+NOTICE: This
opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes
of
Trim Corporation of
March 26, 2007
DECISION AND ORDER
By Chairman Battista and Members Liebman
and Walsh
On June 30, 2006, Administrative Law Judge Arthur J. Amchan issued the attached decision.1 The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set forth in full below.3
The judge concluded, among other things, that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by withdrawing recognition from the
In support of the allegation that the Respondent unlawfully
withdrew recognition from the Union, the General Counsel presented evidence
demonstrating that the
On June 28, two of the three unit employees each gave the Respondent a one-sentence note stating that they no longer desired union representation. Upon receipt of the notes, the Respondent withdrew recognition.
In determining whether an untimely charge relates back to
an earlier charge for 10(b) purposes, the Board applies the three-part “closely
related” test set forth in Redd-I, Inc.,
290 NLRB 1115, 1118 (1988). Under Redd-I, the Board considers: (1) whether
the otherwise untimely allegations of the amended charge involve the same legal
theory as the allegations in the timely charge; (2) whether the otherwise
untimely allegations of the amended charge arise from the same factual
situation or sequences of events as the allegations in the timely charge; and
(3) whether a respondent would raise the same or similar defenses to both the
untimely and timely charge allegations.
Applying the Redd-I
factors here, we find that the 8(a)(1) allegation is closely related to the
timely alleged 8(a)(5) violation. First,
both allegations involve the same legal theory and arise out of the same
sequence of events. The 8(a)(1) allegation
is based on the premise that the Respondent coerced employees by telling them
that they needed to choose between union representation and their jobs. The 8(a)(5) allegation, in turn, is based on
the premise that those same coercive statements caused a majority of employees
to renounce the
For essentially the same reason, we find that the third Redd-I factor, the existence of common defenses, is satisfied here. The Respondent’s principal defense to the 8(a)(5) allegation was that DiFransisco did not make the allegedly coercive statements. In other words, the Respondent attacked the judge’s credibility resolutions concerning those statements. If that defense had been successful, neither unfair labor practice could have been proved.
Our dissenting colleague contends that the third factor is not satisfied because there are possible defenses to the 8(a)(1) allegation that have little in common with the defenses to the withdrawal of recognition. But the application of the Redd-I factors is not a theoretical exercise: with respect to the third factor in particular, the question is not what defenses are hypothetically available, but “whether a respondent would raise the same or similar defenses to both allegations, and thus whether a respondent would have preserved similar evidence and prepared a similar case in defending against the otherwise untimely allegation[] as it would in defending against the allegation[] in the timely pending charge.” Redd-I, 290 NLRB at 118 (emphasis added). In this case, as just stated, the Respondent’s principal defense was an attack on the credibility of the witness who testified regarding DiFransisco’s statements. Accordingly, we conclude that the third Redd-I factor has been met here.6
For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the judge’s finding that the 8(a)(1) coercion allegation is closely related to the 8(a)(5) withdrawal-of-recognition allegation, and that DiFransisco’s statements violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged.
Finally, and for much the same reasons, we reject our colleague’s assertion that the General Counsel’s failure to allege the 8(a)(1) violation earlier in the proceeding deprived the Respondent of due process. “It is well settled that the Board may find and remedy a violation even in the absence of a specified allegation in the complaint if the issue is closely connected to the subject matter of the complaint and has been fully litigated.” Pergament United Sales, Inc., 296 NLRB 333, 334 (1989) (footnote collecting cases omitted). See also Letter Carriers Local 3825, 333 NLRB 343 fn. 3 (2001). As shown above in our application of the Redd-I test, the 8(a)(1) violation in this case is “closely connected to the subject matter of the complaint,” and the issue of what DiFransisco said at the June 23 meeting was fully litigated.7
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Trim Corporation of America, Inc.,
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing to promptly furnish the
(b) Unlawfully withdrawing recognition from the
(c) Threatening employees with loss of employment if they
do not withdraw the
(d) Implementing changes to the terms and conditions of
employment of bargaining unit employees, including sick days, vacations, bereavement
leave, and health insurance coverage, without first notifying the
(e) Laying off Union Shop Steward Wilfredo Cruz in
violation of the “super-seniority” provision, and the provision requiring 5
days’ notice to the
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Promptly furnish the
(b) Recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the Respondent’s employees in the following appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody it in a signed agreement:
All warehouse and assembly employees employed by the
Respondent at its
(c) Upon request of the
(d) Make whole the unit employees for any losses they suffered as a result of the unlawfully implemented changes in their terms and conditions of employment, including sick days, vacations, bereavement leave, and health insurance coverage.
