NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes of NLRB decisions.  Readers are requested to notify the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.  20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can be included in the bound volumes.

Reliable Trucking, Inc. and Teamsters Local 853, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Case 32–RC–5367

April 23, 2007

DECISION AND CERTIFICATION
OF REPRESENTATIVE

By Chairman Battista and Members Kirsanow
and Walsh

The National Labor Relations Board, by a three-member panel, has considered challenges in and objections to a mail-ballot election held between August 10 and 30, 2005, and Administrative Law Judge Clifford H. Anderson’s attached supplemental report recommending disposition of them.  The election was conducted pursuant to a Stipulated Election Agreement.  The tally of ballots shows 43 votes for and 38 votes against the Petitioner, with 6 challenged ballots, a sufficient number to affect the results.

The Board has reviewed the record in light of the exceptions and briefs, has adopted the judge’s findings1 and recommendations,2 and finds that a certification of representative should be issued.

CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE

It is certified that a majority of the valid ballots have been cast for Teamsters Local 853, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and that it is the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the following appropriate unit:

 

All full-time and regular part-time drivers employed by the Employer at or out of, its Northern California facilities and other locations of operations, including but not limited to those located in Stockton, Pleasanton, Redding and Woodland, California; excluding all managerial and administrative employees, mechanics, salespersons, office clerical employees, all other employees, guards, and supervisors are defined in the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).

    Dated, Washington, D.C.   April 23, 2007

 

Peter N. Kirsanow,                           Member

Dennis P. Walsh,                              Member

 

(seal)            National Labor Relations Board

 

Chairman Battista, dissenting in part.

Contrary to my colleagues, I find merit to Employer Objections 6–9, and I would set aside the election.1  Specifically, I find that the Petitioner’s agents’ intrusion into the Employer’s August 9, 2005 election meeting constitutes objectionable conduct under Phillips Chrysler Plymouth, 304 NLRB 16, 16 (1991) (union agents engaged in objectionable conduct by invading employer’s premise and repeatedly and belligerently rejecting employer’s lawful directives to leave). 

The Employer conducted a meeting on August 9, the day before ballots were mailed to unit employees.  The meeting, held in a private hotel meeting room rented by the Employer, was attended by 15–20 unit employees.  During that meeting, when the room was darkened, and a slide presentation was underway, seven or eight agents of the Petitioner, headed by Petitioner’s secretary-treasurer, Rome Aloise, defied the Employer’s directive and barged into the meeting.  Once inside, these union agents disrupted the meeting and yelled at, and exchanged profanities with, employees and the Employer’s representatives.  Both the Petitioner’s and the Employer’s witnesses testified that the meeting degenerated into a shouting match.  Even after hotel security was summoned and requested that the union agents leave, the latter belligerently refused to do so.  Instead, they insisted on remaining in the meeting room until the police arrived and escorted them out.

The judge found that the invasion of the Petitioner’s agents and the subsequent chaotic shouting session caused apprehension and fear among employees at the meeting.  The judge also found that these employees reasonably would remember the forcefulness of the incident throughout the mail-ballot election period.2  The outrageous and trespassing conduct was committed by 7–8 union agents.  The sheer number of the agents, who were engaged in this conduct in a small room, was surely enough to intimidate the 15–20 employees who observed it.  Notwithstanding these findings, the judge and the majority concluded that this conduct was unobjectionable.  I disagree.

The union agents’ belligerent conduct conveyed to the employees at the meeting that the Employer was powerless to enforce its own right to conduct the meeting and to control the premises.  Even the hotel’s agents were unable to enforce the hotel’s property rights.  The union agents left only after the police arrived and led them out.  The fact that the conduct occurred “off site” at a hotel, rather than the Employer’s premises is immaterial.  The Employer had rented the hotel meeting room for the purposes of the meeting, and the union agents blatantly invaded that space and disrupted the meeting.  Further, the fact that the union agents did not punctuate their substantial misconduct with direct threats or physical altercations does not undercut the severity of their conduct.  In refusing to leave, the union agents effectively communicated to the employees an equally coercive message that the Employer was unable to prevent the intrusion or to adequately protect its own legal rights in a confrontation with the union agents.

Nor does the fact that this conduct occurred only once eliminate its coercive effect.  Given the timing and persistence of the Petitioner’s misconduct, its outrageousness, and the sheer number of Petitioner’s agents who participated in it, such misconduct would be indelibly imprinted in the employees’ memories throughout the voting period.  Finally, the lack of dissemination of the Petitioner’s conduct is immaterial.  The 15 to 20 employees witnessing the Petitioner’s conduct constituted a significant percent of those casting votes, and were far more than enough to have affected the election, where a swing of only 3–7 votes could have been determinative.3  

Accordingly, applying the factors of Phillip Chrysler Plymouth, supra, I find the conduct objectionable.  

    Dated, Washington, D.C.   April 23, 2007

 

 

Robert J. Battista,                                Chairman

 

 

 (seal)            National Labor Relations Board

 

Michelle M. Smith, Esq., for the Regional Director.

Spencer H. Hipp, Esq. (Littler Mendelson), of Fresno, California, for the Employer.

Lisa W. Pau, Esq. (Beeson, Tayer, & Bodine), of Oakland, California, and Mr. Stuart Helfer, Petitioner’s Business Representative, of San Francisco, California, for the Petitioner.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON CHALLENGES AND OBJECTIONS

Clifford H. Anderson, Administrative Law Judge: I heard the above-captioned case in Oakland, California, on August 21 and 22, 2006. The matter arose as follows:

On July 14, 2005, Teamsters Local 853, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (the Petitioner or the Union) filed a representation petition with Region 32 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board), docketed as Case 32–RC–5367, seeking to represent certain employees of Reliable Trucking, Inc. (the Employer).

On July 22, 2005, the Acting Regional Director for Region 32 approved a Stipulated Election Agreement directing an election be held in the following unit of the Employer’s employees (the unit):

 

All full-time and regular part-time drivers employed by the Employer at or out of, its Northern California facilities and other locations of operations, including but not limited to those located in Stockton, Pleasanton, Redding and Woodland, California; excluding all managerial and administrative employees, mechanics, salespersons, office clerical employees, all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).

