NOTICE: This
opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes
of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested
to notify the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
May 23, 2007
DECISION AND ORDER
By Chairman Battista and Members Liebman
and Walsh
On December 14, 2005, Administrative Law Judge Richard A.
Scully issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions, a supporting brief, and a reply brief responding
to the General Counsel’s and Charging Party’s answering briefs. The General Counsel filed exceptions, a
supporting brief, and an answering brief in opposition to the Respondent’s
exceptions. The
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,[1] and conclusions[2] as modified below and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.[3]
As explained below, we agree with the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act when it failed to abide by the Tentative Agreement negotiated on January 6, 2005, including the agreement’s strike settlement terms. We reject the dissent’s view that the Respondent’s board of directors’ refusal to ratify the agreement, which was based on an impermissible reason, excused the Respondent from complying with the Tentative Agreement. We further conclude that, in any event, the strike settlement provision was not contingent on ratification by the Respondent’s board of directors.
Background
The Respondent operates an after-hours emergency
veterinary hospital in
The parties began contract negotiations in November
2004. Near the end of December, the
Respondent, at the
On January 6, 2005,[4]
the parties met with a Federal mediator and reached a Tentative Agreement,
which contained terms and conditions of employment. The Tentative Agreement also provided that
the striking employees were to return to work on their former shifts commencing
on January 7.[5]
During the mediation sessions that led
to the Tentative Agreement, the Union told the mediator that if the Respondent
agreed to a union-security clause (which it later did), the
As described by the judge, the
On January 19, the Respondent’s Board of Directors voted
to reject the Tentative Agreement based on Ueberroth’s description of the
Discussion
1. Violations
“Federal labor policy encourages the formation of collective-bargaining
agreements,” and “[i]t is the Board’s obligation to ‘protect the process by
which employers and unions may reach agreements with respect to terms and
conditions of employment.’” American Protective Services, 319 NLRB
902, 904 (1995) (footnote omitted). Like
the judge, we find that the Respondent’s repudiation of the Tentative Agreement
violated the Act.[6] As stated above, employee ratification was not
a condition precedent to the formation of a contract. Therefore, the Respondent was not free to
seize on the
Moreover, even if such ratification were a condition
precedent, Board law is clear that the Respondent does not have standing to challenge
the
We also find that the Respondent’s bad faith was independently demonstrated by the totality of its conduct in response to the January 6 employee ratification. Specifically, the Respondent illegitimately tried to intrude into the Union’s internal process of ratification; it seized upon the asserted flaws in the ratification process—some of which resulted from the Respondent’s own refusal to let employees who were working on January 6 attend the ratification meeting—as a justification for refusing to allow the striking employees to return to work as agreed; it failed to notify the Union of its dissatisfaction until the Union called the Respondent to ask why the employees had been told not to return to work; it unlawfully locked out the striking employees and mischaracterized the lockout as a continuation of the strike; and it unlawfully demanded that some striking employees promise to waive certain Section 7 protections before it permitted them to return to work.
We further conclude that the Tentative Agreement would have gone into effect but for the Respondent’s board of directors’ improper challenge of the union ratification process. Certainly, the Board has held that parties negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement may make the final agreement contingent upon the ratification of their principals. See American Protective Services, supra, 319 NLRB at 905. However, the principals may not refuse to ratify for an improper reason. Here, the board of directors lacked good cause to refuse to ratify the Tentative Agreement. Thus, there is ample evidence that the refusal was in bad faith and the culmination of an unlawful course of conduct. Consequently, we reject the Respondent’s contention that its board of directors’ refusal to ratify the contract privileged the Respondent’s refusal to implement the contract’s terms. See Teamsters Local 287 (Granite Rock Co.), 347 NLRB No. 32, slip op. at 7 (2006) (finding unlawful delay in ratification and observing that “a party to a contract cannot take advantage of his own act or omission to escape contract liability”).