(e) Make whole Wilfredo Cruz for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from his layoff, in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest to be computed in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
(f) Preserve, and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board or its agent, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount due under the terms of this Order.
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its
(h) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated,
Wilma B. Liebman, Member
![]()
Dennis
P. Walsh,
Member
(seal) National
Labor Relations Board
Chairman Battista, dissenting in part.
I agree that the conduct set forth in the untimely allegation
caused the disaffection from the
The credited testimony establishes that Supervisor Richard
DiFransisco conducted a meeting with three bargaining unit employees in the
facility’s locker room. The meeting
occurred on June 23, 2004. DiFransisco
told the employees that the “union was no longer as strong as it used to be,
[and the employees] had to decide if they were going to work for the company
and to struggle” for themselves. Subsequently, two of the employees,
constituting the majority of the unit, submitted notes to the Respondent
stating that they did not want the
The complaint did not allege the statement to be violative of Section 8(a)(1). There never was a charge alleging such a violation. In fact, the General Counsel made no such contention until the submission of his posthearing brief. The posthearing brief was filed on June 13, 2005. As noted, the events at issue occurred on June 23, 2004. My colleagues say that these events are to be treated as if covered by the 8(a)(5) charge of withdrawal of recognition. I disagree.
The allegation cannot stand unless the factors of Redd-I, Inc., 290 NLRB 1115 (1988), are satisfied. Specifically, the Board must be satisfied that: (1) the allegations involve the same legal theory; (2) the allegations arise from the same factual circumstances or sequence of events; and (3) the respondent would raise similar defenses to the two sets of allegations. 290 NLRB at 1118.
The first factor is not satisfied here. The untimely
8(a)(1) allegation does not involve the same legal theory as the timely 8(a)(5)
allegation. The legal theory of the
8(a)(5) allegation is that the Respondent withdrew recognition from the
My colleagues say that the 8(a)(1) and (5) allegations are closely related because the alleged statements caused the loss of majority, and the loss of majority resulted in the withdrawal of recognition. My colleagues have confused the concept of causality with the Redd-I concept of “same legal theory.” Although there is a causal connection between the alleged statements and the loss of majority, that does not mean that a 8(a)(1) violation based on the statements would have the same legal theory as the alleged 8(a)(5) withdrawal of recognition. As discussed above, the two legal theories are quite different. The fact that certain conduct causes other conduct to be unlawful does not mean that the legal theory as to the one is the same as the legal theory as to the other. For example, it may be that 8(a)(1) statements cause a strike to be an unfair labor practice strike and that the refusal to reinstate the strikers is a 8(a)(3) violation. But it does not follow that the 8(a)(1) violation is based on the same legal theory as the 8(a)(3) violation.
Nor is the third factor satisfied. The defenses to this type of 8(a)(1)
allegation may include: the statement was not made; the statement did not
interfere with, restrain or coerce a Section 7 right; the speaker was not an
agent of the employer; or the statement was corrected by later statements. By contrast, the defense to the 8(a)(5) allegation,
i.e., that the
The majority contends that these 8(a)(1) defenses are merely hypothetical, and that the only possible defense involves the credibility of the witnesses. However, the sad fact is that, in the absence of a timely raised allegation, we do not know what other defenses would have been raised. See generally WGE Federal Credit Union, 346 NLRB No. 87, slip op. at 3 (2006) (finding that third Redd-I factor not met where Board did not know what defenses would have been raised for an untimely (8)(a)(3) discharge allegation.) Thus, under the test of Redd-I, I conclude that the 8(a)(1) allegation went beyond the scope of the charge and is not closely related to any timely filed charges.