 

The agreement provided: the payroll period for voter eligibility as the payroll period ending immediately preceding July 20, 2005; that all procedures after the ballots were counted would conform to the Board’s Rules and Regulations; the agreement further provided that the election would be by U.S. mail and asserted that ballots would be mailed by the Region to employees at 5 p.m. Wednesday, August 2005.  Ballots were to be returned by mail to the Board’s Region 32 offices by August 30, 2005.  The agreement stated:  “Ballots will be co-mingled and counted at the [Board’s Region 32 offices] at 11:30 a.m., Wednesday, August 31, 2005.”

The election by mail ballot was held consistent with the agreement from August 10 to August 30, 2005.  The tally of ballots served on the parties at the conclusion of the August 31, 2005 meeting showed the following results:

 

Approximate number of eligible voters ……………….111

Number of void ballots ………………………………….0

Number of votes cast for Petitioner ……………...……43

Number of votes against participating labor

   organization …………………………………………38

Number of valid votes counted ……………………..…81

Number of challenged ballots …………………………. 6

Valid votes counted plus challenged ballots ……………87

 

The challenged ballots were determinative of the results of the election. Thereafter, both the Petitioner and the Employer filed timely objections to the election which were served on all parties. 

On May 31, 2006, the Regional Director issued a Report and Recommendations on Objections and Challenged Ballots, Order Consolidating Cases and Notice of Hearing (the Director’s Report).  The Director’s Report, inter alia, directed that a hearing be held on the Petitioner’s challenged ballots of Todd Alan Andreason, Tim Neal, Everett Strahorn, Ricky Finance, and the challenged “No” vote that was marked on the sample ballot from the Notice of Election mailed to the voter.[1]  Thus, five ballots are under unresolved challenge.  The Regional Director directed that a hearing be held on these five challenges.[2]

The Director’s Report directed that a hearing be held on the Employer and the Petitioner’s objections and, further directs that the hearing officer prepare and cause to be served upon the parties a report containing resolutions of the credibility of witnesses, findings of fact, and recommendations to the Board as to the disposition of the challenges and objections.

On July 26, 2006, the Acting Regional Director for Region 32 issued an Order Severing Cases and Amending the May 31, 2006, Report and Recommendations on Objections and Challenged Ballots (the Amending Order).  That Amending Order announced certain matters had been separately dealt with and were severed from the instant proceeding.  The Amending Order, inter alia, specifically limited the instant hearing directed in the earlier report to the challenged ballots of Todd Alan Andreason, Tim Neal, Everett Strahorn, and Ricky Finance, as well as the disputed “NO” vote marked on a sample ballot from the Notice of Elections as earlier described and the issues raised by the Employer’s Objections 1 through 9 and the Petitioner’s Objections 8 and 9.

The matter was thereafter assigned to me for hearing and was held consistent with the Regional Director’s Report and Recommendations on Objections and Notice of Hearing. At the hearing, without objection from any party, the Petitioner, with my approval, withdrew its Objections 8 and 9.  The merits of those two objections are therefore not further addressed herein.  On brief, the Petitioner withdrew its challenge to the ballot of Rickey Finance.  I approve the Petitioner’s withdrawal of the challenge. The merits of that challenge will therefore not be further addressed herein. I find Finance’s vote eligible.  That finding and conclusion will be reflected in the specific findings and conclusions below.

Findings of Fact

Upon the entire record herein, including scholarly and helpful briefs from the Employer and the Petitioner submitted on August 29, 2006, I make the following findings of fact.[3]

i. the challenged ballots

The Regional Director in his report charged me with resolving five challenged ballots which had not as of the time of its issuance been resolved.  Rickey Finance’s challenge was withdrawn with my approval as discussed supra.  Thus, four challenges remain for resolution. Those challenges were made by the Petitioner to the following individuals:  Todd Alan Andreason, Tim Neal, Everett Strathorn, and to a sample ballot.  The challenges are best addressed separately save for the circumstances of Neal and Strathorn who are considered jointly.

A. The Challenge to the Ballot of Todd
Alan Andreason

The Petitioner challenged the vote of Andreason on the basis that he was not in the bargaining unit. The record establishes that Andreason worked for the Employer as a mechanic or mechanic’s helper through the payroll period ending on August 4, 2005, at which time he became a driver.  The Employer’s records establish unambiguously that Andreason did not work as a driver until after July 20, 2005.  As noted supra, the payroll period for voter eligibility was the payroll period ending immediately preceding July 20, 2005.  It is therefore clear and I find that, while Andreason may have been a driver during the period of the voting, he was not during the payroll period for voting eligibility.  Rather, I find he was a mechanic or mechanic’s helper during the eligibility period, a nonunit position.

The Employer, on brief, does not dispute the above facts but rather argues that since Andreason has become a driver and became one before the election balloting began, his vote should be found eligible and counted.  The Petitioner argues Andreason is simply ineligible by virtue of his eligibility period nonunit employment under the terms of the Stipulated Election Agreement and longstanding Board law.

The Board has long maintained a voter eligibility requirement or “prework” rule requiring unit employment during the established eligibility period in addition to requiring unit employment during the voting period.  As the Board explained in CWM, Inc., 306 NLRB 495, 495–496 (1992):

 

It is settled that, to be eligible to vote in a Board-conducted election, the employee must be employed and working on the eligibility date . . . . The Board’s so-called prework rule has two purposes: it operates as a prophylactic against an employer’s manipulation of an election by hiring employees favorable to its position just prior to the election, and it provides a simple and fair means of determining whether newly hired employees are part of the bargaining unit. Tom Wood Datsun, [767 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1985),] at 352.

 

The Employer has not been able to marshal any recognized exception to this rule which fits Andreason.  I therefore find he was ineligible to vote based on his nonunit employment in the eligibility period.  The challenge to his ballot is therefore sustained.