2. Remedy
In the recent Granite Rock Co. decision, supra, we concluded that the proper remedy for the respondent union’s unlawful delay in submitting the parties’ contract for an employee ratification vote was retroactive application of the contract to the date on which, but for the union’s unlawful conduct, it would have gone into effect. See also TNT Skypack, Inc., supra, 328 NLRB at 469–470 (applying contract retroactively as remedy for employer’s withdrawal from tentative agreements made in negotiations).
As we stated in Granite Rock, the Board’s “remedy should restore the status that would have obtained if Respondent had committed no unfair labor practice . . . [and] any uncertainty and ambiguity regarding the status that would have obtained without the unlawful conduct must be resolved against the Respondent, the wrongdoer who is responsible for the existence of the uncertainty and ambiguity.” 347 NLRB No. 32, slip op. at 1.
Applying the Board’s “broad discretion to fashion ‘a just
remedy’ to fit the circumstances of each case it confronts,” id., we find, as
we did in Granite Rock, that the “just
remedy” in this case is to “restore the status that would have obtained if
Respondent had committed no unfair labor practice.” Granite
Rock, supra, slip op. at 1. Thus, we
conclude that the Respondent is bound by the Tentative Agreement, as it would
have been in the absence of Ueberroth’s unlawful repudiation and the board of directors’
refusal to ratify the Tentative Agreement, both of which were based on invalid
objections to the
Furthermore, the strike settlement provision was not subject to the requirement that the board of directors ratify the agreement. By its terms (as corrected by agreement of the parties), this provision anticipated that striking employees would return to work on their regular shifts on January 7—a full 12 days before the board of directors met to vote on ratification. Clearly, this demonstrates that the Respondent anticipated that striking employees would return to work without the board of directors having ratified the agreement, and indeed, the employees sought to do so. Nor does the strike settlement provision, expressly or by implication, indicate that a subsequent rejection of the agreement by the board of directors would, post hoc, alter the Respondent’s expectations or obligations regarding the employees’ prior return to work. Because the strike settlement provision was not contingent on the board of directors’ ratification of the Tentative Agreement, the Board’s ultimate vote not to ratify the agreement does not negate the strike settlement provision.
3. Response to Dissent
We now respond to the two contentions of the dissent, regarding the Respondent’s violations. First, we reject the dissent’s argument that because the condition of ratification by the board of directors was not met, the Tentative Agreement cannot bind the Respondent.[8] The dissent’s view is inconsistent with the customary practice of collective bargaining and the Act.
The Tentative Agreement reflected the parties’ complete
understanding as to the substantive terms of a collective-bargaining agreement
and the procedural steps by which a contract would be finalized, including
ratification by the Respondent’s board of directors. The Tentative Agreement unquestionably
reflects an exchange of promises. For
its part, the
Although no contract would have been formed had the board of directors refused to approve the Tentative Agreement for a permissible reason, the Board instead rejected the agreement for an impermissible reason under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Thus, the board of directors’ failure to approve the Tentative Agreement did not prevent the formation of a binding contract. Put somewhat differently, we interpret the Tentative Agreement, as a matter of law, to include both the Respondent’s promise that it would present the Agreement to its board of directors and the promise that the Board would act lawfully in accepting or rejecting the Agreement.
In any event, we cannot accept the potential consequences of the dissent’s analysis, which would permit one bargaining party, acting unilaterally and in bad faith, to frustrate a contractual condition. The adoption of such a theory would severely undermine the Act’s goal of promoting labor peace and stability in bargaining relationships. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has observed, “[i]t is very commonplace in the United States for bargaining parties to reach tentative agreements subject to ratification,” and “[o]ften, this tradition facilitates bargaining. . . .” Teamsters Local No. 175 v. NLRB, 788 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (rejecting argument that tentative agreement subject to ratification amounts to bargaining impasse, privileging employer’s unilateral change in employment terms). By treating the Tentative Agreement here as imposing no obligations on the parties, the dissent errs.