Concededly, the second element may be present. The statement caused the disaffection, which led to the loss of majority, which lead to the withdrawal of recognition. However, the satisfaction of one element of Redd-I cannot satisfy the three-prong Redd-I doctrine.
Based on the above, the allegation is barred by Section 10(b).
Finally, not only was there no timely charge, but also there was no complaint allegation. The proper way to proceed is to have a complaint that makes the appropriate allegations, and then the evidence should be heard. Here, the General Counsel did precisely the opposite. Although he knew of the evidence all along, he waited until after the evidence was adduced, and indeed after the close of the hearing, to make his allegation. Such lack of notice deprived the Respondent of due process with respect to the 8(a)(1) allegation. Thus, in addition to the 10(b) point made above, there is a procedural deficiency as well.
I do not imply that the General Counsel intentionally proceeded in this manner in order to deprive the Respondent of the opportunity to rebut the allegation. The intent of the General Counsel in this regard is not relevant. What is relevant is that the failure to timely allege the 8(a)(1) allegation effectively deprived the Respondent of the opportunity to present anything other than a credibility defense to this allegation. Thus, not only was the General Counsel’s mode of operation “not a model of procedure,” as my colleagues acknowledge, but it also deprived the Respondent of due process.
My colleagues assert that the Respondent took the position that the case turned solely on credibility issues concerning the alleged statements, and that the Respondent attacked the credibility of the General Counsel’s witnesses. Even if that is true, it does not satisfy due process concerns as to the 8(a)(1) matter. An 8(a)(1) violation turns not simply on what is said, but on the context of the statement. The Respondent never had an opportunity to defend against an 8(a)(1) allegation because no such allegation was made.
Dated,
Robert J. Battista, Chairman
National
Labor Relations Board
APPENDIX
Notice to Employees
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
We will not
fail to promptly furnish the
We will not unlawfully withdraw recognition from the Union and refuse to bargain with it as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our employees employed in the unit described as follows:
All warehouse and assembly employees employed by us at our
We will not
threaten you with loss of employment if you do not withdraw the
We will not
implement changes to the terms and conditions of employment of our bargaining
unit employees, including sick days, vacations, bereavement leave, and health
insurance coverage, without first notifying the
We will not lay
off employees in violation of the “super-seniority” provision, or the provision
requiring 5 days’ notice to the Union prior to any layoff, of our expired collective-bargaining
agreement with the
We will not in any like or
related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
We will
promptly furnish the
We will recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit described above concerning terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody it in a signed agreement.
We will, on request of the Union, rescind any unilateral changes in the terms and condition of employment of the unit employees, such as loss of sick days, vacation days, bereavement leave, and changes in health insurance that were made after June 28, 2004.
We will make whole all unit employees for any losses they suffered as a result of our unilateral changes in the terms and condition of their employment, such as loss of sick days, vacation days, bereavement leave, and changes in health insurance that were made after June 28, 2004.
We will make Union Shop Steward Wilfredo Cruz whole, with interest, for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from his layoff.
Trim Corporation of America, Inc.
Marcia E. Adams, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Richard M. Howard and Jeffrey Meyer, Esqs. (Kaufman, Schneider & Bianco, LLP),
of
DECISION
Statement of the Case
Arthur J. Amchan,
Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) in a number of respects, including refusing or failing to
respond to information requests and implementing unilateral changes in the
terms and conditions of bargaining unit members. A determination as to whether Trim Corporation
violated the Act in making the changes depends for the most part on the issue
of whether it lawfully withdrew recognition from the
On the entire written record, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel[1] and Respondent I make the following
Findings of Fact
i. jurisdiction
Respondent, Trim Corporation of America, Inc., assembles
and packages Christmas ornaments and decorations at its facility in
ii. alleged unfair labor practices
The
The request for information
In March 2004, Union Business Representative Horace
Anderson visited Respondent’s worksite.