B. The Challenge to the Ballots of Neal
and Strathorn

The Petitioner challenged the ballots of Neal and Strathorn as not being in the bargaining unit.  The two individuals do not have the title of driver but rather are referred to by the Employer as “yard loader” or “load out” person and by drivers as yard employees. The record establishes that the Employer receives product by rail to its yards where that product is unloaded by Neal and Strathorn.  Each also loads the trailers with product that the drivers then haul.  Drivers are compensated based on a percentage of the designated load values of the products they haul.  Neal and Strathorn are hourly paid.  Neither Neal nor Strathorn haul product in company vehicles to other locations.

The Employer argues that the two employees have a community of interest with the drivers.  The Petitioner argues that community of interest is irrelevant because the two were specifically excluded from the bargaining unit which includes all drivers and excludes all other employees.

As noted supra, the unit herein was established based on the parties’ agreed upon unit.  That unit is:

 

All full-time and regular part-time drivers employed by the Employer at or out of, its Northern California facilities and other locations of operations, including by not limited to those located in Stockton, Pleasanton, Redding and Woodland, California; excluding all managerial and administrative employees, mechanics, salespersons, office clerical employees, all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).

 

There was no evidence offered by the parties respecting their intentions in agreeing the specific unit language involved herein.

The Petitioner’s challenge to the ballots of Neil and Strathorn is premised on the argument that he is not a member of the stipulated bargaining unit.  The Board has very recently restated from Caesar’s Tahoe, 337 NLRB 1096, 1097 (2002), the correct analytical approach to challenges respecting unit placement in stipulated bargaining units in Halsted Communications,  347 NLRB No. 20, slip op. at 1 (2006):

 

When resolving determinative challenged ballots in cases involving stipulated bargaining units, the Board’s function is to ascertain and enforce the parties’ intent, provided that it is not contrary to any statutory provision or established Board policy.  Caesar’s Tahoe, 337 NLRB 1096, 1097 (2002).  To determine whether an individual is included in the stipulated bargaining unit, the Board applies a three-step test.  First, the Board must determine whether the stipulation is ambiguous.  If the stipulation clearly expresses the objective intent of the parties in unambiguous terms, the Board simply enforces the agreement.  If the stipulation is ambiguous, the Board continues to step two and seeks to determine the parties’ intent through usual methods of contract interpretation, including the examination of extrinsic evidence.  If the parties’ intent still remains unclear, the Board will reach step three and employ its standard community-of-interest test to determine the bargaining unit. Id.

To determine whether the stipulation is clear or ambiguous, the Board will compare the express language of the stipulated bargaining unit with the disputed classification.  Bell Convalescent Hospital, 337 NLRB 191 (2001) (citing Viacom Cablevision, 268 NLRB 633 (1984)).  The Board will find a clear intent to include those classifications that match the express language, and will find a clear intent to exclude those classifications not matching the stipulated bargaining unit description.  Bell Convalescent Hospital, supra at 191.  If the classification is not included, and there is an exclusion for “all other employees,” the stipulation will be read to clearly exclude that classification.  Id.; see also National Public Radio, Inc., 328 NLRB 75 (1999); Prudential Insurance Co., 246 NLRB 547 (1979).  The Board bases this approach on the expectation that the parties know the eligible employees’ job titles, and intend their descriptions in the stipulation to apply to those job titles.  Bell Convalescent Hospital, supra at 191. 

 

Following the Board’s analytical framework, it is relevant to note that the agreed-upon unit herein expressly includes all drivers and specifically excludes all other employees.  From that fact, applying the above quoted instruction, I find the parties had a clear intent to exclude Neal and Strathorn who were employed as yard and not driver employees. The Respondent’s arguments respecting community of interest do not apply for the reasons explained by the Board above.  Having found that Neal and Strathorn were not in the bargaining unit at relevant times, it follows they were not eligible to vote and I shall therefore sustain the challenge to each of their ballots.

C. The Challenge to the Sample Ballot

1. Events

The circumstances relevant to the merits of the challenge to the sample ballot are set forth at some length in my discussion of the Employer’s “Board Conduct” objections, infra.  In order to avoid needless duplication of that discussion, they will not be set forth here. The findings therein are relied upon here to resolve the challenge to the sample ballot.

2. Analysis and Conclusion

The Petitioner challenged the sample ballot as not complying with Board requirements.  The Employer argues the Board has made it clear in its recent decision in Aesthetic Designs, LLC, 339 NLRB 395 (2003), that a sample ballot in a mail-ballot context is not rendered uncountable or subject to meritorious challenge for that reason alone and will be found eligible and counted unless other disabling factors control.

The Petitioner does not argue that the ballot is per se invalid as a sample ballot.  Rather, the Petitioner argues that Aesthetic Designs does not apply here initially because the instant sample ballot was not anonymous, it was a different and unique color and form and was marked in a manner that distinguished it from all other ballots.  While I find this is true, I do not find the unique nature—i.e., color, shape, and size—of the sample ballot associates the ballot with a particular voter, and I further find that that was the type of voter identifying marks that the Board was concerned with in Aesthetic Designs.  Were it otherwise, contrary to Aesthetic Designs, sample ballots would be found invalid in virtually all situations by virtue of their unique physical description, essentially a per se ineligibility.

The Petitioner argues further that the instant ballot is at the heart of the “ballot box stuffing” and election count irregularities that occurred at the election voter count, as discussed infra, which, it argues, require that the sample ballot under the totality of the circumstances should not be counted. The Employer argues the ballot should be found eligible in effect in spite of those circumstances which, in its objections, it argues requires a new election.

The Board agent conduct and the objections based thereon are discussed infra. In addition to its unusual and irregular use as a ballot in a Board election, the main argument raised in the instant case to the eligibility of the ballot is the irregularity and suspicion of the sample ballot’s discovery by the Board agent reputedly as under the ballot box flap at a time after the ballot count was thought to have been concluded and, after the ballot box had been shown to be empty by the Board agent to the parties at the end of the counting process.  It was at least suspicious and unexplained how the ballot came to properly be placed in the ballot box since it is so significantly and noticeably differently colored and larger than the standard Board ballots and because the Board agent had opened ballot envelopes and extracted ballots placing all the ballots into the empty ballot box in the presence of the parties during the tally process.