Second, the dissent also disagrees with our consideration
of the totality of the Respondent’s conduct in finding bad faith. Nevertheless, the complaint alleges that the
Respondent failed and refused to bargain with the
Conclusion
Accordingly, we agree with the judge that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to abide by the January 6 Tentative Agreement, including its strike settlement terms, and we order the Respondent to abide by the terms of the Tentative Agreement.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended
Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the
Respondent,
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a) and reletter the following paragraphs accordingly.
“(a) Upon request of the Union, sign and abide by the
terms of the collective-bargaining agreement agreed upon by the Respondent and
the
“(b) Make employees whole, with interest, for any losses suffered as a result of the Respondent’s failure to sign and abide by the collective-bargaining agreement agreed to on January 6, 2005, and as a result of the Respondent’s lockout of its employees in support of an unlawful bargaining position implemented in a discriminatory manner.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the administrative law judge.
Dated,
Wilma B. Liebman, Member
Dennis P. Walsh, Member
(seal) National
Labor Relations Board
Chairman Battista, dissenting in part.
My colleagues conclude that the Respondent unlawfully
repudiated a contract with the
Concededly, the board of directors’ reason for nonapproval was the belief that the employee ratification vote was flawed. In addition, I recognize Board law which teaches that, employee ratification is an internal employee-union matter. Thus, where employee ratification is a condition precedent for a contract, the employer cannot challenge the contract on the basis that the vote was assertedly flawed. However, where, as here, the tentative agreement was subject to employer board of director approval, there is no contract because this condition has not been met.
My colleagues contend that “the Respondent’s bad faith was independently demonstrated by the totality of its conduct in response to the January 6 employee ratification.” However, apart from the alleged failure to sign the Tentative Agreement, the complaint does not allege bad-faith bargaining. Further, the Respondent’s basis for nonapproval, i.e., the asserted flaw in the employee ratification vote, was not itself alleged to be unlawful. As noted above, that asserted flaw could not be a reason to disavow a contract. However, that is not to say that the assertion of the flaw is itself unlawful. As noted above there was no contract because the condition of the board of directors’ approval was not met.
Finally, my colleagues assert that there were other acts of bad-faith by the Respondent. However, as noted above, the complaint does not allege bad-faith bargaining.2
The majority also argues that the Respondent unlawfully locked out employees. However, the strike settlement was part of the Tentative Agreement; if there was no contract there was no settlement of the strike. Thus, the Respondent simply returned the parties to the position they were in prior to the Tentative Agreement. Further, even if the Respondent did lock out employees, this would not establish that the Respondent’s bargaining conduct was in bad faith. An employer is privileged to use lockout pressure in a bargaining dispute.3
Dated,
Robert J. Battista, Chairman
National
Labor Relations Board
APPENDIX
Notice To Employees
Posted by Order
of the
National Labor Relations
Board
An Agency of the
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
federal law gives you the right to
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
We
will not refuse to sign a
collective-bargaining agreement, the terms of which have been agreed to with
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 488, AFL–CIO
(the
We
will not refuse to implement and obey the terms of the collective-bargaining
agreement reached with the
We will not lock out our employees in support of an unlawful bargaining position or in a discriminatory manner.
We will not place unlawful conditions on the reinstatement of striking employees or threaten to fire employees if they engage in a strike.
We
will not fail to timely provide relevant information requested by the
We will not in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above.
We
will, upon request of the Union, sign and abide by the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement agreed to on January 6, 2005. In the event that the
We will make our employees whole, with interest, for any losses suffered as a result of our refusal to sign and abide by the collective-bargaining agreement agreed to on January 6, 2005, and as a result of our lockout of our employees in support of an unlawful bargaining position implemented in a discriminatory manner.
Henry R. Protas, Esq., for the General Counsel.
David M. Spitko, Esq. and Sean M. Hart, Esq., of
Lance Geren, Esq., of
DECISION
Statement of the Case
Richard A. Scully, Administrative Law Judge. Upon charges filed by American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 488, AFL–CIO (the Union), the acting Regional Director for Region 4, National Labor Relations Board (the Board), issued a consolidated complaint on April 21, 2005, alleging that the Respondent, Valley Central Emergency Veterinary Hospital, had committed certain violations of Section 8(a)(5), (3), and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, (the Act).1 The Respondent filed a timely answer denying that it had committed any violations of the Act.