He observed an employee working alongside bargaining unit
employees.
The
On May 5, Respondent replied to this request by counsel, refusing
to supply any of the information unless the
On June 28, 2004, the same day that it withdrew
recognition from the Union, Respondent, through counsel, again responded to the
Analysis
The Board has held that information requested by a union concerning the existence of an alter-ego operation falls into the category of information that is not presumptively relevant. When a union has requested information with respect to matters occurring outside the bargaining unit it represents, the union has the burden to demonstrate that the information sought is relevant to the performance of its duties. This burden is not an exceptionally heavy one. The union must show that it had a reasonable belief that enough facts existed to give rise to its suspicion that an alter ego relationship exists. The Union does not have to establish that the requested information would established the existence of an alter-ego operation, Pence Construction Co., 281 NLRB 322, 324–325 (1986); Bentley-Jost Electric Corp., 283 NLRB 564, 567–568 (1987); Reiss Viking, 312 NLRB 622, 625–626 (1993).
The
Respondent argues that the
The fact that Respondent provided the
Moreover, the provision of relevant requested information
the same day that Respondent withdrew recognition of the
Withdrawal of Recognition and Unilateral Changes
In the spring of 2004 only three bargaining unit employees
worked for Respondent, Wilfredo Cruz, who was the
Cruz, testified with the assistance of an interpreter, although he has some facility to speak and write in English. Yulson and Amos testified in English. Cruz testified that:
We sat down in the changing room—the locker room. Richard DiFransisco told the three of us the
At that point is that he put this book on the table and
told us “Here the
Robert Yulson confirmed that DiFransisco called the three bargaining unit employees into a meeting in the locker room on June 23. Yulson’s testimony about this meeting is as follows:
Q. Could you tell me what transpired at that meeting?
A. Richie D. called us in and says that “Under orders of management I’m not going to get involved in negotiations for this contract year.” And then he walked out, just let us know that he had nothing to do with it.
Q. Was there any discussion with Mr. DiFransisco at that meeting or any other time about whether you should or should not withdraw—
A. No, there was not.
Q.—your recognition? [Tr. 91.}
In an apparent effort to contradict Cruz’ testimony, Yulson testified that he did not know where Respondent kept copies of its employee handbook and that he did not receive one from Trim until June 28, after he handed Stanley Pawigon a letter indicating that he no longer desired to be represented by the Union.
Matthew Amos also testified that he was dissatisfied with
the representation he was receiving from Local 2179 and afterwards testified
about the June 23 meeting. Amos said he
was dissatisfied with the
Q. (by Respondent’s counsel): so what did you do about the dissatisfaction that you felt?
A. Well, I spoke to Mr. Richie DiFransisco and he told me that he wasn’t involved in negotiations this year and he told me Stanley and the lawyers were handling negotiations.
Q. Now, you heard testimony earlier today about a meeting
in a locker room with Mr. DiFransisco, Mr. Cruz, Mr. Yulson and yourself and
that Mr. DiFransisco spoke about whether you should remain in the
A. I was in a meeting with Richard
DiFransisco, Bob Yulson and Wilfredo Cruz.
Q. In 2004, has Mr.
DiFransisco—what, if anything, has Mr. DiFransisco said to you about whether or
not you should be in the
Credibility Determination
Before making a credibility determination regarding what occurred at this June 23 meeting, it is worthwhile to examine Wilfredo Cruz’ uncontradicted testimony as to what transpired afterwards. On June 28, DiFransisco called Yulson and Amos into his office. He did not invite Cruz to this meeting. Yulson and Amos were in DiFransisco’s office for about 45 minutes (Tr. 58). There is no evidence in the record as to what was said during this meeting.