It is also true that although the Board held that sample ballots not be found per se ineligible, it has not found that sample ballots mistakenly used as ballots are free from difficulty. The Board in Aesthetic Designs, supra, specifically noted in its decision that in that case there was generally no concern respecting ballot stuffing in the mail ballot process due to the key number addressee-voter designations on ballots and none was present on the facts before it.  The appearance of the sample ballot in the ballot box in a manner free from doubt or suspicion is very much not the case here and the obvious irregularity of the belated appearance of the ballot distinguishes the instant case from Aesthetic Design.  There are important unanswered questions respecting the sample ballot herein.

Considering all the circumstances and on the basis of the record as a whole, I find the question of the sample ballot’s eligibility is a close one.  The parties have marshaled the Board’s many relevant cases dealing with the twin goals of counting voter ballots and of preserving the fairness and regularity of the Board’s election processes.  These cases are fact specific and postelection determinations must focus on the facts in each particular case. The issue of the sample ballot’s eligibility, herein, involves yet another balancing of the important need that the Board’s processes both be honest, fair and open and be seen to be honest, fair and open against the important obligation to allow voter intentions to be considered wherever possible. 

On the facts of this case I am persuaded that the twin unusual if not suspicious circumstances—the unusual coincidence of the rare casting of a sample ballot with the even more rare unexplained discovery of such a ballot belatedly discovered by a Board agent away from the counting area in a ballot box already determined and shown to the parties to be empty, requires that the ballot be held improper based on those suspicious and hence not be counted. Coincidences involving events as rare and infrequent as those involved herein are not to be ignored or minimized. Perhaps if either oddity occurred alone, the ballot might properly be found eligible. I find herein, however, there was simply too much irregularity in the process to allow the ballot to be found regular and tallied with the other ballots.

I am reluctant to disenfranchise any voter and do not do so here because of the fact the ballot was a sample ballot.  I and the parties have read and understand the Board’s teaching in Aesthetic Designs, supra.  Rather, I do so because the entire context of events and circumstances respecting the ballot makes it, in my view, simply too unreliable to be fairly included with the remainder of the properly-poled ballots which reflect employee sentiments.  The Board’s historic and continuing efforts to keep any fraud or even the appearance of fraud from undermining confidence in the Agency must take priority here.  Suspicion and reluctant exclusion in this unusual set of circumstances must take preference over a trusting inclusion.  I simply cannot find this ballot reliable. I shall therefore sustain the challenge of the Petition to this ballot.

D.  Summary and Conclusions Respecting
Challenged Ballots

Two earlier challenged votes were resolved and are simply noted here. Ricky Finance has been found eligible to vote in the election and it is appropriate that his ballot be opened, counted, and included in the final tally of ballots.  Robert Campbell has earlier been found by the Regional Director to be an eligible voter and the Regional Director further found it appropriate that his ballot be opened, counted, and included in the tally of ballots.

I have found Andreason, Neil, and Strathorn not to be eligible voters.  I have therefore sustained the challenges to their ballots.  The ballots of these individuals should not under any circumstances be opened or counted in the instant election.  Finally, I have sustained the challenge to the “sample ballot vote” as described above.  That ballot is not sufficiently reliable to be included in the tally of ballots herein.

The findings and conclusions set forth above reduce the valid challenged ballots to two, i.e., the ballots of Finance and Campbell, with no unresolved challenges remaining for resolution.  The current tally of ballots shows that the Petitioner was favored in the balloting by a vote of 43 to 38.  Arithmetically the two remaining ballots of Finance and Campbell which should be considered in the final tally are too few in number to change the election result and hence are not determinative of the results of the election.  Thus, if both Finance and Campbell voted for the Union, the final tally would be 45 to 38 favoring the Union.  If both voted against, the tally would be 43 to 40 favoring the Union.  If Finance and Campbell votes were split, the Union would prevail with a tally of 44 to 39.  Thus, the Union wins by 7, 5, or 3 votes depending on how these two individuals voted, but it wins in all circumstances. That being so, it is inappropriate and unnecessary to open and count Finance and Campbell’s ballots since no change in the election result could occur no matter how the two individuals voted.

I find and conclude that a majority of valid ballots has been cast for the Petitioner.

ii. the employers objections

The Employer’s Objections 1 through 9 are as follows:

 

1. Board Agent Conduct [all bolding in original]

 

The Board Agents assigned to this case made the conduct of an open and fair election impossible, and/or gave the image of tainted, if not illicit, election proceedings by failing to maintain the integrity of the ballot box, by conducting the tally of ballots in a manner that allowed additional ballots to be inserted in the ballot box, and in a manner that did not account for all ballots or otherwise explain additional extraneous ballots.

 

2. Board Agent Conduct

 

The Board Agents assigned to this case destroyed the integrity of the NLRB’s election proceedings and compromised the laboratory conditions for an NLRB election by not accounting for all ballots cast by eligible voters and received by the Region

 

3. Board Agent Conduct

 

The Board Agents assigned to this case destroyed the integrity of the NLRB’s election proceedings and compromised the laboratory conditions for an NLRB election by leaving the Region’s election files in this case unattended, and by allowing Union representatives to rummage through the Region’s election files in this case and then extract from those files numerous ballot envelopes containing ballots.

 

4. Board Agent Conduct

 

The Board Agents assigned to this case destroyed the integrity of the NLRB’s election proceedings and compromised the laboratory conditions for an NLRB election by not counting and/or accounting for all ballots mailed out and received back by the Region.

 

5. Board Agent Conduct

 

The Board Agents assigned to this case destroyed the integrity of the NLRB’s election proceedings and compromised the laboratory conditions for an NLRB election by losing or misplacing one or more ballots, and conducting the election, ballot count accumulation,  and ballot count in a manner that it was unclear just one or another 20 ballots had been misplaced.