A hearing was held in
Findings of Fact
i.
jurisdiction
The Respondent is a
ii. alleged
unfair labor practices
The complaint alleges that after reaching complete agreement with the Union on the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, the Respondent withdrew from that agreement and refused to execute and abide by the terms of the agreement in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. It also alleges that after withdrawing from the agreement, which provided for striking employees to return to work on January 7, 2005, it locked out those employees in a discriminatory manner in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). During the hearing, counsel for the General Counsel amended the complaint to allege that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by telling striking employees that their reinstatement was conditioned on their refraining from engaging in activity protected by the Act
A. Alleged Unlawful Withdrawal from Tentative Contract Agreement
The Respondent operates a veterinary hospital offering
emergency and critical care for animals on weeknights, weekends, and
holidays. Following an election
conducted by the Board on April 28, 2004, the
All full time and regular part time veterinary technicians, receptionists, and kennel employees employed at the facility, excluding all other employees, managers, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
The parties began contract negotiations on November 17,
2004, in a conference room at the Respondent’s facility. The Respondent was represented by Hospital
Administrator Bart Ueberroth, Brenda Klatz, and attorney David Spitko. The
The next negotiating session was on December 8 with the same representatives at the same place. About 8 employees were also in attendance. The Respondent presented its second contract proposal. No agreement was reached.
On December 20, they met again at the facility and about 12 employees were in attendance. At this session, they discussed the third contract proposal submitted by the Respondent and, after the Union asked for the Respondent’s best offer, the parties agreed on a 3-year contract with a 3 percent wage increase in each year and the Respondent continuing to pay 100 percent of the cost of individual employee’s health insurance. Unresolved were issues involving union security, merit raises, and seniority.
When the session ended, the
Another negotiating session was held on January 6, 2005,2 at the Ramada Inn in
Following execution of the agreement, the
Union attorney Goldstein explained the terms of the agreement to those at the meeting and advised that he considered it in their best interests to accept this 1-year agreement and try to make improvements the next time. Sutton told them that she recommended acceptance because half of the work force had already returned to work and she did not believe the Employer would do anything more. The employees at the meeting discussed their options and, while some expressed unhappiness with the contract, no one suggested that it be rejected. There was no formal vote or show of hands at the meeting, but no opposition was raised when Sutton proposed that it be accepted. She told those who were scheduled to work the following evening to report for duty as provided in the agreement.
During the following day, Ueberroth telephoned striking employees who were scheduled to work that evening and told them not to come to work. The employees contacted Sutton who in turn called Ueberroth. He put the Respondent’s attorney Spitko on the phone. Spitko read a letter stating that the Respondent was withdrawing the offer which led to the “tentative agreement” reached on January 6 because it understood that the Union had conducted a ratification vote which it considered “at least, improper, untruthful and disingenuous, and at most unlawful.” It also stated that striking employees were not to return to work until further notice.
On January 13, Spitko sent Goldstein a letter confirming
that the Respondent had withdrawn the offer which led to the “tentative
agreement” reached on January 6. The
letter stated that the agreement was contingent upon ratification by unit employees
and the Respondent’s board of directors.
It outlined a number of complaints about the Union’s actions on the
night of January 6, as reported to it by unit employees, and asserted that this
made the ratification vote conducted by the
On January 19, at a meeting of the Respondent’s board of directors, Ueberroth described the events of January 6, as they had been reported to him, and recommended that it not ratify the agreement. The board of directors refused to ratify by unanimous vote.
Analysis and Conclusions
It is not disputed that the parties reached an agreement
on the evening of January 6 or that the Respondent withdrew from that agreement
because it felt that the agreement had not been properly ratified by unit
employees. However, in order for it to
have lawfully done so, it must be established that employee ratification was a
condition precedent to a binding contract.