On June 28, after their meeting with DiFransisco, both Yulson
and Amos went to the office of company Treasurer/Controller Stanley Pawigon and
handed Pawigon a one sentence note to the effect that they did not want the
Rather, I credit the testimony of Cruz that DiFransisco,
in some manner, indicated to the three employees on June 23 that if they wanted
to continue working at Trim that they would have to do without representation
by the
I would also note that Yulson’s testimony that DiFransisco called the meeting on June 23, simply to tell unit employees that he had no role in collective-bargaining negotiations is also incredible. Yulson and Cruz had previously attended several contract negotiation sessions. DiFransisco did not attend any of these. Thus, there was no need for DiFransisco to inform unit employees that he was not involved in the negotiations, Tr. 65–66. I would also note that Amos did not corroborate Yulson’s testimony as to what was said at the June 23 meeting; indeed, he did not say anything regarding what DiFransisco said at that time.
In finding Cruz credible and Yulson and Amos incredible, I
rely also on the highly unlikely explanation given by Yulson and Amos for the
purportedly independent decisions to quit the
Finally, in discrediting the testimony of Yulson and Amos I am taking into consideration the fact they were pretried by Respondent’s counsel together in an inherently coercive atmosphere, Tr. 102–103. Respondent interviewed both employees at the same time in the presence of Treasurer/Controller Stanley Pawigon. Pursuant to Board’s decision in Johnnie’s Poultry, 146 NLRB 770 (1964), an employer, when interviewing employees in preparation for trial, must communicate to employees the purpose of their questioning, assure the employee that no reprisals will take place, and obtain his or her participation of a voluntary basis. The questioning must occur in a context free from employer hostility to union organization and must itself not be coercive in nature. There is no evidence that Respondent complied with Johnnie’s Poultry in interviewing Yulson and Amos. Indeed, Pawigon’s presence in the interview by itself was unnecessary and inherently coercive. Although the General Counsel has not plead an 8(a)(1) violation in regard to this pretrial interview, it is a contributing factor to my conclusion that the testimony of Yulson and Amos is unreliable.
After Withdrawing
Recognition of the
It is uncontroverted that after June 28, 2004, Respondent unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of employment for bargaining unit members. It reduced their vacation time from 4 weeks to 3, reduced the number of days of sick leave from 8 to 6, changed employees’ health insurance coverage and mourning or bereavement leave was reduced from 5 days to 3. Respondent also eliminated a paid holiday for employees’ birthdays and ceased the practice of giving employees four hours of paid leave to vote.
On December 20, 2004, Respondent laid off Wilfredo Cruz. It recalled him to work on March 31, 2005. Under the expired collective-bargaining agreement, Respondent would have been obligated to give the Union 5 days notice of this lay-off, which it did not do in the case of Cruz. Although Cruz had less seniority than Yulson or Amos, the expired collective-bargaining agreement gave Cruz, the union steward, “super-seniority” with regards to layoff, which Respondent did not honor.
Respondent Violated
Section 8(a)(1) on June 23, 2004
Based on the credible testimony of Wilfredo Cruz, I find that on June 23, 2004, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) in implicitly or explicitly threatening all three unit employee with the termination of their employment unless they renounced representation by the Union, Frazier Industrial Co., 328 NLRB 717, 726 (1999).
Although the General Counsel did not allege such a
violation until he filed his posttrial brief, I conclude that Respondent is not
being denied due process in finding that Trim Corporation, by Richard
DiFransisco, violated Section 8(a)(1) on June 23. It is sufficiently related to the complaint
allegation alleging an illegal withdrawal of recognition to support the finding
of a violation, The Timken Co., 236
NLRB 757 (1978); Pergament United Sales, 296
NLRB 333, 334–335 (1989). It was also
fully and fairly litigated, Letter
Carriers Local 3825 (Postal Service), 333 NLRB 343 fn. 2 (2001). After Wilfredo Cruz testified about what was
said by Supervisor DiFransisco at the June 23 meeting, Respondent elicited
testimony from employees Yulson and Amos to contradict him. Respondent attempted through their testimony
to establish that Yulson and Amos’ withdrawal of the
Respondent Violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by Withdrawing its Recognition of the
An employer may not rely on decertification petitions or letters that are tainted by its coercive conduct to justify withdrawal of recognition from an incumbent union, Smoke House Restaurant, 347 NLRB No. 16 (2006); Williams Enterprises, 312 NLRB 937 (1993). The withdrawal notices herein were tainted by DiFransisco’s coercive remarks on June 23, and what I infer he said to Yulson and Amos behind closed doors on June 28.