 

6. Petitioning Union Conduct

 

Teamsters Union Local No. 853,  by and through its representatives, agents and supporters,  rendered the conduct of a free and fair and uncoerced representation election impossible, and otherwise destroyed the laboratory conditions for an NLRB election,  by threatening eligible voters that if they did not vote for the Union, they would not have a job anymore.

 

7. Petitioning Union Conduct

 

Teamsters Union Local No. 853, by and through its representatives, agents and supporters,  rendered the conduct of a free and fair and uncoerced representation election impossible, and otherwise destroyed the laboratory conditions for an NLRB election,  by barging into Company campaign meetings,  threatening and intimidating company campaign organizers in from of the eligible voters,  and then threatening eligible voters.

 

8. Petitioning Union Conduct

 

Teamsters Union Local No. 853, by and through its representatives, agents and supporters, rendered the conduct of a free and fair and uncoerced representation election impossible, and otherwise destroyed the laboratory conditions for an NLRB election, by threatening eligible voters with physical violence, such as we’re going to break you in half next time we see you if you don’t support the Union.

 

9. Petitioning Union Conduct

 

Teamsters Union Local No. 853, by and through its representatives, agents and supporters, rendered the conduct of a free and fair and uncoerced representation election impossible, and otherwise destroyed the laboratory conditions for an NLRB election, by threatening eligible voters with job loss through pressure on third party suppliers that would adversely impact the eligible voters’ job performance.

 

While voluminous, the Employer’s Objections 1 through 9 deal—at least to the extent that evidence was offered in support thereof—with two episodes, each occurring on separate dates in August 2005.  Thus, Objections 1 through 5, each sub-captioned “Board Agent Conduct,” complain of the conduct of the Board agent at the August 31, 2005 mail-ballot opening and counting process held at the offices of Region 32. No other evidence or argument on these objections was directed to any other event.  The Employer’s Objections 6 through 9, each sub-captioned “Petitioning Union Conduct,” complain of the Petitioner’s agents conduct respecting an employer campaign meeting for employees held on August 9, 2005. No other evidence or argument on these objections was directed to any other event.  It is appropriate to deal separately with the two events.

A. The Objections Addressed to the Board Agent’s
Conduct—Objections 1
5

1. A brief review of NLRB mail-ballot
election procedures

The Board’s Casehandling Manual—Representation Proceedings, Section 11336.2 directs the following regarding mail ballots:

 

11336.2 Notification and Distribution Procedures:

 

The mail ballot process involves the following steps:   

. . . .

 

(b) Notification

 

Written notification is sent to the parties at least 24 hours before the time and date on which mail ballots will be dispatched to the voters, informing the parties of the dispatch time and thus the time of the “start” of the election for application of the Peerless Plywood rule.  Oregon Washington Telephone Co., 123 NLRB 339 (1959); Peerless Plywood, 107 NLRB 427 (1953).  The notification should also set forth a terminal time and date by which the ballots should be returned to the Regional Office, as well as the date and time of the ballot count.

For the information of the parties, a copy of Form NLRB-4175 Instructions to Eligible Employees Voting by United States Mail, which will be sent to the voters, should also be enclosed with the notification.

 

11336.2(c) Voter Kit

 

A kit is mailed to each voter, not only to those agreed to be eligible, but also to those alleged to be eligible by any party.

The kit contains Form NLRB-4175 Instructions to Eligible Employees Voting by United States Mail. . . .

Also included in the kit is a ballot.  Note that the instructions to voters that appear on the ballot used in a mail ballot election are unique to that election.  Sec. 11306.6.

The kit further contains a blue mail-ballot envelope and a yellow postage-paid return envelope addressed to the Regional Office.  The key number of the addressee should be inserted on the yellow return envelope in each case.  (Pursuant to Postal Service regulations, the yellow return envelopes should be stamped by the Regional Office postage meter, with the date left blank.)

. . . .

Returned envelopes are treated as prospective voters for purposes of identification, challenges, etc.

 

The Manual states further:

 

11336.5 Check and Count of Ballots:

 

(a) Parties ‘s Observers

 

The parties may select observers for purposes of identification, checkoff, challenges, etc. Since the ballots have already been marked at the time of receipt, the employer may designate supervisory employees as observers and the labor organization may designate union officials.

 

(b) Count

 

At the time scheduled for the count, the returned envelopes are treated as “voters’’ approaching the checking table.  The observers at the table make their marks alongside the respective names on the list.  The observers may, if they wish, challenge ballots.  Challenged ballots should not be opened, but simply labeled “challenged” on the yellow outer return envelope.  Sec. 11338.9.

After the yellow outer return envelopes have been checked against the list, all should be opened at once.  Next, the blue ballot envelopes should be mixed thoroughly before the envelopes are opened and ballots are extracted.  The ballots should be mixed again before being counted.

2. The events of August 31, 2005

a. A brief overview of the uncontested elements
of the meeting

Pursuant to the election agreement, the tally of ballots was conducted at 11:30 a.m., Wednesday, August 31, 2005, the Board’s Region 32 offices in a hearing room, likely the room in which the instant hearing was conducted.  The Board agent stood at the front of the room with a table behind him where he placed the materials to be used.  In front of the Board agent was a counsel table at which the two Employer’s representatives sat facing the Board agent.  At the other counsel table, facing the Board agent but further to the Board agent’s left, sat the two Petitioner’s representatives. 

Two representatives of the Petitioner, Helfer and Casqueiro, and two representatives of the Employer, Brown and Askham, were present.  The process was conducted by a single Board agent, Nick Tsiliacos.[4]  The representatives of the Employer and the Petitioner all testified to the events in contest.  No party called or indicated it had attempted to call or intended to call as a witness, any Board agent participant in the events.

