. Oney testified further that he also told Dinkins that if he wanted to speak to Maran, he had to go outside. On further questioning, Oney conceded that he may have said that Dinkins could be sent home if he leafleted. This is consistent with what Oney had stated previously in an affidavit, i.e., that he told Dinkins that he could not hand out or post leaflets or Oney would have to send him home. Oney testified that he did call the police the night of the Dinkins incident but he recalled that no employees were around when the police arrived.
Oney did not impress
me as a candid or reliable witness. It was apparent that he endeavored to shade
his answers in the light most favorable to his employer. Moreover, despite the
apparent conflict of interest, Oney claimed to have voluntarily chosen to
retain legal counsel from the same attorneys representing his employer.[24]
I find that Oney’s earlier statement in his affidavit is a more reliable
account of what he said to Dinkins on January 14. Although I have previously
noted some reservations about Maran’s testimony, I credit her with regard to
this incident because she was corroborated by Dinkins, whom I found to be very
credible with respect to this incident. Accordingly, I find that, on January
14, Oney did tell Dinkins that he would be sent home if he spoke to Maran on
the Respondent’s property or handed out leaflets in support of the
Maran testified that she returned to the YMCA the next day, January 15, around 5 p.m., to leaflet. She was joined on this occasion by Tobon and Santiago Restrepo, both of whom worked on the night crew and were off-duty at the time. This time, Maran and the employees remained outside the building, handing out flyers on the sidewalk leading to the main entrance. After about 15 minutes, the police arrived and told them they had to move because they were still on the Respondent’s property. Maran, Tobon, and Restrepo complied with this request and continued leafleting from the public sidewalk. Tobon and Restrepo corroborated Maran’s testimony regarding this incident.
On January 21, Maran
again went to the Respondent’s facility to meet with the Pritchard employees.
She first met with the day-shift employees around noontime, in the cafeteria.
The three housekeepers and Tobon were present. Maran testified that, while they
were meeting, two
Maran returned to the Respondent’s facility on the night of January 21, to meet with the night crew, sometime between 8 and 8:30 p.m. According to Maran, she saw Oney at the front desk and he appeared to wave her toward the cafeteria where the Pritchard employees were already gathered. She identified Tobon, Fabiano Filigrana, and Aldemar Sanchez as being present.[25] As she was talking to the employees in the back of the cafeteria, she saw two policemen enter from the front of the cafeteria. They told Maran to come with them. According to Maran, as she accompanied the officers, the employees followed. When they got to the lobby, she explained to the officers who she was and why she was there. She also described the incident earlier that day when the officers left after she gave the same explanation. At that point, according to Maran, the police officers went to the front desk and had a conversation with Oney. During this conversation, she saw Oney make a telephone call and saw one of the officers speaking on the phone. After this call, she heard one officer say to the other, “[W]e’ll have to arrest her.” The police officers then approached Maran, who had been observing this while seated in the lobby, and made the arrest. According to Maran, Tobon and the other employees were present when this occurred. Maran testified that, upon being released by the police after being booked, she returned to the facility and asked Oney to call Tobon, who was working, to let him know that she was alright.
Tobon, while
professing not to remember dates and details very well, did recall being at a
meeting with Maran in the cafeteria at night with other Pritchard employees
during which the Respondent’s security guard and then the police arrived and
told them they could not have a meeting there. He recalled seeing the police
take Maran’s car keys from her and saw her leave with them. He did not know
where they took her. Filigrana had a
very poor memory regarding meetings with the Union but he did recall being at a
meeting in the cafeteria with the lady from the
Oney also testified
about this incident. According to Oney, he saw Maran walk past him toward the
cafeteria without stopping. Oney asked the security guard, Sampson, to go get
her. Sampson returned to the front desk with Maran. Oney told her, again, that
she was not supposed to be on the Respondent’s property. According to Oney,
Maran said that she had a right to be there, that the employees had a right to
talk to her and she returned to the cafeteria. At that point, Oney called O’Hair,
told him that the
Oney described a scene similar to that described by Maran, i.e., the police brought Maran out to the lobby, spoke to her separately and then spoke to him, asking Oney what he wanted them to do. Oney admitted telling the police to arrest Maran. Oney also corroborated Maran’s testimony that Maran returned to the facility later that night and asked him to page one of the Pritchard employees. Oney disputed Maran’s testimony that there were employees in the lobby during Maran’s arrest. It is undisputed that Maran was not handcuffed but walked out on her own power with the police.
To the extent there is any discrepancy between the testimony of Maran and the employee witnesses and that of Oney, I credit the General Counsel’s witnesses. Tobon and Filigrana recalled seeing both a security guard and the police come into the cafeteria, which is consistent with Oney’s testimony that he first sent Sampson into the cafeteria to get Maran and, when she wouldn’t l