The
Since Respondent’s Withdrawal
of Recognition Violates the Act, So Do All of its Unilateral Changes in the Terms
and Conditions of Unit Members’ Employment
Respondent was in the midst of negotiating a new or extension
of its collective-bargaining agreement with the
When negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement with
the authorized representative of its employees, an employer is obliged pursuant
to Section 8(a)(5) of the Act to maintain the status quo with regard to
mandatory subjects of bargaining, NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); Our Lady
of Lourdes Health Center, 306 NLRB 337 (1992). During negotiations, an employer’s obligation
to refrain from unilateral changes in the wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees extends beyond the duty
to provide notice to the
The layoff of Wilfredo Cruz in December 2004 also violated Section 8(a)(5) in that Respondent undertook the layoff unilaterally without providing the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain and because the super-seniority provisions of the 2001-2004 collective-bargaining agreement survived the April 30, 2004 expiration of that agreement, Bethlehem Steel Co., 136 NLRB 1500, 1502 (1962); Frankline, Inc., 287 NLRB 263 (1987).
Conclusions of Law
1. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and refusing to furnish the Union, in a timely manner, the information the Union requested on April 27, and May 3, 2004 regarding Respondent’s relationship with Heritage Company.
2. On June 23,
2004, Respondent, by Richard DiFransisco, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
in threatening employees with loss of employment if they did not withdraw the
3. Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by withdrawing recognition from the
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) after June 28, 2004, by making unilateral changes to the terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees. These illegal changes included a reduction in the number of sick days, a reduction in the number of vacation days, a reduction in the number of bereavement days, and a change in unit members’ health insurance coverage.
5. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by laying off Union Shop Steward Wilfredo Cruz on December 20, 2004, in violation of the “super-seniority” provision of the parties’ expired collective-bargaining agreement and in violation of the provision in that agreement which required 5 days notice to the Union prior to any layoff.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent having illegally laid off Wilfredo Cruz on December 20, 2004, must make Wilfredo Cruz whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from the date of his layoff to the date his reinstatement, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended[4]
ORDER
The Respondent, Trim Corporation of America, Inc.,
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with UAW Local 2719
by withdrawing recognition from the Union and by refusing and failing to
provide the
(b) Making
unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of its bargaining unit employees
until it has either successfully negotiated a collective-bargaining agreement
with the
(c) Threatening employees with any adverse consequences
for their support for the
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize and on request bargain collectively with the
(b) Provide a timely response to all relevant information
requests from the
(c) Rescind and make bargaining unit employees whole for any unilateral changes made in their terms and conditions of employment since June 28, 2004.
(d) Make Wilfredo Cruz whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of his illegal layoff on December 20, 2004.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated,
APPENDIX
Notice To Employees
Posted By Order Of The
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
We will not restrain, interfere, or coerce you to abandon your representation by UAW Local 2179 or any other union.
We will not
refuse or fail to provide relevant information requested by the
We will not withdraw recognition from UAW Local 2179 on the basis of coercion or intimidation by any of our supervisors or agents.
We will not make
any changes in the terms and conditions of your employment during negotiations
for a collective-bargaining agreement prior to either reaching an agreement
with the
We will not in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
We will, on request, bargain with the UAW Local 2179 and put in writing and sign any agreement reached on terms and conditions of employment for our employees in the bargaining unit consisting of warehouse and assembly employees.
We will provide
the
We will make Wilfredo Cruz whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from his layoff of December 20, 2004, less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
We will rescind and make all unit employees whole for any unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of their employment, such as loss of sick days, vacation days, changes in health insurance, etc., that were made after June 28, 2004.
Trim Corporation
of America, Inc.