There was no dispute that the parties gathered, Board Agent Tsiliacos made introductory remarks, the envelopes mailed to the Board office were set out and the names on the envelopes were checked off by the parties on the voter eligibility list.  The parties were not sure if envelopes submitted by individuals who had become ineligible or envelopes otherwise deficient were discovered and resolved, but they agreed that challenged voter’s envelopes were identified and those envelopes were segregated from the others.

The nonchallenged ballot envelopes were then each opened by the Board agent who extracted the colored ballots contained and placed them in a standard Board ballot box which had first been shown to the parties to confirm it was empty when the process began.  The Board agent engaged in a disputed ballot extracting style in several instances which is discussed below.  The ballots were then taken from the ballot box which, was thereafter again shown by the Board agent to the parties as now empty of ballots, and the Board agent showed each ballot to the parties and separated them into two piles of “yes” and “no” votes.  No unusual, spoilt, or blank ballots were discovered.  The two stacks of ballots were then counted.  The parties paid close attention and it soon was discovered and discussed that the number of envelopes opened and from which the ballots had been extracted exceeded by one the number of ballots counted. 

The discrepancy upset and confused all present.  Ballot counts are important matters, not only to the parties but also to Board agents who desire that regularity should always obtain and the process go smoothly.  Recounting occurred of both the ballots and the envelopes from which the ballots had been removed with the same inconsistent result—one more ballot than envelope.

At this point the Board agent announced to the parties that he was going to take advice and left the room.  He took the ballot box and the counted envelopes.  He was specifically observed by the Petitioner’s agent, Helfer, to have taken the challenged ballots with him on each occasion he left the room.  In time, the Board agent returned and announced that he was instructed to recount and that process was again undertaken with the same result.  He left again bearing the materials as before. The number of times he left and returned is in dispute, two or perhaps three or four times total.  The parties also dispute the Petitioner’s agent’s conduct during one of Tsiliacos’ absences from the room.

Also contested by the parties, but of no direct consequence to the objection matters in dispute, is the precise timing and means that the late arriving ballot envelope of Campbell was delivered into the room—by another Board agent or by Tsiliacos—and precisely when another Board agent briefly arrived, consoled the parties, and left thereafter.

After Tsiliacos’ final absence from the room, he returned to the room with a sample ballot marked “no” in pencil, which he announced to the parties that he had discovered under a flap in the ballot box.  This announcement apparently produced disbelief and skepticism on the part of the parties who could not understand how a sample ballot—different in appearance from the normal ballots—could have been discovered in a ballot box after the box had been shown by the Board agent to the parties to be empty after all the ballots had been removed.  And they wondered aloud how a sample ballot so different from the other ballots could have managed to get into the ballot box in the first place.  The Board agent was not able to provide further answers or explanations.  The sample ballot was challenged—see my resolution of that challenge, supra.  The tally of ballots completed and the meeting concluded.

b. The disputed elements of themMeeting and the
positions of the Parties
[5]

The Employer, based primarily on the testimony of consultant Ronald Brown, an experienced participant in ballot counts including mail-ballot counts, argues several irregularities tainted the entire tally process and require a new election.  His colleague, Ronald Askham, the Petitioner’s vice president and a first-time observer of the tally process, was present for all events but was admittedly overwhelmed by the entire process and could not supply the informed detail of Brown.  The Petitioner’s witnesses contested the Employer’s contentions. The disputed elements are initially discussed separately below.

While all agreed that the tally meeting started off conventionally and without apparent irregularity, when Board Agent Tsiliacos was extracting the ballots from their envelopes and inserting the ballots into the ballot box, on numerous occasions he turned his back on the parties while he was apparently extracting a ballot out of the parties’ direct line of sight, then placed it in the ballot box he had carried with him as he turned his back.  There is no dispute that this occurred perhaps half a dozen times.  There is also no dispute that no party said anything about it during the process and that the Board agent never made comment on his behavior.  Further, insofar as the parties could observe, there was nothing untoward done by the Board agent during these events.  His conduct was limited to and directed toward ballot extraction from election envelopes and the ballots’ introduction into the ballot box. 

The Employer argues such secretive behavior destroys the confidence of the parties and undermines the election tally process to such an extent that a new election is needed.  The Petitioner’s witness Helfer with the Petitioner’s adoption of the argument on brief, suggested that since he noticed that during the ballot extraction process by the Board agent, in some cases, ballot markings were viewable on the ballot before it was inserted into the ballot box, the Board agent was probably simply trying to avoid disclosing such marks to the parties before the comingling occurred within the ballot box by turning his back.  The Employer argues this is simple speculation by the Petitioner.  The Petitioner argues that the Employer’s agents never questioned or commented on the process at the time and, thus, did not afford the Board agent an opportunity to provide a simple answer and explanation of a procedure he did not know had confused any party or otherwise warranted explanation.

The Employer again, based on the testimony of Brown and Askham, argues that at all times during this process there appeared to be a stack of perhaps 15 to 20 unopened voter envelopes sitting on the Board agent’s table, which Brown suspected might be seemingly ignored ballots submitted by other voters.  The Employer offered evidence that the names and addresses of the approximately 111 eligible voters were reliable and had been computer printed by the Employer for the Board so that ballot envelopes should not have been lost in the mail.  Since there were fewer than 90 ballots under discussion at the tally, that stack of ballots might well account for the “missing” voters.  Ignoring those ballots requires a new election argues the Employer.

The Petitioner’s witnesses deny that any unopened collection of ballot envelopes as described by the Employer’s witnesses ever existed. Stuart Helfer testified that as the parties came together in the Board’s hearing room,  he asked Board Agent Tsiliacos how many ballots the Region had received and that Tsiliacos responded “86.”  Thus, argues the Petitioner, the Board made it clear it did not have a larger group of envelopes to address at the tally.  The Petitioner argues there simply was never a large bundle of ballot envelopes received and carried into the hearing room by the Board agent only to be ignored thereafter.  The Petitioner argues further that Brown in his testimony was not able to testify to his observations as creating more than a doubt in his mind as to what the stack of documents comprised.  And Brown never directly raised the matter with the Board agent, a simple matter of Brown asking Tsiliacos something like: “Are the envelopes in that stack there, ballot envelopes in this matter that need to be addressed?”  The Petitioner concludes the Employer’s agents were simply mistaken or confused other envelopes—perhaps the challenged envelopes—or other papers into the described perception of an impossible and improbable bundle many of unaddressed, unopened, eligible voter ballot envelopes.