Board law is clear that “employee ratification is an internal union
procedure; unless the parties expressly make ratification a condition precedent
to reaching a contract, it is not obligatory.”
Personal Optics, 342 NLRB 958,
962 (2004); Mine Workers (Arch of
The Respondent contends that there was such an agreed-upon condition precedent. It points to the facts that at the first negotiating session on November 17 Union Attorney Goldstein stated that both sides would take any agreement back for ratification and that, during the January 6 negotiations, Goldstein told the mediator that, if the Respondent agreed to a maintenance of membership clause, the Union would recommend the agreement to the employees for ratification. Neither fact taken alone or together establishes a bilateral agreement that ratification by unit employees was a condition precedent to the contract taking effect. There is no evidence that the Respondent’s representatives responded to Goldstein’s statements or that there was any discussion about them during the negotiations. Apart from this, there is nothing in the record to establish that the parties had an express agreement concerning the need for ratification by unit employees. As the Board noted in Personal Optics, “even if the Union’s prior statements arguably may have led the Respondent to believe that the Union would conduct a vote of the bargaining unit, there was never any such agreement between the parties.” 342 NLRB 958 at fn. 2. That is the case here. Moreover, the written agreement signed by the parties’ representatives on January 6 contains no provision requiring employee ratification.3
The Respondent also contends that the
Next, the Respondent contends that ratification by its board of directors was a condition precedent to the tentative agreement taking effect and that, since its board rejected the agreement, it never became a binding contract. Each of the Respondent’s written contract proposals contained the following language:
During the negotiations, the Respondent reserves the right
to add to, delete from, modify, alter, amend or withdraw any portion of this
proposal. The resolution of a complete
agreement shall be contingent upon an agreement on all open issues and not any
one issue. Any issue, sentence, clause
or Section previously proposed by the
However, the Respondent withdrew from the tentative agreement
on January 7, well before its board of directors voted on ratification.4
Moreover, it did so not because of the content of the agreement, a
significant portion of which was based on regressive proposals it had made as a
result of its having successfully weathered the strike, but because of its
objections to what it considered the
In
B. Alleged Failure to Abide by Contract
Provision
Concerning Reinstatement
The agreement reached by the parties on January 6 contained a strike settlement provision that striking employees would return to work on their former shifts commencing on the following day at 5 p.m.5 After the agreement was signed at the Ramada Inn, Sutton informed the employees that if they were scheduled to work that day they should report as scheduled. After the Respondent decided to withdraw from the agreement, Ueberroth called striking employees and informed them that they should not return to work until further notice. By refusing to permit striking employees to return to work as scheduled, the Respondent failed to implement and abide by the strike settlement term of the agreement in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1). Tri-County Produce Co., 300 NLRB 974, 987 (1990).
C. Alleged Lockout of Striking Employees
The complaint alleges that when the Respondent refused to
permit striking employees to return to work on January 7 and thereafter, it
engaged in an unlawful lockout. On the
night of January 6, the
“A lockout occurs
when an employer, ‘for tactical reasons
. . . refuses to utilize [its] employees
for the performance of available work.’”
Union Terminal Warehouse, 286
NLRB 851, 859 (1987). That is what the
Respondent did on January 7 when it refused to permit striking employees to
return to work.6 Although the Respondent claims that it was
returning to the status quo, the strike was over on January 6 when the parties
signed the tentative agreement which provided for the employees to return to
work the following day. The employer’s
assertion that the employees remained on strike does not make it so and there
is no evidence that the
To be lawful, a lockout must be used solely to bring economic
pressure in support of a “legitimate bargaining position,” American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965), and
must be conducted in a nondiscriminatory manner. Allen
Storage & Moving
D. The 8(a)(1) Allegations
At the hearing, counsel for the General Counsel amended the complaint to allege that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by placing unlawful conditions on the reinstatement of striking employees and by threatening to fire returning striking employees if they engaged in a future work stoppage. Jody Smith credibly testified that after she received a message from Ueberroth telling her not to return to work on January 7, she heard nothing from the Respondent until May 4. On that date, she called Ueberroth and asked why she had not been notified to return to work. Ueberroth told Smith that the Respondent considered her to still be on strike and that in order to come back she would have to cross the picket line and make an unconditional offer to return. She asked what he meant and Ueberroth said that she could come back “without firing people up” and that she “absolutely” could not strike. Smith responded that there was no longer any reason to strike and that she could do what he asked.