1 Administrative Law Judge Howard Edelman conducted the hearing in this case on May 3, 2005, and issued a decision on September 7, 2005. On May 31, 2006, the Board remanded the case for reassignment to a different administrative law judge to review the record and issue a new decision. 347 NLRB No. 24 (2006).
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. We note in this regard that because Judge Amchan was assigned to the case after the close of the hearing, his credibility resolutions were not based on the witnesses’ demeanor. In these circumstances, the choice between conflicting testimony rests on the weight of the evidence, established or admitted facts, inherent probabilities, and reasonable inferences drawn from the record as a whole. Lignotock Corp., 298 NLRB 209 fn. 1 (1990), citing El Rancho Market, 235 NLRB 468, 470 (1978), enfd. 603 F.2d 223 (1979). Based on our review of these factors, we adopt the judge’s credibility findings.
3 We shall modify the judge’s recommended
Order to include the Board’s standard remedial language for the violations
found. Finally, we shall substitute a
new notice to employees to conform to the language set forth in the Order.
4 All dates hereafter are in 2004 unless
stated otherwise.
5 The judge credited the testimony of employee Wilfredo Cruz, who used “and” instead of “or” in the quoted statement. Cruz speaks English as a second language and testified through an interpreter. We are satisfied, based on our review of the record, that Cruz said or meant to say “or.”
6
In
any event, the defenses suggested by our colleague do not help his cause. Our colleague states that the Respondent
“may” have also asserted, in response to the 8(a)(1) allegation, that (a) DiFransisco’s
statements did not interfere with, restrain, or coerce a Sec. 7 right; (b)
DiFransisco was not an agent of the employer; or (c) DiFransisco’s statements
were corrected by later statements. But
any of those defenses, if supported by the facts, would have disproved the
General Counsel’s central contention, namely that the
7 Our colleague’s loaded assertion—that the
General Counsel “knew of the evidence all along” but waited until after the
hearing closed to allege the Sec. 8(a)(1)—does not advance the discussion. Both parties were well aware, at all material
times, that the withdrawal-of-recognition allegation would turn on the
credibility resolutions concerning what DiFransisco actually said on June
23. Indeed, in his opening statement at
the hearing, counsel for the Respondent stated that “[t]his case apparently
will come down to a credibility issue between Mr. Cruz [whose testimony about
the meeting was ultimately credited, and] Mr. Yulson and Mr. Amos [whose
contrary testimony was rejected].” Counsel
for the Respondent, who had already cross-examined Cruz in an effort to damage
his credibility, then proceeded to adduce testimony from both Yulson and Amos
about the June 23 meeting. In other
words, counsel for the General Counsel’s posthearing contention that the Respondent
also violated Sec. 8(a)(1) did not take the Respondent by surprise in any
meaningful way.
Although the General Counsel’s intent in proceeding as he did is
irrelevant, it seems likely to us that both parties were focused, initially, on
the withdrawal of recognition and subsequent unilateral changes, which carried
more meaningful remedial consequences than the 8(a)(1) violation, and that the
General Counsel argued the 8(a)(1) only as an afterthought. In any event, we agree with our dissenting
colleague that counsel for the General Counsel’s mode of operation was not a
model of procedure, but we utterly reject his conclusion that the Respondent
was thereby deprived of due process.
8 If this Order is enforced by a
judgment of a
1 I recognize that the prosecutorial response to the defense of loss of majority would include the assertion that the loss of majority was tainted by the alleged 8(a)(1) statement. But this is not the same as saying that the defense to the Sec. 8(a)(5) is the same as the defense to the alleged 8(a)(1) statement.
[1] Page 7 is missing from the copy of the General Counsel’s posttrial brief that is in my possession.
[2] Rendered “was” in the transcript.
[3] Cruz’ testimony is confusing at points, due, I suspect, to an incomplete mastery of the English language. However, I believe his testimony is in essence accurate. As to his conversations with company officials on June 29 and July 12, I glean that Cruz did not understand that Trim would no longer pay for the union’s health insurance plan until specifically told so on July 12.
[4] If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
[5] If
this Order is enforced by a judgment of a