Brown admitted he had never directly asked questions of the Board agent about the mysterious stack of envelopes.  Brown explained that this failure to do so was in part because of a desire to preserve the decorum of the process, to avoid embarrassing a Board agent employed in a position he had at one time held, to avoid providing the Petitioner’s agents ammunition which might be used against the Employer’s election interests and, finally, because he asked the questions indirectly by repeatedly asking the Board agent if all the ballots have been addressed and there were no others to be found.

The Employer argues that during one of the Board agent’s absences from the room, Petitioner’s agent, Jesse Casqueiro, left his place seated at the table and wandered over to the Board agent’s materials and briefly picked up a stack of envelopes and then dropped them back in place.  The Union’s witnesses describe the event as one not involving actual picking up and dropping any materials and further describe the materials observed to have been opened envelopes from which the ballots had been removed and counted.

The Employer argues this misconduct and the fact of the Board agent’s absence and inability to protect Board materials commands a new election be directed.  The Petitioner challenges the employer witnesses’ testimony and suggests there is no true dispute that anything more was involved than at most a momentary picking up and dropping of the already many times counted empty ballot envelopes the ballots from which had been taken from the room by the Board agent.  Further, the Petitioner notes that no complaint was made by the Petitioner’s agents to the Board agent upon his return so that the Board agent could address any concerns.

Finally, the Employer argues the unusual and highly suspect appearance of the sample ballot, discovered outside the counting room by the Board agent and asserted by him to have been discovered under a flap in the ballot box provides the final consummating irregularity which requires a new election.  The Petitioner argues that the sample ballot itself is under challenge and will be resolved independently, but the process was otherwise sufficient and a new election should not be lightly be directed and employees sentiments in the election set aside based on an odd result in the tally process—a process which occurred significantly after the employees had cast their ballots and which only involved a single ballot which was challenged and found ineligible and invalid, supra.

3. Analysis and conclusions respecting the Employer’s Board agent conduct objections

Initially certain evidentiary conflicts must be resolved.  There was an important conflict in the testimony regarding whether or not the Board agent had stacked on a table, in plain sight but not otherwise addressed nor spoken about, a group of unopened mail-ballot envelopes of perhaps some 15 to 20 in number.  Considering the record as a whole including not only the witnesses and their demeanor but the probabilities of the scenarios described, I find there was no large group of unaccounted for unopened employee ballot envelopes in the hearing room that day.  It is not necessary to find the Employer’s witnesses were other than honest in their testimony.  Rather, I find they were simply mistaken.  I find that any such stack or gathering of what was perceived to be unopened ballot envelopes were not unopened ballots but rather were the already opened envelopes from which ballots had been extracted.  There is simply no other plausible explanation given the testimony and the fact that no evidence was offered to suggest that—other than the sample ballot discussed earlier—voters had mailed ballots to the Regional Office which had not been addressed in the process that day.

There is also a conflict regarding the extent of the Petitioner’s agent, Casqueiro’s, rummage in Board materials.  I find that he did in fact momentarily pick up and then immediately drop back in position a group of already opened envelopes.  In making this finding,  I credit the Union’s agents as to what material were involved but favor the testimony of Askham respecting the extent of the contact with materials.  I specifically find that no materials were otherwise handled and that no substitution or other slight of hand occurred respecting the materials.

Turning to the specific employer complaints, it is well to consider them initially separately.  First, there is the matter of the Board agent’s turning of his back during the process of removing the ballot from its envelope.  I agree with the Petitioner that the conduct has a benign explanation and that he was seeking to protect the confidentiality of certain apparently vulnerable ballots as he removed them from their envelopes.  I also find there was simply no credible evidence of irregular handling of the envelope and ballot handling process by the Board agent other than in his turning away as described.  Importantly the Employer’s agents made no complaint and asked for no explanation at the time.  I simply find nothing improper in the Board agent’s conduct in this regard and, even were it irregular, the Employer in such a marginal matter should have raised the matter at the time and sought explanation or cessation of the activity. 

The Employer’s complaint about the apparent stack of 15 to 20 unopened, unit employee ballot envelopes is disposed of by my findings, supra, that there was no such group and the Employer’s agents were mistaken.  Again, the Employer’s case was further weakened by the fact that no comment, complaint, or question was raised at the time of its occurrence. I do not find Brown’s indirect questions directed to the Board agent fairly raised the issue of an apparent stack of uncounted ballots.

The Petitioner’s handling of the Board agent’s materials was wrong but not a basis for setting the election aside because of the Petitioner’s conduct during the tally process.  Since the materials touched were, as I found supra, already opened and repeatedly counted empty ballot envelopes, I do not find that the argued misconduct by the Board agent in leaving them out on the table when he left the area after the ballot count where they might be touched by a party rises to Board agent misconduct such that a new election is needed.

Finally turning to the sample ballot issue, in many ways I agree with the Employer that this aspect of the ballot tally was unusual, suspicious, and regrettable.  Clearly, the Board agent, if he felt it necessary to inspect the ballot box a final time, should have returned to the tally room and done so in the presence of the agents of the Employer and the Petitioner.  I do not find that the conduct by the Board agent requires a new election.  There is simply no evidence of slight-of-hand, corruption or other misconduct on the part of the Board agent regarding the ballot box discovery.  The sample ballot’s appearance on the scene was indeed irregular and even suspicious, but that ballot has been considered in the section on challenged ballots, supra, and found not a valid or countable ballot.

Having considered the various elements of the Board agent misconduct allegations above: Are they sufficient in their totality to require a new election?  I have reconsidered these events based on the record as a whole and the detailed argument and legal analysis of the parties.  I find the whole of the Employer’s complaint in these regards does not rise to a situation requiring a new election.