As discussed above, Jennifer Powell credibly testified
that Ueberroth called her on January 7 and told her not to report for work
until further notice. After calling
Ueberroth she was eventually reinstated in early February. Either when they spoke on the phone or the
day she returned to work, Ueberroth told Powell that if she went on strike she
would be terminated and that employees were not to raise issues concerning the
Employee Ronita Lawrence credibly testified that, when she spoke to Ueberroth about reinstatement in early February, he told her that she could not discuss the Union with employees who didn’t want to talk about it and that, if she were to strike, it would be grounds for immediate termination.
I credit the detailed and consistent testimony of Smith,
Powell, and
I find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by
conditioning the reinstatement of striking employees on their agreeing to
abandon union activity and not to engage in a future strike. A.P.
Painting & Improvements, Inc. 339 NLRB 1206, 1207 (2003);
E. Alleged Failure to Provide Information
Requested by
the
By letter dated March 29, 2005, the
There does not appear to be any dispute that the requested
information is relevant to the
Conclusions of Law
1. The Respondent,
2. The
3. The Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by repudiating and refusing to
execute the agreement reached with the
4. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing, since January 7, 2005, to implement the terms of the agreement reached with the Union on January 6, 2005.
5. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by on January 7, 2005, locking out employees in support of an unlawful bargaining position.
6. The Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to provide in a timely
manner relevant information requested by the
7. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by on January 7, 2005, locking out employees on a discriminatory basis and by requiring locked out employees to make an unconditional offer to return to work.
8. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by telling returning strikers that they could not engage in activities in support of the Union while at work and would be fired if they engaged in a strike.
9. The foregoing unfair labor practices constitute unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The recommended order will require that the Respondent make whole employees who suffered any loss of wages or benefits as a result of its refusal to sign and abide by the terms of the agreement reached with the Union on January 6, 2005, plus interest, as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended8
ORDER
The Respondent,
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to
execute the agreement reached with the
(b) Refusing to
implement and abide by the terms of the agreement reached with the
(c) Locking out employees in support of an unlawful bargaining position or in a discriminatory manner.
(d) Placing unlawful conditions on the reinstatement of striking employees and threatening to fire returning striking employees if they engage in a strike.
(e) Failing to
timely provide relevant information requested by the
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Upon request of the Union, sign and abide by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement agreed upon by the Respondent and the Union on January 6, 2005, and make employees whole, with interest, for any loss of wages or benefits suffered as a result of the Respondent’s failure to sign and abide by that agreement, and if no such request is made by the Union, bargain, upon request, with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and embody any understanding reached in a signed agreement.
(b) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(c) Within 14 days
after service by the Region, post at its facility in
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated,
APPENDIX
Notice To
Employees
Posted
by Order of the
National
Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the
The National Labor Relations
Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post
and obey this notice.
federal law gives you
the right to
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
We will not refuse to sign a collective-bargaining agreement, the terms of which have been agreed to with American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 488, AFL–CIO.
We will not
refuse to implement and abide by the terms of the collective-bargaining
agreement reached with the
We will not lock out our employees in support of an unlawful bargaining position or in a discriminatory manner.
We will not place unlawful conditions on the reinstatement of striking employees or threaten to fire employees if they engage in a strike.
We will not
fail to timely provide relevant information requested by the
We will not in any like or related manner restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
We will,
upon request of the
We will make our employees whole for any losses suffered as a result of our refusal to sign the collective-bargaining agreement agreed to on January 6, 2005, plus interest.