My earlier analysis of the parts remains valid.  Further, it is important to keep in mind that the issues here arose in the context of a mail-ballot tally process which occurs well after the employees have submitted their ballots.  The burden of proof lies with the objecting party, the Employer here.  In the cases of the suspicions and doubts respecting the process testified to by Brown and discredited supra, the Employer is hard put to suggest that activity was seemingly suspicious when nothing was said, no questions asked, no complaints directed at the Board agent during the process now complained about.  Thus, the mysterious back-turning of the Board agent, the stack of ballots which the Employer argues may have been unconsidered eligible votes in these situations are not objectively Board agent misconduct requiring a new election.  The Employer’s arguments are met with plausible alternatives which I have credited.  The Employer did not attempt to elicit testimony from the Board agent.  All of the Employer’s evidence in this regard is in my view insufficient surmise and does not meet its burden of proof. 

In summary, I find that no Board agent misconduct requiring a new election occurred.  The Board agent probably should not have left the room; perhaps he could have had other agents relieve him in that duty.  He should not have examined the ballot box anew outside the tally area.  In the entire context of events, those were his failings.  They are not enough to justify setting aside the expressed election sentiments of a unit of over 100 employees.[6]  I therefore find the Employer’s Objections 1–5 without merit and shall recommend they be overruled.

B. The Objections Addressed to the Petitioner’s
Conduct—Objections 6–9

1. The events of August 9, 2005

a. The Employer’s version of events

With the ballots to be mailed to employees by the Board on August 10, 2005, the Employer conducted a union election campaign meeting on August 9, 2005, in the midafternoon at an area hotel in the community of Pleasanton to which unit employees were invited.  This meeting was one of numerous meetings that the Employer had conducted during the campaign.  The Petitioner had come to be aware of these meetings and at least in some cases positioned its agents in the hotel parking lot before such employer campaign meetings where they could communicate with the arriving or departing employees respecting the Union’s views concerning the upcoming election.  This practice was followed by the Petitioner on August 10.  After communicating with arriving employees in the parking lot, seven or eight union agents and members, as a body, headed by Rome Aloise, secretary-treasurer of the Petitioner, entered the hotel and walked to the hallway area outside the room rented by the Employer where the Employer’s employee campaign meeting was underway.

Ronald Brown testified the meeting was attended by 15 to 20 unit employees and perhaps 3 consultants to the Employer respecting the election campaign.  Brown testified that as the meeting had begun, he was in the hotel hallway in front of the meeting room with the meeting room doors closed.  He testified:

 

[Mr. Rome Aloise] came down the hall with I’d say about seven union reps down the hallway, and I said, what are you doing here, and he said I want to come and address the group.  I says, well, we don’t come to your meetings—. . . .  He said, well, you know, I don’t like what’s being said about the union, and I want to come in.  I said, well, it’s a private meeting, and you can’t.  He said, well, who’s going to stop us.  He said just try, and he proceeded to enter the room and went into the meeting.

Q. What about the other union reps that were with him?

A. They went in also.

 

Brown testified he left the area and managed to obtain the service of two hotel security personnel who came with him to the meeting room where the union agents, the Employer’s consultants and the employees were all arguing and shouting at one another.  Brown testified:

 

I went and got security, brought security back, entered the room with two security officers, and . . . Rome said, that’s all the guys you brought and says we’re not leaving.  I said, well, we are going to have to get the police.  He says, go get them, that’s what Rome said.  So, I then preceded with security out of the room, and they called the police.  The police came . . . and entered the room and removed them.

 

Brown testified that no arrests occurred and that the union agents left when the police requested they do so. At that point, he recalled the meeting simply broke up.  Neither the hotel security staff nor the police were called to testify by any party.

Tony Fuller, a sales representative of the Employer, testified he attended the August 9 campaign meeting to set up the conference room and to provide food for the participants.  He testified he left the meeting and observed the conversation between Brown and Aloise, essentially corroborating Brown.  When Brown left and the union agents entered the meeting room, Fuller followed them in.  He described the events:

 

There was a film or slide presentation going on, I’m not sure which.  The lights came on, there was a lot of yelling and screaming back and forth between union representatives

Q. If you know, who turned on the lights?

A. I’m not for certain because I came in afterwards.  From where the light switch was and the way the union reps had entered, I believe they did, but I’m not for certain.

Q. That’s okay.  When you said there is a lot of screaming going on, can you describe that, what you heard and saw?

A. Yes.  The reps came in and they lined up along the wall closest to the doorway.  Rome introduced himself to the drivers and said he would like to debate.  He had a pamphlet.

Q. What did he say when he introduced himself?

A. He said my name is Rome [Aloise], I’m with Local 853.  I want to debate with Mr. Brown’s consultants.

Q. What happened then?

A. They declined.  There was a lot of yelling and profanities back and forth.  A driver stood up and said, Reliable is paying us to be at this meeting, pay us or get out.  They said we’re not leaving this meeting.

Q. What happened then?

A. Lots of yelling back and forth, debating about wages.

. . . .

Mr. Brown came back into the room with security guards.

Q. How many?

A. Two.

Q. What happened then?

A. They still refused to leave.

Q. Why do youwhat happened that makes you believe that the union reps refused to leave?

A. Because security asked them to leave.

Q. You heard that?

A. Yes.

Q. What was their response if any from the union reps?

A. We are not leaving until the police come.

. . . .

Q. Did the Pleasanton [police]arrive that day?

A. Yes, they did. . . .  One of the police officers came and spoke with myself and the management.  The rest of them went down the hallway some short time later, I seen the union reps, the police officers, and Mr. Brown exiting the hotel area.

b. The Petitioner’s version of events

Jesse Casqueiro, organizer for the Petitioner, testified he was with the group of the Petitioner’s agents and supporters that entered the Employer’s meeting room.  While he did not hear the earlier conversations in the hallway, he testified that he was present in the meeting room during the entire period.